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ABSTRACT
Curriculum theory is a call to understanding. My call as a curriculum 
theorist is to attempt to understand work around the Holocaust. This study 
examines the ways in which the Holocaust gets represented in texts written by 
historians as well as texts written by novelists. I argue that memory is the larger 
category under which history is subsumed; history is the systematization of 
memory. Although historians draw on archives and are constrained by their 
discipline, nevertheless they operate out of their own memories. Psychological 
transference, repression, denial, projection and reversal shape historians’ 
memories and therefore determine, to a certain extent, what gets represented in 
the first place. Novels around historical events are also forms of memory. Like 
the craft of doing history, novel writing is a kind of systematization of memory. 
Writers organize, select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not reducible to 
memory; since writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are constrained 
by the narrative form. For both historians and novelists, personal memories 
function out of sites of psychological transference, repression, denial, projection 
and reversal and may therefore determine the ways in which writers construct 
the past. When educators attempt to grapple with competing memories and 
representations of the Holocaust, they might do so under what I call the sign of a 
dystopic curriculum. A dystopic curriculum is one that brings into awareness the 
ways in which transference relations with texts influence what it is that historians 
and novelists write about, as well as influence researchers’ responses to what I 
call difficult memory texts such as the Holocaust. Understanding the Holocaust 
is therefore ambivalent and must remain open to tentative interpretations.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
CURRRICULUM THEORY AND THE HOLOCAUST
So the curriculum that we study is the presence of 
an absence. Present is the curriculum, the course of 
study, the current compliance, general education.. . .
Present is the window. Absent is the ground from 
which these figures are drawn, negation and 
aspiration. Absent is the laugh that rises from the belly, 
the whimper, the song. Supressed is the body count,
Auschwitz. (Grumet, 1988, xiii)
Madeleine Grumet tells us that curriculum is the presence of an absence. 
The absence of Auschwitz, the silence around this dreadful memory in my own 
educative experience, is like a gaping hole in the heart of memory. Silence 
around the Holocaust in my own education has not, however, silenced memory. 
In fact, silence has allowed this memory to speak to me in haunting ways. It has 
called me out of the site of my unconscious. The repressed has returned. As 
Emmanuel Levinas (1996) might say, the other, or the memory of my ancestors, 
has “summoned" (p. 6) me.
Grumet remarks that “Absent is the ground from which these figures are 
drawn” (1988, xiii). The ground she refers to is that of lived experience, and it is 
lived experience that is absented from school life. Erasing lived experience, 
erasing human subjectivities in school life, endangers students and teachers 
alike because we have no sense of who we are. This absenting erases our 
histories, memories and our situatedness. Repressed human subjectivities and 
continual erasures deaden. William Pinar warns that “Repression of memory 
and history is accompanied by distortions of various kinds, including political, 
social, racial, and psychological distortions” (1991, p. 177). The Holocaust is a 
memory that has been repressed for me. School was not a place in which I 
encountered this memory. Home was not a place that I encountered this
1
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memory either. Hauntings of this memory have emerged because of this
silence. The date was November, 1937. This date marks my mother’s birth.
Exactly one year later, November, 1938, marks the date of Kristallnacht. Efraim
Sicher comments that,
The breaking of crystal obscures any clear 
understanding of the meaning of what has happened, 
so that meaning itself is not easily recoverable. The 
breaking of crystal might therefore be a fit metaphor 
for a continuous crisis in the post-Holocaust generation.
(1998, p. 3)
Kristallnacht signifies a turning point in Jewish and German history. Isaiah 
Trunk (1979) reminds us that it was immediately after this event that Jews 
began to realize that their lives were in danger. Kristallnacht marks the event 
after which many Jews committed suicide.
The date of my mother's birth, November 1937, is significant for me. It 
situates my family historically at the heart of this crisis. But because my parents 
and grandparents are American, they were saved from this nightmare. My 
maternal great grandparents had the foresight to leave Austria at the turn of the 
century. My paternal great grandparents had the wisdom to leave Russia. But 
distant relatives stayed in Europe. However, tracing these distant relatives is 
impossible. With the exception of my maternal grandmother, all of my 
grandparents are dead.
I ask my grandmother to tell me what she remembers about my family. I 
ask her to tell me about my great grandparents. Why did they leave Europe, I 
ask. What about the others who stayed behind? She says she does not know. 
Tell me about my great grandparents, I say to her. She says my great 
grandmother spoke in broken English, she spoke mostly Yiddish. My great 
grandfather was president of a synagogue in Pittsburgh. Both of my
2
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grandfathers were religious men. For women, religious ritual, except in the 
home, was not thought to be important. This is the extent of the oral history my 
grandmother passes down to me. This is all I know about my people.
My parents are secular Jews. I grew up knowing little of my own religious
tradition. Talking about the Holocaust is taboo in my family. No one breathes a
word about it. My older sister tells me that she cannot bare it, she cannot read
anything about the Holocaust, it is just too depressing and too awful. And so the
silence continues into the third generation after Auschwitz. Esther Rashkin,
drawing on the work of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, who are Holocaust
survivors and psychoanalysts, comments that family silences and family secrets
become “suspended within the adult [and are]. .. transmitted silently to the child
in "undigested’’ form and lodge within his or her mental topography as an
unmarked tomb" (Rashkin, 1992, p. 28). “What returns to haunt is the ‘unsaid’
and ‘unsayable’ of an other” (Rashkin, 1992, p. 28). The memory of Auschwitz,
that silent absent presence about which Madeleine Grumet speaks, has
become lodged in my psyche. It is the profound silence, both educative and
familial, that has marked me. The silence has called me toward the other,
toward the memory of the other and toward the other of memory. Emmanuel
Levinas says,
This tie to the Other (autrui) which does not reduce 
itself to the representation of the Other (autrui) but 
rather to his invocation, where invocation is not 
preceded by comprehension, we call religion. The 
essence of discourse is prayer. (1996, p. 7)
The invocation I hear, the call of the other of memory, the call of my ancestors,
demands a response. And this response will be a prayerful one. Like Levinas,
James Macdonald (1995) suggests that “theory is a prayerful act.” Thus, I offer
3
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up this study as a prayerful act, as a response to the call of my ancestors, as a 
responsibility to my own conscience. I am driven by an ethical imperative to 
remember. And this ethical imperative is not marked off from my life in the 
academy. As John Dewey (1909/1975) says, “There cannot be two sets of 
ethical principles, one for life in the school [or the university], and the other for 
life outside of the school" (p. 7). The call to remember is an ethical commitment, 
a public testimony of an academic struggling to grapple with the Holocaust. This 
commitment is also a private testimony of a third generation Jew after 
Auschwitz, as a private testimony to my ancestors.
I have, however, suffered much resistance to thinking about my own 
Jewishness and what this Jewishness means against the backdrop of the 
Holocaust. I wrote my masters thesis on Christology, the study of who and what 
Jesus was. I did not understand fully why I chose this as a masters thesis topic. 
At bottom, I felt deeply troubled by the anti-Semitism Christology perpetuated, 
but still I was not psychologically ready to embrace my own Jewishness.
Doing curriculum theory, William Pinar (1994) stresses, is most 
fundamentally an autobiographical act. Academic work, if it is to progress, must 
have something to do with one's own lifework. Thus, it is through curriculum 
theory that I have been able to return to myself, I have returned to my 
Jewishness. My intellectual and spiritual return to Judaism, to the synagogue, to 
shul has not been without difficulty, however. The return and the work on the 
Holocaust have sent me back and down into the terrifying depths of the 
unconscious. Ten years ago, previous to this return, I plunged into 
psychoanalytic-oriented therapy primarily because I suffered from a sense of 
numbness. I experienced an uncanny speechlessness. I felt haunted by 
phantoms. Some analysts might call speechlessness resistance. And I certainly
4
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resisted these phantoms. Ten years later, during my work on the Holocaust, 
these phantoms returned and so too did I to psychoanalytically oriented 
therapy.
At the start of my research on the Holocaust I fiercely resisted utilizing 
psychoanalytic theory. I did not know why I felt this way. But I suppose I intuited, 
at some dimly conscious level, that engagement with psychoanalytic theory 
opens one to vulnerability because it unleashes the unconscious. Finally, after 
overcoming this initial resistance, I decided that it was psychoanalytic theory as 
it intersects with curriculum theory that would help me to untangle issues 
around the Holocaust. Many argue that curriculum theory and psychoanalytic 
theory are not incompatible (Appelbaum & Kaplan, 1998; Atwell-Vasey, 1998; 
Benzaquen, 1998; Britzman, 1998; Gilbert, 1998; Grumet, 1988; Kaplan, 1998; 
Pinar, 1991; Pitt, 1998; Robertson & Todd, 1998; Salvio, 1998.) William Pinar 
(1991) suggests that “curriculum as a form of social psychoanalysis permits the 
student to emerge as a figure, capable of critical participation in a historical 
present hitherto denied" (p. 165). Drawing on Pinar's notion of social 
psychoanalysis, I offer up what I term a social psychoanalytic hermeneutic to 
recover Holocaust memory. I offer up a Holocaust curriculum, a memory text that 
lets me speak from my own situatedness.
It is curriculum theory which allows me to recover Holocaust memory 
across many registers. William Pinar says, “Curriculum becomes intensely 
historical, political, racial, gendered, phenomenological, postmodern, 
autobiographical, aesthetic, theological, and international” (1999, xvii). A 
psychoanalytic hermeneutic allows me to move across these curricular 
registers, to weave through the warp and woof of the educative landscape. A 
psychoanalytic hermeneutic is a form of interpretation that allows me to cut
5
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across and cut between these multitudinous sites. Madeleine Grumet (1999) 
says that curriculum is “hermeneutic activity [it is an] act of interpretation" (p. 
233). Grumet tells us that the “prefix [of the word interpretation] “inter” means 
between, and the root is traced to its Sanskrit antecedent, prath~to spread 
abroad. Interpretation occurs at the junction of opposites” (p. 233). To move 
inbetween curricular sites in broad ways is my task. My task as a curriculum 
scholar is not unlike Michel Serres' image of the weaver. Serres says, “one 
must find the weaver, the proto-maker of space, the prosopopeia of topology 
and nodes, the weaver who works locally to join two worlds that are separated” 
(1982, p. 52).
Holocaust scholarship tends to be divided into two worlds: the world of 
historical representations and the world of literary representations. William 
Paulson (1988) reminds us that C.P. Snow warned against what he called “the 
two cultures" (p. 4). “Snow denounced the consequences for intellectual 
ignorance of those who live by literature and those who live by science" 
(Paulson, 1988, p. 4). I believe, like Snow, that curricularists must find a way to 
bridge the two cultures of social science and the humanities, especially when 
attempting to interpret the complexities around the Holocaust. However, merely 
adding one culture (history) to another (literature) is not my aim, either. My task 
is to synthesize these two cultures in ways unique to the discipline of curriculum 
theory. A psychoanalytic hermeneutic around different and competing 
representations of the Holocaust allows me to cut across curricular registers 
that are “intensely historical, political, racial, gendered, phenomenological 
postmodern, autobiographical, aesthetic, theological and international” (Pinar, 
1999, xviii).The ways in which the Holocaust gets represented tells much about 
the ways in which this event will be remembered in generations to come.
6
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Many different kinds of representations around Holocaust memory 
abound. Audio-visual testimony, diaries, memoirs, dance, poetry, music, art and 
film all represent the Holocaust in important ways. However, I choose to focus 
on two kinds of representations, the historical and the literary. History was 
always a subject I detested in high school; it seemed interminably boring. It 
seemed to be little more than memorizing dates. But in college, history began to 
fascinate me. Most of my scholarly papers that have been published, since my 
entrance into graduate school, have been historical treatments. Whatever 
curricular issue I have grappled with has been treated historically. I feel that 
historical representations of the Holocaust are indispensible guides toward 
understanding complexities around this event. Of course, historical accounts 
are not the most authoritative representations; historians are not the only 
keepers of memory. But I suggest that if we are to call ourselves educated 
people, we have to know something about the history of this event.
Like history, English was a subject I also detested in high school. It 
seemed little more than memorizing plots. But literature, outside of school, has 
always been my great love. Without realizing it, I had been collecting Holocaust 
novels all during my high school years. In essence, I have been doing memory 
work around the Holocaust most of my life.
Doing interpretive work around historical and literary representations of 
the Holocaust does not mean that one can get a complete picture of this event.
It does not grant a better understanding than, say, study of audio-visual 
testimony or poetry. Studying historical and literary accounts of the Holocaust 
offers a particular perspective that enables me to raise broad curricular 
questions across many kinds of registers of lived experience. Robin Barrow 
(1981) claims that “Education implies breadth of understanding rather than
7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
narrow specialism” (p. 39). And it is a broad picture of the Holocaust that I would 
like to paint. However, any understanding of this event is necessarily limited. It 
would be arrogant to suggest that an academic, who has never actually suffered 
Auschwitz, can really understand after all. In many ways, the Holocaust is 
beyond understanding and representation. And yet-cautiously and with 
humility-1 proceed. Curricularists can approach the black sun of Auschwitz in 
spite of the limits of understanding. If we refuse the call of remembering this 
event altogether because of the ineffableness of Auschwitz, we lapse back into 
silence. And silence is not the place to which I wish to return. Silence kills. 
Evocation, speech, writing, dialogue and prayer beckon. I am driven by 
phantoms: the phantoms of the dead, the phantoms of my Jewish ancestors.
A Holocaust education pains. There is no doubt about that. There is no
way to avoid the fear and trembling in the face of Auschwitz. Shoshana Felman
and Dori Laub ask “whether there is a relation between crisis and the very
enterprise of education" (1992, p. 1). A Holocaust curriculum cannot avoid crisis
because it evokes one. A Holocaust curriculum approaches what Deborah
Britzman calls “difficult knowledges” (1998, p. 6). But doing interpretive work
around the Holocaust is not just about acquiring knowledge. Rather, it is about
understanding the event, while standing at the limits of understanding. It is an
understanding that is necessarily aporetic; it is to understand that we cannot
understand. It is impossible, especially for outsiders to this event, to understand
in the same way as a Holocaust survivor. David Geoffrey Smith tells us that,
While standing in the middle of things, interpretive 
pedagogy looks to the margins of collective life for 
the oracular word of signification... it is exactly at 
the boundary of experience.. . where we become 
available to that which addresses us. (1999, p. 132)
8
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We know that we cannot understand the event of the Holocaust no matter how 
much knowledge we may acquire. Studying historical and literary 
representations of Auschwitz does not mean we understand them. Reading 
history does not mean we understand it. Reading novels about the Holocaust 
does not mean that we understand this event. Still, we understand at the limits 
of our own situatedness, at the limits of our own horizon.
It is on the psychological register, though, that understanding suffers 
most interference. The aporias of understanding are inextricably tied to the 
psychological. The psychological register is complexified by unconscious traces 
that emerge in the forms of resistances, repressions, projections, introjections, 
reversals and denial. At the outset of my study, I believed that the task at hand 
was to get rid of these interferences, because I thought that they thwarted and 
distorted interpretations of the Holocaust. However, I came to realize that this 
position is not realistic. It presupposes that, at the end of the day, we could get a 
close reading of this event without too much psychological baggage. But, as I 
dwelled over my own intellectual resistances and emotional struggles with this 
material, I realized that this position was naive.
My encounter with the writings of Jean Laplanche (1973; 1985; 1999) 
altered my thinking. Laplanche suggests that psychological interferences 
always leave traces in the psyche, no matter how much one works through 
difficult emotional issues. Some amount of repression remains, no matter how 
aware or how conscious one becomes of one’s inner psychic workings. “The 
message [of the other or of the text] is partly translated and partly repressed" 
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 94). The message of the text and its reception by the 
reader undergo repression and interference, no matter how much the reader 
thinks she understands the text. Some repression always remains. This
9
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complex interaction between reader and text is guided by an unconscious 
transferential relation. The reader transfers her own patterns of perception onto 
the text which are marked by a certain amount of resistance, repression and 
anxiety.The reader dwells in the liminal space between her own unconscious 
transference and the unconscious inscriptions introjected into the text by the 
writer. Exactly what it is that transpires between reader and text, at the site of the 
unconscious, is not clear. Interpretations which are inadequate are symptomatic 
of too much repression. An adequate translation lifts repression as much as 
possible, but traces of repression remain.
Laplanche (1999) stresses that translations of an analysand by an 
analyst should leave intact the otherness of the analysand. I argue, drawing on 
Laplanche, that translations of Holocaust texts should also leave intact the 
otherness, the alterity, of these texts. The complexity of doing interpretive work 
emerges as one’s own otherness, which is marked by unconscious 
transference, co-mingles with the otherness of the text, which is marked by the 
unconscious inscription “implanted" (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in the text by the 
writer. Laplanche (1999) says that at the intersection between self and other, 
[and I would add between reader and text] lies an "enigmatic message” (p. 258), 
or a “third reality” ( p. 80) that is in some ways beyond translation. I argue that 
Laplanche’s notion of an enigmatic message can be applied to studying 
Holocaust texts. The alterity of the text, the text as other, the text of the 
Holocaust, which is other to itself (as an inscription of the author's unconscious), 
and its “implantation” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in the reader (which is the 
introjected message) must be maintained. A “failed translation” (Fletcher, 1999, 
p. 16) is marked by rigidity. Laplanche stresses that rigid interpretations are 
guided by the compulsion to repeat old patterns, old habits of perception. And it
10
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is this that analysts call transference. Laplanche (1999) argues that we cannot, 
however, get outside of transference; we cannot get outside of our old patterns 
of perception and interpretation. All we can do is work to “loosen” (Laplanche, 
1999, p. 258) transference. Madeleine Grumet (1988) suggests that we should 
avoid getting “trapped in transference” (p. 117). But perhaps this move is 
impossible. We are always already trapped. Thus, it is not a matter of getting rid 
of transference, rather, it is a matter of becoming aware of our own habits of 
interpretation and translation. We can work to lift repression and resistance 
somewhat and become more aware of our intellectual and emotional responses 
and trappings, and by doing so I think we can become more open to the alterity 
of Holocaust texts.
Historical and literary representations of the Holocaust are determined, in 
part, by the ways in which we approach epistemological and psychological 
interferences. Psychological resistances to the difficult memory of the Holocaust 
may determine what it is that gets represented in the first place. That which is 
not-said and not-represented may be absented because of the writers’ 
resistances and repressions. What it is that historians and novelists choose to 
exclude becomes key to what it is they might be repressing.
General Overview of Study
Generally speaking, this study will examine what I call curriculum as 
memory text. I will argue that memory is the larger category under which history 
is subsumed. History, then, is a systematization of memory. History, though, is 
not reducible to memory; for historians, although operating out of their own 
memories, draw on archives, documents and testimonies and are constrained 
by the discipline of history. Personal memories, perhaps, effect historians' 
renderings, but personal memories are different from historical renderings
11
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because they are not constrained in the same ways. Psychological 
interferences such as repression, resistance, denial, projection, introjection and 
transference shape memory and therefore may determine, to a certain extent, 
the ways in which historians select, imagine, deconstruct and reconstruct 
documents.
Historical novels are also a form of memory; they are expressions of 
memory. Writers organize, select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not 
reducible to memory, since writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are 
constrained by the narrative form. Memory seems not to be constrained in the 
same way. Although memory is a stream, stream of consciousness novels seem 
more tightly woven and constructed than memory itself. Personal memories 
operate out of sites of repression, resistance, projection, introjection, denial and 
transference and may determine, to a certain extent, the ways in which novelists 
select, imagine, construct and reconstruct the past.
I will argue that the writings of historians share certain features with the 
writings of novelists. But, at bottom, writing history is not the same as the writing 
of historical novels. History shares with literature its narrative and imaginative 
form. I maintain that historians construct the past by drawing on memory, 
perception and imagination. Historians select and omit events and express their 
thoughts by narration. But historians are ultimately constrained by the 
methodology of the discipline of history. Novelists, however, do not have to 
draw on evidence and are not constrained by any methodology, so their task is 
different.
History writing and the writing of historical novels around the Holocaust, if 
they are to be considered adequate representations of this awful event, if they 
are to do justice to the memory of the Holocaust, might follow Edith
12
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Wyshogrod's (1998) lead, that the “promise of truthfulness" (p. 10) be 
maintained. Truthfulness, for me, is not the same as Truth with a capital T. Truth 
is nowhere absolute. But truthfulness does justice to the memory of the 
Holocaust because it approaches an approximation of this event through many 
different perspectives and keeps the alterity and otherness of the event intact. 
Whatever truths we may learn about the Holocaust are ultimately limited 
because of the enormity and horror of this event.
William Pinar says that “The curriculur task becomes to recover memory 
and history in ways that psychologically allow individuals to reenter politically 
the public sphere” (1991, pp. 173-174). Recovering Holocaust memory means 
that the researcher might be able to become more reflexive and reflective, 
marking and re-marking her own responses, resistances, interferences and 
repressions around doing this kind of work. Recovering Holocaust memory is 
guided by what I call a dystopic curriculum. A dystopic curriculum allows 
interferences, otherness, alterity and strangeness to emerge out of the 
different sites of representations. Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum, 
memories emerge not as a promise of hope, but as a testament to despair and 
truthfulness. Following Lawrence Langer (1991), Jeffrey Hartman (1996), Ofer 
and Weitzman (1998), I argue against hope. Lawrence Langer says "Tainted 
memory seems inconsistent with the rhetoric of hope" (1991, p. 128). I argue 
against discourse that “eliminates the noise of otherness” (Edgerton, 1996, p. 
57). As Jeffrey Hartman says, “What we generally do is seek a redemptive 
perspective to save the good name of humanity... .Yet the Final Solution’s 
man-made calamity is exceptionally resistant to such a perspective" (1996, p. 
39). Similarly, Ofer and Weitzman point out that there is danger when scholars 
attempt to shield readers from the horrors of the Holocaust. They suggest that
13
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the need to find meaning in the events of the 
Holocaust, the need to shield the audience from 
the worst horror of the Holocaust, and the need to 
comfort ourselves with some “redeeming” message- 
lead to both popularization and banalization. (1998, p. 15)
There is nothing meaningful about Auschwitz; there is nothing about Auschwitz
which is redemptive, salvific or hopeful. The title of the Holocaust film “Life is
Beautiful” signals to me an offensive, trivializing banalization of Holocaust
memory. There was nothing beautiful about Auschwitz. To say that there is, is to
turn suffering into pleasure. It was this that repulsed Adorno (1966/1995).
Similarly, Lawrence Langer (1998) criticizes Judy Chicago’s artwork entitled
Holocaust Project because her message seems to be that there is light at the
end of darkness. Langer suggests that Chicago offers to us a redemptive
memory. But Langer points out that redemptive strategies serve as
psychological defense mechanisms against pain. The film “Tea with Mussolini,"
a comedy about Italy’s complicity with Germany during the Holocaust, is yet
another offensive, redemptive representation which turns suffering into
humor. This has to be the biggest insult of all. Langer comments that we have
inherited “A tradition of avoidance.. . .  how much of our language about the
Holocaust is designed to console instead of confront’ (1995, p. 5). Avoidance is
also marked, Deborah Britzman (1998) tells us, in readings of Anne Frank’s
diary which offer up messages of hope and courage. Britzman argues that these
kinds of consoling interpretations reflect psychological resistances and defense
mechanisms that serve to protect against pain. The fact is that Anne Frank died
in Bergen-Belson and there is nothing hopeful or couragous about that.
Britzman says that
If the pedagogy of the diary enacts the educator’s 
desire for a rescue fantasy, stable truth, and the
14
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splitting of good and evil through the idealization of
the good object, such strategies preclude the
possibilities of the learner and teacher working
through the ambivalences of their own conflict. (1998, p. 134)
Representations of the Holocaust should not be made comfortable. And this
comfort is what these redemptive strategies offer. But there is nothing
comfortable about the Holocaust.The horrors of the Holocaust demand a certain
psychological readiness on the part of the researcher. Psychological readiness
means that Holocaust representations and responses should not be covered
over with gloss, which serve only to make the strange familiar. There is nothing
familiar about planet Auschwitz.
If Jewish experience in the Holocaust can be made to 
“stand for" something else, some “larger human experience" 
whether a testimony to the integrity of the moral self, 
as in Todorov, or, in the case of Judy Chicago, a 
positive statement about the human condition in 
general, then the intolerable might seem more tolerable... . 
Whatever the intention, the result is to dilute or diffuse 
the particularity of mass murder. (Langer, 1998, p. 15)
A dystopic curriculum allows the shadow of the object, the shadow of the
Holocaust, to darken perspectives. But darkening perspectives does not mean
sliding into nihilism. A dystopic curriculum is an ethical one, a response to the
"invocation” (Levinas, 1996, p. 7) of the other. This is a response to “the promise
of truthfulness" (Wyschogrod, 1998, p. 10). A promise of remembering in a
dystopic way. A dystopic curriculum is not unlike what Man Gur-Ze’ev calls a
“counter-education.” Gur-Ze’ev comments that
Within counter-education no room exists for a 
positive utopia, and it does not promise collective 
emancipation.. . .  Counter-education suggests 
possibilities for identifying, criticizing, and 
resisting violent practices of normalization, 
control. (1998, p. 463)
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There is nothing emancipating or liberating about doing memory work around
the Holocaust. As Richard Rorty (1991) points out, it is coping with reality that
matters, not solving it or fixing it. Redemptive or emancipating strategies serve
to fix this horrible reality by making it seem less horrible. But as Net Noddings
(1989) stresses, American education moves against the grain of anything that
smacks of suffering or grief. She says,
Education has at least in modern times been 
guided by optimism and notions of progress 
(notions that are, I think, peculiarly masculine).
Perhaps we should now consider an education 
guided by a tragic sense of life. (1989, p. 244)
And it is the Jewish tragedy, a particular tragedy to Jews, around which we
need to attend.
In what way should we attend to this disaster? I suggest educators
approach the Holocaust without repressing grief and suffering, even though
traces of repression will always already affect our work. Paula Salvio calls for
an attending to the other through “empathetic identification.” She says that
empathetic identification, defined as the capacity 
for attending to how another person feels rather 
than merely imagining ourselves in his/her position, 
is a powerful index to the social attitudes of a given 
period. (Salvio, 1998, p. 44)
But can we wholly empathize with Holocaust survivors? On the one hand, I can
say that I feel for the survivor; I feel for her suffering and am troubled by it. But,
on the other hand, I can never fully empathize, because I really do not know
how it feels to have suffered Auschwitz. Jonathan Boyarin (1992) cautions
against what he terms the “hegemony of empathy” (p. 86). Empathy might have
“repressive effects,” (p. 87) says Boyarin. He explains that we must become
cautious of the way in which we use the notion of empathy. Boyarin argues that
16
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The hegemony of empathy is an ethic of 
obliteration of Otherness. We might say that this 
occurs where humanism demands acknowledgment 
of the Other’s suffering humanity, but where conditions 
do not allow the work involved in what Eric Cheyfitz
calls “the difficult poetics of translation" that is, where
the paradoxical linkage of shared humanity and cultural 
Otherness cannot be experienced, (p. 86)
Empathy can be a move toward making the strange familiar by saying “I
understand what it is you are suffering.” But how can an outsider to the event of
the Holocaust ever understand in an emotional way what this nightmare felt
like? Outsiders to this horrific event will never understand what it was like, or
what it felt like to live and die under the black sun of Auschwitz. If empathy
suggests that your suffering is the same as mine, that the Holocaust survivor’s
suffering is like my own, then empathy is false. Still, a cautious empathy, a
limited empathy, must remain or else we cannot do work on this horrific
memory. A limited sense of empathy must keep the alterity of Auschwitz intact. I
can empathize with the other, but I cannot feel what she feels. I will never wholly
be able to translate her suffering as if it were my own. Her suffering always
remains a stranger suffering than mine. We must always remain strangers to
one another in our grief. The memory of the Holocaust lies at the limits of
understanding, representation and empathy.
Education and the Holocaust 
In the field of education, there have been notable contributions to 
Holocaust scholarship that I would like to comment on at this juncture. I hope to 
demonstrate the importance of some of the work that has already been done in 
the field. Although I draw on my predecessors, my work departs from that which 
has already been done. I offer up a particular perspective of Holocaust 
education primarily because curriculum theory allows me to examine both
17
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
historical and literary representations through a dystopic lens guided by what I 
term a psychoanalytic hermeneutic.
John Weaver’s (1994) doctoral dissertation entitled Academic Politics: 
The Case of Former East German Historians and the Restructuring of the East 
German University System concerns the ways in which former East and West 
German historians shape memory. Weaver writes that historians together with 
government officials in East Germany shaped a particular memory of the 
Holocaust which suited their ideological and political agendas. Former East 
Germany has only recently, since reunification, begun to come to terms with 
their complicity during the Nazi era.
Former West German historians have been attempting to come to terms 
with their Nazi past since the end of World War II. Weaver explains that West 
German historians embraced what was termed “ Vergangenheitsbewaltigung" 
(1994, p. 13). This term means to grapple with loss or to grapple with that which 
passed. This term, then, signals that West German historians attempted to 
examine what had happened, to examine where Germany had gone wrong. 
West German historians, much earlier than East German historians, tried to look 
back with a critical edge. Whether or not they were successful is another issue 
though. But at least there was a start to examine the past after the war had 
ended. Later, Weaver recounts, West German historiography “shifted" (p. 13). 
Doppelvergangenheitsbewaltigung signifies grappling with two pasts. Here, 
West German historians attempted to grapple with “two dictatorial traditions" (p. 
13). These two dicatorial traditions were labeled Fascism and Stalinism. 
Fascism in the West and Stalinism in the East needed to be unpacked. Weaver 
says that West German historians, unlike their counterparts in the East, claimed 
that the “former GDR was just as authoritative and destructive as the Nazi
18
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regime” (p. 13). West German historians always felt that their academic work 
was far “superior” (pp. 13-14) to that of East Germans’ work, for at least in the 
West historians got a head start in coming to terms with the past. West German 
historiography followed trends in the United States and Britain. Political and 
military histories were being written alongside cultural histories and the 
histories of everyday life, which is termed Alltagsgeschichte.
In contrast to West German historiography, East German historiography,
Weaver explains, tended to become “rigid" (p. 98). Academics and state officials
together decided what kind of history would be considered appropriate. As the
keepers of official memory, historians wanted to be certain that East Germans
would not be implicated in the rise of the Nazi regime. But since the opening of
the Stasi archives, it is now well known that Communists in the East were
complicit with the Holocaust, but they also perpetuated crimes against Jews
even after the end of the war. The memory that these historians created was
covered-over rhetoric that served to conceal the truth. Weaver says that
historians conveniently “pass[ed] over working class collaboration with the
Nazis” (p. 98). Calling this framing of collective memory an “issue of power," (p.
41) Weaver explains
East German historians would meet with SED 
[Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands or 
the United Socialist Party of Germany] officials 
at the party congresses to establish research 
agendas. At these congresses, historians would 
be given the task of creating history for the East 
German State with an emphasis on working class 
opposition during the Nazi regime, critiques of the 
West German historiographical tradition and the 
role of capitalism in the rise of fascism, (p. 69)
The East German government has traditionally only honored Communist 
“resisters” of Fascism, while denying recognition that Jews were victims. The
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true victims of the East, according to this ideology, were anti-Fascist resisters, 
while Jews remained an afterthought. East Germany not only denied any 
responsibility for the Holocaust until 1991, they also denied paying restitution to 
Holocaust survivors. In a move of psychological reversal, Jews were seen, 
especially by the State, as enemies of Communism, typically associated with 
capitalism. East German historians and state officials have claimed, in one way 
or another, that the root cause of the Holocaust was capitalism. Capitalism led 
the way to Fascism. Although reunification has changed the East German party 
line, Jeffrey Peck (1996) is not confident that hard liners had changed their 
views. Peck says, “The official disappearance of East Germany, however, does 
not make its response to the Holocaust a moot issue. The 40 year history of the 
GDR was not erased with the declaration of reunification" (1996, p. 449).
Weaver (1994) points out the ways in which collective memory is produced by 
politics and ideology. Academics shape collective memory and can become 
complicit in erasing unwanted memory. As we will see later, fiction writers living 
in the former East Germany were not free to write anything. Like historians, they 
had to comply with the SED mentality or fear accusations of espionage and 
arrest. Later, I will discuss Christa Wolf’s (1980) novel called Patterns of 
Childhood, which evokes critics’ suspicions that she was offering up a portrait of 
heroic East Germans. She suggests that East Germans were victims of Nazism. 
But this portrayal omits the fact that the victims of history were Jews, not 
Germans. This portayai also omits the fact that East Germans were complicit in 
many ways with Nazism.
Weaver’s (1994) dissertation is important because we learn that 
collective memory is place-bound. Where we live has much to do with how we 
remember the Holocaust. Different places produce different kinds of Holocaust
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memory. Bystander countries like the United States and Britain frame Holocaust 
memory differently than collaborating countries like France and Italy.
Bystanders and collaborators also produce different kinds of repressed 
memories to cover up or cover over their indifference, inaction, apathy, or 
outright complicity. Place is indeed an important factor in the work of memory.
In addition to Weaver’s work, Gregory Wegner (1995) also emphasizes 
the importance of place around collective memory of the Holocaust. In the 
Journal of Curriculum and Supervision, in an article entitled “Buchenwald 
Concentration Camp and Holocaust Education for Youth in the New Germany," 
Wegner stresses the emotionally evocative power of doing historical 
work on site at the Buchenwald Memorial with high school students. Wegner 
tells us that, "Students arriving at Buchenwald from theWeibelfeldschule 
stepped into an environment heavily reinforced with the geographical 
significance of place. [The students studied].. . .  in a building once used as 
apartments for SS personnel” (p. 181). Wegner stresses that this high school 
history seminar was not just an intellectual exercise, but a real encounter, an 
emotional encounter with Germany’s past.The intensity of actually being on the 
site at Buchenwald heightened students’ sense of confrontation with the past. 
"One student could be heard to ask "why” over and over again as we proceeded 
to the upstairs rooms, where corpses were sorted.. . .  gold teeth removed"
(p. 183). Downstairs meathooks could be seen. Wegner explains that these 
were used to hang Jews. Buchenwald was "attached to a crematorium" (p. 183), 
which Wegner says was “one of the darkest and most haunting places” (p. 183).
Before reunification, Wegner writes that Buchenwald Memorial reflected 
the anti-Fascist rhetoric common among former East Germans. And so when the 
Memorial initially opened to the public, Buchenwald became a memorial to the
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heroes and resisters of Fascism. Carefully “omitted” from the “visitors guides" (p. 
175) were stories about inmates who were not Communist. Also omitted was 
the story of Buchenwald after 1950. Under Stalinist control, approximately 
10,000 prisoners died there. Wegner tells us that “mention of the Soviet Camp 
remained strictly forbidden in East German schools" (p. 175).
Like Weaver, Wegner points out how collective memories are inextricably 
tied to politics and ideology. The ways in which a memorial is remembered has 
much to do with power. The powerful shape memory for public consumption. 
After reunification, explanations of Buchenwald have since changed as the anti- 
Fascist rhetoric has changed. One of the important points Wegner raises is that 
collective memory is not static. Collective memory changes primarily because of 
politics.
Historians and novelists are not immune from the politics of memory. 
Academic politics influence whether or not one considers legitimate certain 
kinds of memory. Academic politics influences whether or not one considers 
legitimate literary and or historical representations of the Holocaust. Because 
some academics feel that historians are the keepers of memory and represent 
authoritative voice of the past, historians’ renderings of the Holocaust seem to 
be more legitimate than novelists' renderings. Historians are considered, by 
some, to be arbiters of truth and gatherers of hard facts, while novelists are 
considered mere dreamers. James Young (1988) writes that this attitude, which 
he claims is perpetuated by historians themselves, deligitimates and denigrates 
literary representations of the Holocaust. Literary representations seem second 
rate, trivial and unimportant. This unfortunate attitude on the part of some 
historians, and others inside the academy who relegate the humanites to a 
second class status, has done much damage to the ways in which we create
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memory around the Holocaust. Literary representations are just as important to 
the memory of this event as historical accounts. It is not enough to read 
historical representations of the Holocaust. I argue that both historical and 
literary representations are crucial and should be read alongside each other.
But the politics of the academy has much to do with what it is we remember and 
what becomes more valued as memory.
The politics of memory is what Elizabeth Ellsworth (1997) becomes
concerned about in her book entitled Teaching Positions: Difference. Pedagogy
and the Power of Address. Ellsworth draws on Shoshana Felman’s
interpretation of Claude Lanzemann’s film called Shoah. “The political labor of
memory construction,"( p. 178) writes Ellsworth, turns much on the ways in
which we understand this event. Ellsworth argues that notions of communicative
dialogue, representation and understanding cannot help us fathom that which is
discontinuous, that which moves beyond representation, and that which we
really cannot understand after all. Concepts like communication, dialogue,
representation do not do justice to the memory of the Holocaust, Ellsworth
suggests. These concepts attempt to know too much, attempt to promise too
much. These concepts offer up closure where there is none, truth where there is
none. Ellsworth declares that:
This question (about the Holocaust! is not “about" 
truth or establishing warrants for action. The question 
is about the necessity, the right, the responsibility of 
participating in the ongoing, never completed historical, 
social, and political labor of memory construction, (pp. 177-178)
Lanzemann’s film Shoah (1985) “teaches through analytic dialogue, through
the discontinuity and the impossibility of full understanding” (p. 115). Ellsworth
stresses the discontinuity of this event. The discontinuity of this event is not only
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due to differing perspectives of victims, bystanders and perpetrators, but the 
discontinuity is also a psychological one. This discontinuity, is because of “the 
splitness of my own psyche" (p. 124). And she argues that this splitness is 
"beyond any conscious control” (p. 124). Exactly what this split psyche is, 
Ellsworth does not elaborate. But I think she is suggesting perhaps that 
encounters with Holocaust texts create a split in the psyche because the event 
is so hideous. A split off part of the self is a repressed self. And this repressed 
self attempts to protect the ego from being overwhelmed.
Ellsworth argues that what we should be concerned about are active 
engagements with Holocaust texts, with responses to these texts, and the 
aporetic nature of these responses. The consequences of responding to these 
texts in a certain way are not clear. We do not know what the implications of our 
response will be. Further, Ellsworth wants to "foreground the notion of 
performativity" (p. 136). “What has reading performed or let loose in the world?" 
(p. 128). What are the implications of our umode[s] of address?" (p. 116). 
Ellsworth stresses again that these implications are not clear.
I believe that Ellsworth raises some important questions. She is right to 
point out the difficulties and uncertainties that abound when approaching 
Holocaust texts. Unsettling our notions of clarity or understanding, Ellsworth is 
on target. Representing the Holocaust is not an easy task and many questions 
remain about the effects of these representations on readers and researchers. I 
also agree with Ellsworth that the notion of response is important. Of course we 
must respond to these memories. My own work has emerged from an ethical 
sensibility around the notion of response.
Unlike Ellsworth, however, I claim that notions of representation and 
understanding, although problematic, do not always lead to closure and or
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certainty. Unlike Ellsworth, I believe that notions of “truthfulness" (Wyshogrod, 
1998, p. 10) are crucial in this discussion, especially in light of Holocaust 
deniers and so-called revisionists who operate to unwrite the Holocaust 
altogether. I argue that we work at the limits of understanding, empathy and 
representation. Our perspectives are partial and situated. I suggest that 
understanding the Holocaust is always already an ambivalent undertaking. 
Representing this event in textual form does not necessarily imply mapping it 
onto a corresponding reality. But approximations of truthfulness are key, if our 
representations are to be adequate to the memory of the victims and survivors. 
Further, I argue that understandings and representations are always already 
tenuous because of psychological interferences which guide interpretations. 
Ellsworth says that this event is haunted by discontinuties. I draw on the work of 
Jean Laplanche (1999) to try to untangle some of the psychological reasons 
why this event is discontinuous. Laplanche (1999) says that we have a 
“primordial split self (p. 220). The self is split because of the otherness of the 
unconscious. The unconscious is not our center, rather it is perpetually and 
radically “decentered" (p. 52). Human subjectivity is marked by an “ex-centricity" 
(p. 52), because there is no center to the self. The self is a stranger to itself. And 
this stranger within, the stranger of the unconscious is what creates a split self. 
Extending Ellsworth’s notion of the split psyche, I attempt to draw out in more 
detail what the implications of a split self might mean when interpreting 
Holocaust texts. Drawing on Freudian, Kleinian, Fairbairnian and Laplanchian 
psychoanalytic theory, I hope to raise questions not only about the split seif as it 
encounters Holocaust texts, I also hope to raise questions around symbiosis, 
internal objects, mental representations, alterity and individuation.Thus.my 
study is more grounded in psychoanalytic theory than Ellsworth’s and this
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theory helps me to understand why phantasy, good and bad objects, projection 
and transference all play roles in the notion of split selves and why these 
notions are relevant to studying the Holocaust. A split off self, a repressed self, a 
dissociated self, a detached self, could all have many implications when it is 
that self who is trying to untangle responses and “modes of address." The 
notion of the split self, though, is complex and demands interrogation.
Like Ellsworth, Deborah P. Britzman (1998), in her book entitled Lost
Subjects. Contested Objects, and the Power of Address, discusses how a
“mode of address"(p. 119) is made complex by approaching what she terms
“difficult knowledges” (p. 119). Like Ellsworth, Britzman suggests that the
Holocaust demands,
A patience with the incommensurability of understanding. .. . 
the ways meaning becomes... fractured, broken and lost, 
exceeding the affirmation of rationality, consciousness and 
consolation, (p. 118)
Like Lawrence Langer (1998), Jeffrey Hartman (1996) and Ofer and Weitzman
(1998), Britzman worries that the very discourse we use to interpret Holocaust
texts may become suspect. Britzman warns against consoling or comfortable
language around “difficult knowledges" (p. 119). She suggests that words like
courage and hope only reflect psychological defense mechanisms that serve to
protect against pain. Britzman draws heavily on the problematics of the
utilization of defense mechanisms and the ways in which these can protect
readers from experiencing pain. “These mechanisms of defense... are key
ways the ego attempts to console itself (p. 119). In my own work, I too draw on
the problematics of defense mechanisms. However, I think my work differs from
Britzman’s because I also worry about the complexities around the notion of
transference and tease out different interpretations around this term.
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Both Ellsworth and Britzman use Holocaust texts as examples of the 
ways in which educators might grapple with “difficult knowledges” (Britzman, 
1998, p. 119). It seems to me that both suggest pedagogical strategies to cope 
with horrors beyond our imagination. Ellsworth (1997) suggests that the Shoah 
is “pertinent to all teaching situations" (p. 115). Against this position, I argue that 
learning about the Holocaust is not pertinent to all teaching situations; it is only 
pertinent to teaching and learning about the Holocaust. I do not think 
encounters of the Holocaust are generalizable, nor should they be. The 
Holocaust and our encounters with it should not be lumped together with 
Hiroshima or Stalinist crimes. There are no universal messages to be drawn. I 
argue for the radical alterity and radical uniqueness of this event. Any move 
toward comparability is a move which levels the horrors specific to the black sun 
of Auschwitz. Comparing Auschwitz to something else denigrates this Jewish 
tragedy. My approach also differs from Ellsworth and Britzman because I do not 
suggest pedagogical strategies. My work turns on the notion of understanding 
and what it means to be an educated person in a post-Holocaust era.The 
teaching of the Holocaust will spring from our understanding of it.Curriculum 
theory is a call to understanding. In fact, “the field today is preoccupied with 
understanding" (Pinar, Reynolds, Slattery & Taubman, 1995, p. 6). I am 
interested in examining what it is a curriculum theorist can understand about an 
event that is beyond understanding.
In77ie International Journal on Audio-visual Testimony, in a piece named 
“The Contribution of Holocaust Audio-Visual Testimony to Remembrance, 
Learning and Hope,” Roger Simon (1998) suggests that educators encounter 
audio-visual testimony alongside the reading of historical accounts.Simon 
argues that testimonies enable one to engage with Holocaust texts in a
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personal way “not limited to abstract and objectified forms of historical 
interpretation” (p. 148). Here, the viewer must “respond responsibly" (p. 147). 
Like Ellsworth, Simon is concerned about the importance of response. Recall, 
for Ellsworth, responding is an ambiguous performative activity because one 
does not know beforehand the consequences of one's response. There are 
always discontinuites between one’s response and the consequences of 
responding in a particular way. Like Ellsworth, Simon (1998) says that 
responding to testimony demands “an attending to alterity, to a difference not 
easily or ethically reduced to the terms of one's own self-understanding” (p.
147). I agree with Simon here. Like Simon, I argue that the alterity of the text, 
the otherness of the text of the Holocaust, must be kept intact.Unlike Simon, I 
suggest that this otherness is not only due to epistemological problems, but also 
to unconscious traces left or deposited in the text by the other and is co­
complexified by my unconscious transferential relation to the text. Although 
Simon mentions that resistance to viewing testimony will prevail, he does not 
unfold the psychological reasons why this might occur. Again, my 
interpretations are grounded in psychoanalytic theory to help unpack some of 
these notions like resistance.
Simon suggests that there are two kinds of responses to testimony: the 
“spectatorial” (p. 147) and the “summoned" (p. 148). Simon does not privilege 
one kind of response over against the other, but he maintains rather that these 
are different ways in which one may respond to Holocaust survivor testimony. 
The “spectatorial” (p. 147) reception of Holocaust testimony, is a “sensibility 
[that] embodies and enacts a capacity to group a given testimony within frames 
of understanding which render it intelligible and meaningful" (Simon, 1998 p.
148). It seems to me that the spectator’s perception is marked by distance, by a
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detached and intellectualized engagement. At this level of reception, one could 
say that the viewer understands what the survivor says. However, at a deeper 
more psychological level, the observer who remains a stranger to this event 
cannot understand what the survivor says after all. Radical alterity mitigates 
against any clear understanding of what it is the survivor says. I think that 
Simon’s spectator who can “make sense" of what she hears, and make 
“intelligible" what she sees, admits too much. The spectator's reception, to me, 
seems naive.
Drawing on the work of Levinas, Simon suggests that another kind of 
reception of Holocaust testimony is what he calls “the summoned” (1998, p.
147). When one feels summoned to hear the call of the other, one engages in a 
response which opens toward the listener’s “vulnerability” (p. 148) so as to be 
summoned, to open oneself to pain. Like Simon, I suggest that one needs to 
embrace a psychological readiness if one wishes to engage in this kind of work. 
And I suggest also that it is not just a question of the reader’s or listener's 
vulnerability. What is at stake is even more than this. Researchers need to be 
prepared for the possibility of being traumatized. Of course, not everyone who 
does work on the Holocaust becomes traumatized. And certainly researchers 
will not experience trauma in the same ways as Holocaust survivors. But there 
are traces of trauma deposited in these texts, deposited deeply from the 
unconscious of the writer. The reader’s own unconscious will interact with these 
complex psychodynamics and it is almost unavoidable that some sort of psychic 
upheaval will occur. The intensity of this psychic upheaval the researcher may 
experience has much to do with her own psychic make-up, her family history 
and her own personal memory in relation to the black sun of Auschwitz. What 
complexifies “intrapsychic trauma" (Roth, 1995b, p. 38) is that it might not
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happen at a conscious level. I will argue that Holocaust texts, because they are 
so hideous, cannot be assimilated consciously. And as Freud (1915) pointed 
out, what transpires between one unconscious and another (the reader’s 
unconscious and unconscious traces deposited in texts by the author) does not 
have to pass through consciousness at all. Thus the reading impacts the reader 
at the site of the unconscious in uncanny ways. And of course it is difficult to say 
when “intrapsychic” (Roth, 1995a, p. 38) trauma will emerge and in what form it 
might become manifest. Again, not every reader will experience this, but it is 
nearly unavoidable if one is truly emotionally and intellectually engaged with 
these difficult memories.
Roger Simon (1998) calls the engagement with Holocaust testimony a 
“hopeful project” (p. 141). This is not a “utopian” (p. 141) hope, one that is 
pointed toward the future, but a “present” (p. 141) hope. This is a “proleptic” 
hope, as Patrick Slattery (1999, p. 30) might say, one that is intertwined in past, 
present and future. Simon contends that our very “re-thinking” (pp. 146-147) of 
the Holocaust and its necessarily “unsettling” (pp. 146-147) nature, and our 
openness to “loss" (p. 149), gives us hope in the continued remembrance of the 
Holocaust. Against Simon, Britzman (1998), Langer (1998), Hartman (1996), 
and Ofer and Weitzman (1998), suggest that the notion of hope is incompatible 
with the memory of Auschwitz. I too argue against hope. I argue for a dystopic 
curriculum. A curriculum that is not nihilistic but that is guided by an ethically 
sensitive “promise of truthfulness" (Wyshogrod, 1998, p. 10). There is nothing 
hopeful about the Holocaust. Lawrence Langer says, “What [do]hope and grace 
have to do with a historical episode that ended in mass murder?" (1998, xiv).
In sum, John Weaver, Gregory Wegner, Elizabeth Ellsworth, Deborah 
Britzman and Rober Simon have all done noteworthy work on the Holocaust.
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Each of these scholars demonstrates an ethical sensibility. I have learned much 
from their work. However, my study departs from what these scholars have done 
in many ways. I offer to educators a Holocaust curriculum which is interpreted 
through dystopic lenses. Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum, competing 
memories (those memories inscribed in historical representations and those 
inscribed in literary representations) emerge not as a promise of hope, but as a 
testament to despair and truthfulness.
In chapter two I offer up a psychoanalytic hermeneutic that might help us 
to understand the complexities involved when attempting to “recover memory” 
(Pinar, 1991, pp. 173-174). I will argue that unconscious processes may, in 
some way, determine what gets represented as Holocaust memory in the first 
place. And I also suggest that unconscious psychological processes guide our 
responses to these difficult memories as well.
In chapter three I will examine what I term classical and postmodern 
notions of representation and discuss possible psychological effects for Jews, of 
anti-Semitic representations of Jewish subjects. I contend that although there 
were many reasons that the Holocaust occured, one cannot reduce these 
causes to anti-Semitism. Still anti-Semitism played a large role in the rise of the 
Nazi era and the Final Solution. Therefore, it becomes important for educators 
to grapple with anti-Semitic representations. Because the anti-Semite and the 
Jew have interconnected and perhaps symbiotic “representational trajectories” 
(Nochlin, 1995, p. 1), it is crucial to reflect on the relations of anti-Semitic 
projections and Jewish introjections with these representations.
In chapter four I will unravel some complexities around the notions of 
memory and history. I will suggest that memory is the larger category under 
which history may be subsumed, although history is not reducible to memory. I
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will show how the discipline of history grew out of literature during the 
seventeenth century. It is important to understand the connections between 
history and literature. Although history shares certain features with literature, it is 
not reducible to it. Like history, I contend that literature is a form of memory, an 
expression of memory.
What I term the memory text of Holocaust histories will be fleshed out in 
chapter five. Here I will analyze perpetrator, victim and bystander histories. I will 
draw on psychoanalytic theory to help understand the complex nature of 
responses to the Holocaust.
Chapter six will deal with what I term the memory text of Holocaust 
novels. Here I will examine current debates around the very act of writing these 
novels. Then I turn to both Jewish and German non-Jewish Holocaust novels. 
Again, I draw on psychoanalytic theory to interpret these works.
Chapter seven is entitled Competing Memories under the Sign of a 
Dystopic Curriculum. My title is named in memory of Bruno Schultz. Schulz's 
(1939/1979) novel called Sanatorium under the Sian of the Hourglass, was 
written just a few years before he was killed by the Nazis. Schultz was a Jew, a 
teacher, a poet and a novelist whom many consider to have been as great a 
writer as Kafka. John Updike comments that Schulz’s "panoramas disclose 
themselves... through the lens of memory" (1979, xiii). A dystopic curriculum is 
a call to remembrance, a testament to suffering and not a promise of hope.
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CHAPTER 2 
A PSYCHOANALYTIC HERMENEUTIC
In order to interpret competing memories of the Holocaust as they are 
represented in the writings of historians and novelists, I will draw on 
psychoanalytic theory. Psychoanalysis is a form of hermeneutics that offers 
insights helpful for understanding complexities around the ways in which we 
might psychologically frame memories, especially when these memories are 
repressed. As William Pinar suggests, “The curricular task becomes to recover 
memory and history in ways that psychologically allow individuals to reenter 
politically the public sphere in meaningful ways" (1991, pp.173-174). The task 
of recovering Holocaust memory, however, becomes difficult because 
researchers are subject to their own resistances, reversals, intellectualizations, 
projections and denials. Many kinds of unconscious psychological mechanisms 
can alter the way in which we construct and reconstruct memory. A step toward 
recovering memory is grappling with our own unconscious responses to difficult 
texts. Adequate interpretations of the Holocaust take account of the limits of 
interpretation due to psychological resistances. Adequate interpretations must 
do justice to victims and survivors. Yet attempts to tell and re-tell Holocaust 
memory must be made, keeping the limits of interpretation in mind. Justice is 
done if the re-telling approximates truthfulness and keeps intact the otherness 
of this memory. But interpreters cannot represent the Holocaust adequately if 
they are unaware of their own unconscious psychological resistances and 
repressions.
Transferential relations with texts complexify these responses. We 
transfer old patterns of perception onto new texts. And these old patterns, 
perhaps established in early childhood, shape the ways in which we
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interpret and translate texts. Our awareness of these old habits helps to undo 
habitually complacent readings, readings that do not allow for the otherness of 
the text to emerge, readings that do not allow for interference, discontinuity and 
difference to emerge. Reading Holocaust texts interferes with complacency 
because psychic upheavals do not allow for assimilation into consciousness. 
These psychic upheavals get introjected into the unconscious and take on a life 
of their own.
This chapter will examine Freudian, Kleinian and Fairbairnian 
psychoanalytic theory. Freud, Klein and Fairbairn help us raise different 
questions that pertain to the ways in which we construct Holocaust memory.
This chapter will also introduce some debates around the ways in which 
psychohistorians and psychobiographers have traditionally used 
psychoanalytic theory in their work around the Holocaust.
The Vicissitudes of Classical Psychoanalytic Theory
A psychoanalytic hermeneutic is necessarily incomplete and ambivalent. 
Addressing Holocaust texts always keeps us at the limits of interpretation. It 
would be arrogant to suggest that a psychoanalytic hermeneutic could get it 
right or tell the absolute truth about the Holocaust. I want to emphasize that the 
call that has addressed me to do work around the Holocaust continually 
announces itself in interferences and ruptures. I am continually unsettled. Doing 
interpretive work around these texts causes unsettling ruptures in 
understanding and ruptures in representation, in working toward understanding 
these difficult memories, I realize how little an outsider to this event can 
understand. I stand outside this event because I am not a Holocaust survivor 
and thus I am always looking at this event through the memory text of others.
At the moment I think I grasp Holocaust memory, this grasp is ruptured.
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Psychoanalytic theory can do only so much to help us understand. Saul 
Friedlander remarks that “A successful application of Freud’s notions to history 
[or anybody else's notions for that matter] would lead to a partial explanation of 
a partial series of events" (1978, p. 5). A psychoanalytic hermeneutic is indeed 
a partial explanation. Still, I argue that psychoanalytic notions can serve as 
powerful tools of interpretation.
Psychoanalytic theory is not monolithic. Edith Kurzweil comments that 
“the fragmentation of psychoanalytic theory proves, among other things, that the 
Freudians primarily are united by their profession rather than by their ideas” 
(1998, ix). Deter Wyss (1961/1973) categorizes splits in the field of 
psychoanalysis as follows: The Freudian school, he suggests, includes 
Abraham, Ferenczi, Fenichel. The New York Group includes Hartmann, Kris, 
Loewenstein, Erikson, Greenacre, Reich, Reick, Federn, Alexander. The neo- 
Freudians include Adler, Horney, Fromm, Rado and Sulliven. The British Group 
includes Glover, Jones, Anna Freud, Klein. The British Group split because of 
disagreements between Melanie Klein and Anna Freud. Greenberg and 
Mitchell (1983) tell us that the British Group split into the A Group (followers of 
Anna Freud), the B Group (followers of Melanie Klein) and the Middle Group 
(followers of Winnicott and Fairbairn). Sandler and Sandler (1998), however, 
suggest that the A Group includes Kleinians and the B Group “contemporary 
Freudians” (ix). Sandler and Sandler refer to the Middle Group as the “Group of 
Independent Analysts" (ix). The British Group is known for what is called object 
relations theory. Sandler and Sandler (1998) suggest that object relations 
theorists include “Margaret Mahler, Rene Spitz, Ronald Fairbairn, Erik Erikson, 
Michael Balint, Donald Winnicott, Heinz Hartman, Edith Jacobson, Heinz Kohut, 
John Bowlby, Harry Guntrip, Arnold Modell, Otto Kernberg, Wilfred Bion” (1998,
35
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
ix). I would add to these lists post-Freudians like Christopher Bollas, Adam
Phillips, Andre Green, Jean Laplanche, Martin Stanton, Julia Kristeva. Post-
Lacanians might include Bice Benvenuto, Dary Nubs, Filip Geer-a-dyn and
Judith Guruvich (Burgoyne & Sullivan, 1997). Kleinians, Fairbairnians, post-
Freudians and post-Lacanians agree on little. And interestingly enough, many
of these splits in the field have been caused over interpretations of Freud's
texts. Otto Kernberg (1998) points out that
The interpersonal, intersubjective, and self psychoanalytic 
theorists feel that Freud and object relations are incompatible 
because it is impossible to reconcile drive theory with 
object relations. Conversely, Kleinian Independent 
[British Independent Group] and ego-psychology 
theorists feel that those theories are compatible, (xvi)
The question around whether or not theories like object relations are 
continuous or discontinuous with Freud’s initial project has caused rifts in the 
field of psychoanalysis. However, this debate seems misguided because every 
new interpretation of Freud’s texts alters his initial intentions, no matter how 
continuous or orthodox or close the reading. There is no authoritative or 
definitive reading of Freud.
In part, difficulties around Freud’s texts are due to James Strachey’s 
English translation of Freud, which is referred to as the Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Freud, or simply (SE). Many scholars feel that 
Strachey’s translation is the most definitive and authoritative one. Thus, 
Strachey’s translation has become the ’’standard" reading of Freud. Scholars’ 
loyalty to Strachey’s "standard" translation presupposes that, again, Strachey 
has got Freud right, that his is the closest reading. But some point out that 
Strachey’s translation is skewed and re-presents a Freud which is more 
scientific and medicalized than Freud. Use Grubrich-Simitis tells us that
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For the past dozen years or so, James Strachey’s 
English translation, as presented in the Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, has been the butt of vehement 
criticism. The criticism was brought to the attention of 
a wider public in 1983 by Bruno Bettleheim’s book essay 
Freud and Man's Soul.. . .  its author accuses Freud’s 
English translations, including of course James Strachey, 
of corrupting Freud's humanistic project, set down in 
the vernacular... by their scientistic, medicalized 
rendering. (1996, p. 11)
The scientistic, medicalized rendering does pose problems for the reader.
Strachey's translation gives the impression that Freud was even more prone to
pathologize and medicalize than he was. Medicalized and scientistic language
also give the impression that Freud’s notions function in a way that reify and
reduce. Notions that medicalize function as a diagnosis for an illness. Illnesses
need to be cured.Certainly this is one way to read Freud.
However, a post-Freudian interpretation of Freud might sound different. A 
post-Freudian reading of Freud does not reify notions of self but points to 
complexities and ambiguities of self. Christopher Bollas, Adam Phillips, Andre 
Green, Martin Stanton, Jean Laplanche and Jacques Derrida read Freud in a 
post-Freudian way. These scholars point out the ambivalences of Freud’s texts. 
These scholars suggest that the project of Freudian analysis is not to reduce 
and pathologize, but to show, in fact, how strange and other we are, even to 
ourselves. The point here is not to use Freud to normalize and diagnose, but to 
use Freud in order to complexify notions around self and other. Instead of 
interpreting Freud as fixing problems and curing illness, Freud can also be 
interpreted through the lenses of ambivalence and uncertainty around who we 
are as human beings. Ambivalences concerning Freudian notions is something 
around which Jacques Derrida has remarked. Derrida comments that,
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Freud never managed to form anything that deserves 
to be called a concept.. . .  [he offers to us] only an impression, 
a series of impressions associated with a word. To the vigor 
of the concept, I am opposing here the vagueness or the 
open impression, the relative indeterminacy of such a 
notion... the unstable feeling of a shifting figure. (1996, p. 29)
The Freudian notion “introjection", for example, is one that is slippery. It is 
not something that is easily definable by Freud, or by anyone else for that 
matter. Introjection is a vague and shifting impression, as Derrida might say, 
pointing toward the ways in which we might internalize significant others into 
our psyche. Exactly how or why introjection happens is not clear. Freud 
suggests that after the resolution of the Oedipus Complex we introject images of 
our parents. How these significant others get internalized remains a mystery. 
What it is we do with these internal images is not clear either. And Freud does 
not tell us, in any precise way, what it is we do with these internal images. Thus, 
a post-Freudian reading of Freud leaves open these kinds of questions. I 
suggest that we should use Freud’s notions in a way that avoids pathologizing, 
diagnosing or fixing, which reduces and reifies notions around identity and self.
Freud continually revised his texts and changed positions around many
different ideas throughout his life. To say the least, Freud’s texts are bewildering
because of the contradictions, repetitions and reversals readers find throughout
his twenty-four volume masterpiece. Jean Laplanche comments that
It is above all certain large contradictions, traversing 
Freud’s work from one end to the other, which must be 
interpreted dialectically, either as contradictions of 
thought-consequently referable to a certain 
“unspoken” dimension-or as contradictions of the 
object itself: such for instance, is the case for the major 
contradictions inherent in the notion of the “ego,” at 
once a totality and a specific agency, a cathected 
love object that nevertheless arrogates to itself the 
position of a subject. (1985, p. 1)
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Laplanche is right to point out Freud’s “unspoken dimension.” This unspoken 
dimension highlights Freud’s own ambivalences around his work. Now these 
ambivalences, which result in the many contradictory positions one finds 
reading the vast landscape of Freudian theory, can become frustrating for the 
reader who wants clarity and certainty, but that is not what Freud's project was 
about. And certainly, to dismiss Freud because he tended to be contradictory is 
naive.
Freud seemed ambivalent about the nature of the psyche. It seems to me
that the large change in Freud’s own thinking turns on the notion of the
unconscious. Early Freud divides the psychic apparatus into three “systems.”
The first “topography" (Freud, 1932-1936b p. 71) includes systems Ucs., Pcs.
and Cs. which are designated as the unconscious, preconscious and conscious
respectively. Early on, Freud seemed to suggest that the unconscious played
less of a role in our lives than consciousness. Freud became convinced later in
his life that most of our lives are acted out unconsciously. Freud revises this first
topography because he realizes tha t,
portions of the ego and superego [are] well
unconscious... we percieve that we have no right
to name the mental region that is foreign to the
ego the system Ucs; since the characteristic
of being unconscious is not restricted to it. (1932-1936b, p. 72)
Later Freud, therefore, designated these three areas of the psyche, or what is
called the second topography, as id, ego and superego. And the id or the
unconscious plays a much greater role in conscious life than initially assumed
by Freud. The id covers over larger portions of both ego and superego than was
once presupposed. Along with revising his mental topography, Freud changed
his position around many other notions too. For example, the notion of anxiety,
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before 1926, suggests an overloading of stimulus. After 1926 the term “signal 
anxiety” appears and anxiety is considered to be “ a device activated by the 
ego" (Laplanche & Pontalis, 1973, p. 422). Anxiety serves to ward off danger. 
Here anxiety plays a defensive role to protect the ego.This function of defense is 
the crucial change Freud makes around the notion of anxiety.
Along with revisions around the notions of topography and anxiety, Freud
dropped the hypnotic method, dropped the term “defense hysteria,” dropped the
notion of the “seduction theory." Most notably, though, Freud became more
pessimistic about human nature. In 1930 he began to talk about aggression and
the death instinct; some suggest he was influenced by Melanie Klein. But it is
against the backdrop of the rise of the Nazi era that Freud changed his mind
about what it is that motivates human action. Peter Gay says, “Having long
delayed the recognition of aggression as a fundamental human endowment,
Freud, in his later years, confessed that he could no longer conceive of the mind
without if  (Gay, 1989, xxviii). It is important to understand that Freud’s later work
was written against the backdrop of Hitler's ascendency to power. Hitler was
elected in 1933 and Freud, subject to his own denial and resistances, “refused”
(Gay, 1989, xivi) to believe that the Nazis would overshadow all of Europe.
While many Jewish psychoanalysts had already fled Europe by 1933, Freud
refused to leave until his daughter Anna was “summoned to [the] Gestapo"
(Gay, 1989, xivii). Finally, Freud fled to London and died in 1939. He was,
however, not totally oblivious to what was happening. We read in the final lines
of Civilization and Its Discontents that
Men have gained control over the forces of nature to 
such an extent that with their help they would have no 
difficulty in exterminating one another. And now it is 
to be expected that the other of the two 'Heavenly Powers’
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. . .  eternal Eros, will make an effort to assert himself___
But who can foresee with what sucess and with what 
result? (Freud, 1930/1961, p. 104)
James Strachey notes that the last sentence of Civilization and Its Discontents
was added in 1931 when “the menace of Hitler was already beginning to be
apparent" (1930/1961, p. 104).
No matter what objections one might have to reading Freud and utilizing
his psychoanalytic notions, it must be acknowledged that Freud is a major figure
of our time and has changed our language and the landscape of Western
culture. Jacques Derrida says that
The nearly unforgettable and incontestible, 
and undeniable impression (even above all for those 
who deny it) that Sigmund Freud will have made on 
anyone, after him, who speak of him or speak to 
him, and who must, accepting it or not, knowing it or 
not, be thus marked.. . .  If one is under the impression 
that it is possible not to take into account, forgetting 
it, effacing it, crossing it out, or objecting to it, one has 
already confirmed... even countersigned (thus achieved) 
a “repression." ( 1996, pp. 30-31)
Freud suggests in his second topography that there are three places of 
mind: the id, ego and superego. The ego and superego are born out of the id, 
and to a great extent the id covers over both ego and superego. The id 
seeks “satisfaction" (Freud, 1914-1916a, pp. 122-123) of libidinal “aims." “The 
object [objeht] of an instinct.. . .  may be changed any number of times” (pp. 122- 
123). The object around which the instinct aims is secondary, while the 
satisfaction of the libido is primary. The id, Freud tells us, “has no organization..
. contrary impulses exist side by side.. .There is nothing in the id that could be 
called negation... [nothing] compares to tim e... no alteration in its mental 
processes is produced by the presence of time" (1932-1936b, p.74). What is
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unconscious is not remembered. For Freud, there is no such thing as a dim 
unconscious or shadowy unconscious. What is unconscious cannot be 
remembered.
Freud says that “the ego is identical with the id, and is merely a specially 
differentiated part of i t . . .  The same is true of the relation between the ego and 
superego. In many situations they are merged" (1959, p. 17). However, Freud 
also says that the ego is not identical with the id because unlike the id, the ego 
is “an organization” (1959, p. 17), which has the “impulsion to bind together" 
(1959, p. 19). Hence, it seems Freud is saying that the ego is both identical and 
not identical with the id. Thus, the aporia of the ego. Most of the content of 
consciousness, Freud suggests is unconscious; therefore, much of our lives are 
acted out unconsciously.
The superego for Freud is a later development than either id or ego. The
superego develops after the resolution of the Oedipus Complex. Laplanche and
Pontalis explain that the Oedipus Complex is
A desire for the death of the rival- the parent of the same 
sex- and sexual desire for the parent of the opposite sex 
. . .  [or] love for the parent of the same sex, and jealous hatred 
for the parent of the opposite sex. (1973, p. 283)
If the child does not resolve the Oedipus Complex she will develop
relationships in later life that unconsciously repeat these early struggles.
Whether or not the Oedipus Complex is resolved, however, the child still
introjects mental representations of her parents into her psyche. These
introjections sound the voice of conscience. If a too-harsh superego emerges,
then Freud might suggest that the Oedipus Complex has not been resolved. A
too-harsh superego can cause psychic upheavals in later life and become
unsettling. Many suggest that a too-harsh superego is the root of sadism.
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If the Oedipus Complex is not resolved, repression of unbearable thoughts
about parents occur. Freud says that,
All repressions take place in early childhood; 
they are primitive defense mechanisms taken by 
an immature, feeble ego. In later years no fresh 
repressions are carried out; but the older ones 
persist... new conflicts are disposed of by... after 
repression. (1937/1991, p. 14)
After repressions, then, are uncanny repetitions of old conflicts in new forms.
Repressed material pushes upward and has "an impulsion to break through”
(Freud, 1932-1936, p. 68) to consciousness. But the ego, which manifests
resistances, pushes against repressed material preventing it from being made
conscious. Juan-David Nasio explains that
The more the ego attacks the representation 
[which is intolerable] the more it isolates it. This defensive 
spirt of effort on the part of the ego is precisely what 
Freud calls repression.. . repression primarily means 
isolation. It is because this representation has become 
radically separated from the other organized representations 
of psychic life that it becomes fundamentally unbearable.
(1998, p. 17)
That which is repressed returns. But it returns in the form of disguises and 
displacements. Hysteric, phobic, schizophrenic, depressive, obsessional acting 
out are signals that something old is not being remembered and has not been 
worked through. These are symptoms that signal the failure of repression. 
Repression has failed to keep these interferences pushed down into the 
unconscious registers. What is old and not worked through arrives at the 
conscious level in bizarre forms which take on their own trajectories and unfold 
in their own time.
Repression is considered by Freud as one of the “vicissitudes of the 
instincts” (1914-1916a, p. 126). Instincts “undergo the following vicissitudes-
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reversal into its opposite, turning around upon the subject or self, repression, 
sublimation" (I9l4-19l6a, p. 126). These “vicissitudes" serve to protect the ego 
from the flooding of negative or unpleasurable stimuli. In her book called The 
Eao and The Mechanisms of Defense. Anna Freud (1966/1993) fleshes out 
these so-called vicissitudes under the name defense mechanisms. Anna Freud 
expands her father's list of vicissitudes, terming defense mechanisms 
“regression, repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, projection, 
introjection, turning against the self, reversal. .. displacement” (p. 44). She also 
mentions other kinds of defense mechanisms such as intellectualization and 
identification with the aggressor. Understanding defense mechanisms becomes 
key especially when one attempts to deconstruct responses researchers might 
have reading Holocaust texts.
Defense mechanisms are used by the psyche to protect the ego from 
pain. We utilize them all throughout life. They can help or hurt depending upon 
what they are used to do. When examining Holocaust texts we need to 
understand some of the ways defense mechanisms work to shut off intolerable 
thoughts from conscious awareness. Thus, it becomes crucial to flesh out some 
of the defense mechanisms that are relevant to Holocaust memory work.
Denial is the most obvious form of defense. And there are all kinds of 
denials. To deny, for instance, that the Holocaust happened is a form of defense 
against pain. Holocaust deniers are easy to dismiss as kooks, but it becomes 
frightening to realize that their numbers continually grow. So-called revisionists 
practice another form of denial by re-writing the Holocaust in ways that falsify. 
Some revisionists say that fewer than six million Jews were murdered; some 
argue that gas chambers did not exist. Some argue that only Nazis were 
complicit and not ordinary Germans, theWehrmacht (the German army) or
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police reserve units. Some argue that the real culprits were the Russians not the 
Germans, who merely imitated the Gulag system in order to prevent Russians 
from putting Germans in Gulags. The Russians, in other words, should be 
blamed for starting up concentration camps, while Germans merely imitated the 
Russians in order not to be killed themselves. Some claim that the Holocaust 
was a Jewish plot to acquire Israel. These bizzare rationalizations, reversals 
and outright lies are all forms of denial. Although they seem crazy to me and 
crazy to others doing work on the Holocaust, they seem perfectly reasonable to 
revisionists. And this is what is unsettling.
Another form of denial has been prevalent among East Germans. Recall,
East Germans have traditionally considered themselves, not Jews, to be the
victims of history.The anti-Fascist rhetoric serves as a defense mechanism
against pain, against the idea that Germans, East and West, were complicit.
East German Communists persecuted Jews and perpetuated anti-Semitic
crimes against Jews even after the close of World War II. Margaret Mitscherlich-
Nielson points to the way in which Germans have generally been in denial
since the end of the war. She says that
After the defeat [of Germany] there was first an 
abrupt derealization; the past simply faded away 
like a dream. The switch of identity through identification 
with the victims, accomplished as it was without 
particularly noticeable signs of injured pride, reinforced 
the defense against any feelings of being implicated. The 
manic effect to undo, the enormous effort to rebuild, 
a kind of nationally accepted therapy, made permanent 
denial and repression possible for the majority of 
Germans. (Mitscheriich-Nielson, 1989, p. 406)
The idea that Germans were victims of history, is a form of defense, a form of
denial that serves to protect the ego from pain. And in Germany there are all
sorts of levels of this denial still intact today.
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One of the bizarre manifestations of denial for Germans concerns the 
arrival of philosemitism during the 1970s and 1980s (Rapaport, 1997). Against 
the backdrop of the Holocaust and Germany's long history of anti-Semitism, it 
seems odd that all things Jewish had become suddenly fashionable. German 
Jews seem to be, for the most part, skeptical of this; many say that they live in 
Germany but sit on their suitcases. I would suggest that philosemitism, at least 
for Germans, could function as a reaction formation. Laplanche and Pontalis 
note this is a
Psychological attitude or habitus diametrically 
opposed to a repressed wish, and constituted as 
reaction against i t . . . .  reaction-formation is the 
counter-cathexis of a conscious element equal 
in strength to the unconscious cathexis, it works 
in the contrary direction. (1973, p. 376)
Philosemitism masks an anti-Semitism, and I think that I would subsume 
reaction formations as forms of defense. Underneath the love for all things 
Jewish is a more insideous hatred.
Projection is another defense mechanism that becomes useful to look at 
when studying the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Projection is a defense 
mechanism that perpetrators utilized to justify scapegoating and ultimately 
murdering Jews. When the ego cannot tolerate its own heart of darkness, its 
own negativity, it projects negativity onto the other to rid itself of intolerable 
thoughts. Andre Green says that “Projection is linked to a primary defense 
mechanism fundamentally defined by the action of expelling; of casting out (to 
project-to spit, to vomit) something within which is unpleasant” (1986, p. 85). 
Green says further that projection is “closely linked to paranoia" (p. 85). The 
anti-Semite is paranoid because he feels, in a move of reversal, that the Jew is
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the persecutor. Anti-Semites throughout history, and especially during the 
Middle Ages, had bizarre phantasies about Jews. Jews had been thought to be 
the devil, Christ killers, bloodsuckers, cannibals. And of course, these 
phantasies have absolutely no basis in reality. These phantasies get projected 
onto the Jew because the anti-Semite cannot tolerate his own heart of 
darkness: He projects it onto the Jew so as to rid himself of badness.
Along with the mechanism of projection, the defense mechanism of 
splitting might have allowed perpetrators to carry out murder, while repressing 
the emotional effects of killing. Lifton (1986) and Kelman (1976) point out that 
Nazi doctors and camp guards might have experienced a process of 
derealization and numbing, becoming desensitized to what they were doing. 
Sometimes this desensitization led to splitting, or what Lifton (1986) calls 
“doubling” (p. 6). Andre Green points out that splitting and repression for Freud 
are two different things, but both serve to protect the ego from flooding of 
negative feelings. “In splitting the relationship [between id and ego] is 
horizontal; the reason of the ego and the reason of the instinctual demands
coexist It says 'yes' and 'no' at the same time" (Green, 1986, pp.25-26).
Unlike splitting, repression, for Freud, is a “vertical move" (Green, 1986, p. 25) 
which pushes against the ego's resistances. Lifton and Kelman, when they talk 
of splitting, suggest the simultaneity of experiencing two selves at once. The 
man who kills, experiences himself in two places at once. He pulls the trigger, 
but while doing this he splits off from the act psychologically. From the site of his 
observing ego, he watches himself, distancing himself from the act of murder.
For victims and survivors of the Holocaust, the utilization of the 
mechanisms of defense were crucial for survival. But let me make it clear that 
the experiences of victims and victimizers were radically different and should
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never be leveled. I am not suggesting here that victims’ experiences were the 
same as the victimizers, because both groups utilized defense mechanisms. 
People use defense mechanisms for radically different reasons in radically 
different circumstances. Without utilizing defense mechanisms, we would lapse 
into a state of psychosis. According to Freud, everyone needs defenses to be 
ego syntonic. Without defenses, our egos would simply deteriorate. For victims 
and survivors of the Holocaust defense mechanisms became crucial. Those 
who could not turn to stone emotionally endangered their existence. Splitting, 
which serves to cut off emotions and stop the flow of feeling, became prevalent 
among Jews. Bruno Bettlelheim (1971) remarked, while being deported to 
Dachau,“What happened to me-for instance, the split within me onto one who 
observed and one to whom things happened-was a typical schizoid 
phenomena” (p. 114). Splitting might have prevented the ego from 
deteriorating. But, at the end of the day, it is hard to say whether these defenses 
saved anybody. Bettleheim comments that all of the teachings of 
psychoanalysis that he took with him into the concentration camp became 
irrelevant. People who seemed to demonstrate a psychological togetherness, 
before the war, those who seemed to have intact egos before the advent of 
Auschwitz, responded in ways that completely stunned Bettelheim. He points 
out that psychoanalytic theory came up short against the horrors of the 
Holocaust and what these horrors did to the human psyche. Psychoanalytic 
theory did not help Bettelheim understand the complex responses of Jews. And 
I think this is a very important point to keep in mind. Psychoanalytic theory can 
only explain so much.
Repressed memory around the Holocaust, for Jews, serves as yet 
another form of defense against pain. The not-telling, the pact of silence around
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this horrific event is still very much a part of Jewish culture, although more
people talk about the Holocaust today than they did twenty years ago. Even if
Jewish survivors talk about this memory, the re-telling haunts. It becomes
difficult to say whether talking about it or repressing it is more harmful. Many
Jewish fiction writers, after having written about the Holocaust, committed
suicide. But many analysts would suggest that repressing the memory has
bad effects too. Many analysts suggest that lifting repressed memory might help
undo depression and depersonalization. Dori Laub (1992) comments that
repressing Holocaust memory eventually becomes harmful to the psyche, for
the repressed returns. The repressed haunts in all sorts of bizarre ways.
Survivors who do not tell their story become victims 
of a distorted memory, that is, of a forcibly imposed 
“external evil"... The “riot telling” of the story serves as 
a perpetuation of its tyranny. The events become more 
and more distorted in their silent retention and 
pervasively invade and contaminate the survivor’s 
daily life. (p. 74)
Karl Abraham and Maria Torok have suggested that repression is not 
total. Unlike Freud, they suggest that memory becomes, rather, “encrypted” (in 
Bellamy, 1997, p. 21). An encrypted memory is one that is not wholly forgotten 
nor wholly remembered. It manifests itself, Bellamy tells us “in the form of a 
“crypt"- a kind of melancholia that must inhabit an obscure threshold between 
memory and forgetting” (p. 21). Kestenberg (1989) points out that Shatan and 
Rosenfeld suggest that memory of Holocaust survivors is “encapsulated” or 
“jailed” (p. 386). Memory gets stuck; it becomes lodged in the heart of the 
psyche. Repressed memory is located somewhere between the remembered 
and the forgotten; it becomes haunting and torments survivors because it never 
goes away. And repressed memory somehow gets intrapsychically passed
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down to the next generation. Intergenerational trauma is a result of not working 
through encrypted and repressed memory. But it is difficult to say if these 
memories can ever really be worked through. Laplanche (1999) argues that 
when the repressed returns, it does not return as a copy of the originary trauma; 
rather, it becomes “dislocated" (p. 104) and forms what he calls a “double 
inscription” (p. 36). Second and even third generation Jews, who are children or 
grandchildren of Holocaust survivors, suffer these dislocations and 
displacements. It is not uncommon for children of Holocaust survivors to suffer 
nightmares,even if their parents never talk about their experiences in the 
camps. A belated and unwelcome suffering haunts intergenerationally, but 
analysts really do not understand how repressed memory gets introjected into 
the next generation. But the unconscious works in uncanny ways.
Researchers of the Holocaust are subject to their own psychological 
resistances, repressions, denials and projections while working on this difficult 
memory. Curriculum theorists and educators generally who do work on the 
Holocaust might be on the lookout for their own intellectualizations of this 
difficult material. Anna Freud (1966/1993) suggests that intellectual activity, 
when it is divorced from emotional registers, serves as a defense against pain. 
Intellectualization is an “ascetic flight from instinct” (p. 162). It is not enough to 
engage in “abstract intellectual discussions and speculations” (p. 162), 
although these abstractions are important. Anna Freud is not arguing here for 
anti-intellectualism, which is something altogether different from 
intellectualization. Rather, intellectualization is one way the ego 
compartmentalizes overwhelming emotional affects by detaching and 
separating them from emotional life. Laplanche and Pontalis comment that the 
trouble with intellectualization is that it cuts one off from emotional life.
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Intellectualization is comparable to other mechanisms 
described by psychoanalysis, and particularly to 
rationalisation. One of the main aims of intellectualizations 
is to keep the affects at arms length, to neutralize them.
(1973, p. 225)
This process of neutralizing emotions in analysis becomes evident, for 
example, when the analysand draws on theoretical knowledge, of, say, 
psychoanalytic literature, while ignoring emotional conflicts at hand during the 
encounter of working with the analyst. Drawing on abstractions may work to 
avoid emotional reactions from being analyzed. To intellectualize is a way to 
explain away emotions. And this is very dangerous when doing work around 
the Holocaust. If researchers do not feel anything while studying these horrific 
texts, something is wrong. More than likely, the researcher has shut down her 
emotional register. Distance and detachment from memory work damages both 
the researcher and her subjects of research. However, it is important to engage 
in intellectual activity but not at the expense of emotional life.
Researchers of the Holocaust are subject not only to their own 
resistances and repressions around difficult texts, but they are also subject to 
unconscious transferential relations with texts. One's awareness of 
transferential relations with texts may alter the ways in which interpretative work 
is done. At this juncture I would like to flesh out the notion of transference as it 
has relevance to self and other and then I would like to draw out some 
implications of transference for interpreting texts.
Freud (1911-1913) tells us that the “compulsion to repeat” (p. 151) old 
patterns of relations, formed with primary others or significant others, like our 
parents, shape the ways in which we handle relations with new people who 
come into our lives. “Repetition is a transference of the forgotten pasf (Freud, p.
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151). The forgotten past is most fundamentally an unconscious past. When a 
new person arrives on the scene, under the influence of transference, one tends 
to attribute qualities and feelings, thoughts and phantasies that are, in essence, 
transferred from the past, from some other significant other who has become 
internalized in the psyche, onto the new person. The old and the new can get 
blurred. Sometimes one may even unconsciously seek out others who, in some 
uncanny way, remind one of significant others from childhood,especially and 
ironically, if the relations one had with these significant others, were bad. Freud 
says that transference relations turn on uprototypesn (1966/1990, p. 29) from 
childhood which were primarily “unsatisfied" “libidinal cathexis" ( p. 29). These 
prototypes “attach" themselves to “stereotype plates" ( p. 29). Because the 
compulsion to repeat bad relations continues for some throughout life, and 
because it seems that the unconscious seeks its own destruction, Freud 
connects the compulsion to repeat with the death instinct.
The purpose of analysis, says Freud, is to help us undo transferences by 
becoming conscious of what is unconscious so that the cycle of abusive 
relations can stop. Arnold Cooper comments that Freud “believed that the 
transference represents a true reconstruction of the past, a vivid reliving of 
earlier desires and fears that distort the patient’s capacity to percieve the “true 
nature” of the present reality" (1990, p. 513). in analysis, the analysand 
misperceives the analyst who becomes blurred with the internalized phantasies 
of significant others. These internal objects, then, get transferred onto the 
analyst. Freud’s project, and the project of classical psychoanalysis, is to 
untangle these distortions and resolve the transference, so that the analyst can 
appear as she actually is to the analysand. The object of anaylsis is to send 
internal objects back to their original source, to send these phantoms back
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where they belong, back home. Internal objects, or what Freud calls stereotype 
plates, usually represent the image of the mother or father or any other 
significant other who shaped one’s childhood. But when these images get 
projected onto other people, the identities of the new people become blurred 
with the identities of the parents. The internal other, who is a sort of double of 
the original other or, say, the mother, must go back home. The analyst is not the 
mother, although the analysand may see her that way. The analyst may be a 
second mother figure, but she is not the mother. Analysis is supposed to 
untangle these confusions. But whether or not it can do this is questionable.
Freud uses the word transference in several senses. Generalized 
transference, Freud suggests, happens all the time and is not particular to the 
analytic situation. Transference at this level is a psychical process that is not, 
strictly speaking, induced only in the analytic situation. But in the analytic 
situation, the nature of transference changes. As analysis progresses, as 
anxiety is created by the analytic situation itself, the transference heightens and 
it changes from a generalized transference to a more specific one. This specific 
transference, which gets deposited onto the analyst, Freud called transference 
neurosis. Analyst Brian Bird explains, “When I think of transference, I think of 
feelings, of reactions, and of a repetition of past events; but when I think of 
transference neurosis, I think literally of neurosis. A transference neurosis is 
merely a new edition of the patient’s original neurosis, but with me in it” (1990, 
p. 343). When the analyst becomes the center of the analysand’s anxieties, this 
is a signal that transference neurosis has arrived. Transference neurosis, 
according to Freud, can be experienced both as sexual and hostile. Freud 
suggests that both of these responses to the analyst serve as resistances to 
getting underneath the repressed unconscious. In order to sort out the actual
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from the phantasized images that blur relations due to transference, the activity 
of transference neurosis must be enacted. Otherwise analysis will fail.
But transference is not that simple. The analyst, too, undergoes changes 
in her unconscious as a result of the patient’s transference relations with her. 
Freud mentions only briefly that the analyst’s unconscious is subject to what he 
terms countertransference. Freud suggests that countertransference should be 
avoided. Countertransference is seen by Freud primarily as sexual in nature 
and as an impediment to the anaiysand’s treatment and the analyst's work.
In current psychoanalytic literature around the notion of transference 
analysts point out its complexities. Arnold Cooper remarks that Today, the idea 
of transference has become so complex that we are no longer sure what in the 
analysis is not transference, and if it is not, what it is" (1990, p. 527). If 
transference clouds lived experience, can we ever be in relation with others in a 
way that does not blur who these others are in our perception of them? Or are 
others always already blurred with patterns of perception inherited from 
childhood? Is any sorting out of transference possible? Or are we “trapped in 
transference” (Grumet, 1988, p. 117)? This blurring between self and other is 
thought by many analysts to be “inappropriate" (Greenson, 1990, p. 151) to the 
present situation at hand, it is viewed as an “illusion" (Mackenzie Rioch, 1988, 
pp. 37-38), or it is seen as an “abnormal phenomena” (Tower, 1988, p. 155), 
and it is most fundamentally considered to be irrational. The trouble with 
transference is that it is mostly unconscious. And as Margaret Little comments, 
“What is unconscious one cannot easily be aware of (if at all), and to try to 
observe and interpret something unconscious in oneself is rather like trying to 
see the back of one's own head" (1981, pp. 35-36).
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The question becomes whether these unconscious “stereotype plates" 
(Freud, 1966/1990, p. 29) are irrational and inappropriate after all. Merton Gill 
suggests that this kind of thinking “does violence to the actual nature of the 
relationship between patient and analysf (1988, p. 314). Further, Gill claims 
that transference is not so much about distorted perceptions of the other as it is 
a question of seeing the other in preconceived and “rigid" frameworks (p. 320). 
The more we become aware of transferences the more “flexibility" (Gill, 1988, p. 
32) we will have in our relations with others. It is not that transference will ever 
fully be resolved but if we are aware of it, we can undo rigid relations with 
others. Gill comments that transference functions as a way in which we 
“organize the field [of perception] to single out, for example, the particular item 
that others ignored but to which [one] attributes as idiosyncratic significance” 
(1988, p. 320). As against Freud, Martin Stanton (1997) suggests that what is 
made conscious during analysis does not clarify anything. Stanton argues, 
conversely, that “Transference resists interpretation" (p. 50).
Like transference, countertransference is thought by many analysts to be 
inappropriate and irrational. Following Freud, some analysts believe 
countertrarrference disrupts treatment. Countertransference is signaled by the 
analyst's “anxiety" (Blake Cohen, 1988, p. 69) that emerges while in 
relationship with the analysand. According to Edward Tauber, 
countertransference “represents] unanalyzed portions of the therapist’s 
personality that... interfere with the treatment’ (1988, p. 111). The point, then, 
for analysts, is to be analyzed enough before analyzing patients, so that the 
analyst s own issues get worked through. However, some argue that traces of 
countertransference remain no matter how much working through an analyst 
may accomplish. Margaret Little explains the difficulties of countertransference.
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The ever-quoted remedy for countertransference 
difficulties-deepen and move through analysis of 
the analyst-one can at best only be an incomplete 
one, for some tendency to develop unconscious infantile 
countertransference is bound to remain. (1981, p. 45)
Some analysts argue, as against Freud, that countertransference may be 
viewed not as an impediment, but as a “tool” (Blake Cohen, 1988, p. 67) that 
may be used to understand the ways in which an analysand evokes feelings in 
others. Paula Heimann was one of the first analysts to understand 
countertransference in a positive way. Mabel Blake Cohen comments that 
Heimann
states that the analyst's emotional responses to his 
patients within the analytic situation represent one of 
the most important tools for his work, and that the 
analyst's countertransference is an instrument of 
research into the patient’s unconscious. (1988, p. 67)
It becomes important to understand that the analyst should not act out her
countertransference anxieties, but that she should become aware of her own
feelings toward the analysand. The feelings evoked tell the analyst much about
the ways in which the patient evokes these kinds of feelings in others.
Lucia Tower (1988) contends that the term countertransference neurosis 
has also emerged on the scene. This term is not unlike transference neurosis. 
Countertransference neurosis might emerge in late stages of the analysand’s 
analysis. Here the analysand becomes the center of anxiety for the analyst. If 
the analysand reminds the analyst of someone else, and the analysand 
becomes blurred in the analyst’s psyche with someone else from the analyst's 
past, something has not been worked through. Tower, however, is 
uncomfortable with the term countertransference neurosis, thinking it a 
“misnomer” (p. 140). Perhaps she is uncomfortable with the term because it
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suggests a weakness on the part of the analyst. For some, the very notion of 
countertransference seems taboo and has traditionally been thought to be 
destructive for both analysand and analyst. But analysts are not simply mirrors 
to the analysand’s unconscious. Analysts are human beings who are subject to 
their own psychic interferences. Freud was well aware of this, but still he 
thought countertransference a negative response to the analysand.
Another point of contention among analysts around transference
concerns the notion of transference neurosis. Some collapse transference
neurosis onto generalized transference. Generalized, or “floating transference"
(Greenson, 1990, p. 151), according to some analysts, is all that analysands
experience during analysis. Brian Bird points out that
Most analysts nowadays work only with transference 
feelings. They either ignore the transference neurosis 
or believe... that there are no significant differences between 
transference neurosis and other transference reactions. For 
myself, I believe just the opposite: there are differences, 
and they are significant. (1990, p. 342).
Analysts who refuse to believe that transference neurosis signals a significant
shift during analysis may fear their own anxiety and countertrarrference
responses. This fear may result in simply ignoring the patient’s transference
neurosis, as Bird points out, explaining it away. According to Freud,
transference neurosis is different from generalized transference and should be
paid attention to. In fact, Freud argues that analysis will end in failure if the
analysand does not move through the stage of experiencing transference
neurosis. If transference neurosis is not enacted in the analytic situation, the
gritty stuff of the unconscious never comes up. But it is up to the analyst to allow
these intense feelings to surface. Transferential relations with others, whether
inside or outside the analytic situation, remain elusive, especially when
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transference reactions may provoke responses in the other and cause the other 
to experience countertransference. Identities are built in relation, and relations 
are complex.Thus, the translation of transference is anything but transparent. 
Whether in therapeutic or nontherapeutic relations, interpretation with others 
and of others signifies strangeness. Analysis, if anything, points to this 
strangeness of self and other. As Jean Laplanche (1999) stresses, analysis 
points to our ‘‘ex-centric" (62) and idiosyncratic subjectivity.
I suggest that transferential relations continue to emerge not just with 
people but also with texts. The text of transference, then, is broader than a one 
on one relation with an analyst. Freud claimed that generalized transference 
happens all the time. Transferential relations with texts have to do with the ways 
in which old patterns of perception mark interpretive work. Mertin Gill (1988) 
contends that the problem with transference is primarily rigidity. Whenever 
preconceived frames of reference continually haunt interpretations, whenever 
the interpreter finds herself repeating over and over again the same kinds of 
thoughts that keep the interpreter from thinking through the text in broader ways, 
transference could be the culprit. When researchers read Holocaust texts and 
are not psychologically ready to deal with horrific violence, the tendency is to 
gloss over the text or pull from the text ideas that in some way match 
preconceived notions or prearranged feelings about violent encounters. 
Transferential relations with texts are not unlike those experienced with people. 
Researchers need to become aware of their emotional responses to difficult 
texts, they need to become aware of the ways in which old patterns of 
perception overlay new scholarly projects. It is not that researchers can clearly 
translate texts, or clearly interpret texts; but reorganization of perception, and 
the undoing of resistances of our own emotional responses, may alter what it is
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that we see in these texts. I am not arguing for clarity or getting a close reading.
I am arguing for a closer examination of inner psychic upheavals, numbness 
and rigidity when approaching texts. Interpreters should be aware that readings 
of texts do something to the psyche as interpreters do something to the 
translation. As Andre Green suggests that “when all is said and done, it is the 
interpretation that he must give himself of the effect of the text in his own 
unconscious” (1986, p. 338). As the reader translates the text, the text changes 
the reader. And this is especially difficult when dealing with texts around the 
Holocaust. These texts change interpreters, and many of these changes are 
belated. How difficult memory texts change readers and researchers is elusive, 
but change is inevitable. It is important that curricularists mark these changes 
because these changes effect the present work at hand and the work that is to 
come in the future.
Although researchers may transfer a “stereotype plate” (Freud,
1966/1990, p. 29) onto new texts, and although there may a certain amount of 
rigidity and resistance while doing work on the Holocaust, because traces of 
transference will always remain; still, work to construct, interpret and re-interpret 
Holocaust texts can do justice to the memories of victims and survivors. 
Transference is inevitable, but I think that it is possible to translate a text in a 
certain way that is less rigid, less bounded by one’s previous experiences and 
handling of violence. But perhaps researchers are never fully ready to do this 
kind of work after all. No matter how much time is spent around the black sun of 
Auschwitz, constant ruptures in understanding occur, psychic upheavals 
continue. Transferential relations with texts may determine beforehand what a 
Holocaust historian and what a Holocaust novelist will choose to write about. 
Transference, Freud suggests, is brought on by a “compulsion to repear
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(1920/1989, p. 603) which “overrides the pleasure principle” (p. 605). In fact, 
Freud argues that the compulsion to repeat is a manifestation of the death 
instinct. An examination of Freud's notion of the death instinct and aggression 
raises many questions for the Holocaust researcher. Let us now turn, then, to 
Freud’s notion of the death instinct at this juncture.
Aggression is “the main representative of the death instinct” (Freud, 
1930/1961, p. 71). Aggression can either be introjected and “sent back toward” 
the ego (pp. 78-79), or it can be projected out onto other people. It manifests 
itself as self hatred or hatred of the other. And Freud remarks that hatred is older 
than love. But the death instinct, Freud insists, is enmeshed with the life instinct 
or eros. Eros and thanatos are inextricably bound.
Individuals who are aggressive can become dangerous. Groups can
become especially dangerous when thanatos and eros are unleashed. When a
group is led by a “tryannical leader,” Freud stresses that a “horde" mentality
tends to overtake the group (1920-1922, p. 121). When thanatos and eros are
unleashed, trouble is bound to occur. And this trouble is cause primarily
because of “contagion” and “imitation” (Freud, 1920-1921, p. 89). Tyranny is
unleashed because it undoes repressed impulses and allows “all that is evil” in
humankind to emerge (p. 74). Rob Weatherill comments that for Freud,
the catch-all term, the ‘death instinct’ tends to conflate 
sadism, aggressiveness, assertiveness, destructivness, 
mastery and the will for power, which are qualitatively 
different phenomena. Freud did see the differences 
between these qualities... but in his final duality 
[eros and thanatos] he was forced to lump them 
all together. (1998, p. 23)
Although Freud’s notion of the death instinct has not been 
wholeheartedly embraced by the psychoanalytic community (Laplanche and
60
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Pontalis, 1973), he is not alone in his conviction that the death instinct is real.
Melanie Klein (1937/1975), Christopher Bollas (1996/1997), Paul Russell
(1998) and Rob Weatherill (1998) consider Freud's notion of the death instinct
important since it can explain humankind's potential for aggression. Paul
Russel declares that
We take the notion of the death wish quite seriously.
It is not obviously wrong. One usually hears that 
aggression is the basic instinct, but that the idea of 
a death wish is mystical, unprovable. But this won't 
do. Freud's conception is a deeper one.. . .  Hate is 
the death wish, and love and hate lie at the very 
core of what trauma is about. (1998, p. 42)
I struggle with the notion of the death instinct because it suggests an
essentialized, universal, innate thing which is lodged in the heart of humanity.
On the other hand, I wonder why it is people who are not provoked, do bad
things? From whence does their aggression spring? If people have an innate
disposition toward destruction, can they be held responsible for committing
crimes? Ernst Rappaport points out that
One might object to Freud’s theory of the death instinct 
inasmuch as by laying the blame on an inborn destructive 
instinct--man is freed-from the responsibility for his 
behavior and permitted to escape the fear of 
consequences. (1975, p. 295)
Opponents of the death drive (Kohut, 1996a/1996b; Fairbairn, 1943/1954) 
believe that aggression is caused by bad relations with parents. Aggression is 
not natural, it is provoked by others. Heinz Kohut comments that "no purely 
destructive urge arises so long as the environnment is reasonably empathetic 
and responsive” (1996a, p. 207). But counter examples abound. Many 
scholars argue that Germans were not provoked and were not coerced to act 
aggressively. It does not seem to make sense that an entire country was the
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product of bad parenting. Most Germans were not innately sadistic or victims of 
child abuse (Lifton, 1986; Kelman, 1976; Langer, 1998; Goldhagen, 1997). 
Why, then, did Germans murder Jews? What was the source of their 
aggression? Daniel Goldhagen (1997) argues that Germans killed Jews 
because they wanted to, they chose to, nobody coerced them. But Goldhagen's 
argument seems so simplistic. To say that Germans killed because they wanted 
to, still does not explain much. Rob Weatherill (1998) suggests that acts of 
aggression are due to both external provocation and internal conflict. He takes 
a middle position between Freud (1920-1922) and Fairbairn (1943/1954). 
Freud, recall, argued that the death instinct causes violence. Fairbairn suggests 
that aggression is caused by provokation and bad parenting. Weatherill (1998) 
comments that aggression is a mixture of both internal and external 
circumstances. At the end of the day, questions around why it is people kill 
remain open. Perhaps researchers can never get behind the complex motives 
of mass murderers.
Freud has much to teach about aggression, the unconscious, defense 
mechanisms, transference relations, civilization and its discontents. But one of 
his shortcomings turns on dealing with the ways in which others get introjected 
into our psyches and become lodged. Object relations theorists pick up where 
Freud left off and develop notions of what they term internal objects. Object 
relations theorists flesh out the ways in which others get introjected into the 
psyche. Object relations theorists ask questions around the unconscious 
underpinnings of our inter-relations. Internal objects influence social relations.
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Object Relations Theory
Generally speaking, object relations theorists draw on Freud, in one way 
or another, to expand the notion of the “object." Freud claims that “the object 
[objeht ] of an instinct is the thing in regard to which the instinct is able to 
achieve its aim" (1914-1916, xiv). An object can be a person or a thing. Object 
relations theorists flesh out how objects get internalized and what it is these 
internalizations do to the psyche. When we interact with others we not only have 
a sense of the other as “an actual other" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 10) but 
as an “internal other" (p. 10) as well. These internal objects or internal 
representations of others “go under various names.. .‘illusory objects,’ 
‘introjections,’ ‘personifications'" (Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983, p. 11). Thomas 
Ogden (1994) stresses that object relations is not just about inter-relations with 
others, but it is about most “fundamentally a theory of unconscious internal 
object relations in dynamic interplay with current interpersonal experience" (p. 
88, 1994). Thus, object relations theorists are interested in understanding the 
way in which these introjects complexify our inter-relations at an unconscious 
level.
At the start of this chapter, I suggested that there are many theorists who 
engage in what is termed object relations. Donald Winnicott, Wilfred Bion, Rene 
Spitz, Heinz Kohut, Heinz Hartman, Harry Guntrip, Edith Jacobson, Erik Erikson, 
Melanie Klein, and Ronald Fairbairn, to name a few, are all considered object 
relations theorists. I have chosen, however, to examine the work of Melanie 
Klein and Ronald Fairbairn only. Melanie Klein was the first to do object 
relations theory and I think she offers much depth and insight especially around 
the notions of phantasies, projections and paranoia. These issues become 
crucial when examining Holocaust perpetrators. For Holocaust texts, Fairbairn’s
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ideas around the notion of introjection and reactive aggression become key. 
When examining Holocaust perpetrators, Fairbairn’s theories become relevant.
Let us first turn to Melanie Klein's work. For Klein, the infant introjects the
image of the mother into her psyche. This internal object is “bound up with the
external one, of whom she is a 'double'" (1940/1975, p. 346). This ‘double’
becomes distorted because the infant’s phantasies of her mother do not match
the actual mother. The actual mother and the double, or introjected
representation of the mother, become blurred. Klein suggests that the more
blurred the mother becomes with the internal representation of the mother, the
more split the ego becomes. Klein remarks that
Phantasies and feelings about the state of the internal 
object virtually influence the structure of the ego. The 
more sadism prevails in the process of incorporating the 
object, the more the object is felt to be in pieces. (1946/1984, p. 6)
Klein goes on to say that the more in pieces is the object the more likely the ego 
becomes split. Phantasies, for Klein, are the most primordial psychic reality. 
Thus, perceptions of the mother are always already distorted by phantasies. If 
phantasies are not worked through, the child cannot see the mother as mother, 
rather she sees the mother as a product of phantasy.
Phantasies, for Klein, emanate primarily out of the site of anxiety. Anxiety 
is brought on by the death instinct and the ego’s fear of being “annihilated" 
(1946/1984, p. 4). “Persecutory anxiety” (1950/1975 p. 43) emerges as a 
response to the intrusion of the mother as internal object. The child’s image of 
the mother is split into the good and bad breast. “From the beginning the 
destructive impulse is turned against the object and is first expressed in 
phantasized oral-sadistic attacks on the mother’s breast" (Klein, 1946/1984, p. 
2). A key term for Klein is projection then because the child projects onto the
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mother what she phantasizes about the bad breast. The mother is potentially 
dangerous and is a possible persecutor. Klein calls this period in the child's life, 
which occurs from the beginning of life until about eighteen months, the 
paranoid-schizoid position. And it is this persecutory anxiety and fear of 
annihilation that characterizes the child's phantasies. Most fundamentally, then, 
for Klein, object relations, from the very beginning of life, are primarily 
aggressive.
When the child reaches about eighteen months, if she is able to work
through the paranoid-schizoid position, she arrives at what Klein calls the
depressive position. Here, anxieties and guilt consume the child. Guilt arises
due to the child’s feelings towards the mother. “[D]epressive anxiety relates to
dangers felt to threaten the loved object” (1950/1975, p. 43). In other words, the
child feels guilt over projecting such hateful feelings onto the mother. Klein
states that the child experiences “a melancholia in statu nascendi : The object
that is being mourned is the mother’s breast" (1940/1975, pp. 344-345). During
the depressive position a “reparative" phase announces itself if the child has
been able to work through the paranoid-schizoid position. Klein claims that
reparation is possible and is perhaps
a more realistic response to the feeling of grief, guilt 
fear of loss resulting from the aggression against the 
loved object. Since the drive to repair or protect the 
injured object paves the way for more satisfactory 
object-relations. (1946/1975, p. 14)
For Klein, then, a psychologically healthy individual works through both the
paranoid-schizoid position and the depressive-position. If one gets stuck in
either position, neurosis and or psychosis is bound to appear in later life. Klein
suggests that the psyche introjects and projects both good and bad objects all
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throughout life and so the psyche is dynamic and fluid. But these two positions, 
if not worked through, sound the cry of repetition compulsion later in life. If these 
two positions are worked through, the ego is less likely to become split.
Greenberg and Mitchell (1983) point out that Klein “has a tendency to 
see bad objects as internally derived... and good objects as absorbed from the 
outside” (p. 135). If the mother is good, it is the child who turns her into a bad 
object through phantasies. What is important here concerns the origin of 
aggression. Like Freud, Klein suggests that aggression and the death instinct 
are innate. Therefore, a predisposition toward aggression is natural. Mitchell 
comments that “For Klein, the root of evil lies in the heart of man himself” (1994, 
p. 84). In other words, Klein argues that there is lodged internally an innate 
desire toward aggression. There is something in human nature that leads to 
phantasies about aggressive and “terrifying objects" (Klein, 1940/1975, p. 348). 
And if we cannot work through these phantasies, the tendency to act out 
aggression and paranoia becomes a real and dangerous potential.
For Klein, phantasies about the other, especially paranoid phantasies, 
have no basis in reality. So when we study, for example, the anti-Semite, it 
becomes clear that his phantasies are born out of this sense of paranoia; most 
scholars would agree that these phantasies about the Jew have no basis in 
reality. Phantasies tell more about the anti-Semite than the Jew. Klein helps us 
to understand that paranoid phantasies have little to do with the other but have 
everything to do with the paranoic's own persecutory anxiety. Representations 
of Jews as devils on horseback, as cannibals, as child murderers, as 
menstruating men (which were all popular during the Middle Ages) arrive on the 
scene out of a bizarre panorama of phantasies springing from paranoia. 
Paranoia also played a role in German culture during the rise of the Third Reich.
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A paranoid country needs a scapegoat. A paranoid country needs to blame 
someone for its problems. And so the Jew became a convenient scapegoat. 
However, Sheldon Roth (1995a) argues that Germans did not suffer from a 
paranoid-schizoid illness. The Germans’ egos, he claims, were quite intact.
They knew what they were doing. Klein’s paranoid-schizoid position may 
suggest that someone who suffers from this is psychotic. But Germans were not 
psychotic. Thus, Roth suggests that when applying psychoanalytic notions to 
perpetrators, caution becomes necessary.
Some questions around Klein’s work might be raised here. Whether we 
can divide up the psyche into two positions is questionable and seems to be 
reductionistic. Whether or not children phantasize bad thoughts about their 
mothers universally is questionable. And whether or not children phantasize at 
the very beginning of life is impossible to determine. Mitchell claims that Klein’s 
"critics (e.g. Guntrip [who was a Fairbairnian]) accuse Klein of depicting the 
objects of human passion as phantasmagoric, solipsistic creations, with no 
necessary connection to the outside world" (1994, p. 69). However, I think 
phantasy life for both children and adults plays a much larger role in our lives 
than most would like to admit. So I think Klein is right to emphasize phantasy. 
Laplanche (1999) suggests that one of the problems with theories like Klein's , 
is that it offers up a "subjectivist" position whereby the other is always reduced 
to a perception of the other. But how does one get outside one’s perceptions? 
Can we ever really see the other as other? Does perception always blind?
W.R.D. Fairbaim is often overlooked. Many people are not familiar with 
Fairbairn's work simply because he only wrote one book and his work has been 
overshadowed by Heinz Kohut. Some claim that Kohut has taken many of his 
ideas directly from Fairbairn without crediting Fairbaim. Grotstein and Rinsley
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(1994) have accused Kohut of stealing Fairbairn's ideas. “It is ironic, therefore,
that the recent contributions of Heinz Kohut, which bear a striking resemblance
to those of Fairbaim, never refer to Fairbairn's work. The same irony
unfortunately applies to Winnicott, who never acknowleged Fairbairn's
anticipations of his work” (Grotstein & Rinsley, 1994, p. 6). And so Winnicott and
Kohut have become, perhaps the most well known object relations theorists,
while Fairbairn remains somewhat obscure. I think Fairbairn is one of the most
important psychoanalytic thinkers of our time and so I would like to bring him out
of obscurity.Fairbairn (1941 /1954;1943/1954;1944/1954; 1946/1954) tried to
get beyond Klein's solipsistic position. Fairbairn suggested that the child can
see the mother as other, therefore, the mother does not get reduced to the
perception or representation of the mother. The mother is bad only if she
neglects and or abuses the child. She is not bad because of the child’s
perception or projection or phantasy about a bad breast; rather, she is bad
because she may be so in actual reality. Fairbairn's message was,
fundamentally, that children are innocent. They become ill because of abusive
parents. James Grotstein and Donald Rinsley (1994) tell us that, interestingly
enough, Fairbairn’s name itself is significant.
Fairbairn’s name, like Freud (“joy” in German), describes 
an important aspect of his contributions-that of 
acknowledging “fairness" to the child at a time when such 
a view could not be taken for granted. At the same time, 
his name represents the acknowledgment of the sense 
of a “blessing” offered to the “fair” child ("bairn”), (p. 3)
Unlike Freud, Fairbaim suggests that it is not instinctual “impulses” 
(1943/1954, p. 62) which seek satisfaction. But rather that “iibidinal “aims” are 
of secondary importance in comparison with object relationships... that a 
relationship with the object, and not gratification of the impulse, is the ultimate
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aim of libidinal striving” (p. 60). Here, Fairbairn turns Freud on his head. For 
Freud, the object of libidinal satisfaction serves as a means to an end; whereas, 
for Fairbairn the object is the end itself. What is primary for Fairbaim, then, are 
object relations, not instinctual satisfactions.
Unlike Freud and Klein, Fairbairn dismisses the notion of drives and the 
death instinct. In order to account for aggression, Fairbairn turns to actual 
relations between mother and child, not phantasized ones. Accordingly, if the 
child is in some way neglected and or abused by the mother, a “basic 
endopsychic structure" (1944/1954, p. 114) is set in place by forces of 
repression. Repression is put in motion by “a certain volume of aggression” ( p. 
114). Like Klein, Fairbairn claims that the mother's image is split into the good 
and bad mother. Recall, for Klein, both good and bad breast get introjected. But 
Fairbairn stresses that there is no need to introject a good object. Only bad 
objects get introjected. And the bad object gets introjected not because the child 
has phantasized that she has a bad mother, but rather the mother is bad in 
actuality and bad objects seep into the psyche. Initially, bad objects “are simply 
banished to the unconscious" (1943/1954, p. 65). Along with bad objects, “parts 
of the ego” (1944/1954, p. 89) get repressed as well. “What are primarily 
repressed are neither intolerably guilty impulses nor intolerably unpleasant 
memories, but intolerable bad internalized objects" (1943/1954, p. 62).
Thus bad memories are bad because they are attached to bad objects and it is 
because of the bad objects that memories get repressed. When “repression 
fails” (1943/1954, pp. 65-66) what comes up from the unconscious, where the 
bad object was initially “banished” (p. 65), are distorted and 
“psychopathological defences” (pp. 65-66). The abused child, later on, 
expresses herself in “phobic,""obsessional,” “hysterical,” or “paranoid” ways (pp.
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65-66). These defenses serve to protect the ego from pain. These modes of 
being serve to distance the self from itself. Obsessional thinking is a way to not 
think about things that are bothersome. Ruminating obsessively over the 
number five for instance, keeps the self from getting underneath this desire to 
repeat words over and over again. Underneath these ruminations, lurks some 
repressed memory and some kind of bad object that has gotten internalized in 
the psyche.
For Fairbairn there are three egos. Fairbairn suggests that there is the 
central ego, the libidinal ego and the superego, plus what he termed and 
“internal saboteur” which “differs from the superego... [because] it is in no 
sense conceived as an internal object. It is wholly an ego structure" (1944/
1954, p. 106). Fairbairn explains that “The subsidiary egos are of course, 
ordinarily unconscious; and their unconscious status at once raises the 
suspicion that they are subject to repression” (p. 108). Unlike Freud's second 
topography (id, ego, superego), whereby the ego and superego are bom out of 
the id, Fairbairn claims that the endopsychic structure of the mind develops 
because of the ways in which subsidiary egos split off from the central ego, 
especially if one has introjected bad objects. “The central ego is conceived as a 
primary and dynamic structure, from which... other mental structures are... 
derived” (p. 106). The libidinal ego, unlike Freud’s id, is not “a mere reservoir of 
instinctual impulse, but as a dynamic structure... [has] greater devotion to 
internalized objects" (1944/1954, p. 106). Hence, the central ego, libidinal ego 
and superego are all “dynamic ego structures" (p. 132). While the internalized 
objects are “objects of the dynamic ego structures... [they are] endopsychic 
structures which are not themselves dynamic" (p. 132). Odgen explains that for 
Fairbairn, internal objects are not images, they are structures. Internal objects
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are not simply mental representations of objects, 
but are active agencies whose activity is perceived 
by itself and by other dynamic structures [which become] 
organized and registered as stable mental representations.
(1994, p. 95)
Fairbairn's insistence that internal objects become endopsychic structures
suggests that internal objects lodge themselves in the heart of the psyche and
become very difficult, if not impossible, to remove primarily because these
objects are structures, not images. Grotstein and Rinsely explain that
By postulating the obverse of classical and Kleinian 
theory, he [Fairbairn] helped us to understand the 
well-known conundrum that the worse one’s internal 
objects are experienced to be, the less one is able 
to leave them! (1994, p. 7)
Bad objects which become internalized as endopsychic structures also are the
root of self destruction and self hatred because the child believes that she must
have somehow provoked her mother’s wrath. Fairbaim declares that “the
reaction provoked in the child conforms to the idea that he is not loved because
of the badness and destructivness of his hate” (1941/1954, pp. 55-56).
Fairbairn argues, most fundamentally, for the goodness of the child. He 
believes that no one is a natural born killer. And it is here that Fairbairn departs 
from both Klein and Freud. Aggression, for Fairbairn is bom of provocation. 
Heinz Kohut, whose work is derivative of Fairbairn, suggests that “no purely 
destructive urge arises so long as the environment is reasonably empathetic 
and responsive" (1996a, p. 200). Kohut claims that "when the self is shattered..
. you have the fragment of utter destructiveness” (p. 223).
When one examines early psychohistories and psychobiographies of the 
Nazi era, many early works suggest that Germans acted out because of bad 
parenting. But again, I stress that it cannot be the case that the whole of German
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society was a product of bad parenting. I find this claim counterintuitive.
Children who are abused often continue the cycle of abuse. This is, for the most 
part, true. However, many children who are abused, do not act out this cycle. 
Universal claims about human behavior always come up short against the 
complex landscape of lived experience. Even if many German children were 
victims of child abuse, it still does not explain why they turned into killers. Many 
victims of child abuse never kill. Rob Weatherill critiques reactive explanations 
of aggression because “the claim that all aggression is environmental and 
reactive does not seem to answer the obvious: namely, the unbelievable cruelty 
and destructiveness that erupts in human behavior” (1998, p. 25). Reactive 
positions around aggression, Weatherill suggests, overlook “internal psychic 
realities" (p. 26). Here, I think Weatherill is referring to the death instinct or a 
death wish. Something springs from within the psyche that has little to do with 
the external world and pulls the self toward destruction. Ultimately, I think none 
of these explanations complete. But they do offer up partial answers, or at least 
raise questions that perhaps have no resolution.
Fairbairn argues that only bad objects get introjected into the psyche.
The question is what does the self do with these bad objects once they get 
installed? The psyche cannot seem to get rid of them. This introjective 
mechanism may explain why it is that bad relations in later life manifest, if the 
compulsion to repeat gets acted out. That is, the compulsion to repeat the 
originary bad object’s internalization may shape later relations and the psyche 
may continue throughout life to introject bad objects. Transferential relations 
with others may turn on this kind of introjective mechanism. One may even 
unconsciously seek out others who are bad because they remind one of the 
initial bad object. The psyche tends to act in ways that are comfortable and
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familiar, even if these familiar ways are bad. Patterns of acting out become rigid 
especially when one seeks bad objects.
Introjecting others' badness can occur even when reading texts. The Jew 
who reads anti-Semitic texts, who introjects representations of Jews as 
monsters, devils or evil people, harms the psyche. It may become quite 
devastating to read texts which represent Jews as devils, as Christ-killers. A 
certain amount of distance becomes necessary for Jewish readers, if they 
encounter anti-Semitic literature or do research around it. The point here is that 
Jewish readers must work to not introject these bad representations; they must 
read in ways that puts psychological distance between themselves and the 
texts. But it becomes difficult to say just how this mechanism works. It becomes 
difficult to say what exactly the effects of introjection are on Jewish readers. At 
the end of the day, it is not clear how these bad objects work on Jewish 
subjects.
From Freud, Klein and Fairbairn we learn how primal our early 
relationships are with significant others. We tend to repeat patterns of reponse 
and behavior that were evoked with these originary relations with others later in 
life. And it is not just that early object relations shape our perceptions; rather, 
they become part of the very structure of our psyche. Phantasies, splitting of the 
ego, change the very structure of our psyche. So the ways in which we perceive 
others and texts written by others, to some extent, are products of early 
experiences in life. The more integrated the ego, Freud, Klein and Fairbairn 
would agree, the better able we are to get an approximation of the person or 
text or event we are trying to understand and deconstruct. But for Jean 
Laplanche (1999), what is at stake is not getting an approximation of the other, 
but loosening up the transference so that we are able to see the other as other,
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as radically different from the self. The other is stranger. John Fletcher (1999)
states that Laplanche’s notion of otherness demands attention. He
writes ‘otherness’ as a neologism in French- 
not just etrangete, strangeness, foreignness, 
alienness, but strangerete, strange-ness, 
foriegner-ness.. . ‘alien-ness.’ (p. 47)
Thus for Laplanche our perceptions of the other are not reduced to a mental
representation of the other which might get housed in a solipsistic realm. The
other becomes stranger through language, through “the enigmatic message”
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 80), the “third reality” (p. 80) that ensures a distance
between self and other. So for Laplanche relations with others and with texts do
not turn on getting a likeness, but remembering to keep strangeness of the other
and of the self intact.
The Limits of Psychohistory
Applying psychoanalytic notions to history is not new. In fact, a field of 
study called psychohistory has been established since the 1930s. Here, I want 
to briefly introduce some of the debates that have emerged around doing 
psychohistory. A study of these debates teaches about the limits of doing 
psychohistory in the first place. And it is to these limits that we should turn.
Frank Manuel (1979) suggests that one can trace the roots of 
psychohistory to Vico, Herder, Michelet, Diithey and Febre. Albin argues that 
“psychohistory’s birth pains occurred in the wake of Hitler” (1980, xi). Reich 
(1933/1945), Fromm (1941/1969), Adorno (1950), Horkheimer (1950), Erikson 
(1976) all grapple with the horrors of the Holocaust utilizing psychoanalytic 
tools. Some of these writers’ works will be fleshed out in subsequent chapters. 
Psychohistories can broadly be divided into two kinds: psychobiographies 
(Binion 1976; Rappoport, 1975; Waite, 1977; Erikson, 1976) and social
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psychohistories (Litton, 1986; Reich ,1933/1945; Lowenberg, 1983; Adorno,
1950; Horkheimer, 1950; Fromm, 1941/1969; Friedlander, 1978). Within the
field of psychohistory there are, broadly speaking, two rival groups. Lawton
explains that the
radicals (basically the de Mause Group) tend to 
view psychohistory as an independent field.. . .
The conservatives (basically GUPH) are more 
cautious about viewing our field as being 
separate from history. (1988, p. 10)
Many historians dismiss psychohistory altogether because they feel that
psychoanalysis is not scientific (Stannard, 1980), and when it is applied to
history much of it tends to be reductionistic and simplistic (Stannard, 1980;
Albin, 1980) or “too speculative" (Kren & Rappoport, 1976). Kren and Rappoport
suggest that “most efforts to apply psychology and particularly psychoanalysis
to history have at best been interesting failures” (1976, p. 66). These “failures,"
as traditional historians might call them, are due to “lack of rigor" (Friedlander,
1978, p. 7). Friedlander counters these claims and offers up some important
insights on the ways in which Freud’s notions can be useful for the historian.
Peter Gay says that traditional historians complain that “researchers cannot
psychoanalyze the dead” (1985, p. 3). And the discourse of psychoanalysis, for
the traditional historian might seem obfuscating or beside the point of historical
research. Peter Gay says that the traditional historian
is likely to find the techniques of psychoanalysis 
esoteric, its language deplorable, and its propositions, 
to put it generally, remote from his researches into the 
past. (1985, pp. 43-44)
Even though the discourse of psychoanalysis is, no doubt, difficult, I 
would argue, and I think Peter Gay would support my claim, that psychoanalytic 
notions could certainly help historians articulate and explain, partially, why it is
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people do what they do. Common sense explanations around complex 
motivations of perpetrators just will not do. The discipline of psychoanalysis has 
much to teach about the inner workings of the psyche. Moreover, without a 
background in psychoanalytic literature, the historian has no way to articulate 
her own anxieties around disturbing material. Without at least the awareness of 
what defense mechanisms are and what they do, the historian is at the mercy of 
her own repressions. And these repressions and resistances will determine, to 
a certain extent, what it is the historian chooses to write about or not write about. 
What gets excluded from history, then, has much to do with what it is historians 
can psychically handle. It would, therefore, behoove the historian to have some 
understanding of her own psyche before attempting to recover the past.
The question becomes what is it we are using psychoanalytic notions to 
do? Do we use these notions to think through complex historical issues, or do 
we use them to shut thinking off? If we use psychoanalytic notions in 
reductionists ways, we are using them incorrectly; we are using them to shut 
down thinking and emotion. But psychoanalytic notions do not have to be used 
reductionistically. In fact, Peter Gay points out that both historians and 
psychoanalysts work against reductionism “As discoverers and documentors of 
overdetermination, psychoanalysts and historians, each in their own manner, 
are allies in the struggle against reductionism, against naive and crude 
monocausal explanation" (1985, pp. 74-75). Pathologizing labels such as 
survivor syndrome, post-traumatic stress syndrome, obsessive-compulsive 
disorder tend toward reductionism. These labels squash out the depth of the 
complexities around the human psyche. These categories gloss over the radical 
difference of suffering. It becomes problematic to box people into categories 
and attempt to fix them with a label. I find these practices normalizing and
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oppressive. Diagnostic categories can also scar because they stigmatize, and 
stigmas do not easily go away. But, as I have pointed out throughout this 
chapter, there is much more to psychoanalytic theory than labeling. If anything, 
psychoanalytic theory should point out how strange we are. Human beings 
cannot be labeled.
Early psychobiographies on Hitler tended to demonize him. Rappaport 
(1975) diagnoses Hitler as an “ambulatory schizophrenic” (p. 210); Binion 
declared that Hitler suffered from “oral sadism" (1976, p. 170); Waite argued that 
Hitler suffered from “anality and sadism" (1977, p. 149); Walter Langer 
suggested that Hitler was “neurotic bordering on schizophrenia" (cited in 
Rappaport, 1975, p. 208); Waite (1977), Erikson (1976) and Bromberg (cited in 
Rappaport, 1975) suggested that Hitler suffered from borderline personality 
disorder. But Waite (1977) cautions that when we demonize Hitler we exonerate 
him. “To dismiss Hitler or Himmler as mad men or fiends, incomprehensible to 
“normal" people, is to say that critical judgment of them is not possible (1977, 
xvii). In later chapters I will tease out some of these studies in more detail. But 
for now I want to introduce certain trends in psychohistory. These trends are 
interesting to follow because they demonstrate a real shift in the ways in which 
psychoanalytic notions have been used.
Like psychobiographies, social psychohistories tended to pathologize 
Germans. Adorno (1950) and Fromm (1941/1969) argued that Germans 
suffered from sadomasochistic upbringings and had a tendency to develop 
authoritarian personalities. Some argue that Germans suffered from “infantile 
helplessness" and “passivity” (Reich, 1933/1945, p. 26). But these kinds of 
explanations are reductionistic and simpleminded. Not ail Germans are 
obedient, passive, sadistic or sadomasochistic.
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A turn in Holocaust scholarship in the 1980s signals a complete reversal 
of some of these early theories. Browning (1998), Goldhagen (1997), Lifton 
(1986); and Kelman (1976) argue that Germans were not “inherently evil"
(Lifton, 1986, pp. 4-5) and most Germans did not demonstrate sadistic 
tendencies. As Lawrence Langer suggests, “sadism or psychotic rage” do not 
explain mass murder (1998, xii). Browning, Goldhagen, and Lifton declare that 
those who were complicit in crimes during the Holocaust were quite ordinary. It 
was the “ordinariness of most Nazi doctors" that stunned Robert J. Lifton (1986, 
p. 4). Even the category “ordinary Germans,” which is used by Browning, 
Goldhagen and others, does not help us understand much. What is an ordinary 
German? Who is ordinary? But I think the point here is that Holocaust scholars 
emphasize that sometimes mass murderers are not psychotic maniacs, or 
sadistic lunatics; they are sane, everyday human beings.
Christopher Browning (1998) argues in the beginning of his study around 
Police Battalion 101 that his aim is not to demonize the perpetrators. Browning 
claims that historians must reject demonization.
My analysis departs from what has been done in the field of 
psychohistory in many ways. As a curriculum theorist, I argue that a broad 
understanding of the Holocaust is key. Both the memory text of history and the 
memory text of novels need to be examined. Curriculum theory allows me to 
cross borders and cut across narrow fields of inquiry. Again, I argue that it is not 
enough to read history. Literary representations are just as important to 
examine as historical ones. So my task is broader than the task of, say, a 
psychohistorian. And I think I bring unique insights to Holocaust texts because I 
am not merely adding historical insights to literary ones. From the perspective of 
curriculum theory, I am able to analyze these texts from a particular point of
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view. A social psychoanalytic hermeneutic around Holocaust texts turns on the 
notions of unconscious traces, transferences and countertransferences and 
defense mechanisms. A post-Freudian reading of Freud, an analysis of Klein 
and Fairbairn and the insights of Laplanche broaden the scope of my 
investigation by allowing me to ask questions which most psychohistorians 
have not asked because, for the most part, they only draw on Freud.
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CHAPTER 3 
REPRESENTATION AND ANTI-SEMITISM
Maxine Greene suggests that “the educative task is to create situations in 
which the young are moved to begin to ask, in all the tones of voice, ‘why’" 
(1995, p. 6). The “why" Greene refers to could point to questions around 
existence, being: why am I here? The “why” might also point toward the horizon 
of the self, identity. Why am I this way and not that? Why am I who I am? Why do 
I think this way about myself? Why do I experience the world in this way? 
Suzanne de Castell suggests that “the formation of self [is an educator’s] 
project" (1996, p. 28). The why of self concerns not only a self who thinks but a 
self who feels as well. And the self who feels may not feel very well. The self 
who does not feel well may feel exiled, alienated, marginalized. And so the 
educator’s task is to ask why.
Curriculum theorists might recognize that feeling bad about oneself 
affects the ways in which one interacts with others. But engagement with our 
world cannot be healthy if the self feels bad. Negative feelings about oneself 
may be co-complicated with how others define who we are and how we then 
internalize those negativities. The “why” of education might become, then, a 
question about naming. Why do others name or define me the way they do? 
Why do I internalize these negative namings?
Identities are produced, not in isolation, but in relation. As Madeleine 
Grumet points out “Relation is basic to education” (1995, p. 16). Relations 
between us, as we walk through our lives in schools, tend to be unhealthy 
because they are not interrogated deeply enough. Understanding relations 
is fraught with difficulties, of course. Understanding what we know about 
ourselves and others, and how we define others and how others define us, is a
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highly complex, problematic enterprise. The unhealthy self cannot relate in a
productive way to the other. William Pinar explains:
We are what we know. We are, however, also what we 
do not know. If what we know about ourselves- history, 
our culture, our national identity- is deformed by 
absences, denials, and incompletenesses, then our 
identity-both as individuals and as Americans, is 
fractured. This fractured self is a repressed self. Such 
a self lacks access both to itself and to the world. (1995, p. 23)
Identity, thus, also has to do with our relations with memory, history and culture.
And this memory comes to us through texts. uDeformed” selves, as Pinar points
out, do not understand how interconnected they are to memory, history and
culture. Formation of self, then, has much to do with how we are always already
inscribed in the texts of our culture before we arrive on the scene and how we
interact with these texts and how we might struggle against these texts. Susan
Griffin remarks that “perhaps we are like stones; our own history and the history
of the world are embedded in us It is said that the close study of stones will
reveal traces from fires suffered thousands of years ago" (1992, pp. 88-89).
Memory, history and culture webs us to events; pasts are sedimented in our
very being. Interrogation of these sedimented pasts, these traces, becomes
necessary for the process of self formation.
Memory, history, culture and identities are also co-produced, in part, in 
relation to textual representations. But as Jan Jagodzinski explains “Society is, 
at once, both an open and closed system; we are caught by our representations 
of it, at the same time we struggle to change these represenations” (1997, p.
25). We may try to push the stone of self up the hill, like Sisyphus, but upon 
arrival at the top of the hill, the stone of self may fall down again into the 
sedimentation and inscription of culture and memory. It is the educator's task to
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interrogate the struggle of Sisyphus as we are caught between culture and the 
re-invention of ourselves. This re-invention is continual and it is complex.
My own struggle concerns Jewish self formation against a backdrop of 
centuries of what I term Jew hatred. Therefore, I am interested in examining 
relations between those representations of Jews in texts that have already been 
handed down to us by Jew haters, and the process of Jewish self 
representation and self formation. The hermeneutic circle between how Jews 
are defined by others and how Jews define themselves may be insidious and 
difficult to break. Jews may introject cultural inscriptions by others and graft 
these inscriptions onto themselves in the form of self hatred. Although these 
circles of hatred are hard to break, I will argue that there are ways around these 
difficulties. Opening spaces and rupturing places between representations by 
others and self-representation become key.
In Western culture since about the third century, it has been Christians 
who have had the power to define and represent Jews. Educators must 
remember that students and teachers may be Jews and Christians and come to 
that place we call school with the traces of these very complex theological 
memories sedimented and grafted onto their skins. Curriculum theorists cannot 
under-estimate the importance of understanding how these theological 
memories, traces, emotionally and intellectually affect our lives in schools. 
Although school is the place that is supposed to be neatly separated from 
religion, it is not. Students and teachers grow up in traditions and bring them 
into the classroom, even if only in quiet ways, even if the question of religion is 
never raised. The traces of these traditions mark the text of school life. These 
markings, these stains, cannot be ignored. Ignoring these stains is dangerous.
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The historical memory of Jewish-Christian relations has been stained 
with violence. Christians, since the third century, have represented Jews in 
violent and pejorative ways. Old stoney representations of Jews remain in the 
collective unconscious or consciousness of many Christians. Jews have been 
exiled and marginalized for centuries, and we remain, in many ways, exiled in 
the classroom and in the academy by Jew hatred. Although there is much 
debate over the current climate for Jews in America, the presence of Jew hatred 
can never be under-estimated. Under many unturned stones lie the bedrock of 
hatred. Jew hatred is like an an invisible poison that permeates all of our 
relationships and damages us all. Most often, though, the problematics of Jew 
hatred remain hidden. These are stoney “silences our pedagogies ought 
somehow to repair” (Greene, 1995, p. 47). But the repair can never be 
complete. The damage done to Jews is centuries old, and Jew hatred pervades 
our culture in all sorts of insidious ways. Thus, I do not offer up a healing 
pedagogy; I only suggest some ways to better understand how representations 
of Jews by Jew haters have been introjected into the self-representations of 
Jews and how this injection or introjection has been a dangerous one for 
Jewish self-formation. And these things have everything to do with life in 
schools and scholarly life. Scholars, too, are Jews and Christians and other 
religious denominations, carrying the rocks and webs of culture up and down 
the Sisyphusean hills in and beyond the academy. Madeleine Grumet tells us 
that curriculum “is the process of making sense with a group of people [about] 
the systems that shape and organize the world that we can think about together” 
(1995, p. 19).
Judaism and Christianity are complex theological social systems that 
have shaped us and have organized the ways we think about life. However,
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Judaism and Christianity have been strange bedfellows for centuries. 
Christianity is a complex system which, by and large, has had the power to 
name, to control, to supress, to define and to represent Jews. Ours has been, 
historically, an unhealthy relationship. I am skeptical that many of us have 
engaged in healthy dialogues around these complexities. Certianiy, Jewish and 
Christian fundamentalists cannot dialogue at all. And ultimately, as Myles 
Horton points out, dialogues “don't change men’s hearts" (1990, p. 103). Still, 
Paulo Freire suggests we must attempt to understand “the spirit of the culture... 
the soul of the culture" (1990a, p. 131).
How I respond to representations of Jews in texts may determine how I 
feel about myself as a Jew and how I feel in relation to others. The tricky thing 
about reading texts is that we tend to merge with what we are reading 
psychologically. Wolfgang Iser comments that in the process of reading “text 
and reader.. . merge into a single situation, the division between subject and 
object not longer applies” (1978, pp. 9-10). If I merge with texts in the process of 
reading, how do I then protect myself, psychologically, from the assault and 
violence of representations of Jews by Jew haters. Can I protect myself? Self- 
identification with representations that are Jew hating produce self-hating Jews.
I am certainly not immune from this phenomenon. Reluctance to grapple with 
my Jewish identity comes out of, perhaps, an unconscious self-hatred.
I will argue that self-identification with Jew hating representations, 
however, can be disrupted. And one way to disrupt these negative 
identifications is by first becoming outraged. Jan Jagodzinski says that “The 
sense of outrage belongs somewhere at the limit of the frame... for it signifies 
an almost unbearable desire, an uncontrollable temper, a body which cannot 
be contained" (1997, xi). So it is the feeling of outrage that moves me to
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interrupt these negative representations of Jews. But these interruptions do not 
go without difficulties. The outrage must not harden one’s heart and result in 
Christian-bashing. Outrage must move one to expose, though, texts written by 
writers who have perpetuated hateful representations of Jews. The dangers of 
representation are, perhaps, obvious as we live in a post-Holocaust age. 
Although, certainly, textual representations in themselves cannot account for the 
why of the Holocaust.
It is when textual encounters move me emotionally that I begin to find
productive ways in which to deal with these kinds of issues. Ironically, though,
as David Jardine points out, the encounter “does not begin with me. It only
begins when something happens to me in my reading of a text, when something
strikes me, tear me open, ‘wounds’ me and leaves me vulnerable and open to
the world" (1995, p. 110). Something has happened to me studying these texts,
these violent representations. I have grown outraged but I realize that my
outrage must move toward a systematic analysis around issues of
representation and self-formation. By engaging in a systematic analysis of these
texts I hope to undo stoney, rigid, simplistic representations of Jews. Hopefully
my analysis may point toward ways that might “intervene in the dominant modes
of representation” (Jagodzinksi, 1997, p. 139). Intervention becomes possible
partly through what I term jagged imaginings which move us to undo rigidity.
Deborah Britzman (1995) teaches that
Imaginative thinking can move us beyond the 
constraints of nostalgia and the anxious impulse 
to arrange history without an awareness of what 
it is that structures our destinies or how the inherited 
contexts and practices constrain our possibilities, (p. 76)
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Jagged imagining is a way that might allow us to question culturally
inherited representations. But re-imaginings cannot completely overturn that
which we imagine against, for imagining against something implies a certain
friction with that something. That something of tradition always remains, even as
a trace or stain. Further, we must not simply re-place one static image with
another. Doing this only causes paralysis. And as Robert Musil writes, we must
attempt to avoid "paralysis and rigidification" (1914/1990, p. 56) in our thinking.
Jagged imagining, re-inventing how we might represent ourselves, also means
embracing a willingness to walk on or near a precipice. Imagining against
tradition is risky. Paula Salvio remarks that
Resistance to regulatory control and culture’s 
continual attempts to grip the body is, in reality 
(and particularly in schools), wrought with forms 
of resistance that are marked by painful struggle, 
misunderstandings, confusions, and feelings of 
betrayal. (1997, p. 248)
But we will always, in some ways, be gripped by culture, no matter how 
much we struggle against it. The grip of a stoney body, a stoney body of 
representations, however, can be disrupted by attempting to dissolve partially 
the stone by digging into the layers of cultural sedimentation. Jewish 
representations become problematic because they have become stoney, 
reified, hardened and wedged into historical memory. Moreover, my 
understanding of what representation in itself means may determine how I 
interpret what I read and how these readings may affect my very identity.
There is no essential Jew; there is no essential representation of a Jew. 
There are as many kinds of Jews as there are pebbles on a beach. And like the 
changeableness of pebbles, Jews are changeable too. If anything, Jewish self­
representation and identity are elusive. Suzanne de Castell tells us that “finally,
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this place of ambiguity... must be our destination in all our journeys” (1996, p. 
31). Perhaps we do not have a final destination or end place, but the journey is 
one that is not certain or clear. We take this walk one step at a time. As Paulo 
Freire says ul am sure that we make the road by walking” (1990b, p. 6).
Because the notion of representation is highly compelx, I would first like 
to examine different ways of understanding what representation might mean 
and the possible effects of representation. More specifically, I will examine how 
Jews are represented historically by what I term Jew hating texts.
Understanding the Notion of Representation
Recall, object relations theory teaches that self and object
representations are co-complex because of unconscious transferences and
internalizations of the object. James Grotstein suggests that
internal objects whether Kleinian or Fairbairnian 
are third forms-neither the external person, nor 
merely split off parts of the self. They are in fact, 
phantasmically altered, transformed montages.
(1994, p. 118)
Internal objects are co-mingled impressions of self and other. Self
representations and object representations become difficult to untangle. How
the self perceives the other and the other perceives the self depends upon a
complex unconscious relationship. Stephen Mitchell (1998) points out that at an
unconscious level, individuation of self from other becomes difficult to untangle
because primary process thinking knows no division. Mitchell declares that
Because on a primary process level minds are 
permeable, interactions are co-constructed, and 
time is not linear but simultaneous, separation into 
the neat catagories of secondary process /me/ you, 
then/ now... can never be complete, (p. 56)
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Identity formation is always in relation with the other. Unconscious
transference may maintain rigid patterns of perception. Significant others who
get internalized in early childhood shape the ways in which we perceive others
later on in life. Recall, Laplanche (1999) criticizes Freud and others who offer up
what he terms a ‘subjectivist' (p. 73) position around the notion of
representation. Laplanche claims that subjectivist positions
reduce the other to the subject’s perception of 
of the other... nothing in this approach allows the 
other any place other than the depths of 
subjectivity, (p. 73)
Laplanche argues for a “third reality" (p. 80) which is “implanted" (p. 80) by the 
other into the self. This enables us to speak of the other as other and not 
subsume her representation under a radical subjectivity which would reduce 
her to my perception of her. The other is separated from the self. The other's 
alterity is due to her own internal “alienness” her own “internal alterity” (p. 220). 
The perception of the other, though, is always already overlayed with 
transferential relations from the past. Transference confuses any clear 
separation or individuation between self and other. Whoever we are in relation 
to the other, this relation is clouded and co-complexified by the ghosts of 
internal objects. These co-complex internal objects are dynamic and have a life 
of their own. The compulsion to repeat old patterns of relations with new others 
continues throughout life. These ghostly internal objects are guided by primary 
process thought which knows no time, division, or negation.
Secondary process thinking marks a site of organization, rationality, 
categorization. This is what Freud called the reality principle. The reality 
principle suggests that in order to function in reality, the psyche must divide 
things up or else it will get lost in the flow of time. Dualities and opposites,
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although constructions, help us function in the real world. However, the primary
process hovers right below the secondary process and these processes are in
fact co-mingled. Stephen Mitchell (1998) comments that for
Lowewald [a psychoanalyst] there is a perpetual 
tension between primary process and secondary 
process as organization, through which experience is 
generated. The distinctions between me and you... now 
and then are logical distinctions.. . .  All these distinctions, 
he argues, are not given, but rather are constructions.
(p. 56)
The ego must be able to make these distinctions and categorize in order to 
function in the world. If we were to regress to primary process thinking we could 
not distinguish between objects, and time would flow seemingly without end; 
like a dream, life would would become halluncinatory, an Alice in Wonderland 
experience. But because primary process thinking always overlays secondary 
process thinking, the unconscious guides us. Secondary process thinking 
separates out thoughts and distinguishes between now and then.
When we talk about representation on the secondary process level, what 
we are talking about are distinctions and separations between things. 
Philosophical debates, unlike psychoanalytic ones, draw on secondary process 
thinking to separate this and that. When we talk about images and referents, 
appearances and reality, signifiers and the signified, we have moved into the 
realm of secondary process thinking. Let us now move from the psychoanalytic 
register around mental representations to the philosophic register around the 
notion of representation. These two kinds of discussions mark different ways of 
talking about this idea.
Understanding what representation means is no easy task. The classical 
understanding of representation implies that two things, p and q, are somehow
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connected. The thing p may represent the thing q. That this represents that 
usually suggests that an image may represent a corresponding reality. In this 
sense, then, represention clearly and distinctly separates lived experience into 
two things or two realms. Further, the image p is a mere copy of the real thing q. 
Since Plato, q has been associated with reality, truth, the given; p, on the other 
hand, is a mere appearance, a mere copy of the real. The phenomenal (the 
appearance) realm and the noumenal (the real behind the appearance) are 
therefore split apart. The trick, then, is to get behind appearance in order to get 
at truth.
Many modernists since Descartes have appropriated this way of 
understanding representation. Jan Jagodzinski (1997) tells us that for the 
modernist, representation collapses onto the term mimesis. Representation 
means likeness, sameness. In other words, the image may mirror its referent; 
the image may reflect its referent. More concretely, the image, say, of a cat I 
conjure up in my mind is simply a copy of a real cat in the world. Therefore, the 
cat in my mind is like a mirror image of the real cat. But the image of the cat in 
my mind has less value than the real because it is a mere copy, a copy cat. The 
real has more value because it is true; it coincides with the given.
Texts also conjure up images in my mind. A text may discuss, for 
instance, a cat. The words, then, point to an image of a cat. From the words on 
the page, I then imagine a picture of a cat in my mind. Thus, texts too can serve 
as mirrors to the real. Texts about cats, that is, may correspond to real cats in the 
world. Wolfgang Iser comments that “semblance, then, appears to be a basic 
ingredient of representation” (1989, pp. 242-243).
Photographs, like texts, may also be thought of as corresponding to their 
referent. Realist photographers, who embrace the modernist position of
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representation, believe that the photographic image can neatly mirror that which 
is photographed. For instance, Roland Barthes claims that a photograph of a 
pipe “is always and intractably a pipe" (1981, p. 87). Further, Barthes declares 
that “every photograph is somehow co-natural with its referent" (p. 76). Thus, for 
realists like Barthes, the photographer's frame of reference does not matter, for 
the photograph simply corresponds to a reality independent of the 
photographer's cultural frame in which she is situated. The photographer, says 
Kevin Robins, is a “passive” spectator of the real (1995, p. 30). Realist 
photographers, then, think of themselves as nothing more than “recorders of 
reality" (p. 30).
Like realist photographers, writers, such as Christopher Isherwood, 
describe the process of writing novels in much the same way photographers 
take pictures. Isherwood describes writing about Berlin during Hitler's rise to 
power as if he were a realist photographer. He considers himself to be nothing 
more than a passive spectator of the world waiting to capture images in words, 
like a photographer who acts as a passive recorder of reality as he shoots 
pictures, capturing images. Isherwood says “I am a camera with it shutters open, 
waiting, quite passive, not thinking.. . .  Someday, all this will have to be 
developed, carefully printed, fixed “ (1959, p. 1). For Isherwood, then, the eye/ “I” 
is like a camera allowing the real to press in on the self, as if the real were 
completely external to the body. The real is viewed as an independent thing or 
realm that can be gotten at by fixing it, by catching it, making it still, by stopping 
time. What my eye/ “I” sees can be shot with a camera or recorded in words.
John Bloom suggests that the “still image [for realist photographers] 
marks a death ritual driven by an assumed capacity to know the world” (1993, 
p. 3). Killing images, stilling time, history, capturing truth and boxing it into a
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frame leads to what I term massive hysteria, which is an overload of anxiety. 
This anxiety sets in because images keep arriving on the scene, refusing to be 
stilled. That is, images continually slip through the frame. And it is this slippage 
which leads to nervousness. We can no longer be certain what the image is.
Issues of representation, then, have much to do with how the West has
understood what images are. Since Plato, images have had a second class
status because they are considered nothing more than shadow. In fact, these
shadows interfere with the quest for truth; they get in the way of understanding
ideas. Plato and others have driven a wedge between ideas and images,
denigrating images. Western philosophy has been a history of epistemological
problems which are caused, in part, because images attempt to creep into what
is considered the real. Since Descartes, and even perhaps before the arrival of
modern philosophy which I would date around 1659 with the death of
Descartes, philosophers focused on problems around how we know ideas, not
images. Images lie. Philosophers do not like lies. And because images lie, the
West, according to W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) fears images. Mitchell claims that the
fear of images is nothing new.
The fear of the image, the anxiety that the “power 
of images" may finally destroy even their creators 
and manipulators, is as old as image making itself.
Idolatry, iconoclasm, iconophilia, and fetishism are 
not uniquely “postmodern” phenomena, (p. 15)
Many Christians and Jews think that so-called idol worshiping is foolish 
or even evil because images of the godhead are not real. This kind of thinking 
leads to dangerous, exclusive, ways of being in the world. This kind of thinking 
can lead to religious wars. This Eurocentric way of thinking is what drives 
missionaries to convert so-called “primitive” people to Christianity. But if
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Christians and Jews are made in the image of God, does this not mean then 
that we are not real? Are we mere copies of God? And if we are copies of the 
real (God) why is it that people like Hitler exist?
Classical understandings of representation are highly problematic. Part 
of the problem is the eye/ “1." Representation as an act of seeing seems to me a 
narrow way of understanding how we move through the world. I approach the 
world in various ways. I listen. I feel. I smell. I touch. I desire. And my being is 
merged-with-the-world, not separated from it. My merging-with-the-world, thus, 
makes it difficult for me to get a grip on my surroundings in neat and tidy ways. It 
is perhaps arrogant to assume that I can know the truth of things, the truth of the 
world. Classical representation squashes out the mystery of being-in-the-world. 
It presupposes that I can know things with certainty and I can, therefore, 
conquer and control that which I know.
However, lived experience is much more complex and elusive than 
classical notions of representation allow. I cannot fix time or history in the eye/
“I" of my camera. Moreover, there are many problems around the notion of 
correspondence itself. If I am merged-in-the-world and cannot get a grip on my 
surroundings, how can I say with certainty that p corresponds to q? As Jean- 
Paul Sartre points out “the relationship between the image and its object is very 
obscure" (1948, p. 21).
The postmodern turn suggests we have arrived at a crisis. The crisis of 
representation, stated simply, is this: What you see is not what you get. P, in 
other words, does not correspond to q. Thomas Docherty points out that 
"the perception of an image involves us in a specific deception or irony with 
respect to the status of the real" (1996, p. 23). Thus, this postmodern paradigm 
shift around the notion of representation points toward obliterating the given, the
93
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
real, while elevating appearances, images. Plato is turned on his head. Many 
postmodern thinkers, though, still talk about representation by using visual 
metaphors. Representation continues to be a discussion, for the most part, 
around the visible. According to Docherty, Jameson "argues that it is not the 
modern but rather the postmodern which is "essentially a visual culture” (1996, 
p. 21). Likewise, W.J. T. Mitchell claims that the postmodern era is a turn toward 
the "pictorial” (1994, p. 15). But this turn toward the pictorial, according to 
Mitchell, differs from classical understandings of representation, for pictures do 
not correspond to the real. Mitchell comments that the postmodern turn is "rather 
a postlinguistic, postsemiotic, rediscovery of the picture [image] as a complex 
interplay between visuality, apparatus, institution, discourse, bodies of figurality” 
(1994, p. 16).
Culture, then, in all its various manifestations, serves as the intermediary 
between what we see and what we get. In fact, culture constructs, produces and 
may even determine what we see in the first place, and it may also determine, in 
many ways, how we interpret what we see. The always already of culture 
haunts the whole interpretive process around representation. The crisis of 
representation is that “the camera portrays something other than what we see” 
(Bloom, 1993, p. 3). And Foucault reminds us that "it is in vain that we say what 
we see; what we see never resides in what we say” (1966/1994, p. 9). Or as 
Homi Bhabha declares, "there can be no such immediacy of a visualist 
perspective, no such face-to-face epiphanies” (1994, p. 50).
Representation is re-configured in postmodern discourse.
Representation is a re-presentation of a re-presentation of a re-presentation. 
What is presented before us is a copy of a copy of a copy. What we see is 
always already constructed through culture glasses. But these glasses do not
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help us see better; they convolute and complexify what we see. P represents 
what? It represents p re-presenting p, while q slips away into oblivion, into 
nothingness. Wolfgang Iser (1989) claims that representation, in this sense, has 
nothing to do with a pre-given reality, for there is no such thing. Perhaps the 
given, or pre-given, is just another construction, another phantasy made up to 
control the viewer’s perception of the world.
The crisis of representation becomes disturbing when one attempts to
discuss how historical events such as the Holocaust are to be represented. If
there is no real, no given, how can we determine whether historians’
representations are real or true? How can we even say that real events happen
if the real is actually a copy of a copy? Jan Jagodzinski teaches that
The crisis of representation... is to question the
accuracy of any representation.. . .  If all representations
are artificially and often arbitrarily constructed, the
question of what and who to believe can lead to
suspicion, skepticism, cynicism, and even paranoia. (1997, p. 39)
By what criteria do we judge the accuracy of a representation? If one
representation is as good as the next, how can we tell who is telling the most
accurate story? Or is there no truth to tell? The notion of accuracy haunts us
especially in the face of the so-called revisionist movement of pseudo-historians
who claim, in one way or another, that the Holocaust is a myth. Does the
postmodern crisis of representation allow for this kind of thinking? Does this
crisis open the door to any discourse? Petra Munro asks, “When history is no
longer about represention [in the classcial sense] what then? (1997, p. 3) The
“what then” is the crisis about which I am most concerned. And the “what then”
leads Wolfgang Iser to question “whether one could continue to speak of
'representation' at all” (1989, p. 249). But how can we describe what we see?
95
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
A more moderate and convincing position around the re-working of the 
notion of representation is W.J.T. Mitchell’s. Mitchell (1994) suggests, first, that 
representations are not only visual, but also verbal. He declares that 
representation is like a “visible language, a form that combines sight and sound, 
picture and speech” (1994, p. 14). Further Mitchell argues that images are not 
separated from words, as Sartre (1948) and others hold, but are rather “already 
immanent in the words, in the fabric of description" (1994, p. 99). By collapsing 
images and words, in what Mitchell calls “image-texts” (p. 91), we avoid 
dualisms that split lived experience up neatly into categories. Image-texts, 
Mitchell declares, are always already “a site of conflict, a nexus where political, 
institutional, and social antagonisms play themselves out” (p. 91). 
Representations, then, are “not a homogeneous field or grid of relationships 
governed by a single perspective” (p. 419). Stressing that representations are 
couched in a “cultural field" ( p. 57), Mitchell points to the complexities of 
interpreting how we experience our world. The seer is also hearer and engages 
in an active way with the text of the world. Martin Lister calls this engagement 
“interactivity” (1995, pp. 19-20). No longer am I a passive eye/ “I," a spectator 
who allows the world to pass by, but rather I am an active being who is merged 
with the woof and web of the world. I am an active being who is interconnected 
in elusive ways to cultural texts. Mitchell also suggests that we ought to think of 
representation as a “set of relationships” (1994, p. 47) and not as a “kind of 
object” (p. 420). Representation is a “process in which the thing is a participant” 
(p. 470). Although Mitchell’s position is perhaps the most useful way I have 
found to talk about the notion of representation, I still think that as long as our 
discourse uses the word representation itself to describe the way we 
experience the world, it will always conjure up subject-object dualisms. The
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“thing” Mitchell talks about as being a participant in the process of 
representation is still something which resides outside of the person who 
experiences it. Further, representation still conjures up the appearance/ reality 
split postmodems have tried to overturn. Thus, the crisis of representation is 
also a crisis of language.
Jan Jagodzinski (1997) suggests that what is important for scholars to 
think about are the possible “effects” (p. 90) of representation. And I argue that 
one of these effects that tends to get overlooked in the debate over 
representation is the emotional response we have to textual representation. Of 
course, the emotional response is not separated from the intellectual one, and 
in fact, they are interconnected in highly complex ways. But I think scholars 
need to pay more attention to how they feel when trying to understand what a 
particular representation means. Emotional responses to texts emerge with all 
sorts of complexities and ambiguities associated with reading and interpreting. 
Interpreting texts, though, cannot become a productive or generative act if I 
have not sorted out my emotional response to the text with which I am working. 
And if I feel outraged by the way in which subjects are represented in texts, what 
am I to do?
Historical Overview of Anti-Semitism
Here, I would like to examine what I term Jew hating texts and I would 
like to suggest that unexamined emotional responses to these texts, these 
representations, lead to internalizing hate. Internalization leads to self-hatred. 
Self-hatred damages. What is disturbing to me is that, as Linda Nochlin points 
out, Jews and anti-Semites have “the same representational trajectory” (1995, 
p. 10). Therefore, it becomes crucial to examine Jew hating texts in order to 
understand how the Jew has been created. Once we grapple with this, it
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becomes possible to break the inscription of Jew hatred by re-imagining who 
we are. I will also argue that my understanding of the notion of representation 
may determine how I interpret and interact with these texts, and this ultimately 
affects how I construct my own image of who I am. If I understand representation 
to mean that images in the text correspond to real people in the world, then my 
interpretation of this text may collude with Jew hatred. However, if I understand 
representation to mean that images in the text do not correspond to real people 
in the world, then I may resist the image in the text, not appropriate it, and 
perhaps avoid taking up self-hatred. But if the images in these texts do not 
correspond to real people in the world the question might arise as to why I 
should take these texts seriously in the first place. If these images are bizzare 
phantasies of anti-Semites why should I bother reading them at all? I will argue, 
indeed, that these representations of Jews by Jew haters are utter phantasy and 
do not have anything to do with real Jews. These representations spring from 
paranoia and hatred. If I am concerned about the emotional effects of 
representation and examine these texts as events that co-arise with my own 
identity formation, I might take them very seriously because I understand that 
texts are co-textual with my very being. No matter what I think of these texts, they 
will impact my own self-formation.
Who is the anti-Semite? Perhaps to ask the question is immediately 
problematic because anti-Semites are produced out of many cloths. Jean-Paul 
Sartre(1946) argues that there is an essential anti-Semite. Sartre declares that 
the anti-Semite “has chosen hate” (p. 18). And hatred is a “passion” (p. 17) that 
“involves the entire personality of the anti-Semite” (p. 33). Sartre argues that 
anti-Semitism is not just an “opinion” (p. 33) but a way of being in the world. 
Further, anti-Semitism is “a basic sadism” (p. 46) and thus the anti-Semite has a
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“profound sexual attraction toward Jews” (p. 46). But perhaps there is no 
essential anti-Semite, just as there is no essential Jew. Paul Rose (1990) points 
out, as against Sartre, that when one examines many German anti-Semites, 
their profiles are quite contradictory. German anti-Semites, says Rose, are often 
“simultaneously revolutionary and national, “left” and “right"" (xvi). Rose tries to 
suggest that within the character of a single individual, all of these contradictory 
stances around Jew hating emerge. Martin Luther and St. Paul are good 
examples of these contradictions. They both despised and felt at certain times in 
their lives benevolence toward Jews.
Ernst Rappaport (1975) argues that the anti-Semite has introjected his 
hatreds during early childhood. Both parents and teachers, says Rappaport, are 
responsible for cultivating Jew hatred. Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) argue that 
introjection, imitation and conformity shape the anti-Semite. Freud (1920-1922) 
suggested that imitation is key when looking at the formation of aggression 
within groups. The horde mentality allows defense mechanisms to 
vanish, unleashing all sorts of hatreds. Freud suggests that group ties are 
bound by thanatos and eros. Freud claims that, at bottom, group ties are sexual. 
Is there something sadistic about the anti-Semite, as Sartre (1946) claimed? 
Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) argue that the anti-Semite suffers from 
““paranoia,” “character disorders,” “sado-masochism” and other “psychotic" 
personality types” (p. 25). Adorno (1950), Fromm (1941/1969) and Horkheimer 
(1950) also argued that anti-Semites are sadistic.
However, recent Holocaust scholarship questions these earlier positions 
around the nature of the anti-Semite. Lifton (1986), Browning (1998),
Goldhagen (1997) and Langer (1998) argue that German anti-Semites, for the 
most part, were not sadistic. And even if some were, Langer argues that “sadism
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and psychotic rage" cannot explain mass murder (1998, xii). These scholars 
contend that anti-Semites were “ordinary Germans," not sadistic psychopaths.
When scholars suggest that hatred is caused primarily by introjection,
they are suggesting that hatred is internalized from without. This internalization
is then projected back out onto scapegoats. As I mentioned earlier, this is most
fundamentally a Fairbairnian or Kohutian position. People are not natual born
killers, these analysts would argue; they become killers because the
environment encourages this. Fairbairn and Kohut would argue that when
young children are abused by significant others, this early introjection of the bad
object permanently ruins the child. The child becomes self-hating and then
projects this hatred onto the world and onto the other. But what is it that he
projects? The anti-Semite projects that shadow side of himself which he
cannot integrate; he projects his heart of darkness onto the other, he rids
himself of any negativities. Peter Loewenberg (1995) explains this complicated
move of projection:
The delusional position of Jew haters is that they 
must persecute the Jew because they themselves 
are persecuted by the Jews because of the projective
quality of the fantasies of persecution Jews are
always demagogically accused of the very crimes
that are about to be committed against them___
Those who martyr and kill Jews actually are 
expunging the asocial anti-religious, ambivalent 
part of themselves, (p. 188)
The cycle of introjection and projection continues throughout life, as Melanie
Klein teaches. But ultimately it is projection that marks the anti-Semite. As
Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) remark, it is “the mechanism of projection [which]
permeates the entire personality of the anti-Semite" (p. 56). A Kleinian
interpretation of the anti-Semite might suggest that he is stuck in the paranoid-
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schizoid position. Recall, here human subjectivity is guided by bizarre 
phantasies of the mother as bad breast. She is the persecutor. These 
phantasies have no basis in reality; the badness comes not from the mother but 
from the child’s phantasies that the mother is bad. The implication is that 
original sin lies within. Hatred is not brought about by external factors, but it is 
bom actually within the heart of humanity. Klein would argue that human beings 
are natural born killers. Aggression is innate. And Freud would agree.
Who is the anti-Semite? Who knows. What makes him hate remains a 
mystery. Anti-Semites are everywhere and are every type of person imaginable. 
They are American, German, Austrian; they are Christian, Muslim and athiest. 
There is no essential anti-Semite as Sartre would have us believe. But some 
scholars feel that the basic characteristics of anti-Semitism are “ uniform" 
(Yardeni, 1990; Rose, 1990; Carmichael, 1992; Nicholls, 1993). These scholars 
suggest that there is a certain continuity about anti-Semitism because of its long 
and intense presence. However, Wistrich (1990/1991) argues that anti- 
Semitism, in spite of this continuity, continually changes form. Although Jew 
hating texts have been a continuous phenomena throughout Western history, 
specific images and representations of Jews have changed over time, to fit the 
times.
There is much debate in the literature around the term anti-Semitism 
itself. The word itself did not appear until 1879 as it was coined by Wilhelm 
Marr. Therefore, some historians and theologians insist that when we are 
talking about Jew hatred we need to draw a distinction between what many 
theologians term anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism. There is little consensus 
here, though. When exactly anti-Semitism begins is debated. Some argue that 
we can draw a distinction between these terms even before the arrival of the
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nineteenth century. For example, Gavin Langmuir (1990) suggests that we can
begin to call Jew hatred anti-Semitic with the appearance of irrational
phantasies Christians had about Jews in the medieval era. It is this irrationality
that makes them anti-Semitic. Langmuir names four such irrational phantasies:
that Jews ritually crucified Christian children, used 
human blood and flesh in their rituals, tortured the 
wafers of the Eucharist, and sought to destroy 
Christendom by sowing the Black Death, (p. 302)
If we want to talk about irrational phantasies Christians had of Jews, we 
can trace these even farther back in history to perhaps the biblical John who 
calls Jews devils (Lazar, 1991). Why does Langmuir draw the distinction 
between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism where he does historically? Is he 
trying to exonerate the early church by suggesting that anti-Judaism, because it 
was not irrational, was not as bad or as morally reprehensible as medieval Jew 
hatred? Heiko Oberman warns that “The search for the root [of anti-Semitism] 
conceals the dangers of wishing to absolve Christianity entirely in every period" 
(1984, xi).
Anti-Semitism and anti-Judaism basically underscore the same agenda: 
Jew hatred. When scholars attempt to drive a wedge between these two terms, 
John Weiss tells us that they tend to miss the “strong influence of Christian anti- 
Judaism on modern secular racism” (1996, x). Thus, the terms anti-Judaism and 
anti-Semitism conceal more than they reveal. And one of the things that they 
conceal is that both, in many ways, are forms of hatred. It is one thing to be 
against Judaism as a system of ideas, but it is another thing to hate the 
followers of this religious movement and to persecute and kill them for their 
beliefs. Anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism are nothing more than euphemisms for 
Jew hatred. Thus, I suggest we call this thing what it is: Jew hatred.
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Nicolas de Lange claims that the word anti-Semitism is “itself anti- 
Semitic in that it assumes the existence of a Semitic (i.e. Jewish) race” (1991, 
pp. 21-22). Semitic, Robert Wistrich explains, was a term that described, first, 
language groupings “including Hebrew, Arabic, Aramic, Babylonian, Assyrian, 
and Ethiopian” (1991, xvi). So-called Aryan languages were associated with 
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Celtic and Gothic (Poliakov, 1975). Leon Poliakov 
suggests that in the nineteenth century William Jones attempted to show that 
Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, Celtic and Gothic had similar linguistic structures. 
Poliakov argues that the point of this assumption was to “attribute preeminence 
to the Indian language" (1975, p. 311). August Wilhelm Schlegel also claimed 
the “superiority" (p. 312), Poliavok tells us, of the Indian language. These 
languages were considered to be Ayran.
According to Lewis Hopfe (1991) the word Aryan means noble and was 
used in the nineteenth century to describe people who lived in Iran prior to 
about 1750 B.C.E. and spoke an early version of Sanskrit. Some of these 
Iranians or Aryans are said, by some scholars, to have conquered the 
Dravidians or pre-Aryan natives of India. Other scholars are not so sure. The 
Dravidians could have perished from some natural disaster before the Aryans 
arrived on the scene. The Aryans were responsible for developing both 
Zoroastrianism in Persia, which is present day Iran, as well as Hinduism in 
India. Poliakov (1975) declares that the word Aryan was coined by Johann 
Gottfried Rhode and was made respectable among academicians by Oxford 
scholar Max Muller.
Poliakov suggests that the trouble for Jews started when the “West 
decided to establish a new geneaology for itself” (1975, p. 321). When people 
such as Rhodes and Muller legitimated the supposed superiority of a so-called
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Aryan race, they invented a new way to think about themselves, a way that 
denigrated the Jews. Christians wanted to detach themselves from their 
historical relatedness to Jews. Still, Poliakov points out that “the Ayran myth... 
was modeled on the biblical myth while trying to free itself from it” (1975, p.
312). Once Christians udiscoveredn their new roots, their relatedness to Indo- 
European Iranians or Aryans, they could boast of their supposed superiority 
over the Semites, or the Jews. This new-found geneaology served, in effect, as 
a justification for oppressing the other, the Jew.
It is no accident that the term anti-Semitism arrived on the scene when it 
did. In 1879, when Wilhelm Marr coined this term, Jews had been already under 
fierce pressure to assimilate into European culture. And many Jews did 
assimilate, perhaps following the lead of Moses Mendelsohnn. Those who 
assimilated and dropped the old style of dress, and the use of Yiddish, began to 
blend into European culture. However, Poliakov declares that “the more like 
Christians they became, the more mysterious, elusive and frightening they 
appeared” (1975, p. 460). Thus, naming Jews “Semites" was a way to define 
the other, supposedly in a clear and distinct term, just precisely at the moment 
when Jews began to look and sound like everyone else. In addition, the notion 
of a Jewish race or a “Semitic” race, then, served to drive the wedge between 
Christians and Jews even deeper. The notion of race served to oppress. Robert 
Wistrich points out that Ernest Renan and Christian Lassen “popularized the 
racial concept of ‘Semites’” (1991, p. 47). Today, much of our discourse take 
these notions of the Semite and anti-Semite for granted. These terms, however, 
are social constructions which now have become very difficult to untangle.
Anti-Semitism as a political movement emerged, according to Nicholas 
de Lange, "between the Franco-Prussian war and the Second World War”
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(1991, p. 21). Robert Wistrich (1990) traces the anti-Semitic political movement 
to the 1890s. Wistrich and Rose (1990) agree that anti-Semites politically were 
both leftists and rightists, and sometimes both simultaneously. Disturbingly, 
Wistrich points out that it was historian Heinrich von Treitschke who “gave 
academic legitimacy and respectability” to the first anti-Semitic movement in 
Berlin, led by Adolf Stoecker (1991, p. 59).
However we choose to define anti-Semitism, its premises can be traced, 
without a doubt, to early Christianity. It can be traced as far back as Paul who 
lived around 50 C.E.. Leon Poliakov insists that “a history of anti-Semitism is 
first and foremost a theological history" (1975, p. 397). Thus, at this juncture I 
would briefly like to trace this theological history in order to show how pervasive 
Jew hatred is in Christian doctrine.
Robert Wistrich (1991) says of the biblical Paul that it was he who was 
“most responsible for the detaching of Jesus from his Jewish background, for 
the shifting of guilt for the crucifixion from the Romans to the Jews" (pp. 14-15). It 
was not until Vatican II, in 1962, when the Roman Catholic Church formally 
retracted this position. Jew hatred, thus, stems primarily from this belief that 
Jews are nothing more than Christ-killers.
Unlike Paul, the biblical figure John talked about Jews in language that 
was much more vitriolic. Mosche Lazar relates that John was the first Christian 
writer “to transform the Jews from human beings into a mythical and monsterous 
race” (1991, p. 44). John is the first Christian writer, says Lazar, to “identify the 
Jews with the devil” (p. 44). Some theologians attribute the book of Revelation 
to John, others attribute it to John’s disciples. Nonetheless, John’s teachings 
about the Jews and the end time or the eschaton instigated, in part, the actual 
apocalypse which occurred between 1933 and 1945 for European Jews. Of
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course, Christian teachings cannot be blamed for the Holocaust. Certainly there 
were many other factors leading up the that event. Still, Christian theological 
doctrine against Jews had much to do with fostering Jew hatred.
Unlike the biblical writers, the church fathers, or the patristic writers, 
codified Jew hatred in what was called “the adversos Judaeos tradition" 
(Ruether, 1974, p. 137). Rosemary Radford Ruether explains that the church 
fathers defined Christianity by what it was not. These writings against the Jews 
became webbed into the very definition of what it meant to be a Christian. In 
order to be considered a real Christian, then, you had to hate the Jews. If not, 
you were thought to be a heretic. Ruether claims that the church fathers all 
wrote tracts against the Jews. Cyprian, Tertullian, Augustine, Origen, Eusebuis, 
Chrysostom all engaged in Jew hating dogma. Along with these, Robert 
Wistrich (1991) adds even more names to Ruether’s list. He tells us that Gregory 
of Nyssa, St. Jerome and St. Ambrose wrote Jew hating tracts too. Jews were 
imaged by Chrysostom as “theives, grave robbers, and sorcerers" (Ruether, 
1974, p. 143). Jews “sacrificed their children to demons" (p. 128). Whatever the 
Jews were charged with, Ruether points out that it was “axiomatic in the 
adversos Judaeos tradition that Jewish reprobation is permanent and 
irrevocable” (p. 144).
Even though the patristics were filled with Jew hatred, they felt, at least 
until the Inquisition, that Jews had a place in God’s world. Jeremy Cohen 
suggests that it was Augustine “who had ordained the survival of the Jews... so 
that they would convert at the end of days” (1982, p. 14). Changes, though, 
toward the Jews could be seen after the death of St. Anselm around 1104 C.E. 
Cohen (1982) claims that according to Amos Funkenstein, Anselm’s followers 
justified killing Jews because it seemed the ‘reasonable’ thing to do. The real
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changes in attitude toward Jews, however, came during the Inquisition. 
Franciscans and Dominicans were responsible for the move from tolerance to 
murder. “It was they who developed the papal Inquisition... [the Franciscans 
and Dominicans] directed the burnings of the Talmud” (Cohen, 1982, p. 13).
Along with the Inquisitors, Martin Luther, an early reformer and initiator of 
what later became known as Protestantism, raged against the Jews. Luther's 
three writings against the Jews, That Jesus Christ was Born a Jew (1523/1962): 
Against the Sabbatarians: Letter to a Good Friend (1538/1971); and The Jews 
and their Lies (1543/1971), became deeply etched in the hearts and minds of 
Germans for centuries to come. Paul Rose notes that "Luther legitimated 
hysteria and paranoia in a major European culture" (1990, p. 8). Luther was not 
alone in advocating this. There were others like Johannes Pfefferkorn who, 
according to Heiko Oberman (1984), distributed the highest number of 
pamphlets against the Jews during the early Reformation. However, Pfefferkorn 
was relatively unknown. Luther was not unknown, especially after 1517 when 
he nailed his Ninety Five Theses on the door of the Wittenberg Church in 
Germany.
When we trace Luther's writings, it becomes apparent that he changes 
his position around Jews as he grows older. By 1538 Luther grows more and 
more angry toward Jews. By 1543 he is a fierce Jew hater. Paul Rose suggests 
that scholars who support the thesis that there was a “young pro-Jewish,” but an 
“old anti-Jewish” Luther are nothing more than “apologists” (1990, p. 7). Rose 
claims that Luther was always an anti-Semite and “throughout his life Luther 
longed for the destruction of Judaism” (p. 7). I would like to make two comments 
about Rose’s claims. First, I do not consider myself, in any way, an apologist for 
Luther because I argue that it was not until 1538 that we can say that Luther
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was a Jew hater. I do not hold, however, that Luther was ever “pro-Jewish." He 
was tolerant of Jews in his early days. But tolerance does not mean pro-Jewish. 
Secondly it is impossible to determine Rose's claim that Luther always 
longed for the destruction of Judaism. We do not see this kind of language until 
1538. If Luther did long to destroy the Jews, he does not say it until 1538. It is 
hard to say what Luther wished for all along. Thus, Rose’s claim, I think, is 
exaggerated.
Here, I want to show how Luther's attitudes toward Jews evolved 
between 1523 and 1543. Let us first turn to Luther's 1523 work entitled That 
Jesus Christ was born a Jew. Luther wishes to persuade Jews to convert to 
Christianity. "I hope that if one deals in a kindly way with the Jews and instructs 
them carefully from Holy Scriptures many of them will become genuine 
Christians” (1523/1962, p. 200). I suppose conversion of Jews could be 
interpreted broadly to mean “destruction of Judaism” (Rose, 1990, p. 7). But I 
take “destruction" to mean something much more radical like burning down 
synagogues. Luther argues in this early work that Jews are, in a way, important 
for Gentiles because “Jews are of the lineage of Christ” (p. 201). We hear 
echoes of St. Paul, who in the Letter to the Romans suggests that Christians are 
like branches and Jews are like roots of the same tree; thus, Jews should be 
respected because they are historically related to Christians, and Judaism 
serves as the foundation for Christianity. It is clear that both Paul and Luther felt 
torn by the presence of Jews; they expressed both benevolence and hostility 
toward them. Luther wants to “help" (p. 229) Jews “by the law of Christian love” 
(p. 229). He declares “we must receive them cordially, and permit them to trade 
and work with us” (p. 229). But Luther does not remain friendly toward Jews.
108
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
In 1538 Luther's tone begins to change toward the Jews. In Against the 
Sabbatarians: Letter to a good Friend. Luther has grown frustrated, it seems, 
because his mission to convert Jews has not been successful. Luther 
comments, “the Jewish people have become very stubborn because of their 
rabbis. As a result they are very difficult to win over” (1538/1971, p. 65). In this 
piece, Luther talks much about the “terrible sins" (p. 67) of the Jews. The worst 
sin, according to Luther, is that the Jews killed Christ. The Jews “must have 
committed gruesome and terrible sins previously unheard of on earth” (p. 67). 
And for these “gruesome" sins the Jews “deserved complete destruction" (p.
71). Here is the passage to which Rose (1990) probably refers.
It is not entirely clear why Luther turned against the Jews in his later 
years, but he did, and by 1543 Luther’s words become scandalous and almost 
unbearable to read, especially for Jews. In On the Jews and their Lies. Luther 
sets the stage for what is to happen in Europe. It is disturbing to note that the 
Nazis reprinted this material and distributed it throughout Germany. It is here 
that some might begin to draw connections between Luther and Hitler. Others 
might contend that this connection is inappropriate because, for one thing, the 
two men lived centuries apart. And it must seem almost blasphemous for 
Lutherans to even think that this connection might be possible. Nevertheless, 
Paul Rose (1990) suggests that Luther and Hitler “remain uniquely 
charismatically German figures. They were both charismatics in whom 
revolutionary and reactionary impulses flowed together.. . .  It will not do to 
dismiss these parallels as pure accidents” (p. 8).
Like Paul Rose, Erik Erikson (1962), in a psychobiography called Young 
Man Luther, suggests that there is a connection between Luther and Hitler. 
Erikson declares that “Hitler was a totalitarian leader. Luther became the leader
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of a rebellion too... trends in him [in Luther] may have prepared his nation for 
the acceptance of a leader like Hitler” (p. 109). Erikson claims that Luther, like 
Hitler, suffered from borderline personality disorder. Robert Waite, who also 
suggests that Hitler suffered from borderline personality disorder, tells us that 
“borderline patients characteristically show paranoid tendencies. They... 
fantasize about their 'magical omnimpotence’. .. [they have] an impulse to self 
destruction... [they are] oral-aggressive... narcissistic... [they have] phobias 
about dirt, feces” (1977, p. 357). Luther, Erikson claims, matches the borderline 
personality profile: He suffered from “suspiciousness, obsessive scrupulosity, 
moral sadism, and a preoccupation with dirtying infectious thoughts” (1962, p. 
60). Luther also suffered from occasional psychotic episodes. The most famous 
episode that has been passed down to us from chroniclers of Luther’s life 
concerns the devil. Luther hallucinated that “the devil [was] sitting on a rainpipe 
outside his window, exposing his behind to him” (Erikson, pp. 58-59). Erikson 
remarks that Luther was “compulsively retentive” (p. 176).
Upon analyzing Hitler's mental topography, many scholars point out that 
his behavior was, in many ways, very much like Luther's. Later I will tease out 
what it is some of the psychobiographers of Hitler have to say. However, for now 
I would like to raise a few questions. Erikson offers an interesting psychological 
portrait of Luther. But I think making comparisons between Luther and Hitler is 
problematic. Whenever we compare two individuals we tend to oversimplify. 
Diagnosing Hitler and Luther as borderline personalities, labeling both as 
having the same character type, reduces them to the same. One of the 
dangerous implications here is that these characterological portraits suggests 
that there is some innate thing or essence lurking in the psyche of all Germans. 
There is no essential Germanness and I think that this is the implication of
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arguments like these. Even if Luther and Hitler were borderline personality 
types, they were still radically different men who lived in different eras. Both, 
however, were products of culture, of a Christian culture which has always 
perpetuated anti-Semitism. Still, Erikson’s psychobiography is important and it 
does give us some insight into Luther's ravings. However, I caution that 
psychobiographies that claim to get into the mind of their subject are suspect 
because it is impossible to know what it was that really motivated Luther.
In On the Jews and their Lies. Luther gave “advice” to Christians about
what they should do with Jews. And it is this so-called advice that is really
frightening, especially for post-Holocaust readers. Luther declares, “F irst.. . set
fire to their synagogues or schools and... bury and cover with dirt whatever will
not burn” (1543/1971, p. 268). Luther goes on to say that if Moses “were alive
today [he] would be the first to set fire to the synagogues and house of the Jews”
(p. 269). Luther’s advice continues:
I advise that all their prayer books and Talmudic 
writings be taken from them... I advise that their 
rabbis be forbidden to teach... I advise that safe 
conduct on the highway be abolished completely.. .
I advise that usury be prohibited to them, and that 
all cash and treasure of silver and gold be taken 
from them and put aside for safe keeping, (pp. 269-270)
Luther also says in this piece that the Jews are “base, whoring people” (p. 167).
Their “law must be accounted as filth” (p. 167). Jews are like a “defiled bride..
.an incorrigible whore and evil slut” (p. 166). And thus, Luther put the nail in the
coffin for European Jews. What gives these rantings legitimacy is that Luther
was basically the founder of Protestantism. However, other Protestant
reformers, unlike Luther, did not feel this way toward Jews. John Weiss points
out that Luther “was the only important Protestant leader who believed in the
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irredeemable corruption of Jewry. John Calvin and Ulrich Zwingly.. .were not 
obsessed with the Jewish refusal of Christ” (1996, p. 25).
Along with Luther, many Catholics during the Counter Reformation 
argued that Jews were evil and must be dealt with. Pope Paul IV, according to 
John Weiss, decreed that the Reformation “was a Jewish-inspired plot to 
destroy the Vatican" (1996, p. 30). Robert Wistrich recounts that the Counter 
Reformation brought with it the "introduction of ghettos in the second half of the 
16th century, first in Italy and then in the Hapsburg Empire” (1991, p. 37). Thus, 
Catholics were no friend to Jews either.
Ironically, when the church lost its grip on the West and secular culture 
gained a foothold, especially during the rise of scientism, Jewish oppression 
increasingly worsened, although in some regions Jew hatred seemed to fade. 
However, in Austria and Germany it did not fade; It got worse. John Weiss 
(1996) declares that it was during the Napoleonic era that Jew hatred began to 
grow. Moreover, Robert Wistrich (1990) claims that it was not difficult for secular 
culture to embrace Jew hatred. In fact, Wistrich comments that "the task of 
integrating anti-Semitism into the mainstream of central European culture was 
greatly facilitated by... Luther, Kant, Goethe, and Fichte... Hegel, Feuerbach, 
Schopenhauer, Richard Wagner” ( p. 39). Interestingly enough, Leon Poliakov 
(1985) declares that Germans were far surpassed in the intensity of their Jew 
hatred by the French, especially during the Dreyfus Affair (1898-1900).
European Jew hatred, no doubt, was much more dangerous than it ever 
has been in the United States. However, David Gerber contends that “European 
images [of Jews] were embedded in the American consciousness in the first half 
of the 19th century” (1986, pp. 22-23). In spite of the fact that European images- 
stereotypes- of Jews crept into American culture, many historians seem to
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agree that America has always been an exceptional place for Jews. Americans 
seem to tolerate Jews more so than Europeans. This toleration is termed 
“American exceptionalism” (Gerber, 1986, pp. 9-10). The idea that America is 
an exceptional place for Jews has gone basically unchallenged until around the 
1970s. Since the 1970s many argue that the description of America as an 
exceptional place for Jews is not entirely accurate (Gerber, 1986; Dinnerstein, 
1994; Learner, 1986). This position presupposes that Jew hatred is virtually 
absent in America. But David Gerber claims that the “lack of anti-Semitism in the 
American past’ has more to do with “the concerns of historians" (p. 9) than with 
the experiences of Jews living in America.
it seems that historians have been so concerned to show how Jews have 
helped build America as a nation that they omitted the story about Jew hatred 
because they felt it would make things worse for Jews (Gerber, 1986). And so 
historians sanitized and erased Jew hatred in America. Historians, keepers of 
memory, altered the ways in which Jews talk about living in the United States. 
Jew hatred is here and has been here since the Puritans arrived. But why Jew 
hatred in America did not lead to the brutalities it did in Europe is difficult to 
answer. Lucy Dawidowicz suggests that America s history of non-violence 
against Jews has to do with Puritan doctrine. Puritans embraced a “philo- 
Hebraic strain” (1982, p. 29) and “encouraged a neutral interest in Judaism 
[and] at times even a favorable one" (p. 29). Perhaps, in part, Puritan philo- 
Semitism kept back the tide of hatred. But philo-Semitism is merely the flip side 
of anti-Semitism and one wonders why these extremes did not lead to overt 
violence.
It was not until 1994 that American Jew hatred was grappled with in an 
extensive way. Leonard Dinnerstein compiled the first “comprehensive survey
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(1994, vii) of anti-Semitism in the United States. Another alarming facet of Jew 
hatred in America is the ways in which university and school officials handled 
Jewish presence in their institutions. Many universities developed policies to 
keep Jews out. Dinnerstein (1994) claims that Harvard, Princeton, Williams, 
Yale, The University of Pennyslvania, Columbia and a host of others limited the 
number of Jewish students and faculty allowed in their institutions. Dinnerstein 
declares that
before the 1920s few Jews had earned doctorates...
This was especially true in the disciplines of English 
and History where it was thought inconceivable for 
a Jew to transmit or comprehend the culture or 
traditions of an American Christian society, (p. 87)
Universities were not alone in discriminating against Jews. David Gerber says
that between 1920 and 1945 “Jews in Minneapolis... were never employed in
public schools” (p. 28). And, of course, this was no accident.
Times have changed and Jews in America certainly have it better today 
than in the past. But Jew hatred still thrives. Under every unturned stone, hatred 
is getting ready to be born. And in Europe, notably in Germany, Jack Zipes
(1991) warns that Jew hatred is on the rise again. The message here is that 
Jews must never become complacent. Mortimer Ostow wisely points out that he 
is not
reassured by the fact that for American Jewry, this 
might be called a golden age... Jews have enjoyed 
similar golden ages in the past, in Babylonia, in Spain, 
in Italy, in Poland... and yet changes in the political, 
economic, or military situations have brought each 
golden age to an end whereupon anti-Semitism revived.
(1996, pp. 1-2)
Thus, historical memory teaches that hatreds brew around every comer and it is 
crucial to keep awake and sniff out odors of hatred. Hatred must be undone.
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Effects of Anti-Semitic Representations
Throughout the long history of Jew hatred, troubling images or 
representations of Jews have appeared in almost every country in the West. 
What is interesting about these representations is how varied they are. In fact, 
Linda Nochlin comments that “only mutally exclusive categories would seem 
large enough to encompass the totality of our iniquity” (1995, p. 7). At this 
juncture I would like to paint a montage of these hideous images. The question I 
will ask here is, How do these representations affect Jewish subjects?
Let us begin with Peter the Venerable (1092-1156). Peter the Venerable 
called the Jews “beasts" (Cohen, 1982, p. 28). During the thirteenth century, 
Jewish males were thought to be sexually “damaged" (Gilman, 1995, p. 75) 
because of circumcision. Not only this, Gilman explains that some thirteenth 
century Christians believed in “Jewish male menstruation. Thomas de 
Cantimpre... presented the first ‘scientific’ statement of the phenomenon"
(1986, pp. 74-75). In around 1350 Jews were imaged as “bribers, secret killers, 
sorcerers, magicians” (Wistrich, 1991, p. 29). Further, in medieval art, “Jews
were portrayed as agents of Satan, with evil faces, horns and a tail........
Sometimes the Devil might be seen in a painting or sculpture as riding on the 
back of a Jew” (1991, p. 29). John Weiss claims that during the 14th century 
Jews were imaged on “the sides of cathedrals... as scorpions or pigs” (1996, p.
19). During the Reformation, it was believed that Jews could “transform 
themselves into demons and serpents” (p. 24). Napolean called the Jews 
caterpillars who attempted to “ravage the countryside” (Poliakov, 1975, p. 226). 
Poliakov says that Schopenhauer “vented against the ubiquitous “Jewish foul 
odor” (1985, p. 7). Schopenhauer was not the only one to think that Jews had a 
foul odor. Sander Gilman explains that this supposed foul odor of Jews could
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be traced back to the medieval era. Gilman explains that this odor was
connected with a mythology connected with the goat and the devil.
The smell of Jews, the foetor Judaicus, is 
always associated with the Other. For Jews it is 
a quality ascribed to them by the medieval anti-Semitism 
that is linked with the sexualized image of the goat.
For Jews, like the devil, are horned and have a 
goat’s tale and a goat’s beard. (1986, p. 174).
Paul Brienes (1990) comments that all of these types of representations 
of Jews are ultimately “overshadowed by Nazism’s dead Jewish bodies” (p. 17). 
Here I would like to turn to twentieth century images of dead Jewish bodies that 
are displayed on the internet by the Holocaust Museum in Washington (1997). 
Questions around representation become particularly difficult for many reasons 
I hope to explore.
First, I would like to examine different ways of understanding these 
photographs. Understanding these images as a source of evidence that the 
Holocaust happened is the most obvious reason the Holocaust Museum has 
such an exhibit on the internet. As against the rising tide of Holocaust deniers, 
these computerized images prove that, indeed, the Holocaust happened. Thus, 
the displays are important in a crude way. Here it is easy to be more 
sympathetic with the realist view that photographs reflect their referent. As 
Roland Barthes suggests, “the photograph [ or the computer image] is indifferent 
to all intermediaries: it does not invent" (1981, p. 87).
If we understand these images from a constructivist stance, whereby the 
image is constructed by the photographer looking through the grids of culture, 
we might think that “photographs are as much an interpretation of the world as 
paintings” (Sontag, 1977, pp. 6-7). Some scholars like W.J.T. Mitchell (1994) 
might argue that these images are no less ‘real’ because they are constructed
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through cultural grids. Mitchell does not reduce everything to imagination or 
phantasy; he complexifies how we understand the ways in which 
representations or images are produced. However, when we begin to question 
how these images were produced troubling questions enters the picture. Jan 
Jagodzinski insists that we must ask the question: “Whose images are they?” 
(1997, p. 139). According to Daniel Goldhagen (1997), most of the photographs 
of Holocaust victims were taken by Nazi SS. The reason, he says, that we have 
so many photographs is that the Germans insisted on taking them,even against 
the wishes of their commanders. Goldhagen tells us that these photographs 
were distributed among Germans and even placed in family albums. And if 
someone wanted copies of the photos, they too, were available.
Most of the photos we find on the internet at the Holocaust Museum web 
site were taken by Germans. Knowing that many of these photos were 
displayed in family albums and were considered trophies by German police and 
Nazi SS may undermine the viewer’s willingness to continue viewing this 
internet site. Goldhagen comments that these photographs make certain that 
“the victim’s shame would be displayed for years to come” (1997, p. 296). There 
is something almost obscene about viewing these images. In fact, some might 
even argue that viewing pictures like these is not dissimilar to the viewing of 
pornography. W.J.T. Mitchell argues that the ““taking of human subjects by a 
photographer... is a concrete social encounter, often between a damaged, 
victimized, and powerless individual and a relatively privileged observer, often 
acting as the 'eye of power’” (1994, p. 288).
The power relationships between photographer and that which is 
photographed certainly demand interrogation. And in the case of the Holocaust 
photos, we can see a dear power relation, with the victim losing every time.
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These photo-images affect both emotional and intellectual registers more 
intensely than, say, images we read about during the medieval era. The images 
produced out of the medieval era seem so remote and bizarre that the reader 
may simply shake her head. But when viewing photos that are not so far off in 
the distant past, we begin to understand the emotional impact images can have 
on viewers. Further, we begin to see just how tangled the emotional and 
intellectual registers are when attempting to sort out what is going on between 
images, viewer, computer, photographers.
Intellectually, I can understand why these images are on the internet. At
one level people need to know that this event happened. We need to squash
revisionists’ myths at every turn. The internet is a good opportunity to get this
message across because it is global. However, emotionally, I think these
images are potentially damaging both to the memory of the victims and living
relatives of victims. In a way the victims’ memories are desecrated. There is
something really awful about this web site, but exactly what it is I do not know.
As Mitchell points out, uWe still do not know exactly what pictures are, what their
relationship to language is, how they operate on observers" (1994, p. 13). I
worry about how these images operate on me and on others because their
potential effects could be damaging to one’s psyche. Images and
representations are interdependent events with the eye/ T  of both my intellect
and my emotions, with my very process of self-formation. But I am uncertain
about the impact of such an encounter. Homi Bhabha tells us that
the image-a point of identification- marks the site 
of an ambivalence. As representation is always 
spatially sp lit-it makes present something that is 
absent-and temporally deferred: it is the 
representation of a time that is always elsewhere 
a repetition. (1994, p. 51)
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The site of ambivalence confuses my sense of identification with these 
images. The distance I put between myself and the images, in some ways, 
contributes to a sense of guilt that I feel, because I was graced by being bom 
late and being bom in America and not in Europe. What makes me feel bad, 
though, is that I think this web site is cheap. Susan Sontag reminds us that “the 
main effects [of viewing photographs are] to convert the world into a department 
store... every subject is depreciated into an article of consumption" (1977, p. 
110). The consumption of corpses, or of dead bodies or near dead bodies, can 
be had on this web site. Simply click on the word 'corpses' and a series of 
images appear on your computer. The viewer can consume thousands of 
images of corpses if she wishes. Photograph # 11472 reads “A wagon loaded 
with corpses intended for burial at Buchenwald." Photograph # 74819 reads 
“Corpses in the Woebbelin concentration camps.” Click on the word 'women' 
and you can see many photographs of women about to be executed. 
Photograph # 76461 reads “A woman about to be executed in Belzec 
concentration camp.” Photograph # 43195 reads “German police and Ukrainian 
collaborators in civilian clothes look as Jewish women are forced to undress 
before their execution.”
After clicking on various places on this web site, after viewing hundreds 
of photos like these, one simply becomes numb to them. Susan Sontag (1977) 
explains that “After repeated exposure to the image it . .. becomes less real” (p.
20). She comments that “images anethestize” (p. 20). And this would be the 
crime. The effects of viewing these photographs on the Jewish subject are not 
clear. The effects of reading anti-Semitic texts are not clear either. It becomes 
difficult to avoid internalizing hatred. But we must continually try to undo the 
hate. Self-hatred is destructive. Keeping psychological distance intact when
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enountering anti-Semitic texts is crucial. But I do not think that it is possible to 
completely break the inscription. Texts get introjected into readers in strange 
ways that we really do not understand. But perhaps trying to articulate feelings 
and responses to these texts is a start.
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CHAPTER 4 
MEMORY AND HISTORY
Asked by a reporter if he had forgiven the Nazis,
Wiesel answered: “I didn’t speak about forgiving.. . .
Nobody asked me to forgive, nobody authorized me 
to forgive. I speak on behalf of memory without 
hatred, and I think memory, in my case, is a shield 
against hatred”. (Kemptser & Chen, 1999 p. 22)
Elie Wiesel tells us that remembering the Holocaust does not mean 
forgiving the perpetrators. Remembering the Holocaust does not mean making 
“meaning’’ out of it either. Lawrence Langer comments that “When asked if there 
were any meaning in the Holocaust, historian Raul Hilberg is said to have 
replied “I hope not.”” (1998, xvi). The Holocaust and its remembrance is difficult 
and yields difficult memories devoid of meaning. But this lack, this void, this 
meaninglessness does not necessarily slide into nihilism because memory 
work, as I see it, is a form of justice. As Edith Wyshogrod points out the memory 
worker makes “ a promise to the dead to tell the truth about the past” (1998, xi). 
Of course, this “truth" is not absolute but rather yields “truths” which reflect 
differing perspectives and interpretations. Some truths are more adequate than 
others. A radical relativism will not do.
The construction of memory, as Freud (1937-1939) explains, is also a 
reconstruction of the past. And in spite of the complexities of interpretation, 
memory work should attempt to get at that “kernal of truth" (Freud, pp. 267-268) 
we call the Holocaust. But that kernal of truth is not exactly a construction or a 
reconstruction, but a third thing; it is a translation. And that translation is always 
already other. The text of the Holocaust is always a stranger to us and must 
remain so if we want to avoid the trap of arrogance and domestication. 
Translations of this event must always be tentative. Response to the call of
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doing interpretive work beckons. So we listen with caution and care.
Psychoanalytic memory work with Holocaust survivors is both a process of
construction and reconstruction. As analyst Dori Laub explains,
Indeed, historical reality [of the survivor’s memory] has 
to be reconstructed before any other work can start.. . .
[Once the memory is reconstructed] the theraputic process 
of constructing a narrative... [and] the re-externalization of the 
event--has to be set in motion. (1992, p. 69)
Freud compares the process of memory work to archaeological excavation. He
contends that the “work of constructing [memory], or, if it is preferred, of
reconstructing, resembles to a great extent an archaeologist’s excavation of
some dwelling place that has been destroyed and buried” (1937-1939, p. 259).
The old sites of memory exist alongside the new ones; the ruins remain even if
they are buried. Holocaust survivors live alongside their memories and it is
unlikely that the memories fade. Ironically, Holocaust memories may intensify as
the survivor ages.
Paul Ricoeur suggests that memory workers “owe a debt to the past, a 
dept of recognition to the dead" (1990, pp. 142-143). Remembering the dead, 
remembering the victims and survivors of the Holocaust, is clearly an ethical 
imperative. Not only is memory work an ethical imperative, it is also a religious 
one. For Jews, Yerushalmi (1982) contends that memory is “felt as a religious 
and ethical imperative" (p. 10). Yerushalmi explains that “Altogether the verb 
Zakhar [to remember] appears in its various declensions in the bible no less 
than one hundred and sixty nine times" ( p. 5).
Memory work is tied to loss, especially for Jews. When we examine the 
etymology of the word memory, Edward Casey reminds us that MEMOR” the 
Latin root means “to grieve" and the Greek uMERIMNAm means “sorrow”" (1987,
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pp. 273-264). Yet how can we remember an event that is so hideous as to 
seem beyond representation, beyond thinkability, beyond understanding? And 
how can a third generation Jew like myself remember this event? How can I do 
justice to a memory that is three generations removed from me? With caution 
and care.
We must be cautious never to domesticate the memory of the Holocaust
by making it more comfortable. This memory is difficult and unbearable, too
difficult to take in psychologically at times. We must never assimilate the
memory into our own lifeworld, but perhaps live alongside it: to remain a
stranger to it. We must never make the strange familiar. As Richard
Stammelman stresses
The extremity of the genocidal condition, its 
unimaginability and horror, generate a difference, 
a strangeness, an alterity lying beyond the powers 
of thought, language, and memory. (1995, p. 267)
This memory refuses to be made into the same, the sameness of other
atrocities. This is a uniquely Jewish tragedy, not simply a humanitarian one.
Researchers must remain strangers to the event of the Holocaust, especially if
they did not actually live through this event. To say that research around the
Holocaust grants more understanding or better understanding may be a trap, a
trap of arrogance. What we understand is very little indeed. The complexities of
remembering the Holocaust are overlayed by the difficulties of psychologically
dealing with loss. Difficulties also abound because of the ways in which
memory comes to be inscribed in one's individual consciousness and memory
traces. Difficulties also abound because memory of the Holocaust may be
silenced within Jewish and German families. Silence haunts. Silence hovers.
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Collective and Personal Memory
Memory is not monolithic. Different kinds of collective memories abound. 
Historical representations, oral histories passed down through generations, 
literary representations, film, artwork, museums and other kinds of memorials all 
point to our collective memory of this event. Iwona Irwin Zarecka remarks that “A 
collective memory-as a set of ideas, images, feelings, about the past--is best 
located not in the minds of individuals but in the resources they share" (1994, p.
41). Memory inscribed in individual consciousness tends to be blurred with the 
collective because we are always already bom into a collective social setting. 
The point here is that memory is never solipsistic, although it is individually 
formed; yet it is always already culturally produced. There is a blurring between 
my own personal memory and the memory that is handed down to me by my 
family, school, and other cultural institutions.
George Herbert Mead (1913/1964) claimed that the self is social; 
therefore, selfhood does not arise in a vacuum. Like Mead, Maurice Halbwachs
(1992) agrees that memory is not private or personal but rather it is primarily 
social. "Yet it is in society that people normally acquire their memories” (1992, p. 
38). Against these positions, I will contend that memory is not primarily social, 
nor is it primarily personal; rather, it is a complex combination of both.
Collective memories arise for all sorts of political, ideological and 
psychological reasons. Collective memory has everything to do with the politics 
of national identity. Collective memory “defines such key ingredients as pride,
shame, fear, revenge It is central to an understanding of nationalisms
(Markovits & Reich, 1997, p. 9). The collective memories of heroes and 
resisters, rhetoric that is robed in anti-Fascist myth, overlays former East 
Germany. These myths of Communist resisters of Fascism served to erase East
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German complicity in the perpetuation of crimes against Jews during the 
Holocaust. Shameful national memories may tend to be repressed for decades. 
Vichy, and the relatively late acknowledgement of France’s complicity with the 
Holocaust, signals repressed memory. Maurice Halbwachs insists that we only 
remember events in what he calls “collective frameworks" (1992, p. 40) which 
are shaped by culture. “Collective memory is invoked to heal, to blame, to 
legitimate. It has become a major idiom in the construction of identity, both 
individual and collective." (Markovits & Reich, 1997, p. 9). These collective 
frameworks function as frames which actually limit what it is we are able to 
remember. For example, an American collective framework might be limited by 
the mere fact that we were bystanders during the Holocaust. Bystander 
perspectives, which are not monolithic, differ radically from victim or perpetrator 
perspectives. Further, American culture might be limited in its “collective 
framework” by its Puritanical character, as well as by its difficulty dealing with 
race, ethnicity and violence. The American “collective framework” still may be 
limited in its refusal to see Jews as Jews, Jews as other. Jewish Americans who 
do not assimilate are still marginalized and are considered too Jewish. But at 
the end of the day, the American “collective framework” is highly complex and 
elusive. The notion of a “collective framework” becomes problematic because it 
suggests that there is, in this case, an American character, an essential 
Americanness. But America is made up of so many different kinds of people that 
it becomes difficult to say what a collective framework is after all.
Memory is not only collective, it is also intensely personal. As Suzanne 
Langer tells us “memory is the great organizer of consciousness. It simplifies 
and composes our perceptions into units of personal knowledge. It is the real 
maker of history” (1953, p. 263). And of course memory is not one thing, nor is it
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even uone faculty” (Warnock, 1987, p. 14). Memory is dense and scaffolded both 
horizontally and vertically over time and place. Some memory traces haunt 
while others vanish. Mary Warnock remarks that “memory images are like 
guests. Some are invited, even sought after, others invite themselves, they are 
welcome or unwelcome” (1987, p. 16).
Recalling personal memory, especially of the Holocaust, becomes 
complex because as Ruth Linden (1993) points out that “As we fashion the 
stories of our lives, memories naturally blur with subsequent interpretations of 
remembered events" (x). And memories seem to come up from deep recesses 
in the psyche, arriving on the scene in their own time. Memories seem to have a 
life of their own. Patricia Hampl suggests that “there's precious little order to the 
slides [of memory] in the rotating carousel [of the mind]. Beyond that confusion, 
who knows who is running the projector?" (1997, p. 66). The otherness of 
memory leaves unconscious inscriptions, traces deposited in the sites of the 
body. Memory is embodied and memories pain and course through the body.
At the end of the day memory is fuzzy.
Not only is memory fuzzy, its relation to history is fuzzy too. Saul
Friedlander (1993) and Eric Hobsbawn (cited in Friedlander, 1993) suggest that
memory and history have a fuzzy relation. In fact, Hobsbawn declares that
there is a twighlight zone between history and memory 
between the past as a generalized record which is open 
to relatively disspassionate inspection and the past as 
part of, or background to, one's own life. (1993, viii, cited 
in Friedlander)
This fuzziness between memory and history is also due, in part, to the fact that 
“Memory is the raw material of history, whether mental, oral, or written, it is the 
living source from which historians draw” (LeGoff, 1992, xi). And as Carl Becker
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declares, history is, in fact “the artificial extension of social memory” (1935, p. 
248). However, Halbwachs argues that social memory differs from the notion of 
history. For Halbwachs, collective memory is completely antithetical to history. 
Markovits & Reich point out that for Halbwachs, “history is universalistic, 
[whereas] collective memory is particularistic... history is timeless, collective 
memory is an expression of feeling" (1997, p. 14). But bifurcations such as 
these make little sense. History is the systematization of memory. History is 
about the particular and may have universal significance, even if it does not 
explain universal laws or apriori principles. Doing history involves both 
cognition and emotion. History is both time-bound and subjective. Historians 
work out of their own memories and the memories of their subjects. And 
historians' renderings of the past are clearly affected by the ways in which they 
remember the event itself, if, that is, they are writing about recent history. If 
historians repress their own memories around the event that they are working 
on, their interpretations will reflect this repression. Memory, however, is not the 
same thing as history and I argue that history should not be collapsed onto 
memory. As Jacques LeGoff stresses, this move would be “naive” (1992, xi).
Collapsing memory onto history or, conversely, polarizing memory and 
history reduces the complexities of the past. Both of these ways in which to 
explain memory suffer from the disease of a Cartesian logic which is an infantile 
wish phantasy to move toward simpler and simpler ideas. Should not 
explanations of the past be complexified?
Polarizing memory and history also results, usually, in valorizing history 
at the expense of memory. Halbwach’s position clearly valorizes history at the 
expense of memory. Memory is reduced to emotion and feeling, fragility and 
unreliability. Early Holocaust scholarship appropriated this kind of position. One
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of the unfortunate consequences of such a position is the exclusion of voices of 
the victims. Holocaust victims have been othered from their own history.
It is important to note that historians do not simply remember historical 
events, they systematize events by relying on documents. Even though 
documents are forms of memory, because they are constructed by human 
beings who remember, doing history is still different from remembering. But 
historians, if writing about recent history, do remember, and the ways in which 
they remember ultimately shape their constructions of the past. Thus, history 
and memory overlap in uncanny ways.
I think that memory, because it is the very stream out of which we operate 
as human beings, is the larger category under which history is subsumed. 
Therefore, I want to privilege memory, since it shapes consciousness, 
perception, and lived experience in general. If anything, privileging memory 
complexifies our notion of history because it risks getting lost in “the 
unconquerable flow of time" (LeGoff, 1992, vii). History is a form of memory of 
course, but it is not the same as memory. To signify this co-complex 
interrelation, I term history a memory text. I emphasize that memory and history 
are overlapping categories, yet they are not the same.
Whatever history is, it is ultimately ambiguous. Paul Thompson points 
out, though, that "All history depends ultimately on its social purpose” (1988, 
p.1). History may sen/e as a "justification of war,” as an "escape,” as a form of 
what Thompson calls “Bland contemporary tourism which exploits the past as if 
it were another foreign country to escape to . . .  purged of social suffering, 
cruelty and conflict" (1988, p. 1). Or some may feel that the purpose of history 
may be to master and control the past. To write about history, in other words, is 
a way of feeling that one is in control of the past. But the past is forever slipping.
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The dream of a “total history" corroborating the 
historian's own desire for mastery of a documentary 
repertoire and furnishing the reader with a vicarious 
sense o f... control in a world out of joint has of course 
been the lodestar of historiography from Hegel to 
the Annales School. (LaCapra,1985, p. 25)
Before the discipline of history separated from philosophy of history in the
nineteenth century, philosophy of history, especially as instantiated in Hegel
and Marx, embraced a passion for control and mastery by offering up total
systems, or grand metanarratives and apriori principles, to which history might
adhere. Historical idealism was outstripped by historical empiricism and like
historical idealism, empirical studies, like Ranke’s and Bury’s, attempted to
match “facts" with reality in a correspondence-like fashion. But already in 1752
the epistemological basis of [history's]... ideal of 
impartially copying or representing the real was 
put into question... the German theologian Johann 
Martin Chaldenius, elaborating a position outlined 
by Leibniz and Bayle, made the concept of point of 
view fundamental. (Grossman, 1990, p. 230)
Point of view, or interpretation, undermines the historian’s quest to master and
control the past, because interpretation and translation admit of slippage
between the signifier and the signified.
Some feel that the purpose of history serves to bolster national pride and 
national identity,especially when a nation suffers from an embarassing past. 
History, accordingly, is re-written to suit national and political agendas and 
ideologies. For others, the purpose of history may revolve around the notion of 
“conversation” (LaCapra, 1985, p. 36) with the past. LaCapra contends that 
“historiography is dialogical in that, through it, the historian enters into a 
“conversational" exchange with the past.. . .  The problem is the nature of the 
conversation” (1985, p. 36). For me, though, the purpose of history is ethical.
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Edith Wyshogrod remarks that the historian who embraces an ethics of 
remembering “the historian when bound by a responsibility toward the dead for 
whom she claims to speak becomes... the heteroiogical historian" (1998, p. 3). 
The heteroiogical historian “feels the pressure of an ethics that is prior to 
historical judgment” (p. 3). This “ethics of an ethics... would bring the dead to 
life” (p. 3).
Constructing historical narratives opens questions around the ways in
which historians rely upon imagination. It opens questions around whether or
not history and fiction overlap. Georg Iggers suggests that history and fiction are
overlapping categories because the historian must rely on imagination. But he
stresses that history is not fiction. Iggers tells us that,
The panel on “Fictionality, Narrativity, Objectivity” 
at the International Congress of Historical Sciences 
in Montreal in 1995, was to occupy a middle position, 
to recognize, as Roger Chartier formulated it, that 
while “one among many forms of narration, history 
is nevertheless singular in that it maintains a special 
relation to truth. More precisely its narrative constructions 
aim at reconstructing a past that really was. (1997, pp. 1-2)
I will argue that history, or what I term, the memory text of history, occupies this
middle position between construction and reconstruction and takes up a place
where a third thing resides. This is the third thing of translation (Edgerton,
1996).Translation is not exactly a correspondence and not exactly a fiction, but
something else, something complex, a translation of the other, the other of
history and the other of memory. And I argue that although history is “subject to
fiction” (Munro, 1998), it is not the same as fiction. Although historians draw on
imagination to construct narratives, history-making is constrained by the
discipline of history, and it is constrained in its attempts to make truth claims.
Thus, history and fiction, although overlapping, are not the same. As Paul
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Ricoeur suggests history and fiction are two different things, although both draw
on narrative and imagination. Historians do attempt to get at the reality of the
past. Fiction writers do not necessarily do this.
Whatever may be said about the selective aspect 
of gathering, conserving, and consulting documents 
or about their relationship to the questions historians 
put to them, or even about the ideological implications 
of all these maneuvers, the recourse to documents does 
indicate a dividing line between history and fiction.
Unlike novels, historians’ constructions do aim at 
being reconstructions of the past. (1990, pp. 142-143)
There is always already a tension between what has actually happened 
in the past and our present interpretation of that event. There is a co-complex 
interrelation between knowing what we remember and yet not fully 
understanding what memory is in the first place. Part of the problem is that 
memory is shot through with unconscious traces which may become manifest 
as reversals, projections, resistances and transferences. The strangeness of the 
unconscious or the otherness of the unconscious shapes memory in uncanny 
ways. Memory is subject to many uncanny aporias.
This chapter will examine the aporias of memory and the aporias of 
historical understanding as they have relevance to doing memory work around 
the Holocaust. I will argue that the memory text of lived experience becomes 
complexified because of unconscious traces. Memory and the unconscious are 
inextricably tied. Memory of the Holocaust is subject to our own unconscious 
operations. The memory text of history is also complexified because historians’ 
renderings of the past are indelibly marked by the unconscious.
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Memory, the Unconscious and the Holocaust
Edward Casey (1987) remarks that memory is “thick" (p. 265). Memory has a 
“depth not easily penetrable by the direct light of consciousness... [and it is] 
resistant to conceptual understanding [because it is] sedimented in layers" ( p, 
265). Casey further declares that memory is “gappy” (p. 72) and this gappiness 
results in “undefined and unlocalized particles of space” (p. 72). Thus, 
memory’s gappiness can never fully recapture exact representations of the past, 
but only “pastiches” (p. 72). And these pastiches come to us in what Casey 
terms a “quasi-narrative” (p. 44) form primarily because “what is lacking in 
memory is a proper narrative voice, the voice of an authoritative narrator who 
spins out the tale” (p. 44). These quasi-narratives are situated first in what 
Casey calls primary memory, but are more properly located in secondary 
memory or recollection proper. In order to remember at all, an event must have 
some “persistance” (p. 39). The “just-lapsed” (p. 39) memory traces must have 
“prolongation” (p. 39) to be remembered at all. But unless the memory is an “ex­
perience” (41), that is, unless the memory jolts us in some way as being 
different from the perception of the just-passing by, recall will not happen later. 
Primary memory, then, “occurs so continually and often so imperceptibly that we 
rarely notice it at all" (p. 49).
The operation of actually recalling memory traces belongs to the realm of 
secondary memory. Secondary memory is a form of “remembering again or 
re-remembering” (p. 51). The function of secondary memory for Casey is “that of 
rescuing former experiences from oblivion” (p. 50). And these recollections are 
embodied and “emplaced” (p. 182). The body serves as an “intra-place" (p. 196) 
or interior site which “opens out onto place,” (p. 182) as an exterior site. In other 
words, memory for Casey, occurs in the interior place of the body but memory
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also flows outwards toward the world. Thus, memory has a kind of elastic quality 
that stretches over places and bodies.
I draw on Casey's work because he stresses that memory is embodied.
And it is an embodied memory that pains Holocaust survivors. Memory literally
pains in the body. Because of the workings of the unconscious, memory is
subject to displacements and these displacements are embodied.
Psychological displacement is marked, as John Fletcher explains, by
Affective reactions that separate from and appear to 
forget their circumstances of their genesis, becoming 
bound to very different representations; the somatization 
of hysteria... free-floating anxiety... transference [are 
embodied memories that have been displaced]. (1999, p. 29)
Somatizations may manifest bodily traces such as sweaty palms, quickened
heartbeat, numbness, headaches, anxiety, panic attacks, nightmares,
depression, dissociation, phobias, paranoia, manic speech, defensive
reactions, psychosis and hallucinations. Memories that get repressed manifest
in displaced forms which get acted out in sites in the body. Displacements mark
a site that is out of joint with current lived experience. It would seem that nothing
in the present situation would warrant these somatizations. Memory traces
leave residues if they do not get worked through, at least partially.
These psychological interruptions of memory become sedimented over 
time, especially for Holocaust survivors. When memory is repressed and 
pushed down into the registers of the unconscious, the repressed returns and 
haunts. Aaron Hass (1996) explains that it was William Niederland, who in 
1964, coined the term “survivor syndrome,” (p. 1) which describes many kinds of 
displacements of memory from which Holocaust survivors often suffer. Some of 
the symptoms of displaced memory, according to Niederland include, “chronic
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anxiety, fear of renewed persecution, depression, recurring 
nightmares... anhedonia... social withdrawl, fatigue...  hallucinations, and 
depersonalization" (cited in Hass, p. 8). However, diagnoses such “survivor 
syndrome" are problematic because they tend to reduce suffering to stable 
categories which serve to simplify what it means to suffer in the first place.
Pathoiogizing and categorizing reduces suffering to sameness and 
squashes out the “alien-ness” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 67) of suffering. And the 
suffering caused by the Holocaust is nothing strangers to this event can 
imagine. Diagnoses presuppose that we can understand this kind of suffering. 
These diagnoses, therefore, tend to domesticate and trivialize. Paula Salvio 
remarks, “We might ask ourselves what we use these diagnoses to keep 
ourselves from thinking about” (1999, p. 186). Diagnosing Holocaust survivors 
keeps us from thinking about the unintelligibility of what it is survivors must 
endure over a life time. And this pain that memory brings is not something that 
can be reduced to a this or a that. Suffering is personal and idiosyncratic, 
strange and alien.
Like Casey, William James's (1890/1950) work on memory helps to raise 
questions relevant to Holocaust survivors. James argues with Casey that, 
basically, there are two kinds of memory, “elementary memory” (p. 646) and 
“secondary memory" (p.648) or “recollection" (p.646). Primary memory, if it is to 
exist at all, must have a certain “endurance" (p. 643), what James terms a 
“substantive state” (p. 643). This substantive state results in an “after­
consciousness" or “after-image" (p. 645) of the event. The difficulty of grasping 
this after-image is that it “blends in” (p. 645) with subsequent after-images. “The 
just-past” (p. 646) blends in with fresh impressions. If this primary memory is 
recollected later, it is not recollected in an originary form but it is remembered,
134
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
rather, through the lenses of the present. Primary memory is recollected or re­
presented in “the nearward portion of the present space of time and [is not a 
representation of] the genuine past” (pp. 646-647). The genuine past, says 
James, is always already gone and what we recall is the “belief” that we 
remember the event. James declares that “Memory is the feeling of belief in a 
peculiar complex object” (p. 652). The genuine past is remembered in highly 
imaginative ways because we cannot capture the “genuine past” or the “just 
past” any longer. Secondary memory, or recollection, is not located around a 
singular event, but rather it is layered over by “associations” (James,
1890/1950, p. 650). James explains that
the more facts a fact is associated with in the mind, 
the better possession of it our memory retains. Each of 
its associates becomes a hook to which it hangs when 
sunk beneath the surface. Together they form a network 
of attachment by which is woven into the entire tissue 
of our thought, (p. 662)
But we generally do not recollect all of these associations, James claims.
Rather, we select this and that. In fact, James argues that “selection is the very
keel on which our mental ship is built" (p. 680).
Does James focus too much on the conscious activity of memory? Is it the 
case that most of our memory is selected consciously? Or does the unconscious 
operate in uncanny ways shaping what is remembered and what is forgotten? 
Unwanted memories and repressed memories arrive in their own time, arising 
out of the unconscious. Certainly, Holocaust survivors’ nightmares attest to this. 
These are unconscious memories that survivors do not consciously select. It 
seems that repressed memories select themselves as the unconscious pushes 
them upward, unwanted. Freud suggests that most of our so-called conscious 
lives, which includes our memories, are covered-over in unconscious traces.
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James declares that the more associations one has with an event the 
more likely one is "in possession of if  (p. 662). This may be the case 
sometimes. But when memory is horrific, the rememberer, in many instances, is 
not in possession of the memory; rather the reverse is true. The memory is in 
possession of the rememberer. The rememberer, that is, seems possessed. 
Freud and Breuer certainly would adhere to this. Before the advent of 
psychoanalysis proper, Freud and Breuer engaged in the hypnotic method to 
release their patients from buried memories. These patients seemed to be 
possessed by their memory.
Charolotte Delbo, a Holocaust Survivor, remarks about the “alien-ness"
(Laplanche, 1999, p.67) of her own memory. She says she feels possessed by
memory’s strangeness. “I live in a twofold being” (1990, p. 3). This twofold being
lives in the everyday postwar world and in Auschwitz simultaneously. Delbo
comments that it is not that she lives "with Auschwitz... [but she] lives next to if
(p. 5). Possessed by the memory of Auschwitz, Delbo becomes dissociated from
herself and often talks in the third person.
For all these years she has done little things, 
gone through the little motions of everyday life 
she listens to the sounds of life moving around 
her. She hears only the wind blowing across the
icy plain, the shouts of the female guards She
smells only the smell of the crematoriums. She hears 
only the voices of her friends who tear her away from 
her dead sister’s body. (p. 6)
Clearly unwanted memories kept Delbo prisoner during her life.
Memory disturbs and interferes with everyday life. Disturbances of 
memory are due to unconscious traces. These kinds of disturbances and 
interferences suffered by trauma seem to undermine the neat and tidy
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epistemologicai schematization that both James and Casey offer. What does it
mean to have a primary and secondary memory? Why do these distinctions
even matter? What is significant about them? For Holocaust survivors, memory
does not seem to follow a clear chronology and it does not seem to break down
into tidy distinctions between the here and now, the first and the second, the
there and then. Memory lacks coherence. Memory interrupts and breaks into the
everyday. Memory brings nightmares. Perhaps the more associations one has
with an event, if that event is traumatizing, the more it gets repressed. But
repressed memory returns. When repressed memory returns, it takes its own
idiosyncratic path, a path that is marked by displacements and reversals. The
memory and its
unconscious inscription, however, behaves quite 
differently from a single memory or copy [ what James 
would call the genuine past] of what was once 
conscious: for making conscious the representation 
does not automatically abolish the unconscious 
inscription and its effects. (Fletcher, 1999, p. 36)
Memory traces have a life of their own, traveling across an unconscious
trajectory that offers up strangeness.
In spite of my criticisms of James, I think his work is important for several 
reasons. The notion of associations, one that would become very important to 
Freud, is crucial when doing memory work. To freely associate opens the doors 
of the unconscious. In analysis this is the goal. But free association does not 
come easily, for it is blocked by secondary process thinking. This is why dream 
work, for Freud, became key to opening the doors to the unconscious. To freely 
associate around dreams opens the doors to blocked memories. Consciously 
trying to remember traumatic events is made difficult by the psyche's own 
censorship and resistances. Whether associations help us remember more or
137
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
the genuine past, as James would put it, is really not as important as the latent 
thoughts and state of mind that these repressed memories currently create. And 
the associations are not peripheral either. They tell us much about the ways in 
which the rememberer gathers and collects remnants from her past. The 
gathering and collecting of remants are just as important as the actual event 
itself.
James's notion of belief and the way in which belief is inextricably tied to
memory is crucial. I think he is onto something when he asserts that memory is
shot through with belief. To have believed something to have been true does
not make the memory of the event less real. Even if memory is covered over
with belief and imagination, it still clues into something important about the
rememberer’s complex relation with her past. Paul Thompson remarks that
History [or memory], in short, is not just about 
events, or structures, or patterns of behavior, but 
also how these are experienced and remembered 
in the imagination. And one part of history, what people 
imagined happened, and also what they believe might 
have happened. .. may be as crucial as what did happen.
(1988, p. 139)
Belief, associations, imagination are all important because they tell us about 
the ways in which memory gets inscribed in all kinds of different emotional 
registers. All of these seemingly peripheral and unimportant feelings 
that surround the actual memory become clues to the ways in which 
unconscious traces shape memory. Thus, belief, associations and imagination 
are not peripheral at all; in fact, they beome central when thinking about the 
complexities of memory.
Unlike Casey and James, Henri Bergson (1988) complexifies the 
memory through the notion of “duration" (p. 83). Bergson seems to emphasize
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more than Casey or James that memory, as a function of time, rather than of 
place, is, as Patrick Slattery might suggest uprolepticn (1999, p. 30). A proleptic 
sense of time is without rigid boundaries. Past, present and future blend 
together. The categories of past, present and future, which are of course 
constructions, may be a function of the ego and secondary process thinking. 
Time experienced in a more regressive way has no boundaries; it is free 
flowing. And it is this sense of time and memory that Bergson offers to us. For 
Bergson, sometimes the past overtakes and blurs with the present. "Our 
consciousness of the present is already memory” (p. 151). No sharp distinctions 
exist between that which is remembered and that which is experienced in the 
here and now. Experience is always already beginning to be remembered as it 
is happening.
Bergson does not draw a distinction between the categories of 
perception and memory. He seems to blur these to suggest their co-complexity 
and interrelation. Bergson declares, “Your perception, however instantaneous, 
consists then in an incalculable multitude of remembered elements, in truth, 
every perception is already memory" (p. 150). Memory, if it is to "survive” (p. 66), 
“must constantly mingle with our perception of the present and may even take 
its place” (p. 66). For Holocaust survivor Charlotte Delbo, past and present 
overlap. Recall, she remarks that she lives in two worlds simultaneously. She 
lives in the postwar world doing everyday things, and at the same time, she 
lives alongside Auschwitz. Auschwitz is there with her always and overtakes the 
present. Bergson claims that “successive perceptions... extend over a certain 
depth of duration” (p. 70). "Memory condenses... appears to us all at once, 
although [it happens in moments that are] successive” (p.70). But for Holocaust 
survivors, successive moments of time seem to stop. Memory condenses,
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becomes displaced and takes on a life of its own. Memory has its own uncanny 
pattern. But this pattern seems to be jagged and haphazard.
Bergson’s notion of duration may not be incompatible with loss. Jean 
Laplanche (1999) explains that “loss is probably co-extensive with 
temporalization itself... [mourning is] an affect with a duration... it occupies a 
lapse of time” (p.242). Traumatic memories get lodged in voids and lapses and 
they seem to return in their own time and have their own “depth of duration" 
(Bergson, 1988, p. 70). For Holocaust survivors, time may be experienced 
differently than, say, third generation Jews after Auschwitz. Memory may 
overlap with the present, remaining unintegrated. Memory may lack coherence, 
yielding up, as Casey would say, only “gappiness" (1987, p. 72).
Bergson does not deny that memory and the unconscious are related. 
However, he does not discuss the unconscious much at all. It is Freud who 
takes up the notion of the unconscious and its complex relation to memory in a 
systematic way. Unlike Bergson, Freud draws a distinction between perceptions 
and memory traces, making the former less complex than the latter. “A trace is 
left in our psychical apparatus of the perceptions which impinge upon it. This we 
may describe as a memory trace; and to the function relating to it we give the 
name memory" (1900b, p. 538). Perceptions, Freud tells us, form “associations" 
(p. 539) when connected. But many of our memories and their associations are 
unconscious. Freud declares that we only realize this through the study of 
dreams. “It may happen that a piece of material occurs in the context of a dream 
which in the waking state we do not recognize as forming a part of our 
knowledge” (1900a, p. 11) But it is not a literal dream that yields up the memory 
but the associations that the dream yield that are crucial for “recovering 
memory" (Pinar, 1991, pp. 173-174). What becomes difficult, though, is that the
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psychic apparatus shields itself through "resistance” and "censorship”
(Freud, 1900a, pp. 143-144). Thus, it is what is not said and not remembered 
that becomes key to doing dream work. What is repressed is forgotten but still 
remains in the ruins, buried. Freud claims that "Both memory and trace and the 
affect which is attached to the idea are there once and for all" (1893/1899, p.
42). What we remember we never really forget; the contents of memory become 
repressed and are pushed down into the unconscious.
When we try to recollect our memories, repressed memories are
censored by what Freud terms ‘screen memory.' Freud remarks that
"Recollections... whose value lies in the fact that it represents in the memory
impressions and thoughts of a later date whose content is connected with its
own by symbolic or similar links, may appropriately be called screen memories"
(1899/1989, p. 126). In other words, screen memories serve the function of
screening difficult memories by producing other memories that are closely
connected and associated with that actual event, but are not the original
memory. The originary memory is screened because it is too painful. Freud
believed that what is unconscious and repressed could be made conscious
though analysis and dream work. But until unconscious memory traces are
made conscious "acting out” (1911-1913, p. 150) wins the day. Acting out is a
way of not remembering. Freud terms this repetition compulsion. He declares
that in repetition compulsion,
the patient does not remember anything of 
what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts 
it out. He reproduces it not as a memory but as 
action; he repeats it, without of course knowing 
that he is repeating it  (1911-1913, p. 150)
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And it is this acting out or repetition compulsion that lies at the heart of 
transference. In order to undo transferential relations, which Freud thought 
inappropriate to the current situation, it would become necessary to trace back 
through the ruins the path toward repressed memory. Freud comments that 
through analysis one could be able to make the unconscious conscious 
through what he called “intentional recollection” (1900a, p. 54). This intentional 
recollection attempts to lift memory traces that block recollections. The 
“reconstruction" of memory would be possible through the patient’s 
“construction" of narrative and dream work (Freud, 1937-1939, pp. 267-268). 
Memories are repressed and pushed into the unconscious because they are 
too overwhelming.
Freud’s earliest work on repressed memory was tied to incest. Freud's
seduction theory turned on the idea that all repressions were due to incest. But
in 1897 he abandonded this theory. As John Fletcher points out, even though
Freud abandoned this theory, Laplanche argues that traces of it can be found
throughout Freud's work. Fletcher says
As Laplanche has argued, the 'turning point’ of
1897, the abandonment of the seduction theory,
does not represent a clean or absolute break. Elements
of the theory persist in different forms... the acknowledgement
of the traumatic power of actual events, infantile sexuality
and the dominance of two theories of the drives. (1999, p. 9)
Laplanche (1999) suggests that Freud actually “domesticates” (p. 67) the notion
of the unconscious. He domesticates it by “reducing it" (p. 66), by taking the
“alien-ness" (67) out of it. Freud claims that what is unconscious can be made
conscious again and transference can be resolved at the end of analysis.
Laplanche (1999) argues that these clean resolutions serve only to domesticate
by making the strange familiar. Laplanche reappropriates Freud's seduction
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theory by claiming that we are always already seduced by significant others. We 
are seduced by “enigmatic messages” (p. 80) that get "implanted” (p. 258) in our 
psyche. These messages are for the most part beyond translation. Laplanche 
argues that Freud went astray when he abandoned the seduction theory 
because all of life, for Laplanche, is about seduction.
One reading of Freud might suggest that if repressed memory, in the 
case of Holocaust survivors, were made conscious, the sufferer of memory 
would be "cured” because the repressed would stop returning in unhealthy and 
bizarre ways. This reading also suggests that transference and acting out, the 
compulsion to repeat, will just go away after the Holocaust survivor endures 
analysis and works through her nightmares, depression, anxiety or 
depersonalizations. However, this reading of Freud tends to simplify what it 
means to be a Holocaust survivor.
We must keep in mind, though, at the end of Freud’s life, he became 
more and more skeptical about the prospects of psychoanalysis (1937/1991).
He was well aware that going through analysis guaranteed little. And, in fact, he 
argued that psychotics were unbeatable. It was Jung’s work with schizophrenics 
that changed the minds of those in the psychoanalytic community who were 
weary about the prognoses of psychotics. Nevertheless, Freud, at least early 
Freud, seemed confident that analysis could offer up a cure. Paula Salvio 
(1999) terms this kind of thinking an "epistemology of cure" (p. 186) and she 
suggests that it "invoke[s] a cultural desire for an imaginary ‘ending’" (p. 185) to 
suffering. Salvio argues that we must move beyond this epistemology of cure to 
admit that suffering does not just go away through analysis. There is no way to 
work completely through Holocaust memories. This implies a getting better 
when there was no illness to begin with. Laplanche’s (1999) post-Freudian turn,
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his post-Freudian reading of Freud moves beyond what Salvio terms “a 
narrative of closure” (1999, p. 185). Again, Laplanche suggests that if we 
remain open to our own otherness in relation to the other’s otherness, and if we 
understand the aporias and complexities of the strangeness of the unconscious, 
the task of recovering memory becomes much more difficult. There is no cure for 
repressed memory because it was never pathological to begin with.
The Memory Text of History: The Unconscious and the Holocaust
At this juncture, I would like to turn to what I call the memory text of 
history. Here I will examine different positions on what it is that historiography 
might be. What is it that allows us to think historically in the first place? In what 
ways do historians' unconscious inscriptions shape history? Here I am 
interested in the aporias of historical understanding as these have implications 
for reading Holocaust texts. First, let us turn to Hegel.
Hegel’s (1837/1987) work around the philosophy of history is 
scandalous, for it serves as a justification of evil, what theologian John Hick 
calls “dysteleological evil" (1978, p. 362). Dysteleogical evil is massive evil. 
Hegel contends that all historical events, whether evil or not, have a final 
purpose: a telos, a justification. And this final purpose and justification is the 
self-consciousness of God. God comes to himself (Hegel's God is male) through 
history. Ultimately, for Hegel, history is the story of divine providence. Hegel 
explains that “divine providence is wisdom endowed with infinite power which 
realizes its own aim, that is, the absolute, rational, final purpose of the world” 
(1837/1987, p. 15). Hegel’s God is all knowing and all powerful. But is this God 
good? How could a good God allow the Holocaust to happen? How could this 
event be part of God’s divine plan? Primo Levi, a Holocaust survivor, writes 
“Today I think that if for no other reason than that an Auschwitz existed, no one
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in our age should speak of providence” (1996, p. 158).Theodicists and 
theologians attempt to exonerate God from crimes like these by re-defining the 
notion “God.” The formula that God is all knowing, all powerful and all good gets 
re-done to save God from accusations of evil. For some, especially process 
theologians like John Cobb (1975) and David Griffin (1973), God is all knowing 
and all good, but not all powerful. Since God is not all powerful, he could not 
prevent the Holocaust. God gets off the hook.
Another argument some offer, like John Hick’s (1978), is what is called 
the free-will defense. Here, Hick contends that God endows human beings with 
free will, so human beings are free to do as they please. Thus, human beings 
get blamed for bad events because they are free to choose evil or good. God 
gets off the hook again. If evil gets injected into God, then we might do away 
with the notion of God altogether, for who needs an evil God? But is the problem 
of evil this simple? Theodicies tend to split evil and good into neat and tidy 
categories. The problem with theodicies is that they tend to suggest that evil is 
an absolute category. But upon examining the Holocaust, it seems to me that 
this notion of evil gets complexified by the very fact that perpetrators were not 
demons; they were human beings, ordinary everyday Germans. I am not 
exonerating or excusing Germans who were complicit in crimes against Jews; I 
am suggesting, rather, that individuals are neither good nor evil; they are 
complicated. These absolute categories, I think, serve to simplify. Marion 
Kaplan (1998) points out that it was only after Kristallnacht in 1938 that Jews 
began to realize that they were in real danger. And what made it hard for Jews 
to leave Germany, according to Kaplan, is the fact that many Germans remained 
friendly to Jews. This became confusing because Germans were giving Jews 
mixed messages. How could anyone believe what the future would bring?
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Human relatedness is much more nuanced and complicated than the splitting of
good and evil. Theologians and theodicists, at the end of the day, continue to
exonerate God by re-defining him. Perhaps they need to think again. Perhaps
theologians should listen to Elie Wiesel (1986) who put God on trial in his novel
entitled The Trial of God. Rabbis put God on trial but continued to pray. The
question that some might raise is how Jews could keep their faith after
Auschwitz. The black sun of Auschwitz has made many Jews more religious. I
think my turn back to Judaism is partially a result of my work on the Holocaust.
But still, many Jews of my parents’ generation are secular and not religious. Is
this a result of the Holocaust? Or perhaps it is a result of the pressures of
assimilation? I leave these as open questions. And so Jews respond to life after
Auschwitz differently.
More arrests, more terror, concentration camps 
the arbitrary dragging off of fathers, sisters, brothers.
We seek the meaning of life, wondering whether 
any meaning can be left. We are but hollow vessels, 
washed through by history. (Hillesum, 1983, pp. 28-29)
These are the words of Etty Hillesum. She died in Auschwitz at the age of
twenty nine. It is through her words that I hear the echoes not only of Wiesel, but
of Hegel. The specters of Hegel can be heard in her words as she says "We are
but hollow vesels, washed through by history.” Hayen White (1987) comments
that Hegel's philosophy of history "wears such a face of regularity, order and
coherence that it leaves no room for human agency" ( p. 21).
“We are but hollow vesels" throughout which spirit runs. Hegel's 
philosophy of history is the adventure of spirit as it makes its way through the 
world. Anything or anyone in the way of spirit is destroyed. We are but hollow 
vessels. "World history goes on within the realm of spirit” (Hegel, 1837/1987, p.
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30). The spirit of which Hegel speaks is derivative of the Christian notion of spirit
or the holy ghost. But spirit, for Hegel, differs from the Christian notion, because
it is divided into an objective and subjective side. The subjective side of spirit is
nature, matter, human life. But this subjective side that moves through us is
unconscious of itself. Hegel claims
World history begins its general aim-to realize 
the idea of spirit-only in an implicit form ... namely, 
as nature-as an inmost, unconscious instinct. And the 
whole business of history... is to bring it into consciousness.
(p. 30)
In the meanwhile, spirit works itself out against itself. “Spirit is at war with itself
(p. 69). Spirit is alienated from itself because the subjective side continually
gets in the way of the objective side. Human beings, that is, continually get in
the way of God's purposes. The objective side of spirit reflects Gods will and is
conscious of itself. It is “the operation of coming to itself (p. 23). And it comes to
know itself through freedom. “World history is the process of the consciousness
of freedom" (p. 24). However, as spirit progresses toward its self-consciousness
it also necessarily becomes “connected with the degradation, destruction,
annihilation of the preceding mode of actuality" (pp. 38-39). Thus, history is not
happy but filled with conflict, struggle and pain. Hegel claims that “history is not
the soil of happiness. The periods of happiness are blank pages in i f  (p. 33).
Hegel also refers to history as a “slaughter bench” (p. 27). For what purpose,
Hegel asks, is this slaughter bench? For God’s divine purpose. Did God, then,
will the slaughter bench of the Holocaust?
I awoke on January 29th at dawn. In my fathers’ 
place lay another invalid. They must have taken 
him away before dawn and carried him to the 
crematory. There were no prayers at his grave.
No candles were lit to his memory. His last word
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was my name. A summons to which I did not 
respond. (Wiesel, 1982, p. 108)
Did Hegel’s God will the slaughter bench of six million Jews? If so 
Hegel's God is a scandal. This scandalous God is also a reasoning God for 
Hegel. Sometimes Hegel even talks as if reason is God. Reason, says Hegel, is 
“the law of the world and that, therefore, in world history, things have come 
about rationally" (p. 11). Like spirit, reason “determines itself in absolute 
freedom” (p. 15). Sometimes Hegel refers to reason as the Idea. The Idea, this 
transcendent something, is the prime mover of the world. The Idea, Hegel 
declares “remains in the background, untouched and uninjured” ( p. 43) while 
the “particular exhausts itself in the struggle and part of which is destroyed" (p.
43). Human beings are destroyed, in other words, in the process of world history 
while the Idea remains safe and unharmed. Hegel calls this movement of the 
Idea in history the “cunning of reason" (pp. 43-44). Reason is cunning because 
it destroys whatever gets in its way while remaining free from injury.
Like spirit, the Idea divides into two parts: the absolute part and what 
Hegel calls “absolute free volition” (p. 32). The absolute Idea is God or the 
“substantial fulness of content” (p. 32). Free volition is the movement of the 
universe, the movement of people in the universe. However, “God and the 
universe have separated and set each other at opposites" (p. 32). The Idea 
“uses an external phenomena which in history present themselves directly 
before our eyes” (p. 26). History uses us as it pleases, we are but “hollow 
vessels” (Hillesum, 1986, pp. 28-29).
Some individuals throughout history, however, intuit God’s purposes, 
according to Hegel. Here the subjective and objective sides of spirit coincide; 
here God's fulness of content and free volition coincide. “World historical
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individuals,” (p. 39) or heroes coincide with God's purposes. But I wonder what 
kind of heroes Hegel is talking about? World historical individuals, if they 
coincide with God’s purposes, must also coincide with God’s self- 
consciousness. Hegel’s dream (or nightmare) then is about consciousness. The 
goal of history is to get rid of what is unconscious. To me, Hegel squashes out 
the mystery of life because the unconscious is this mystery. Hegel’s system 
smacks of what Freud called the “arrogance of consciousness” (1909-1910, p. 
39). Hegel believed that world history would fulfill its purposes by spirit’s 
becoming ever more conscious of itself. But what exactly is this consciousness 
of which Hegel speaks? It is God, it is spirit, it is reason, it is little more than a 
mythical creature floating around, disembodied, pulling human beings into its 
web and closing off the future. Hegel’s notion of consciousness is a ghost in the 
machine of history. The ghost of consciousness has pre-arranged the universe. 
The already-made, the apriori principles to which world history is to unfold, 
weaves world history together without gaps, holes, or broken threads. Human 
beings need not worry, because God already has made up his mind, he has a 
plan. What God wants, God gets.
Of course, world history does not happen according to a plan. The 
coursings of history happen in chaotic, violent and unpredictable ways. A 
Kleinian interpretation of Hegel might suggest that the Godhead, or the 
objective side of spirit, represents the good breast; the demonic, or the 
subjective side of spirit, represents the bad breast. The bad breast projects all of 
its hatred onto the world.
A Laplanchian reading of Hegel might suggest that the otherness within 
the self of God takes on demonic properties as it lashes out and destroys part of 
itself. The self of God, or the subjective side of spirit, cannot manage its own
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difference within, it cannot manage otherness. Thus the repressed otherness 
projects its hatreds onto the world. The split-off self of the Godhead masters and 
controls world history. World history is controlled through violence. History is the 
unfolding of violence.
Hegel's system is sadistic. Spirit seems to take pleasure from the 
ruthlessness and cunning of reason. The polarization of good and evil, 
unconsciousness and consciousness, objective and subjective sides of the 
Godhead serve as defense mechanisms against complexities of God, world, 
self and history. These kinds of dichotomies wipe out ambiguities and 
unresolvabie paradoxes of lived experience. Hegel seemed afraid of 
uncertainty and the aporias of historical understanding. He seemed to have 
world history sown up into a box. And out of this box comes Pandora’s 
scandals.
The metanarratives of “consciousness," and “reason" have been 
deconstructed and questioned with the advent of post-structuralism and post­
modernism. The notion of “reason" has been demonized, especially since the 
Holocaust. Some scholars even blame “reason” and “progress” and “modernity" 
for the rise of Hitler and the Nazis. The specters of Hegel have appeared in one 
form or another in the writings around the Holocaust. The world of reason, its 
progress and perfection, is the “kind of universe dreamt up by the philosophers 
of the Enlightenment" (Bauman, 1995, p. 199). Zygmunt Bauman believes that 
modernism, with its penchant for reason, perfection, progress and optimism 
created the very conditions necessary for the Holocaust to occur. Bauman 
claims that Hitler was the “offspring of the modem spirit, of that urge to assist 
and speed up the progress of mankind toward perfection” (p. 199). The 
Holocaust was a “kingdom of reason, the ultimate exercise in human power
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over nature” (p. 198). Recall, Hegel's rational God willed a perfect kingdom as 
spirit comes to itself through the destruction of anything that gets in its way. 
Bauman suggests that our era is the “age of the camps" (p. 193). Bauman 
declares that the camps are places where difference is wiped out, where 
“efficient killing, scientifically designed and administered genocide” (p. 193) 
occur.
Like Bauman, Tony Kushner (1994) calls for a critical look at modernity
suggesting that modernity and liberalism created the conditions for the
Holocaust to occur. The lack of response on the part of Great Britain and the
United States had much to do with the ways in which both of these countries
embraced modernity and liberalism. Liberalism actually prevented these
democracies from responding to the crisis until very late. The “liberal
imagination," (p. 55) Kushner contends, worked against itself. That is, liberal
ideas of tolerance, progress, optimism and reason made it impossible for
people to “think the unthinkable" (p. 74). Although Kushner points out that
responses were not monolithic, generally speaking the United States and
Britain did little to help the Jews. And this non-response was due in large part to
liberalism and optimism. People in the West thought the crisis would just go
away. Disturbed by the non-action of the free world, Elie Wiesel writes
the free world didn't care whether Jews lived or 
died, whether they were annihiliated one day or 
the next. And so the sealed trains continued to 
shatter the silence of Europe's flowering landscapes.. . .
I freeze every time I hear a train whistle. (1995, p. 74)
Uke Bauman and Kushner, Christopher Browning (1992) claims that 
Susanne Heim and Gutz Aly argue that reason and modernism set the stage for 
the Holocaust. Browning comments that for Heim and Aly, the Holocaust
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became possible primarily because of “the rational means employed by 
technocrats” (1992, p. 60). Heim and Aly suggest that the Final Solution was 
carefully and rationally planned out by an “intelligentsia [who].. . cooperated 
closely with one another in an interdisciplinary fashion" (cited in Browning p. 
60). These so-called “technocrats” embraced a “common vision and way of 
thinking-sober problem solving and rational” (p. 60). The specters of Hegel are 
echoed here.
Bauman, Kushner, Heim and Aly all feel, in one way or another, that
modernity itself, reason as the stepchild of modernity, created the very
conditions that allowed the Holocaust to occur. But perhaps this kind of
thinking is too simplistic, too reductionistic, too monocausai. How does one
make the move from ideas about modernity to actions of mass murder? What
happens between reason and killing? How does “the cunning of reason”
(Hegel, 1837/1987, pp. 43-44) turn into the cunning of murder? I do not think it
is enough to say that modernity and reason caused the Holocaust. As Saul
Friedlander points out, the “major features of modernity itse lf... do not alone
constitute the necessary cluster of elements... leading from persecution to
extermination" (1997, pp. 2-3). Jeffrey Herf drives this point home.
The message of the Nuremberg trials was that 
human beings and their political decisions had 
made Auschwitz possible--not being, fate, 
destiny, instrumental reason, the Enlightenment, 
modernity, or the West. (1997, p. 208)
The tropes of the Enlightenment, instrumental reason, fate and modernity, when
used to explain or perhaps explain away the cause of the Holocaust, serve as
defense mechanisms which cover over human complicity. The trope of
modernity, when applied to the Holocaust, explains little about the makings of
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Auschwitz or the ways in which ordinary Germans perpetrated horrific crimes. 
Individuals made choices and these choices are what moved history along.
Unlike Hegel, Marx felt that individuals make history. Marx and Engels 
insist that The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of 
living human individuals" (1845-1846/1987, p. 147). Many times, Marx refers to 
"man" as the center of history. And this emphasis on human agency runs 
counter to Hegel. Hegel's history is one that could press on without human 
beings. In fact, it is humankind that gets in the way of God's self-consciousness. 
Marx and Engels stress that human beings are central to history. "Its [history's] 
premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation or abstract definition, but in their 
actual, empirically perceptible process or development under definite 
conditions" (pp. 149-150). But the historical journey is not without difficulties.
Our “alienation" and “self-estrangement" (1844/1987, p. 74) thwart the advance 
of history. Marx is not talking about alienated spirit after the fashion of Hegel, but 
rather he is talking about alienated self-actualization. The worker is alienated, 
both by the end product of labor and by the very activity of labor itself. Marx 
claims that
Whatever the product of labor is, he is not. Therefore 
the greater this product, the less he is himself. The 
alienation of the worker in his production means not 
only that his labor becomes an object, an external 
existence, but that it exists outside himself, independently, 
as something alien. (1844/1987, p. 72)
Labor, itself, alienates and it is the very activity of labor that causes "loss o f...
self" (1844/1987, p. 74).
Bertrand Russell (1972) and Jean-Paul Sartre (1968) agree that, even 
though Marx's philosophy of history is usually termed dialectical materialism 
(because Marx sometimes says that history makes us as we make it) still;
153
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
human agency seems to weigh heavily over against the pressures of external
circumstances. While Sartre (1968) praises Marx’s emphasis on human
agency, Russell denounces it. Human beings are not the center of all things.
Russell declares that
Marx has many grave shortcomings. He is too 
practical, too much wrapped up in the problems 
of his time. His purview is confined to the planet, 
to Man. Since Copernicus, it has been evident that 
Man has not the cosmic importance which he 
formerly arrogated to himself. (1972, p. 788)
It seems that Marx calls for a centering of the self in the scheme of things.
Alienation of the self signals loss for Marx. But perhaps this understanding of
the self is too simplistic. Unlike Marx's call toward centering the self, Laplanche
(1999) suggests that what psychoanalysis teaches is just the opposite. In what
he terms the “Unfinished Copernican Revolution,” (p. 52) Laplanche calls for a
“de-centering" of the self (p. 52). The self is “de-centered" by the “alien-ness" of
the unconscious (p. 62). The unconscious “is precisely not our center, as it is an
“ex-centric center" (p. 62). The “other thing" (p. 62) of the unconsioues always
makes us strangers to ourselves and to our own actions. We are both strangers
in our being and in our doing. But this condition of strangeness does not
prevent us from social engagement; it enhances it by keeping us open to the
radical alterity of the other.
Thus, unlike Marx, Laplanche complexifies the notion of the self and 
turns the concept of alienation on its head. Alienation or alien-ness becomes an 
asset not an impediment. In spite of the fact that I think Marx undertheorizes 
around notions of self and agency, I do think, however, that he is correct to say 
that human beings do indeed shape history and shape their lives. And like 
Jeffrey Herf (1997), I believe that when we examine the Holocaust we must
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understand that the perpetrators made decisions to do what they did and they
were not guided by anything other than their own conscience or lack of
conscience. Still, human beings are not radically free, as Marx might suggest.
Rather, freedom is always qualified and strained by institutionalized racism,
sexism, homophoia, anti-Semitism and classism. But for Marx and Engels,
human beings can overcome circumstances even if they are “not free to choose
their productive forces” (1845-1846/1978, p. 137). Unlike Hegel, Marx and
Engels suggest that history will be toppled not by criticism, not by
resolutions into self-consciousness or transformations 
into “apparitions," “specters," “fancies," etc., but only 
by the practical overthrow.. .revolution is the driving 
force of history, (pp. 156-157)
Conflicts will be brought on by class struggle and capitalism. Class struggles
are caught up in the material forces of economic production. Terry Eagelton
(1976) comments that for Marx “ Yorces’ and relations of production forms...the
economic structure of society; or what is more commonly known by Marxism as
the economic ‘base’ or ‘infrastructure’" (p. 5). The superstructure, Eagelton
points out, “produces laws and politics, [and] a certain kind of state" (p. 5). For
Marx, Eagelton contends, “certain... forms of social consciousness” (p. 5)
produce ideology that serve to “legitimate the power of the ruling class” (p. 5).
The forces of economic production and class struggles will be resolved 
with the development of the Communist State. Marx and Engels suggest that 
Communism is the “specter... haunting Europe” (1844/1987, p. 203). The 
bourgeoisie will eventually “disappear in the face of modern industry” (p. 219). 
Accordingly, the proletariat will emerge victoriously as a mature form of 
Communism births itself. Communism will move toward the future and will be a
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postive transcendence of private property... 
the real appropriation of the human essence 
[Man’s centering ego] by and for man; Communism 
therefore is the complete return of Man to himself, (pp. 102-103)
Clearly, Marx returns to a Ptolemaic universe where humankind re-centers itself
in the world. Not only are human beings re-centered, but struggle will be
overcome and the dialectic of history will resolve itself. Communism will win out
and at last a happy ending to history will occur.
It is obvious that Communism has been a disaster. And it is also obvious 
that there is much more to history than class struggle. The narrowing of history, 
the reigning in of history, through the supposed adherence of real events to 
apriori principles suggests that Marx, not unlike Hegel, was uncomfortable with 
contingency, complexity and chaos. Again, I argue that pre-conceived systems 
like Hegel's and Marx's serve as defense mechanisms against the unknown, 
against the very instability and uncertainty that surround us, against our own 
strangeness and our own inner alterity and our position as strangers in the 
world. However, Marx's fundamental premise that human beings make history 
is an important one which has been overshadowed by the specters of 
structuralism, especially within the discipline of Holocaust historiographies.
Since the 1980s overriding principles governing these debates have 
turned on arguments between intentionalists (Davidowicz, 1975/1986; 
Goldhagen 1997; Friedlander, 1997) and structuralists (Hilberg, 1961/1985; 
Mommsen, 1966; Browning, 1992/1998; Broszat, 1969/1981). I will discuss 
these debates in subsequent chapters, but for now I wil suggest that the 
argument between intentionalism and structuralism turns on the question of 
whether subjects produce history or whether history produces subjects. 
Intentionalism, much like Marxism, stresses that human agency and human
156
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
choice make history, while structuralists, much like Hegel, stress the function of 
social structures like institutions and the role these have in making history. It 
seems, for the structuralists that human agency gets overshadowed by larger 
socially constructed institutions. It is as if institutions and social apparatuses 
have a life of their own, a driving force of their own. Intentionalists tend to stress 
the orderliness and know-how of the Third Reich; structuralists tend to stress the 
chaos and happenstance of the Third Reich.
Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) suggests that ultimately the problem with 
the structuralists’ argument is that they have no way to determine 
blameworthiness. Davidowicz contends that structuralists cannot hold actors 
accountable.
Structuralists regard political decisions as the 
by-product of the ... structures or functions, and 
not as an expression of the will or intention of 
the States’ leaders. Accordingly, no human agent 
can then be held responsible for decisions or for 
their consequences, (xxvii)
As Charles Maier (1988) points out, Saul Friedlander criticizes structuralist
approaches because they tend to obscure blame. Maier contends that “In
Friedlander's view [structuralists]... dissolve guilt for the horrors of Nazism.
Reponsibility for an unspeakable crime becomes diffuse and elusive” (p. 95).
Maier claims that structuralists might counter these charges by arguing that
responsibility for the crimes of Nazism shifts from a few leaders to the “whole
Nazi apparatus” (1988, p. 95). Thus, blame seems broadened.
I find that this debate over intentionalism and structuralism, although 
important, too narrow. It frames perspectives of Holocaust scholarship in a 
certain way that sanitizes history. This debate serves to obscure and shift 
attention away from the hideousness of the Holocaust. Intentionalism and
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structuralism are signifiers that operate to keep certain questions at bay and
keep certain horrible thoughts abstracted and unreal. Windows into the world of
Holocaust victims undo these abstractions. The window into the world of this
horrific memory is beyond the thinkable. This haunting is beyond imagination.
Passages from this past, passages of personal experience like the one below,
sink into the unconscious in ways that abstractions do not.
They started the motor and the two Gestapo men 
began to pour some liquid, like water, on the Jews.
But I am not sure what while pumping, they were 
connecting the hoses to the other containers, one 
by one. Apparently, because of the slaking of the lime, 
people in the pit were boiling alive. The cries were so 
terrible that we who were sitting by the piles of clothes 
began to tear pieces of stuff to stop our ears.
(Biskupi, cited in Langer, 1998, pp. 21-22)
Reading a passage like this one demands a certain psychological readiness on 
the part of readers. The intentionalist-structuralist debate serves as a defense 
mechanism against dealing with this kind of emotionally gritty material. Victims’ 
and survivor’ voices are hardly heard in historians' renderings and part of the 
reason might not just be epistemological, it may be psychological too. Many 
cannot stand reading these kinds of horrific narratives, and so they exclude and 
erase them.
The Vicissitudes of Historiography
Alongside philosophy of history, the writings of historiography were often 
subsumed under the category of literature. But with the rise of scientism and 
positivism, history gradually became a discipline in and of itself. Eventually 
history departed from both philosophy and literature. In contrast, during the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, history and literature were closely 
related, if not inseparable. Lionel Grossman (1990) explains that the “relation of
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history to literature was not notably problematic. History was a branch of
literature” (p. 227). Crafting history was considered an art by many. The debates
over history’s artistic or scientific foundations continued long after the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Croce and Travelyan (cited in Stem
1973) argued that the craft of doing historiography was artistic. Dilthey (1907-
1910/1962) suggested that historiography was a “hermeneutic art” (p. 139).
Marc Bloch (1954) declared that “the very idea that the past as such can be the
object of science is ridiculous” (p. 122). R.G. Collingwood (1922/1965)
suggested that historiography embraced both art and science. Leopold von
Ranke and J.B. Bury (cited in Stern, 1973), believed that historiography was a
science. Some commentators suggest that questions around whether or not art
and or science serve as the foundations of historiography are misguided. Hans
Kellner remarks that
the problem is not whether history is best conceived of 
as art, a science, or both, or neither, but whether art 
or science or something else is the most adequate 
representational model for historical consciousness.
(1989, p. 34)
The connection between literature and history began to disintegrate,
when literature, especially during the Romantic era (eighteenth and ninteenth
centuries), became elevated to the level of the “sacred" (Grossman, 1990, pp.
228-229). Conversely, with the rise of scientism, history writing modeled itself
after the natural sciences, which sought to name univeral laws governing
human relations. Grossman comments that
The separation of literature and historiography 
was institutionalized, by the breakup of what had 
once been the republic of letters--a society in which 
the historians, both of the Enlightenment and of the 
Early Romantic period... had mingled freely w ith... 
novelists, poets, philosophers. (1990, p.223)
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The idea of interdisciplinarity, then, is nothing new. But with the age of 
specialization and separation of the disciplines, with the rise of scientism and 
positivism, interdisciplinarity fell out of fashion. What was in fashion during the 
late seventeenth century and early eighteenth century was history writing as 
“active reflection" and “judgment’ (Kellner, 1989, p. 5). But some thought that to 
judge historical actors anathema. Marc Bloch argues that historians should 
never judge their subjects. “Are we so sure of ourselves... to divide the 
company of our forefathers into the just and the darned?" (1954, p. 140) 
Similarly, Tony Kushner (1994) suggests that Holocaust historians should not 
condemn but explain. But I think that historians can and do make judgments. 
Even if they think they are not judging, they are by the mere selection and 
omission of material. As R.G. Collingwood declares, “We are making a 
judgment" (1924-1925/1965, p. 50) in what it is we wish to represent. 
Interpreting material in particular ways is already an act of judging.
It is interesting to note that many historians, John Weaver (1994)
explains, do not consider historical scholarship legitimate before the arrival of
Leopold von Ranke. Ranke, who lived from 1795 to 1856, marks a turning point
in the discipline of history. Many consider him to be the father of modern history.
Weaver remarks that
The tradition of history writing is thought to have 
begun with Leopold von Ranke... the tradition defines 
history as an almost strict recounting of the diplomatic 
and political events of the past. According to the 
principles of historicism, the historian was not to 
interpret any contemporary viewpoints or theories 
into the past because if done correctly, the spirit of 
the past era would come through the historian's 
recounting. Historicism will dominate as a way of 
writing history... well into the 20th century, (p. 6)
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Ranke believed that the historian could let the facts speak for themselves 
without any extraneous interpretation. The historian was to seem the invisible 
arbiter of facts. The historian's voice was to vanish amidst a mountain of 
evidence. But Carl Becker (1935) comments that “to suppose that the facts 
[could] speak for themselves is an illusion. It was perhaps the illusion of those 
historians of the last century who found some special magic in the word 
“scientific" (p. 249). And Marc Bloch (1954) declares that to let facts speak for 
themselves “effaces" the historian (p. 138). Historians cannot efface themselves, 
though. The historian and her writings are one, no matter how much she tries to 
be dispassionate.
Ranke and Bury both engaged in doing what might be termed historical
realism. They believed that words can mirror reality; facts can copy reality and
capture the past. Fritz Stern remarks that “J.B. Bury’s lectures of 1903 may be
taken as the culmination of that earlier mood of certainty. .. the historian's task
was to reconstruct the past. . . to establish cause and effect in history, just as the
natural scientists did” (1973, p. 20). But as I mentioned earlier, not all historians
agreed with the so-called scientific nature of history; not all adhered to the naive
belief that facts correspond to reality in an exact fashion. Grossman (1990)
explains that Chladenius, Leibniz and Bayle understood already in the 1700s
that interpretation and “point of view” (p. 230) undermine correspondence
theories when applied to historiography. If everyone is different, if everyone
operates out of his or her own perceptions, how can facts correspond in any
neat and tidy way to reality? Hayden White (1978) comments that
four major theorists of historiography rejected the 
myth of objectivity prevailing among Ranke's 
followers. Hegel, Droysen, Nietzsche, and Croce 
all viewed interpretation as the very soul of 
historiography, (p. 52)
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But Ranke and Bury won the day. Historical realism won out over against 
constructivism. John Weaver (1994) argues that the dominant mode of history 
writing still resembles Ranke's. Historians, though, are well aware that their 
interpretations shape their texts. But that historians of the Holocaust, for 
instance, do not overtly interpret their representations is commonplace. They 
might offer a few introductory remarks about their point of view, but they tend to 
shy away from being overly speculative, overly philosophical, or overly 
interpretive. This is problematic because the facts do not speak for themselves.
Weaver (1994) explains that history has been considered a social 
science since the 1960s. And still, most traditional accounts of history focus on 
political and diplomatic issues. These top-down approaches, as Tony Kushner 
(1994) calls them, ignore broader social categories. Recently, though, in 
Holocaust scholarhip there is a movement toward doing what is called 
Alltagsgeschichte, or everyday history (Kushner, 1994; Browning, 1998; 
Kaplan, 1998). These bottom-up approaches examine the histories of labor 
movements, women’s struggles, police battalions and other facets of everyday 
life under the Nazis. However, Alltagsgeschichte has been criticized by some 
who feel that it might tend to avoid discussing the more important issues that 
concern high level officials who became ultimately responsible for setting 
policies during the rise of the Nazis (Friedlander, 1997). But Christopher 
Browning argues that Alltagsgeschichte “becomes an evasion, an attempt to 
"normalize” the Third Reich, only if it fails to confront the degree to which the 
criminal policies of the regime inescapably permeated existence under the 
Nazis” (1998, xix). Still, the bulk of Holocaust historiography takes a top-down 
approach and most sources attempt to explain political or military struggles. It is 
interesting to note that the History channel on television follows this pattern as
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well. Many of the Holocaust documentaries presented on the History channel 
take top-down approaches. Cultural histories, or everyday histories are absent.
The Vicissitudes of Historical Interpretation
Michel Foucault (1966/1994) comments that since the middle of the 
seventeenth century, during what he termed the classical age, textual 
interpretation, or exegesis, turned on the notion of "resemblance" (p. 17). The 
exegete's task was to reveal hidden meaning in the original text. Once this 
hidden meaning was revealed, the exegete’s explanation was supposed to 
resemble the original text as closely as possible, thus the phrase a close 
reading.’ “Search for meaning is [always about bringing] to light a resemblance" 
(p. 29).The exegete’s goal was to produce true copies or at least "similitudes”
(p. 30) of the original. Foucault notes that “commentary halts before the 
precipice of the original text, and assumes the impossible and endless task of 
repeating its own birth within itself” (p. 81). The purpose of writing commentaries 
or doing exegetical work was to mirror back the text, to try to get it right, to 
attempt to get a likeness, to reveal the truth concealed and buried within the 
text.
Wilhelm Dilthey stressed these principles. He considered the work of the 
historian a “hermeneutic art” (1907-1910/1962, p. 139). And even though the 
historian “stands in the midst of the ruins,” (139) his goal is to get behind the text 
to get at the truth[s] of history. In order to tell the truth[s] of history, which “are 
universally valid” (p. 69) the historian must “determine the inner side” [of the 
mind of historical actors] (p. 69). Dilthey argued that “Actions and their 
permanent outward results constantly help us to reconstruct the mental content 
from which they arose” (p. 76). Dilthey offered up a psychological hermeneutic. 
Some consider him to be the father of psychohistory. When we examine the
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bulk of the work that has been done in psychohistory, especially 
psychobiographies, the goal seems to be to get behind the mind of, say, Hitler 
(Rappaport, 1975; Binion, 1976; Waite, 1977; Langer, cited in Rappaport, 1975; 
Erikson, 1976; Bromberg, cited in Rappaport, 1975). But is it really possible to 
get inside the mind of anyone? Can we ever really know what motivates 
people? Can we ever determine what people’s intentions are? And does 
diagnosing historical actors help? Even if the diagnosis of borderline 
personality disorder is correct when applied to Hitler and to Luther, what is it 
that we do not learn about these people?
Like Dilthey, R. G. Collingwood (1946) offers another kind of 
psychological hermeneutic when thinking about doing historiography. Like 
Dilthey, Collingwood suggests that the historian, if he is to get at the truth of 
history, must “think himself into... the thought of its agent" (p. 213). The 
historian must attempt to delve into “the thought in the mind of the person by 
whose agency the event comes about" (pp. 214-215). Again, Collingwood 
assumes that we can actually get into the mind of historical actors.
When hermeneutics is used to reduce complex phenomena, to reveal a 
truth hidden behind a text, it becomes inadequate to its task. Hermeneutics 
should not be reductive, but productive and generative. To suggest that we can 
know what it was that made Hitler tick presupposes too much. Assuming that we 
can get behind texts to reveal truth suggests that truth stops somewhere, that 
truth must be absolute. Truth with a capital T is nowhere to be found. But the 
proliferation of interpretations around a single event suggest that many truths 
may emerge. But these truths do not lie behind the text. They emerge in the 
complex interaction of reader and text. Doing good interpretive work does not 
clarify truth, it complicates truthfulness.
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Jean Laplanche (1999) calls for an “anti-hermeneutics" (p. 88). He 
worries that hermeneutics always works to squash mystery out of texts. “The 
notions defense, conflict, compromise, condensation... lose all their impact 
when psychoanalysis is reduced to a new version of hermeneutics" (p. 88).
Even so, I think we can use hermeneutics to complicate rather than reduce and 
therefore I am not willing to renounce hermeneutics once and for all. If 
interpretations of texts, of history are done sensitively they will generate rather 
than reduce ideas. Interpretations are always tentative and partial. And what it is 
that gets represented as Holocaust scholarship depends on the interpretation 
given by the historian. The shifting and changing trends in Holocaust 
historiography change the ways in which this event will be remembered by 
generations to come. New interpretations might not generate new material, but 
perhaps new interpretations will reflect the growing concerns of the next 
generation. With every new interpretation comes a new strangeness. As Dilthey 
stresses, “Interpretations would be impossible if expressions of life were 
completely strange. It would be unnecessary if nothing strange were in them. It 
lives, therefore, between these two extremes" (1907-1910. p. 77).
The strangeness of interpreting historical texts lies not in our ability to get 
at the mind of the author or even to get at the workings of our own mind, 
because much of our lives are covered over in unconscious traces. Rather, 
strangeness in interpreting historical texts comes out of sites of liminality, slips 
of the tongue, or what Freud would call parapraxes, proliferations of doubles, 
repetitions, ghosts, reversals, internal objects, uncanny transferences. As Hans 
Kellner points out, “historical thought” becomes open through “the problem of 
disjunctiveness, interference, and destruction of information" (1989, p. 34). The 
destruction of information has much to do with the ways in which historians
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repress difficult materials. As Hayden White (1978) comments, “there are 
always more facts in the record than the historian can possibly include in his 
narrative representation" (p. 51). And it is what the historian chooses to throw 
away or exclude that might offer clues to her own psychological resistances to 
her material. “By filling in the gaps,” White contends, the historian interprets 
(p.51). But what is it about these gaps and lapses and absences that become 
troubling? It is in the not-said that we should turn our attention.
It becomes clear in Holocaust scholarship that gaps in historical 
representation emerge around victims, women, gays and lesbians. These 
representations in Holocaust studies have been, for the most part, considered 
“unfitting subjects" (Talburt, 1999, p. 59). We must disturb the memory text of 
history and examine these unfitting subjects, as Susan Talburt might call them. 
These historical subjects are considered “unfitting” by many traditional 
historians because matters of gender and sexuality are taboo and are not 
considered appropriate to discussions around the Holocaust. But there is a 
movement, albeit a small one, mostly by feminists and queer theorists, to move 
these so-called unfitting subjects into the discussion. Historical writing shapes 
memory by erasing subjects.
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CHAPTER 5 
MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST HISTORIES
Haftling: I had learnt that I am HaWing. My number 
is 174517; we have been baptized, we will carry 
the tatoo on our left arm until we die. (Levi, 1996, p. 27)
The definition of Haftling is prisoner. But the word prisoner does not and 
cannot capture what it must have been like to have lived through Auschwitz. 
Primo Levi survived Auschwitz, but forever remained a prisoner to its memory. 
The memory of Auschwitz, though, eventually overpowered and killed him.
Primo Levi committed suicide, like many other Jews returning to life after 
Auschwitz.
Through the prisms of memory, the term “Holocaust" arrived on the scene 
in the 1960s, but not without debate. This is a contested term, a contested site of 
representation which serves “to separate this particular massacre from other 
historical instances of genocide” (Marrus, 1987, p. 3). But some Jews are 
offended by the term Holocaust. Berel Lang (1990) explains that the word 
Holokautima, which is found in the septuagint, is a “Greek translation of the 
Hebrew Olah, which designates the type of ritual sacrifice that was to be 
completely burned" (xxi). But the Holocaust had nothing whatsoever to do with 
the divine. There was nothing divine or sacred about it. Lang (1990) points out 
that many Jews prefer the term “shoah" which means “wasteland" or 
“destruction” (xxi.) The term shoah is taken from the book of Isaiah and 
Proverbs. Whether one embraces the term Holocaust or shoah, the crucial and 
significant point here is to respond to the event in an intellectually and 
emotionally senstive way. With “non-postponable urgency” Emmanuel Levinas 
remarks, the other, “face” of the other, demands a response (1969, p. 212). The 
others of this wrenching history demand a response; the face of six million
167
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
dead others demands attention. And so respond we must. Levinas, a Holocaust
survivor, declares that we must respond to the call before it is too late.
With the indulgent attitude toward mortality which 
we call the historical conscience, each of us has to 
wait for the occasion and recognize the call addressed 
to us. To respond to the call of the perishable instant!
It must not come too late. (1995, p. 184)
An historical consciousness and conscience should be an ethical one. Doing
work on the Holocaust is an ethical task, and I feel that I have been called to
address this difficult memory; I have been called out of my own unconscious,
called out of a place that has no name. As a third generation American Jew, a
third generation Jew after Auschwitz, I feel that it is my responsibility to grapple
with this event. As Geoffrey Hartman claims, “the enormity of the event. . .
blocks thought and leads to a black hole that swallows the haunted interpreter"
(1996, p.1). Indeed, I am haunted by the memory of Auschwitz. But in spite of
being haunted by this horrific past, I am bound by a “promise of truthfulness"
(Wyshogrod, 1998, p. 10) to remember the Holocaust, to remember both the
living and the dead, to remember my Jewish ancestors.
The memory of the Holocaust is unique, a particular Jewish tragedy. One 
of the important points about the term “Holocaust” is that it designates the 
uniqueness of this tragedy. Michael Marrus stresses that “Holocaust specialists 
have presented a strong case for the “centrality" of anti-Semitism in Nazi 
ideology, or the “uniqueness” of the Holocaust, even by the grim standards of 
20th century massacres” (1987, p. 8). As David Weinberg (1996) points out, it 
was the trial of Adolph Eichmann that drove this point home. “Of particular 
significance was the emphasis that the Israeli prosecutors placed on the 
specificity of the Jewish tragedy” (1996, p. 22). The Holocaust was not merely
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a humanitarian tragedy, it was rather a specifically Jewish one. It was not a 
tragedy like other tragedies. Charles Maier (1988) claims that “suggesting the 
comparability of the Final Solution to other genocides opens the way to 
apologetics. It facilitates a literature of evasion” (p. 1). The Holocaust signifies a 
radical alterity that must not be subsumed under the notion of the same. The 
attempt to subsume the Holocaust under the notion of the same, to suggest, in 
other words, its likeness or resemblance to another tragedy smacks of 
“normalization" (Maier, 1988, p. 70). To think that the Holocaust is like 
something else is to trivialize it.
The position which allows for comparability is one that is embraced by
neo-conservative historians in Germany. Neo-conservatives often compare the
Holocaust to Stalinist crimes. Charles Maier explains that
The central issue has been whether the Nazi 
crimes were unique, a legacy of evil in a class 
by themselves, irreparably burdening any concept 
of German nationhood, or whether they are comparable 
to other national atrocities, especially Stalinist terror.
(1988, p. 1)
The debate around the issue of comparability surfaced during what is termed 
the Historikerstreit in Germany in the 1980s. Fiercely opposed to comparability, 
Jurgen Habermas charged neo-conservative historians like Andreas Hillgruber, 
Ernst Nolte and Joachaim Fest with “relativizing” the Holocaust (cited in Maier, 
1988, pp. 1-2). Ernst Nolte, in a move of projection, shifts blame from the Nazis 
to the Bolsheviks as the “original perpetrators of global annihilations “(cited in 
Freidlander, 1993, p. 34). Saul Freidlander explains that, according to Nolte, the 
Nazis acted out of desperation and “copied the Bolsheviks” (p. 34) because 
they feared that if they did not kill Jews in camps, the Bolsheviks would kill the 
Germans. The Historikerstreit entertained debates like these. And the key issue
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here turns on national identity.The question becomes, how could historians 
frame history in Germany to bolster national identity and national pride? If they 
shifted blame to other perpetrators, or if they leveled the Holocaust and 
suggested that it was similar to other tragedies, the hope was that Germans 
would not feel so bad about having been complicit during the rise of the Third 
Reich. Jurgen Habermas suggests that the Historikerstreit signaled a "new 
nationalism" (cited in Maier, 1988, pp. 1-2). This new nationalism served to 
erase the past, or at least re-write it so as to become more palatable.
Comparisons between victims and victimizers also works to unwrite 
history. The so-called Bitburg Affair demonstrates this morally repugnant 
stance. The year was 1985, the 40th anniversary of the end of the Holocaust. 
When President Reagan visited the Bitburg cemetary in Germany, where both 
the Wehrmacht (German army) and Nazi SS are buried, Jews protested. The 
protest concerned two issues. Initially President Reagon did not wish to visit a 
concentration camp. As historian Raul Hilberg points out, Reagan declared that 
he did not want to go to a concentration camp because he did not wish to 
“reawaken the memories and so forth, and the passions of time" (cited in 
Hilberg, 1986, p. 19). After pressure, however, and as an aside, Reagan did visit 
Bergen-Belson. But to make matters worse, he then compared Jewish victims 
with Nazi SS, who he also considered “victims" of history. “ “Reagan: F in 
history,” a French newspaper headline declared" (Hartman, 1986, p. 11). It is 
repugnant and offensive, especially for Jews, to level victims and victimizers.
Many Jews were offended at Reagan's visit for another reason: Nazi SS 
were buried at Bitburg. Why honor perpetrators of horrible crimes? Would 
Reagan’s visit have created such controversy if SS had not been buried there?
If he would have only commemorated the Wehrmacht would it have made any
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difference? This depends upon what it is people think about the German army
and their role in the Holocaust. Jose Brunner points out that revisionist historian
Andreas Hillgruber has argued that the Wehrmacht
fought in the name of their nation and protected 
their families and women from death.. .rather than 
aiding and abetting genocide--their deeds were 
not only innocent but heroic. (1997, p. 269)
But evidence to the contrary abounds. It has long been known by historians that
not only were the Wehrmacht soldiers not innocent but rather they were directly
complicit in “aiding and abetting genocide.” Omer Bartov explains that the
Wehrmacht was deeply involved not “only” in killing pows and partisans... but
also, in a direct and massive manner, in the implementation of the Final
Solution" (1997, p. 172). Thus, it does not make sense to draw a dear
distinction between Nazi SS and the Wehrmacht, for they were both guilty of
war crimes. Hence, Reagan’s visit to Bitburg probably still would have created
controversy even if Nazi SS were not buried there, while his Bitburg visit was
aimed at reconciliation with Germans, it turned out to be an utter disaster, and if
anything, it further alienated Jews.
I saw people being sent to the gas chamber. I lived 
a block opposite the gas chamber and could see from 
my window people going into the building. There was 
a tall chimney and I could see flames coming from 
inside the building and never saw these people come 
out. (Szafran, cited in Zeiger, 1960, p. 186)
Dora Szarfran’s deposition taken at the Eichmann trial is a reminder that 
these mass murders were carried out by human beings, who were doctors, 
teachers, soldiers “ordinary Germans” (Browning, 1998; Goldhagen, 1997, 
Friedlander, 1997). The smoke from the crematoriums is said to have been so 
thick that it produced a black cloud which hung densely overhead. The smoke
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could be seen for miles around. The smoke was so thick that it made the sun 
turn black, hence the metaphor the “black sun of Auschwitz." The smoke 
covered the walls of the train station at Auschwitz. People said they could smell 
burning flesh for miles away. How could they do it? I ask this question to myself 
every day. How could they do this? When I attend synagogue and look around 
at all these Jewish people, at all these Jewish children, the question rings in my 
ears, How could they do it? I am aghast.
A crisis of representation and erasure of memory is happening now
around the Holocaust. The so-called revisionist historians are, as Pierre Vidal-
Naquet (1992) suggests by the title of his work on Holocaust denial, “Assasins
of Memory.” Revisionists claim that a) the Holocaust is a hoax, b) that the
numbers of deaths reported are exaggerations, c) that the gas chambers did not
exist, d) that the Holocaust was actually a Jewish plot to acquire the state of
Israel. Deborah Lipstadt comments that the United States Holocaust Memorial
Council receives many complaints from high school teachers that their students
believe these fallacious claims. Lipstadt explains that
High school teachers have complained that when 
they teach the Holocaust in their classes, they 
increasingly find students who have heard about 
Holocaust denial and assume it must have 
legitimacy. (1993, pp. 3-4)
This is troubling especially since the last generation of Holocaust survivors are
dying off, and within one generation they will not be able to testify to the horrrors
through which they lived. The burden of memory is on us.
That the Holocaust happened, that six million Jews were massacred is 
historical reality. As Georg Iggers explains, “historical accounts refer to a 
historical reality, no matter how complex and indirect the process is by which
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the historian approximates reality" (1997, p. 147). A historical reconstruction 
attempts to get at the truthfulness of the event. A construction, a narrative, may 
shift our viewpoints around the event, but still it leaves the truthfulness of the 
event intact. Louis Mink remarks that “of course our interpretations and state of 
knowledge may change, but either Caesar visited Britain or he didn’t" (1987, p. 
93). But doing interpretive work around the Holocaust is not just about changing 
states of knowledge. It is also about changing states of the psyche. Repression 
and its unconscious formations alter our viewpoints around historical events. 
Repressed memory might determine beforehand what it is an historian exludes 
in her interpretation. Interpretation of historical reality does not mean anything 
goes; it does not mean that radical relativism will do. Some interpretations are 
better than others; some interpretations are completely inadequate, some are 
outright lies.
Scholarship around the Holocaust is generally divided into three areas:
perpetrator, victim and bystander histories. Historians tend to specialize in one
domain or another, rarely crossing boundaries. Saul Friedlander worries that
Holocaust historiography has become too specialized and fragmented so as to
obfuscate. Friedlander remarks:
the image of the Nazi era presented by German 
and foreign historians, in becoming so diversified 
and complex, is perhaips blurred: the sheer multitude 
of specialized studies on the minutest aspects of this 
epodi tends to erase the sharp outlines of certain 
central issues, be they conceptual or ethical. (1993, pp. 5-6)
The balkanization of Holocaust scholarship can produce for the 
researcher an overwhelming array of material which may become difficult, if not 
impossible, to sift through. What I would like to do here is to tease out some of 
the broader questions that are raised when looking at the three broad areas of
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Holocaust scholarship (perpetrator, victim and bystander historiographies) to try 
to touch on key issues that Freidlander worries are being obscured. I argue that 
psychological mechanisms such as transference, repression, denial, projection, 
reversal and introjection may shape and determine what gets represented as 
Holocaust historiography in the first place.
Perpetrator Histories
The first time I came face to face with a German 
soldier was in 1940, when I was ten and a half.. . .
The Germans wore goggles, black leather jackets, 
shiny high boots. In their powerful mechanized 
equipment they looked like giants from outerspace.
At that moment I felt we had lost the war.
(Jeruchim, cited in Rosenberg, 1994, p. 139)
German soldiers seemed like giants from outerspace, says Holocaust 
survivor Simon Jeruchim. It is this seemingly alien nature, this bizarre portrait of 
Germans, that echoes in many early Holocaust histories. Social 
psychohistorians (Reich 1933/1945; Adorno, 1950; Horkheimer, 1940; Fromm 
1941/1969) and psychobiographers (Binion, 1976; Rappaport, 1975; Waite, 
1977; Erikson, 1976) tended to emphasize the pathological, and hence alien 
nature, of German society. According to Peter Marthesheimer, German’s 
willingness to follow Hitler, “led to the psychopathology of a whole nation" (cited 
in Markovits & Noveck, 1996, p. 406). Wilhelm Reich argued that Germans, 
under the sway of Hitler and his Nazi henchmen, got themselves embroiled in 
“a psychotic situation” (1933/1945, p. 29). Martin Broszat suggested that the rise 
of Nazism was, in part, due to “the general pathology of German nationalism" 
(1969/1981, p. 29).
According to Wilhelm Reich, German pathology was caused by “sexual 
regression" (1933/1945, p. 26). Reich argued that German men became willing
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to “submit” (p. 25) to “authoritarian order" (p. 25) because they were
“masochistic” (xi). Boys suffered at the hands of authoritarian fathers and
consequently felt that they needed to identify with someone, namely Hitler, who
could satisfy their masochistic needs. Hitler, the sadist, then filled the gap
psychologically for German men especially. Reich comments that
Sexual regression aids political reaction not only 
through this process which makes the mass 
individual passive and unpolitical but also by 
creating an interest in actively supporting the 
authoritarian order. (1933/1945, p. 26)
The so-called “mass individual" or collective German culture, had a basic flaw,
an “irrational structure" (xvi) that allowed for the very condition of “fascism" (xvi)
to arrive on the scene. Reich remarks that “fascism is not the deed of a Hitler or
Mussolini, but the expression of the mass individual” (xvi).
Like Reich, Adorno (1950) suggested that German collective
psychopathology was due to what he termed the “Authoritarian syndrome" (p.
759). This syndrome was caused by a tendency toward a “sadomasochistic
resolution of the Oedius complex” (p. 259). Similarly, Erich Fromm (1941/1969)
declared that German society had a “symbiotic relationship" (p. 246) with
Hitler, as he was the sadist and Germans masochists. The “authoritarian
character” of German society allowed for the
Simultaneous presence of sadistic and masochistic 
drives. Sadism was understood as aiming at unrestricted 
power over another person more or less mixed with 
destructiveness; masochism as aiming at dissolving 
oneself in an overwhelmingly strong power and 
participating in its strengths and glory, (p. 246)
Unlike Fromm, Reich and Adorno, Ackerman and Jahoda (1950) claim that
Germans, because they had authoritarian parents, were afraid to show
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weakness, and consequently became sadistic. And as Robert J. Litton (1986) 
stresses, many “early descriptions of Auschwitz and other death camps focused 
on the sadistic and viciousness of Nazi guards, officers and physicians" (pp. 14- 
15).
All of this pathologizing of German society is, however, problematic. To
suggest that all Germans behaved in sadomasochistic ways is to essentialize.
Of course, there are many accounts of sadistic camp guards and passive
German citizenry. But as Marion Kaplan (1998) points out, many Germans
exhibited neither sadistic nor masochistic behavior. And as Robert J. Lifton
explains, “sadism and violence alone would not account for the killing of
millions" (1986, pp. 14-15). One of the most serious problems of these early
studies, aside from essentialism, turns on blameworthiness and responsibility. If
German society is pathologized, if Germans have collectively gone mad and are
considered alien and abnormal, they can be exonerated from perpetrating
crimes, for who would try the insane? “To dismiss Hitler or Himmler [or collective
German society] as madmen or fiends, incomprehensible to “normal" people, is
to say that critical judgment of them is not possible” (Waite, 1977, xvii). Germans
are not demons. Germans are not aliens from outerspace. Germans are people.
Since at least the 1980s scholars have stressed that German crimes were
committed by ordinary people. Robert J. Lifton comments that what troubled him
while doing research on the Nazi doctors was,
the ordinariness of most Nazi doctors... [who were] 
neither brilliant nor stupid, neither inherently evil 
nor particularly ethically sensitive, they were by no 
means demonic figures-sadistic, fanatic, lusting 
to kill. (1986, pp. 4-5)
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Langer (1998), Kelman (1976), Browning (1998) agree with Lifton that
Germans, by and large, were neither sadistic nor psychopathic. Like the label
“psychopaths", the label uauthoritarianismn conceals more than it reveals. It
keeps us from thinking about the complexities of the responses and actions of
perpetrators. To say that all Germans have authoritarian characters is to
essentialize and simplify. Like the label “authoritarian" the term “Fascist” also
becomes problematic because it too conceals more than it reveals. Wilhelm
Reich claimed that Fascism was the “basic emotional attitude of man in an
authoritarian society” (1933/1945, ix). Reich contended that Fascism was a
“mixture of rebellious emotions and reactionary social ideas” (x). But the term
Fascism explains little. Saul Friedlander argues that
“’Fascism” as an overall tag... shielded many of them 
[Germans] from the specificity of the Nazi past, and 
such ideological generalizations became deeply 
embedded in subsequent historical discourse. (1993, p. 125)
Recall, East German historiography became saturated with rhetoric of
anti-Fascism. Communists blamed former West Germans for the Holocaust.
West Germans were referred to as “Fascists." But this anti-Fascist rhetoric is
problematic because not only does it obscure, it shifts the onus of blame onto
West Germany. Jeffrey Herf explains that
The dominant German Communist anti-Fascist 
discourse suggested that its exponents were 
“anti-Fascists” who were only incidentally 
German and thus only incidentally bound up 
with the burden of German history. (1997, p. 56)
The East German government has traditionally only honored Communist
resisters of Fascism. Communists in the former East Germany just three years
after the war “abolished the Jewish anti-Fascist Committee and arrested its
leaders" (Herf, 1997, p. 119). Herf remarks that with the recent opening of the
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Stasi Archives in Berlin, historians have learned that Communists who helped 
Jews found themselves in trouble with the police. And many Jewish 
Communists, along with their non-Jewish compatriots landed in jail. Herf relates 
that
those who returned from Mexico... those Communists 
such as [Paul] Merker, [Leo] Zukerman, and others who 
in the spirit of Communism wartime anti-Fascism, had 
emphasized Jewish issues. .. now fell under a cloud 
of espionage accusations, (p. 64).
Anti-Fascism also meant “government initiated anti-Semitism” (p. 117). Jeffrey
Peck (1996) is not confident that the Former East German mentality has
changed much with reunification.
Early Holocaust scholarship also embraced what is termed the
Sonderweg thesis. Before 1933 Sonderweg , which means special path,
suggested that Germany was superior to other nations. After all, Germany
produced Beethoven and Bach. And all major German historians, John Weaver
(1994) claims, appropriated this position of superiority before 1933. Weaver
explains that after 1933, Hans Ulrich Wehler argued that Germans had taken
the wrong path. Now, Sonderweg designated deviance. German historians felt
that “somewhere Germany had gone wrong” (Maier, 1988, p. 103). Martin
Broszat (1969/1981) claims that while Germany may have progressed
economically, she lagged behind socially and politically. Like Broszat, Thorstein
Veblen argued that
Germany had borrowed Britain’s advanced technological 
achievements without having had time to internalize 
the values of workmanship and democracy... The concept 
of a lag between economic and political modernization 
continued to mark influential historical interpretations.
(cited in Maier, 1988, p. 104)
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However, the Sonderweg thesis has come under attack. Charles Maier 
stresses that Germany “was hardly a feudal society” ( p. 108). Maier asks what it 
is German historians mean when they suggest that Germany diverted from the 
West? What “West" are they talking about? And exactly what were Germans 
diverting from? Maier argues that the Sonderweg thesis is nothing more than “a 
complacent or apologetic notion that Germany had been seized by “demonized” 
forces" (1988, p. 106). After 1945, then, the implication is that Germany was no 
longer off track, but squarely on track once again. The Sonderweg thesis 
implies that after 1945 everything was fine again in Germany. Germans, after 
the war, for the most part, were not held responsible for their crimes, so that in 
fact, many were put back into positions of power. Former Nazis became judges, 
teachers, and attorneys. Scholars stress that there was an uncanny continuity 
between pre-1945 and post-1945 German society. Thus, the Sonderweg thesis 
has been dismissed by many historians primarily because it served as an 
apologetic.
More recently, Holocaust scholarship has been guided by the 
intentionalist-structuralist debate. Christopher Browning (1992) comments that 
the intentionalists “explain history through the ideas and decisions of 
individuals [and these historians emphasize] the “continuity" of Hitler’s goals 
and “the central role of Hitler (p. 3). Conversely, structuralists stress 
“improvisation and cumulative radicalization produced by [the] contradictory 
nature [o f]... chaotic decisions]” (Browning, 1992, p. 3).
Intentionalists argue, generally, that Hitler had a “blueprint" (Goldhagen, 
1997; Dawidowicz, 1975/1986) or a program or plan to murder the Jews all 
along. Dawidowicz looks to Mein Kamof for evidence of Hitler’s plan. Other 
historians, Christopher Browning (1992) explains, look to Hitler’s 1939
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Reichstag speech. It is here that Hitler talks of a “bloody solution" to Germany’s
problems. Browning comments that
The programmatic view is based primarily upon the 
statements made by Hitler, such as those in the late 
1920s threatening a “bloody” solution through the 
sword or his famous 1939 Reichstag prophecy that 
the outbreak of war would mean the destruction of 
the Jewish race. (p. 26)
Some caution that in spite of these early pronouncements of murder, in spite of 
Hitler’s ravings in Mein Kampf. it becomes difficult to prove whether he actually 
intended all along to commit mass murder. Saul Friedlander remarks that the 
Holocaust was not a “predetermined enactment of a demonic script. .. [nor was 
it] haphazard, involuntary, imperceptible and chaotic” (1997, p. 5). Lucy 
Dawidowicz (1975/1986) claims that structuralists offer up an apologetic 
because they obscure blame. “By removing the moral aspect of decision­
making in the Hitler era, the structuralists initiated a new cycle of apologetics" 
(xxvii).
The intentionalist-structuralist debate echoes ideas found in both Hegel 
and Marx. Recall, Hegel’s work suggests that history produces subjects. 
Subjects have little agency, as spirit moves through the world. Of course, 
structuralists are not mystical like Hegel, and they certainly do not argue that 
history is akin to some spiritual entity moving like a phantom through the world. 
However, structuralists do argue that Nazi “apparatuses” functioned in ways to 
move history. This kind of explanation leaves little room for human agency. The 
notion of an “apparatus” seems obscure. What is an apparatus? How can we 
assign blame to an apparatus? The rhetoric of apparatuses (Hilberg, 
1961/1985) obfuscates and may serve to depersonalize and sanitize what it 
was that individual perpetrators did. Apparatuses do not kill, people do. People
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bleed, people die. Perpetrators have names and faces.Upon reading 
depositions taken at the Eichmann trial, it becomes very clear that the rhetoric of 
apparatuses conceals the human complicity, the humanness of crimes 
perpetrated.
I identify Number 21 on photograph Z/4/7 as an 
SS kitchen chief of number 1 kitchen at Belsen.
I have been told that his name is Erich Basch___
I was standing near the door to the kitchen. There 
was a girl prisoner... Basch... when he was about 
3 meters from her he fired 2 or 3 shots... at this girl.
I saw the girl fall to the ground and blood coming 
from her head. (Siiberberg, cited in Zeiger, 1960, p. 172)
The above particular perpetrator was named Erich Basch. Erich Basch was not
an apparatus, he was a human being who shot and killed a girl at point blank
range. Daniel Goldhagen (1997) stresses that historians should attach faces
and names to perpetrators. He wants to "restore them to their identities" (p. 6).
Goldhagen declares that he wants to let the reader see that these were people
who killed and these people get garbed in what Goldhagen considers to be
“obuscating labels, like "Nazis” and "SS men” (p. 6). Goldhagen stresses that
we should call "them what they were, Germans” (p. 6).
Intentionalists, like Goldhagen, argue that subjects produce history and 
are responsible for their actions. This position echoes that of Marx’s. Here, 
intentionalists stress that we can examine what individuals did and make 
judgments about their actions and hold them responsible for crimes.This is the 
power of the intentionalist argument. Clearly Eichmann was an individual, not 
an apparatus, and he had to be held responsible for what he did.
Raul Hilberg's (1961/1985) early work anticipated structuralist accounts 
of perpetrators. Michael Marrus comments that Hilberg’s work "offers a 
magesterial synthesis on a scale that no one has matched before or since...
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[Hilberg’s] remains the most important book that has been written on the 
subject" (1987, p. 48). Although Marrus praises Hilberg, others criticize him and 
consider him a scandal. Hilberg writes in his memoirs that for thirty years he has 
"almost been buried under an avalanche of condemnations” (1996, p. 137). 
Hilberg argues, generally, that Jews were passive and did not resist the Nazis, 
and in fact uhasten[ed] their [own] destruction” (1961/1985, p. 28). Hilberg 
contends that “In many cases they failed to escape while there was still time and 
more often, still, they failed to step out of the way when the killers were already 
upon them” (p. 26). Hilberg contends that "Jewish institutions [were]... an 
extension of the German bureaucratic machine” (1996, p. 127). Jews were led 
like sheep to slaughter. And I think it is this image which has gotten Hilberg in 
so much trouble. Oscar Handlin and Arno Lustiger (cited in Hilberg, 1996) and a 
host of other Jewish historians since Hilberg have tried to overturn this image. 
Responses of Jews were quite complex and it is this complexity that Hilberg did 
not take into account (Kushner, 1994).
Contrary to what Hilberg maintains, Yehuda Bauer (1989) suggests that
Jews did resist. Bauer explains that
In the Generalgouvernment there were three armed 
rebellions.. . .  four attempted rebellions at Kielce,
Opatow, Pilica, and Tomaszow Lubelski... [there were] 
rebellions in six concentration and death camps 
Kruszyna, Krychow, Minsk Mazowiecki... Sobibor, and 
Treblinka. (1989, p. 143)
Still Bauer points out that Jews could not always resist because they had little
access to guns. Without guns, resistance was impossible. Jews fought back with
what they had and did what they could do but the Nazis were just too strong. In
the camps, according to Hermann Langbein (1996) there was organized
resistance. This, he writes, is a fact that tends to get overlooked or obscured.
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It is little known that there was resistance in the 
camps~in defiance of an inconceivably brutal 
and totally effective system of terror-resistance to 
the killing of human beings... not just individual 
resistance, but organized resistance, (p. 2)
And so the debate about resistance rages. The image of Jews passively 
marching like sheep to slaughter has been the impetus for these counter­
arguments. And it was Hilberg who initiated the debate. I do think he 
undertheorized around the complexities of Jewish responses. It seems that 
scholars can come to little agreement on how much or how little Jews actually 
reisisted.
I consider Hilberg to be a structuralist, not in the same way as Broszat 
(1969/1981) or Mommsen (1966), because unlike them, he argues that Hitler 
was responsible, and unlike them, he argues that the actions of the Nazis were 
carefully throught through. Hilberg remarks that the Nazis knew just what they 
were doing. But Hilberg's discourse is similar to structuralist discourse. He 
argues that the Nazi “Apparatus" (p. 55) churned like an “engine of destruction" 
(p. 55), like a “sprawling” and “far-flung bureaucratic machine” (p. 53). It was the 
“sheer mechanism of destruction” (xi) that concerned Hilberg. Robert J. Lifton, 
like Hilberg, remarks that it was the “bureaucracy of killing: the faceless, 
detached bureaucratic function” (1986, p. 15) of murder that allowed 
perpetrators to carry out such hideous acts. The bureaucratic nature of mass 
murder allowed for a “routinization” (p. 15) of killing to numb the perpetrators 
enough so that they could detach themselves from what they were doing.
What exactly is an “engine of destruction?” Why all this mechanistic
language? Lawrence Langer writes that “the very image of machinery tends
to obscure individual offenders and obscure the identity and the catalyst of the
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very culprits who initiated and carried out the crime” (1998, xii). And it is this 
mechanistic language that becomes troubling for me. Although I understand 
that Hilberg attempts to suggest that the Holocaust was a much more complex 
web of complicity than one might assume, but I believe that this web is made up 
of people, and it is to these individuals we should turn. Structuralists’ accounts 
of the Holocaust, like this one, suggest that people do not produce history, but 
rather historical structures (mechanisms, networks of power, engines of 
destruction and so forth) sweep people into the web of history, events.
In spite of my criticisms, I want to suggest that Hilberg’s work is important. 
He does complexify the web of complicity. He attempts to locate perpetrators in 
a broader network of power structures; he attempts to show how intertwining 
systems of bureaucracy aided the process of carrying out mass murder. But 
most of all, Hilberg becomes important because he is one of the earliest 
Holocaust scholars to suggest that Nazi SS were not the only group of people 
who became complicit. Hilberg stresses that “All components of German 
organized life were drawn [in]” (1992, p. 20). If this is the case, then ordinary 
Germans became just as blameworthy as Nazi SS.
Martin Broszat (1969/1981), structuralist par excellance, argues that the 
Nazis operated as “a growing system of rival power groups” (xi) who 
“improvised" (xi) in the form of a ”polyocrac[ies]” (xi) which competed for power 
with Hitler. These so-called polyocracies engaged in a “wild proliferation of 
National Socialist power” (p. 139). Broszat’s portrayal of the Nazi era is one of 
utter and complete chaos. The Nazis lacked any “direct and systematic 
leadership" (xi). Thus, Broszat is led to the conclusion that “below Hitler there 
was no overall political responsibility" (xi). But how could Broszat maintain such 
a claim? In one sentence he exonerates all Germans complicit in Holocaust
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crimes. Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) calls Broszat’s interpretation “bizarre” 
(xxvi). She criticizes him for offering up a “science-fiction-fantasy of government 
by automation, robutistically driven by an internal law of motion” xxvi). And not 
only does Broszat rule out political responsibility of middle and lower eschelon 
leaders, according to Dawidowicz he also suggests that Hitler's place in all of 
this was secondary. Broszat “downgraded Hitler's role,” (xxvi), Dawidowicz 
suggests. The implication here is that the rise of the Nazi era was so chaotic 
and so haphazard that it becomes hard to pinpoint the real culprits. But is this 
just an apologetic? Broszat claims that Germany suffered from a “collective 
neuroses" (1969/1981), a society out of control, a society gone mad. And a 
society gone mad cannot be held responsible for its actions. Something is out of 
joint here. Broszat’s work signals, to me, repression.
Repressed memory shapes historians’ work. And one can get a better 
understanding of perhaps why Broszat writes about the Holocaust in the way 
that he does when one examines his so-called “plea for historicization." Broszat, 
in a well known debate with Saul Friedlander (1997), argues that German 
historians must become more objective by separating their own personal 
memory of the Holocaust from their rendering of the Holocaust in historical 
accounts. Broszat declares that he does not want to distance himself from the 
event; he wants to lessen “the moral loading” (cited in Rusen, 1997, p. 123) of 
writing about the event. But still, it seems to me, that in spite of his claim, he 
does distance himself from the past. And he wants German historians to 
become more objective so that they can do their work without emotional 
upheaval. It seems that Broszat wishes to repress the memory of the Holocaust, 
by suggesting that it is necessary for historians to separate their memories of 
the event from the work that they do around the event. How is this possible?
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When the memory gets repressed, the historiographies produced end up being,
as Lucy Dawidowicz puts it, bizarre. Jorn Rusen comments that,
by historicizing National Socialism, Broszat wishes to 
overcome the historical estrangement of Germans and 
their identity in relation to that era. Friedlander interrogates 
this project, wondering whether a normalization in the 
historical patterns of German identity can be achieved at 
the cost of neglecting the special quality of National 
Socialism in historical perspective. (1997, p. 119)
Here again, for so many German historians the question turns on 
national identity and national pride. If historians are old enough to remember 
the Holocaust, how can they write history pretending that remembering the 
event is irrelevant? Here we see the implications of drawing sharp distinctions 
between history and memory. Friedlander has often argued that these sharp 
distinctions cannot be drawn, that the relation between history and memory is 
fuzzy, especially if the historian works on recent history. Personal memories of 
Auschwitz and of the Nazi era have got to affect the writings of German 
historians. And it seems to me that Broszat’s plea to separate memory and his 
refusal to admit that this memory affects historians, sounds the Freudian theme 
of negation. But for Freud, a negation signals an affirmation of some sort. For a 
very strong ‘no’ a very strong ‘yes’ lurks in the unconscious (1925/1989). 
Broszat doth protest too much. I wonder what it is that he does remember and 
why this memory bothers him so much for him to call out for forgetfulness. 
Broszat's plea serves as a defense mechanism against his own memories.
Christopher Browning, unlike Martin Broszat, calls himself a moderate 
structuralist. He takes a "middle position” (1992, p. 5) between intentionalism 
and structuralism. Browning argues that the Nazi regime was divided by 
"factionalism and infighting” (p. 76). Planning "emanated from the center with
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receptivity and accomodation in the periphery" (p. 76). Taking up the 
“evolutionary position” Browning still contends that Hitler was ultimately 
responsible.Like other structuralists, Browning suggests that the Nazis, because 
they embraced a sort of evolutionary scheme, improvised as they went along.
The important move that Browning has made, I believe, is toward doing 
what is termed Alltagsgechichte. Unlike most perpetrator histories since Hilberg, 
Browning does not focus on “middle-echelon perpetrators" but rather he 
focuses on the “little men" (Browning, 1996, p. 27). Because Browning’s work 
attempts to humanize and not demonize the killers, because he suggests that it 
is human beings who kill, it is the human conscience that makes decisions and 
shapes history, I would consider him closer to the intentionalists than the 
structuralists.
Christopher Browning’s (1998) work, entitled Ordinary Men: Resen/e
Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland, has been overshadowed
by Daniel Goldhagen’s (1997) Hitler’s Willing Executioner’s: Ordinary Germans
and the Holocaust. The Goldhagen controversy, which I will discuss later,
caught the eye of the popular press and consequently led to submerging
Browning’s book into the background. What is interesting is that both books
deal with a similar topic: ordinary German complicity during the Holocaust.
Ordinary men, who were not Nazis, but who were reserve police, willingly
engaged in brutality, murdering innocent people. Ordinary men willingly
murdered Jews. Yahuda Bauer (1997) attributes Goldhagen’s popularity, at
least with lay readers, to his simplistic argument.
I believe that the real reason is the very simplicity 
of the argument, its manichaen (black and white) 
character. A complicated phenomenon is seemingly 
explained in the most simple fashion: the Germans
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killed the Jews because they wanted to; they wanted 
to since the mid-nineteenth century, and maybe 
before that too. And that’s all there is to it. (p.71)
Unlike Goldhagen’s simple explanation, Browning offers up what he calls a
“multilayered approach” (1998, p. 215). His treatment of police reserve battalion
101 is complex. He does not demonize, yet he does not exonerate either.
Browning’s, is a more sympathetic approach than Goldhagen’s. Goldhagen
tends to demonize Germans. Thus, I prefer Browning’s to Goldhagen's portral of
ordinary German complicity.
Browning bases his book on “judicial interrogations” (xviii) of 125 men
who served in reserve police battalion 101. These interrogations were
conducted in the 1960s. Browning’s research led him to believe that not only
did some of these men repress their memories of what they did to Jews, but
some lied outright. What is disturbing is the way in which many of them,
according to Browning, utilized projection, to cover over their hatred for Jews.
Browning describes this projection as it had implications for Germans’ relations
with Poles. He comments that
While the policemen’s testimonies offer scant 
information concerning German attitudes toward 
Poles and Jews, they contain very frequent and 
quite damning comments on Polish attitudes toward 
Jews. (p. 155)
Germans often considered Poles second class citizens; in fact many Germans 
hated Poles and many Poles were anti-Semites. But the very “omission" (p. 73) 
of policemen’s own Jewish prejudices during these interrogations reveals 
something about their attitudes toward Jews. It is in the not said that we begin to 
understand something lurking in repression. Browning contends that the men of 
reserve police battalion 101 were given the choice of not participating in
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shooting Jews, of “stepping out” (p. 71). Only 12 out of 500 men took up the offer 
of Major Trapp (who was affectionately called Pappa Trapp). Why did only 12 
men step out? Browning suggests that most of the policemen felt the “pressure” 
to conform (p. 71) and had “a lack of time for reflection" (p. 71). Goldhagen 
(1997) refutes these claims. He suggests that Browning is merely excusing here 
and that Germans murdered because they wanted to. Conformity and lack of 
reflection had nothing to do with it.
Browning asks, “How did a battalion of middle-aged reserve policemen
find themselves facing the task of shooting some 1,500 Jews in the Polish
village of Jozefow, in the summer of 1942?” (p. 3) They faced the task initially
with difficulty. Some of the men displayed “sheer physical revulsion" (p.74),
some expressed “resentment’ and “bitterness" (76). The Jozefow Massacre was
carried out essentially by what Americans would consider the equivalent of a
national guard unit made up of weekend warriors, not professional soliders.
These were not professional soldiers; they were everyday men, middle-aged
men, far beyond the age for military service. Nonetheless, these ordinary men
killed Jews by the scores. Some were killed in a face off. Some were killed at
point blank range. Browning explains that
When the first truckload of 35 to 40 Jews arrived, an 
equal number of policemen came forward and, face 
to face, were paired off with their victims... Kammer then 
orderd the Jews to lie down in a row. The policemen 
stepped up behind them... and on Kammer’s orders 
fired in unison, (p. 61)
But the policemen did not alway aim well. Skulls were blown off, blood
splattered everywhere. Some of the policemen intentionally missed. If they did
not aim right they had to shoot several times. The account that Browning
portrays is completely disgusting and gruesome. Some perpetrators became
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sick and threw up; some ran into the woods in hysterics. “When the men arrived 
at the barracks in Bilgoraj, they were depressed, angered, embittered, and 
shaken" (p. 69). However, Browning stresses that after a while, the policemen 
became numb to what they were doing. After killing ten or twenty Jews or more 
"they became increasingly efficient calloused exectutioners” (p. 77).
It is interesting to note that in Goldhagen’s account of police reserve 
battalion 309, it seems that the men had little difficulty in killing. Goldhagen’s 
portrait of ordinary Germans is quite different. He gives the impression that they 
were natural bom killers who suffered little from pulling the trigger. Browning, on 
the other hand, tries to paint a more complex picture. But he does not exonerate 
or apologize for the men of reserve unit 101. He simply paints a picture that is 
probably more truthful than Goldhagen's.
Browning relates that not only were reserve policemen involved in killing 
villagers, they were also directly involved in the Final Solution. Resen/e police 
were involved in the Einsatzgruppen in 1941 in Russia where they mowed 
down scores of Jews with machine guns. It was after this event, that the 
Germans decided to use gas instead of guns because gas was more efficient 
and caused Germans fewer psychological problems than shooting their victims 
face to face. It is interesting to note that in post-war trials, the leader of the 
reserve police, Kurt Daluege denied that these men had anything to do with 
direct executions. And it was this kind of myth that protected ordinary Germans 
from feeling, in any way, responsible. Often, one hears the protest that Germans 
were simply following orders, or that the reserve police and regular army were 
not complicit; they were only doing their duty. But stepping out of the line of duty 
was not a punishable offense. Germans had choices.
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Browning points out, unlike Goldhagen, that “ordinary Germans" were 
“not of one mind" (p. 216). The irony about reserve police battalion 101 is that 
most of the men were from Hamburg, which according to Browning, was one of 
the “least Nazified” (p. 48) cities in Germany. These men were not really 
interested in politics. Some of them, Browning suggests, were not anti-Semites 
at all. These ordinary men were not raving, murderous lunatics who thought 
only about killing Jews. Rather, these men incrementally became killers; their 
transition from ordinary men to mass murderers was not without difficulty.
Unlike Browning’s sympathetic, complex portrayal of the role ordinary 
Germans played in the Holocaust, Daniel Goldhagen’s (1997) portrayal of 
ordinary Germans is unrelenting, unsympathetic and outright demonizing. 
Goldhagen is an intentionalist, although he would probably refuse the label 
because he argues that the intentionalist-structuralist debate a “misnomer” (p. 
10). Goldhagen, however, argues in typical intentionalist style. Hitler, he 
contends, had a “blueprint" (p. 86), a map, a program, if you will, for the 
Holocaust. And this blueprint could be traced back to Mein Kampf. Hitler 
intended all along, says Goldhagen, to murder the Jews. Not only that, but the 
“Nazis were remarkably consistent" (p. 132) and “Hitler never waivered” (p, 134) 
from his plan. Recall, Browning contends that intentionalists usually argue for 
“continuity" (1992, p. 3) of Hitler’s goals and this is just what Goldhagen 
suggests here. For Goldhagen, unlike Broszat, the Nazi era was not one of 
chaos and disorganization. Hitler and his henchmen knew just what they were 
doing. Goldhagen argues that Germans killed Jews because they wanted to 
and because Germans embraced, what he terms, “eliminationist anti-Semitism” 
(p. 132). This so-called eliminationist anti-Semitism was “shared” (p. 132) 
among all Germans. Clearly, anti-Semitism is more complex than this, and I find
191
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
it hard to believe that an entire nation shared one brand of anti-Semitism. It is 
also unlikely that all Germans wanted to kill Jews. Perhaps many Germans 
wished that Jews would emigrate, but I cannot believe that all Germans wished 
for the mass annihiliation of Jews.
Unlike Browning, Goldhagen contends that ordinary Germans “would 
easily become genocidal executioners" (p. 185). This claim is in stark contrast to 
Browning’s. Recall, Browning went to great lengths to demonstrate the 
difficulties many Germans had when they initially began killing Jews.
Goldhagen refutes this claim and says it was easy. Germans were natural bom 
killers. Why did they do it? Because they wanted to. Goldhagen declares that 
“it is cognition and values, and only cognition and values, that in the last instant 
moves someone willfully to pick up his hand and strike another” (p. 21). 
Goldhagen argues that the men of reserve police battalion 309 “became 
instantaneous Weltanschauungskriegen, or ideological warriors" (p. 190).
Goldhagen has been taken to task by other historians for several 
reasons. First, his explanation is monocausal and simplistic. There were many 
causes for the Holocaust and although anti-Semitism was an important factor it 
was not the only factor. Further, Goldhagen has oversimplified this term as well. 
There are many brands of anti-Semitism and not all kinds lead to murder. It is 
ironic that Goldhagen stresses that “studies of the Holocaust have been marred 
by a poor understanding and or under-theorizing of anti-Semitism” (p. 7). I think 
he has got a poor understanding of the complexities of this term. And I argue 
that not all Germans embraced an “eliminationist” model of anti-Semitism. 
Historically, there have been many varieties of anti-Semitism as I have shown in 
a previous chapter. Hans Mommsen argues that Goldhagen oversimplifies his 
entire approach to the Holocaust, he reduces the complex to the simple. He
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is driven by the determination to deny every 
mixture of ideological fanaticism, of psychopathological 
aberration, of moral indifference and bureaucratic 
perfectionism, even of “the banality of evil” (1997, p. 36)
Although, I do not agree with Mommsen’s explanation here, the point is that
Goldhagen narrows his explanation so much as to make it sound as if his is the
absolute and authoritative understanding of the Holocaust, which basically boils
down to the fact that all Germans wanted to kill Jews because they all embraced
a deadly variety of anti-Semitism. Mommsen does point out that Goldhagen’s
argument implies that the collective German spirit embraced an "innate” (1997,
p. 36) kind of anti-Semitism, even though Goldhagen denies this charge. But
one does get the impression that Goldhagen suggests the collective guilt of
Germans, since this anti-Semitism must have been innate. Goldhagen denies
this, but all the same, this is the impression one gets from reading his work.
Among historians, the notion of collective guilt is no longer a tenable one. Since
at least the Eichmann trial, most historians would suggest that what is at stake is
individual guilt and individual responsibility. Further, the notion that Germans
had some “innate" thing that caused them to kill is untenable also. There is no
essential Germannness. All Germans are different.
Goldhagen has also been taken to task for making errors. He suggests 
that, for instance, he is the first historian to discuss the role of ordinary Germans 
in Holocaust historiography. Pollefeyt and Colijn remark that Von der Dunk 
criticizes Goldhagen’s “distorted depiction of Holocaust literature to underlie his 
own originality and he finds especially steep Golhagen's contention that he is in 
fact the first one to focus on ordinary executioners” (1997, p. 5). Other scholars 
are upset at Goldhagen’s arrogance. Yehuda Bauer (1997) comments that his 
“overbearing attitude" and his refusal to “take into account “(p. 62) the works of
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other historians simply will not do. In Goldhagen's notes at the end of the book, 
he takes to task every major Holocaust historian and argues that that their ideas 
are completely misguided. He says that ordinary Germans did not kill because 
they were coerced, which is what Sarah Gordon argues (p. 490); they did not 
kill because they were “blind followers of order" (p. 490) which is what 
Friedlander, G.P. Gooch, Stanley Milgram, and Hannah Arendt argue; they did 
not murder because of “social psychological pressure” (p. 490) which 
Goldhagen suggests is Browning’s contention; they did not kill because they 
were “petty bureaucrats” (p. 490) which is Heim and Aly’s and Mommsen’s 
position. No. According to Goldhagen, Germans killed because they wanted to. 
Each of these other historians has something to offer but it seems that 
Goldhagen dismisses all of the them.
I attended a Goldhagen lecture in New Orleans.When people asked him 
questions he was very arrogant and dismissed nearly every questioner. I 
thought him a very defensive young scholar. And this becomes evident in his 
work. Pollefeyt and Colijn remark that Goldhagen's “book is of no value to 
historians. There are no new, previously unknown facts” (1997, p. 5). Well, I 
would not go this far. I do think that what Goldhagen has done is to cause a 
terrific uproar in the historical community, while for the general reading public 
he has become a sort of cultural hero. His book is widely read by lay persons 
and has been translated into many languages. He is known world-wide. His 
book is one of the few in recent years to capture so much public attention. And I 
think that lay readers like his book because it is a very emotional one. His anger 
comes out on nearly every page. I must say that on my first reading I was swept 
up in his book as well. And yet in spite of all the criticisms, I think that Yehuda 
Bauer (1997) is right to point out that Goldhagen has brought the problem of
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anti-Semitism out into the open once again. This is a problem that gets buried, I
think, in all the minutiae of Holocaust scholarship. And Goldhagen has raised
popular consciousness in such a way that most historians have not. Most
everyday people never read history. They are confronted with the past, and with
the Holocaust through popular culture, primarily through film. It is amazing that
Goldhagen’s work has captured the attention that it has. But still this does not
make his book a good one either. The Holocaust memory will not die. These
controversies, these contested sites of representation attest to this. And scholars
must remember that we are talking about the struggle to come to some kind of
understanding of this event. And sometimes this struggle is fraught. The burden
of memory proves heavy.
May 1944: a transport arrives at Auschwitz-Birkenau...
Elie Wiesel, age fifteen, his father, mother, and little 
sister, Tzipora, are among them. Separated by the 
SS, the boy loses sight of his mother and sister, not 
fully aware that the parting is forever.
(Berenbaum & Roth, 1989, p.371).
We must not lose sight of the fact that debates and controversies around 
what it is scholars do when they talk about the Holocaust may serve to repress, 
distort, distance, rigidify and alter memory of this horrific event. We must never 
forget that ultimately we are talking about the murder of six million Jews. We 
must never forget that history is about people. Getting lost in scholarly debates 
might serve to prevent the researcher from really thinking about these horrors. 
Intellectualization serves as a defense mechanism to keep emotion at bay. 
Researchers must try to avoid the trap of intellectualization.
The literature on perpetrators is immense and continues to proliferate. 
Nothing has been written about so much and we still know so little. I have 
painted a very broad picture of some of the debates in Holocaust historiography
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around perpetrators. I tried to highlight what I thought some of the major issues 
have been. My picture is partial and incomplete. Earlier, I suggested that 
historians are subject to the workings of their own psychological repressions. 
Although we can never get into the mind of an historian to find out why it is that 
he or she represented the Holocaust in a particular way, we can assume that 
emotional responses and transferential relations with subject matter matters. 
These responses shape what it is historians write about and exclude. I am 
convinced that unconscious traces are deposited in these texts, and it is these 
strangenesses that defy translation. There is always a remainder, a something 
left over, an ineffable residue lurking in these texts. Historians cannot even 
begin to capture the hideousness of Auschwitz; Auschwitz leaves us with traces, 
screen memories and disgust. There is always something left over, something 
beyond representation, phantoms lurking between the sites of historiography 
and the actual past. Memory of this event haunts. Like Friedlander (1997), I 
believe that historians who can remember the event cannot separate that 
memory from their work. And if they attempt to repress the memory, their 
representation of the event tends to reflect this repression in some way. The 
memory of the event and its subsequent historiography are interconnected.
Victim Histories
In most Holocaust historiography, victims’ voices do not appear much.
Tony Kushner explains that,
The first major historians of the Holocaust, Leon Poliakov 
in France and Gerhard Reitlinger in England [notably two 
non-Germans] were in close agreement that the voice of 
Jews themselves would be used sparingly in their 
narratives.. . .  ‘Authenticity’ was thus required and it was 
assumed that evidence from the victim was somehow 
less... objective. (1994, p. 3)
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It seems a symptom of repression, on the part of historians, that victims are not 
included in the traditonal accounts of the Holocaust. Part of the problem is the 
distinction historians make between history and memory. When these two 
categories are dialectially opposed, memory is seen as something beside the 
point, unreliable and soft. Is it that historians have a difficult time dealing with 
the emotional horrors that victims report? Is it easier, psychologically, for 
historians to examine train schedules, rather than look at painful accounts 
of unthinkable suffering? Many historians claim that it is more important to do 
histories of perpetrators than victims because if we are to understand why or 
how the Holocaust happened, we must first examine perpetrators. Of course this 
is true. But still, I find it curious that victims’ voices are absent from most 
perpetrator historiography.
Even though perpetrator accounts of the Holocaust have managed to 
exclude victims’ voices, one can turn to other kinds of writings to hear what they 
have to say. The repressed has returned, in fact, in a great proliferation of 
memory. Victims’ voices are scattered in diaries, The Diary of Anne Frank 
(1989); The Diary of Eva Heyman, (1981); Child of the Holocaust (1988); The 
Diary of Etty Hillesum (1983); in memoirs, Delbo (1990); Levi (1990); Bettelheim 
(1971); Wiesel (1995); Anger (1981); Freidlander (1979); Geve (1987); Nir
(1989); in studies about children , Lukas (1994); Rosenberg (1994); Klarsfeld 
(1996); Kamenetsky (1984); Stein (1994); Wardi (1996); Boguslawska (1975); 
Dwork (1991); Eisen (1988); Holliday. (1991); Lifton (1988), in studies on 
ghettos, Ringelblum (1974); Cholowski, (1980); Gutman, (1984); Heydrecker
(1990); Katz (1970), Marks (1975); in studies on camps, Donat (1979); Kogan 
(1975); Dobroszycki (1984); LeChene (1971); Smith (1995); Langbein (1996). 
Victims’ voices are scattered throughout these and many more writings.
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As a curriculum theorist it is my responsibility is to uncover historical 
memory that has been most repressed and most marginalized. The two most 
marginalized memories of the Holocaust are those of women, and gays and 
lesbians. Generally speaking, issues around gender and sexuality are still 
considered taboo subjects for many who do work on the Holocaust. Thus, the 
literature around these two subjects is limited, in comparison with the enormous 
amount of literature on perpetrators. I will therefore tease out some of debates 
on gender and sexuality and then move to a discussion around repressed 
memory and what it is that psychoanalysts and psychotherapists have 
discovered while working with Holocaust survivors and their children.
As I mentioned earlier, one of the unfortunate consequences of driving a
wedge between memory and history, is the validation of history and the
denigration of memory. Memories of victims have traditionally gotten squashed
out of Holocaust narratives. And when memories of victims appear, they are
distorted primarily because victims and survivors have been portrayed as an
"amorphous mass" (Hilberg, 1992, x). And this facelessness of victims is partly a
result of the way in which historians have couched their debates. Abstractions
tend to wipe out humanness. Isaiah Trunk explains that,
One of the results of this one-sided concern 
with the Nazi aspect of the war and the Holocaust 
is the mistaken notion that, within the immense 
bureaucracy and techology of genocide, the Jewish 
victims were passive objects of the “process." (1979, ix)
The rhetoric of apparatuses, technocrats, machines, networks of power, shape
not only the way we understand perpetrators, but also shapes the way we might
think about victims. The absence of victims in these accounts gives the
impression they were not even part of their history, that they were led like sheep
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to slaughter. Saul Friedlander (1997) remarks that this assumption needs to be
interrogated. The responses of victims is far more complex than one might think.
Friedlander comments that
In many works the implicit assumption regarding 
the victims' generalized hopelessness and passivity, 
or their inability to change the course of events... have 
turned them into a static and abstract element of the 
historical background, (p. 2)
Jewish responses to the rise of Nazism differed of course. Some fled, 
some hid, some believed they could live with Hitler and just ignore him. But as 
Yehuda Bauer (1989) points out many more Jews fled than is commonly 
remembered. Bauer comments that “Contrary to conventional wisdom, most 
German and Austrian Jews, some 410,000 out of 700,000, did manage to leave 
the Third Reich" (p. 146). And gender made a difference here too. Women were 
more eager, by and large, to leave Germany than men. Marion Kaplan declares 
that “As emigration became more and more crucial, women usually saw the 
danger signals first and urged their husbands to flee Germany” (1998, p. 63). 
Men were more reluctant to leave because they were tied to their businesses. 
But in the early years, if men decided to leave, some left without their wives 
because they thought only men would be endangered. In fact, women were in 
greater danger than men. Joan Ringelheim (1993) suggests that more women 
than men were deported from the Lodz ghetto to Chelmno death camp. More 
women than men were deported from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz. And while 
more men arrived than women in the OP (displaced persons) camps in 1945, 
this was because more women had been killed. Ringelheim argues that men 
were put in camps that “offered some possibility for survival" (p. 399).
Schindler’s List included only 200 women, while 1,000 men were asked by
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Schindler to work for him. Some Jews who were lucky enough to appear on
Schindler’s list survived the Holocaust. Ringelheim stresses that,
The numbers begin to show a stark and disturbing 
reality. It can no longer be doubted that being male 
or female mattered... Sexism attended anti-Semitism 
. . .  as it attends all forms of racism... Anti-Semtism, racism 
and sexism were not separated in the theory of the 
Nazis, (p. 400)
Women were also targeted if they had children or were pregnant. These
women were killed immediately upon arrival in the concentration camps. Gisella
Perl, a Jewish doctor who was deported to Auschwitz, performed as many
abortions as she could to save women from being sent to death. She remarks
that she did not believe what it was the Nazis were doing to pregnant women
until she witnessed their executions with her own eyes.
A few days after the arrival of a new transport, one 
of the SS chiefs would address the women, encouraging 
the pregnant ones to step forward because they would 
be taken to another camp where living conditions were 
better.. . .  Group after group of pregnant women left Camp 
L. Even I was naive enough... to believe the Germans, 
until one day. (1993, p. 113).
Perl comments that one day she saw these women being executed. If women
got past “selection," Sybil Milton contends they faired better than men. Milton
claims that “women appear to have been more resiliant than men, both
physically and psychologically to malnutrition and starvation” (1993, p. 227).
Still, more women than men died during the Holocaust. Women were subject to
medical “experiments,” as were gay men, and this was also a factor in higher
mortality rates. Rittner and Roth (1993) explain that that so-called Ravensbruck
“Rabbits,” as the Nazis called them, or women at Ravensbruck, were subjected
to “tortuous medical “experiments” [which] wasted women.. .  infections were
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induced, limbs amputated, and wartime wounds replicated" (p. 9). Gay men also 
suffered due to these so-called "experiments.” Klaus Muller reports that "At 
Buchenwald... an SS doctor performed operations... the insertion of a capsule 
which released testosterone; some of the men died during the operation” (1980, 
p. 12). These so-called medical experiments are beyond comprehension. One 
of the most difficult books for me to read, emotionally, was Robert J. Litton’s 
(1986) work on Nazi doctors. There is something so insideous about the part 
that doctors played in the Holocaust. Doctors’ roles in the Holocaust are often 
overlooked. The doctors decided, willy-nilly, who would live and who would die. 
They were waiting at the off-ramps when Jews stepped outside of the trains. 
They decided, left or right. One side meant death, the other life. They were 
there, at the killing sites, at the crematoriums. The Nazi doctors orchestrated the 
Holocaust more than some would like to believe. Women and gay men became 
the largest number of victims, in part, because the Nazi doctors decided that 
they might benefit from experimenting on them.
Some scholars argue that the emphasis on gender and sexuality distorts 
the memory of the Holocaust and turns it into a debate over sexism or 
homophobia (Fagin, Ozick cited in Rittner & Roth, 1993). These scholars argue 
that if the Holocaust is made into an example of sexism, for instance, the larger 
picture is lost. However, it makes little sense to separate out racism, sexism, 
homophobia and anti-Semitism. I think we get a fuller picture of the Holocaust 
when a multilayered approach is taken.
Not all women were led like sheep to slaughter. Some women were 
engaged in underground movements, some were involved in revolts. Sybil 
Milton declares that "There were open revolts in which women participated at 
Sobibor, Treblinka, Auschwitz, and possibly Bergen-Belson” (1993, p. 231).
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Isaiah Trunk (1979) suggests that lower and working class Jews adjusted better 
than middle and upper class Jews. By implication, lower and working class 
women were probably more likely to be involved in active resistance like the 
camp revolts, while middle and upper class women resisted in other ways. Of 
course middle and upper class women had a better chance to escape Germany 
simply beause they had the money to get out. Similarly, Eastern European and 
Western European Jewish women responded differently. The more assimilated 
Jewish women were with their Christian neighbors the better chance they had 
of surviving. And because, for example, Jewish women in Western Europe were 
not assimilated, as were their husbands due to business exchanges with 
Christians, they had “no extended Christian family to protect them” (Ofer & 
Weitzman 1998, p. 14). Middle class Jewish women were not forced to work 
and their isolation from Christian neighbors hurt them. But in Poland, Ofer and 
Weitzman suggest, the situation for women was very different. Because women 
were mostly working class, they were forced to assimilate with Christians and 
Poles generally. Thus, their ability to speak Polish helped them “pass” (p. 4) and 
hence some would escape.
Sara Horowitz (1998) points out that women have traditionally been 
represented by men in Holocaust historiography. These representations have 
been distorted. “In many narratives by men, women are portrayed as peripheral, 
helpless, and fragile, as morally deficient; or as erotic in their victimization” (p. 
367). But Rittner and Roth paint a different picture. These scholars explain that 
many women were resistance fighters. But Ruth Linden (1993) cautions that not 
all Jewish women were resistance fighters and to give this impression is false. 
Linden comments that “Scholars now recognize that there was indeed, 
significant Jewish resistance... Yet an oversimplified, idealized view of Jews as
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“victims”. .. or self-conscious resistance fighters has obscured our 
understanding” (1993, pp. 84-85). The point here is that women’s experiences 
during the Holocaust differed from one another. Class status, the ability to fight 
back, assimilation, age, geography all affected the ways in which women 
responded. Just as women experienced the Holocaust differently from men, so 
too were experiences for heterosexuals and homosexuals different. Gender and 
sexuality mattered.
Currently, there is little documentation on lesbian experiences during the 
Holocaust. There seems to be more literature on gay men, but still there is not 
very much literature on this group either. Vera Laska explains that “while 
homosexuals were treated in a manner that even within the concentration camp 
framework was ghastly. . . the lesbians, were seldom hunted down for special 
treatment” (1993, p. 263). As Klaus Muller suggests, “only gay men were made 
criminals under Paragraph 175. We know much less about the persecution of 
lesbians" (1980, p. 11). Richard Plant comments that “Most lesbians managed 
to survive unscathed. Fortunately, they fell outside the universe of Himmler’s 
sexual obsessions” (1986, p. 116). If lesbians did survive the camps, the 
memories are yet to be written. Sybil Milton suggests that lesbian life stories 
during the Holocaust are virtually non-existent primarily because of the 
“inhibitions of survivors and historians” (1993, p. 231). Perhaps it is the 
historians’ homophobia that keeps these memories hidden. Historians, the 
keepers of memory, have painted a picture of the Holocaust that makes lesbian 
experience invisible.
1934 marks a turning point in the history of gay life in Germany. Richard 
Plant (1986) explains that when Hitler demolished the SA, and ruthlessly had its 
chief Ernst Roehm, who was homosexual, murdered, the pace of arresting gay
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men increased. "During a 15 week period in 1934, the Berlin Police and the SS
arrested more homosexuals than the Weimar Police did in 15 years" (Plant,
1986, p. 90). Heinrich Himmler was one of the chief architects behind the
murder of Roehm. For Himmler, homosexuality
was to be diagnosed as a contagious disease. The 
plague was highly dangerous because it affected the
young Himmler was repeatedly to urge chiefs of
the Hitler Youth to purge former leaders of the old 
Rover youth movement, which... he judged to be 
strongly homoerotic. (Plant, 1986, p. 102)
It was paragraph 175 that, in 1935, made it illegal to even look as if you were
gay; and if anyone suspected gay activities, the suspicion alone could get you
arrested. And so when gay men were put in camps they were subjected to
brutal treatment. Pierre Seel recalls a scene in which a gay man is literally torn
apart and killed by a German Sheperd.
The loudspeakers broadcast some noisy classical 
music while the SS stripped him naked and shoved 
a tin pail over his head. Next they sicced their ferocious 
German Sheperds on him: the guard dogs first bit into 
his groin and thigh, and then devoured him. (Seel, 1997, p. 43)
Not only were gay men subject to brutalities such as these, they were also
"treated with contempt by their fellow prisoners" (Muller, 1980, p. 13). Unlike
their fellow prisoners who were liberated after the war, gay men never felt
liberated. Pierre Seel remarks that "liberation was for others" (1997, p. 88). Gay
men were treated as criminals not only in Germany but also in France. In fact, in
Germany Paragraph 175 was not repealed until 1969 (Plant, 1988), and in
France homosexuality became legal only in 1982. Because gay Holocaust
survivors were considered criminals, they did not receive restitution from West
Germany after the war.
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Heinz Heger, whose memoirs were made into the 1979 play Bent by
Martin Sherman recalls some of the meaningless tasks Nazis forced gay men to
perform. These tasks were meant to humiliate. And humiliate they did.
Our work, then, was as follows: In the morning 
we had to cart the snow outside our block from the 
left side of the road to the right side. In the afternoon 
we had to cart the same snow back from the right 
side to the left. (1980, p. 35)
Bent was eventually made into a film and it is here that we see the scene Heger
describes above. In a Beckettian landscape, two men carry snow with their bare
hands back and forth all day. Hermann Langbein (1996) comments that this
kind of meaningless “work" occured in many camps. Langbein contends that,
Since work was intended as punishment, many performed 
meaningless tasks, the kind that really wears a person 
down. Only members of units that were charged with 
maintaining the operation of the camp and its 
workshops escaped such demoralizing activities as 
swiftly carrying rocks to a certain place and then 
carrying them back the same way. (p. 15)
The humiliation of these tasks, according to Heger (1980), resulted in many
suicides, as men would run into electrified fences or throw themselves
in front of carts filled with rocks and clay and “human bodies would fly through
the air, and limbs would be crushed to pulp" (Heger, p. 35). Of course, there are
many acounts of sexual torture carried out by SS guards. Pierre Seel comments
that after liberation, he “returned as a ghost" (1997, p. 91). Klaus Muller remarks
“ours is an empty memory” (1980, p. 13). During the course of my research I
was disturbed to discover that literature concerning gender and sexuality was
limited. This signals a denial of memory. Jews are not just Jews. We are
engendered, Jews are heterosexual, homosexual, queer.
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The repression of memory is evident in the lives of many Holocaust 
survivors. And it is to these various repressions I would like to turn. More 
specifically, I want to examine what it is that psychoanalysts and 
psychotherapists have discovered in their work with Holocaust survivors. It is 
important to keep in mind, though, that no matter what psychoanalysis teaches 
about the human psyche and its vicissitudes, it cannot define what it means to 
suffer, nor can it name the pain of Holocaust survivors. To think that 
psychoanalysts have the answer is simply naive. However, psychoanalytic 
theory may help us to keep Auschwitz strange.The otherness of this event must 
be kept intact, otherwise it risks domestication.
Bergman and Jucovy (1990) suggest that psychoanalysts felt ill-
equipped to treat Holocaust survivors, especially during the early years after
liberation. “The theoretical position of psychoanalysts, many of whom were
classically Freudian... did not appear sufficient to conceptualize and explain
the bewildering array of symptoms" (Bergman & Jucovy, 1990, p. 8). The
bewildering testimonies of Holocaust survivors demand a different kind of
listening. “Listening with the Third Ear," the title of Theodor Reik’s (1948/1998)
work on psychoanalysis, might help to hear these voices in a way that lends an
otherness to Holocaust survivors' experience. As Brent Davis remarks,
Listening, rather, is more toward an imaginative 
and conscientious participation in the unfolding 
of the world. Immediate, intimate, implicating, and 
interactive" (1996, xxvi)
A conscientious participating when listening to Holocaust survivors’ memories
means that readers/listeners must have a certain psychological readiness to
allow survivors to speak without censorship, without censoring the unconscious
of the other or the other of memory. The immediacy of experiencing Holocaust
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survivors’ memories requires a certain kind of distancing. To keep intact what I 
call the not-me of the event is crucial, especially for the reader/listener who did 
not actually live through the black sun of Auschwitz. Still, in spite of attempting 
to remain psychologically distant, readers and listeners will experience some 
kind of traumatic effect through the listening. Sheldon Roth (1995b) states that 
there are three kinds of trauma: one is external, another is developmental, and 
the third is intrapsychic. Roth claims that “those of us not directly involved can 
be traumatized by the third, intrapsychic conflict” (p. 88). Thus, listening with the 
third ear might open one up to this kind of conflict. It is nearly impossible to 
avoid psychic upheavals while working with the texts of the Holocaust. Reading 
survivors' testimonies and Holocaust texts generally impacts not only the ways 
in which we approach “difficult knowledges” (Britzman, 1998, p. 119), but it also 
affects the ways in which we approach the other. Transferential relations with 
these texts mark the reader in uncanny ways leaving her changed. The “Ruins 
of memory” (Langer, 1995, pp. 195-196) leave their traces in our skin.
1938, the year which marks Kristallnacht; was a decisive moment in the 
history of Jewish and German life. As I stated earlier, it was not until 
Kristallnacht that Jews began to fear that their lives may be in danger. Marion 
Kaplan (1998) explains: “Psychologists who studied refugee memoirs 
determined that almost 40% of memoir writers did not give up psychologically 
until 1938 or 1939" (p. 129). It became enormously difficult to understand what 
was happening and part of the problem, Kaplan suggests, is that “normalcy” of 
“German daily life” (p. 9) prevented Jews from grasping the severity of their 
situation. Ambivalent messages from German friends and signs of “loyalty” (pp. 
43-44) made it even more difficult to believe that Nazis would kill Jews, that 
most of German society would become complicit one way or another. So many
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underestimated Hitler's power. As I mentioned earlier, even Sigmund Freud
had a difficult time leaving Austria. Peter Gay traces Freud's reluctance to leave.
1938.... Freud refuses to believe it, in any event,
he says he is too old to leave the country 1938
Nazis march into Austria, greeted by cheering 
throngs.. . .  March 1 5 .... Ernst Jones reaches Vienna 
persuading a most reluctant Freud that it is time
for him and his family to leave.. . .  March 22 Anna
Freud [is] summoned to [the] Gestapo... the trauma 
persuades Freud to make every effort now. (1989, xlvi-xlvii)
If Freud had difficulty leaving, difficulty believing what was happening, 
imagine what it must have been like for the everyday person, for the non- 
introspective person, for working class non-political people or for middle class 
Jews who were apolitical. Not only did Freud underestimate the power of Hitler 
and the complicity of German society, he also underestimated the callousness 
with which many of the perpetrators would eventually carry out their crimes. Dan 
Bar-On (1993) explains that Freud said in 1930 that horrific atrocities could not 
be perpetrated without psychic splitting. Freud believed that perpetrators of 
hideous crimes “could not remain psychologically intact for long. Guilt feelings 
of great intensity might drive them crazy or kill them’’ (Bar-On, 1993, p. 195). But 
Bar-On points out that Germans, by and large, did not go crazy and hardly any 
committed suicide after Auschwitz. The converse, however, was true for Jews. 
Many suicides had been reported after Kristallnacht, in the ghettos, in camps 
and upon liberation and even afterwards. The burden of memory killed German 
Jews (and Jews from other countries outside of Germany), not German non- 
Jews. However, there is evidence that subsequent generations of Germans 
have suffered psychological damage from the effects of denial and repression.
Like her father, Anna Freud underestimated the psychic effects of trauma 
in children who survived the Holocaust. Kestenberg (1990) explains that Anna
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Freud thought that young children who had survived the horrors of the camps
would heal relatively easily after the war. But Kestenberg claims that Freud was
wrong on this. Young children did not heal easily; in fact, they suffered deeply.
This early impression [of Freud’s] was not born out by 
the facts.. . .  Shalom Robinson (1979) in an 
Israeli mental hospital revealed that the 
psychic damage to children traumatized 
during the Holocaust was most severe in 
those who were persecuted before the age 
of three, (p. 85)
This psychological damage suffered by survivors cannot be defined, named or
“cured.” To label this suffering is to trivialize it. Post-traumatic stress syndrome,
survivor syndrome, depressive reactive disorder, reactive aggressive disorder,
are labels that trivialize and reduce suffering to neat and tidy categories. Jack
Terry remarks that
The survivor has been avoided, blamed, “syndromized;" 
exploited and rarely understood.. . .  I suggest that the 
unconscious contempt for the survivor plays a role 
in generalizations and clarifications such as 
“survivor syndrome." (1984, p. 139)
Pathologizing survivors is troublesome and highly problematic. It is difficult,
however, to avoid doing this because classical psychoanalytic theory is
pathologizing. But again, a Laplanchian or post-Freudian reading of
psychoanalytic theory may help us not to pathologize, but rather to translate
these so-called symptoms as a form of radical otherness and strangeness.
We turned toward the grave and then he turned 
around and asked, 'Whom shall I shoot first?’. ..
I did not answer. I felt him take the child from my 
arms. The child cried out and was shot immediately.
And then he aimed at me.
(Yosselesvka, cited in Gilbert, 1985, p. 421)
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Mass graves, shootings, torture, burnings, beatings, gassings, medical 
“experiments,” starvation are simply unimaginable, unthinkable and in a certain 
sense beyond representation. Most acadmics know nothing of this kind of 
torture. Yet academics writing about the Holocaust must remember this fact. It is 
arrogant to assume that we can understand fully what these experiences were 
like. Holocaust memory bums a hole in one’s psyche. There is always a lack, a 
void and an otherness that marks these memory texts.
Martin Gilbert (1985) reminds us that in 1941 the death camp at Chelmno 
was up and running. “The first 700 Jews were being transported to the death 
camps at Chelmno... Roosevelt’s day that would ’live in infamy’ was also the 
first day of the Final Solution" (p. 240). But Roosevelt, as we will discover later, 
did not give a whit about the fate of the Jews. The trains kept rolling into 
Auschwitz and America and Britain did little to rescue the Jews.
When Jews were first deported to the camps, psychologically, they had to
turn to stone or they would not be able to survive. Defense mechanisms such as
dissociation actually helped some Jews survive. Martin Wangh explains that,
Profound psychic schock enveloped those who 
newly arrived at the death camps.. . .  Shock was 
followed by apathy. Recovery from these states 
would occur only by means of psychic splitting... 
denial... numbing, derealization. (1984, p. 197)
Jews who could not allow defense mechanisms to operate lessened their
chance of survival. Yet, even if defense mechanisms were intact, it did not
necessarily make a difference, because Germans murdered indiscriminately.
Still defense mechanisms saved some, at least for a while. Kaplan reports that
“a recurrent theme in Victor Kelemperer’s diary was his and other's attempts to
deaden their feelings” (1998, p. 53). Camp life did not offer chances to grieve.
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Delayed grief haunted many Holocaust survivors long after liberation. In
fact, Yael Daneli stresses that expressing grief while in the camps probably
would have threatened survival. “During the war, mourning endangered victim’s
lives. As with any prisoner’s behavior which might have slightly deviated from
that of the totally obedient automaton the Nazis expected, grieving had to be
supressed" (1989, p. 428). Delayed grief returns in all kinds of somatizations.
Repressed grief comes back. There seems no end to it. As Dori Laub points out,
The trauma is thus an event that has no beginning, no ending, no before, no
during and no after. The absence of categories that defines it lends a quality
of otherness” (1992, p. 69). Despair, which is marked by a “lapse of duration”
(Laplanche, 1999, p. 242), tells much about the workings of the unconscious. As
Freud suggested, the unconscious is timeless, it knows no division between
past and present. Holocaust survivors' nighmares attest to this. An event that
happened years ago gets replayed over and over again as if the events which
transpired happened yesterday. Repressed memories find a way of returning
through unconscious traces, splitting the ego and continuing to push against
consciousness. Dina Wardi explains in her work with Holocaust survivors that,
We thus witness an excessive use of the 
mechanisms of defense, denial, and 
compartmentalization, which became vital 
for the preservation of some basic integrity 
of the ego. But the excessive use of these 
mechanisms necessarily lead to structural 
changes in the ego itself. Emotional experiences 
that flood and terrify the ego eventually bring 
about internal splits and rifts. (1996, p. 13)
Structural changes in the ego are marked by continual utilization of defense
mechanisms when they are no longer needed. Depersonalization, numbing,
depression set in and get sedimented over time. Memories haunt.
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The old, the sick and the babies... were 
placed on stretchers and taken to the edge 
of the huge mass graves. There, the SS man 
Irrman shot them and pushed them into the graves 
with his rifle. (1985, Reder, cited in Gilbert, p. 414)
It is simply impossible to integrate these kinds of memories into the psyche. The
notion of working through the past is probably naive. There is no working
through the Holocaust. Perhaps there is only a coping with.
Holocaust survivors and psychoanalysts Nicolas Abraham and Maria 
Torok suggest that traumatic memories get “lodged" like “phantoms" (1992, 
cited in Raskin, p. 27) in the psyche. These memories are not wholly repressed 
but they hover in a place that is located between remembering and forgetting, 
between the unconscious and the conscious. These phantoms, then, get 
introjected or “implanted” (Laplanche, 1999, p. 258) in another and this is what 
Torok calls “transgenerational haunting” (cited in Raskin, p. 27). Sometimes 
transgenerational hauntings are triggered by secrets. What is muffled reappears 
in ghostly forms. Many Holocaust survivors, especially immediately after 
liberation, entered into a pact of silence about what it was that they 
experienced. But these secrets and these silences mark subsequent 
generations in uncanny ways. Rashkin explains that Abraham and Torok 
believe that,
The unspeakable secret suspended with the
adult is transmitted silently to children in
“undigestable form and lodges within him
or her mental topography as in unmarked
tomb of inaccessible knowledge.” (1992, pp. 127-128)
These entombed memories leave “cryptic traces of an unspeakable drama" (p.
157) in another, in an infinitely regressive infinitely “repressive family history” (p.
157). Like Abraham and Torok, Shaton and Rosenfeld (cited in Kestenberg,
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1989) feel that memory gets “encapsulated" or “intrapsychically jailed" (p. 386) 
neither exactly repressed or denied but marking a site between repression and 
denial, between forgetting and remembering. Memory haunts and hovers like 
ghosts. Distance in time from these memories does not bring psychological 
distance for many. In fact, the reverse may be true. Aaron Hass points out that 
“As most [survivors] enter old age, a phase characterized by reintegration, 
reinterpretation, and reminiscence, trauma that had been successfully buried 
may come to life” (1996, p. 23). This Freud would call failed repression. 
Repression has failed because memories which have been buried now push 
through to consciousness. But the memories that surface do not mirror the 
original memories; they take on their own shapings and coursings.
Precisely how generations pass along repressed memory is not clearly 
understood. These are “enigmatic messages" (Laplanche, 1999, p. 80) that get 
transferred from one generation to the next. Whether surivors tell their stories to 
their children or not, intergenerational trauma is likely, if not unavoidable. And if 
survivors keep secrets, these secrets somehow get “implanted" (Laplanche, p. 
259) into their children's psyches. And children will phantasize about their 
parents’ experiences during the Holocaust whether or not it is spoken about. 
Dori Laub and Nanette Auerhahn suggest that it does not matter whether the 
child actually witnessed his or her parents’ persecution. “Children imagine 
trauma or, rather, experience it through identification” (1984, p. 153).
A symbiotic relation usually develops between parents and children if 
they are Holocaust survivors, analysts reveal. It is this symbiosis that causes 
children of Holocaust survivors to suffer later on in life. While the children want 
to understand their parents' experiences, their parents become enmeshed 
through the telling or not-telling of their pasts. Many times the children, for the
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parents, symbolize “all the relatives who perished” (Wardi, 1996, p. 6). Thus, the
children have, it seems, a double identity. Dina Wardi explains,
Many survivors preserve the memory of family 
members in their children and name them after
dead relatives This is not a mere identification
with those who perished, but a more complex 
mechanism- A transportation of the world 
of the past; during the course of which a 
divided ego is created in which two or 
more idenities exist simultaneously, (pp. 94-95)
Usually girls, who are referred to as “memorial candles” (Wardi, 1996, p. 
31), carry the burden of memory. When survivor’s children reach the age of 
thirty or so they sometimes seek therapy. And one of the reasons they seek 
therapy, according to Wardi, is that they have difficulties individuating 
themselves from their parents. Maud Mannoni (1999) explains that another 
reason children seek therapy is guilt. Child survivors, even second generation 
children who were bom after Auschwitz, may suffer from a terrible sense of guilt, 
especially when the “survivor [or children who were bom after Auschwitz] 
reaches the age when his own parents were deported” (Mannoni, p. 39). These 
guilt feelings may result in what Mannoni considers “serious somatizations... 
depression, fractures, angina” (p. 39).
Intergenerationai trauma even into the third generation is real and 
refuses to just go away. Of course, the ways in which these memories affect 
second and third generation Jews vary widely. As Dominick LaCapra suggests, 
“especially in cases of severe trauma, one may never fully transcend tlie past 
and that one should be...respectfully attentive to the voices of victims” (1994, p. 
3). Being respectfully attentive requires that we listen “with the third ear” (Reik, 
1948/1998). Listen to Emmanuel Ringelblum’s (1958) report about Auschwitz:
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A great many dispatches are arriving from Oswiecim 
[Auschwitz] with news of the death of inmates. People 
are forced to exercise under showers for three hours 
there; this produces inflammation of the lung[s] and death.
(P- 38).
Ringelblum's reports from Auschwitz refuse assimilation into consciousness. A 
third generation Jew like myself, without actually having experienced the 
Holocaust, cannot imagine what this must have been like. I do believe that 
difficult memories like this one mark the unconscious in ways that cannot be 
named. Freud commented that “the unconscious of one human being can react 
upon that of another without passing through the conscious" (1915, p. 194). 
Because Holocaust memory texts are so difficult to deal with emotionally, I think 
that the reception or introjection of these texts bypasses consciousness, 
depositing residues into the unconscious. What happens there is a mystery. 
Sometimes these images will re-appear in strange forms in nightmares. 
Sometimes the reader of these texts changes in uncanny ways. Robert J. Litton 
explains that after he finished his research on Nazi doctors he was no longer 
the same.
As I reached the end of this work, many people 
asked me what it had done to me. My answer has 
usually been, “A great deal," followed by a change 
of subject. The truth is that it is still a little too early 
to tell. One cannot expect to emerge from a study 
of this kind spiritually unscathed. (1986, xiii)
I would add to Lifton’s comments that one cannot expect to emerge from this
work psychologically unscathed either. The unconscious messages transferred
from text to reader and the reader's transferential relations with these texts
shape and re-shape the reader’s unconscious in uncanny ways.
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Bystander Histories
Holocaust scholarship has moved in its own uncanny ways since the 
1960s. It has moved from what Tony Kushner calls “Hitlercentric" perspectives 
to “one incorporating the role of ‘ordinary people’ in its execution, the 
involvement of non-Germans in the occupied or Nazi influenced countries, the 
impact on Jews themselves and the presence of bystanders" (1994, p. 11).
Thus, at this juncture I would like to turn first to two collaborating countries, 
France and Italy, and then examine two bystander countries, Britain and the 
United States. Here I am interested in looking at the complexities of response to 
the Holocaust and the ways in which repressed memory and psychological 
denial play a role in shaping the memories of the Holocaust in these various 
countries.
One of the disturbing facts about collaborators is that there were so many 
willing non-Germans who were not only complicit but directly involved in 
carrying out brutalities against Jews. Latvians, Lithuanians and Ukranians 
actually volunteered their services to aid the Germans during the actions of the 
Einsatzgruppen in Russia in 1941. Here scores of Jews were mowed down with 
machine guns. Paul Webster remarks that in France, under the leadership of 
Rene Bousquet, “There was no lack of French police ready to work directly for 
the Gestapo. By the end of the war, it was estimated that about 30,000 French 
were working with the Nazis” (1991, p. 108). Many Italians were willing partners 
in crime too. In spite of the fact that 85% of Italian Jews had survived the 
Holocaust, 6,800, according to Susan Zucotti (1996), were deported and 
murdered. And when Germany occupied Italy in 1943, Eichmann sent to Italy 
“Jew hunters” and “thousands of Italian Fascists... were eager to help” (xxvi).
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What becomes difficult for me not to repress is the fact that so many
European countries collaborated with the Nazis. Raul Hilberg (1992) reminds
us that collaborating countries included: Italy, Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary,
Slovokia, Croatia, Norway, France and The Netherlands. We can also add
to this list Switzerland. Tom Bower comments that in November of 1940,
two hundred of Switzerland’s financial and political 
leaders-the pillars of that nation-petitioned their 
government to show greater sympathy toward the 
Nazis.. . .  While Europe shuddered before the apocalypse, 
Switzerland was aligning itself with evil.. . .  The hopes of 
many refugees ended in Switzerland and they were 
murdered soon afterwards. But their money remained 
secure, too secure, in Switzerland's banks. . . .  A country 
whose citizens...boasted to their neighbors about their 
enviable wealth, was quite knowingly profiting from 
blood money. (1998, xiii-xiv)
It is difficult as a Jew to take in, psychologically, the fact that we have been so
despised as a people historically. Do these hatreds ever die? While in Rome
this summer, I saw spray-painted on a wall near the Collesium, “The Holocaust
was a hoax.” I know that anti-Semitism is alive and well but I have difficulty
believing that Holocaust deniers and Jew haters are everywhere, even in
Rome. This constant reminder that Jews are still despised unsettles me
continuously. According to Albert Memmi, Jews live in a “pathogenic condition”
(1966, p. 268). Lawrence Kritzman comments that for Memmi “Jewishness can
never be anything beyond the mere reification of torment, the reflection of a
problem that the Jewish subject internalizes” (1995, p. 105). The question is
how not to internalize hatred. But this presents difficulties especially when much
of Europe and America has had a history of anti-Semitism.
One of the few countries that has not had a history of anti-Semitism is 
Italy. And this was one of the reasons I wanted to travel through Italy this
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summer. I was shocked to see anti-Semitic graffiti in Rome. But then again, Italy 
did collaborate with the Nazis, although their collaboration was not total and did 
not come close to the visciousness of Vichy. The history of Italy usually brings to 
mind Fascism and Mussolini. Of course, there is more to Italy’s history than this 
but these seem to be the lasting impressions that many Americans share about 
Italy. Many Italian intellectuals, Furio Columbo suggests, have traditionally only 
remembered the past in this way too. Italian intellectuals “felt purified by the 
great wave of the anti-Fascist crusade, by participation in the Resistance... 
Fascism had not only been defeated by the Allied troops. It had been beaten by 
partisans.. . .  But in that manner an entire past was erased and the Holocaust 
was forgotten" (1996, xi). The internal resistance against Fascism covered over 
and repressed the memory of Italy’s collaboration with the Nazis, although, by 
and large, most Italians were not involved and not complicit.
The question that Suan Zuccotti (1996) raises around Italian 
collaboration is important. She asks why Italians became complicit in the first 
place since anti-Semitism never really took hold in Italy. Daniel Carpi explains 
that "There is widespread agreement among scholars.. . that Italy was a 
country, (or even the only country) where anti-Semitism did not strike roots” 
(1994, p. 241). Nevertheless, racial laws, roundups and deportations were 
carried out in Italy. 6,800 Jews were deported and murdered. In light of the fact 
that Italy never had a history of anti-Semitism, Italy’s complicity becomes 
puzzling. It is crucial to understand that in France, it is estimated that 76 
thousand Jews were deported to concentration camps and Marrus and Paxton 
(1981/1995) contend that only 3% of those deported survived. In Italy 6,800 
Jews were deported. These numbers tell two different stories.
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Zuccotti (1996) believes that so many Jews survived in Italy because 
unlike France, Poland, Belguim and The Netherlands, which were occupied 
by the Nazis for five years, “the Holocaust began late in Italy [and]... by 
September 1943 most Italians had heard about the deportation of Jews” (pp. 
272-273). Moreover, most Italians wanted nothing to do with deporting Jews.
Scholars agree that Italians did everything they could to save Jews in the 
occupied territories of Greece, Southern France and Tunisia. Zuccotti explains 
that Italians "resorted to every imaginable scheme and subterfuge to resist 
repeated German demands for the deportation of Jews. They ignored 
Mussolini’s directives” (1996, p. 75). Not only did the Italians ignore Mussolini, 
they ignored the Nazis and they ignored the Vichy police as well.
The irony, though, is that Jews living on Italian soil were not protected 
from arrest and deportation. Jews were arrested and deported and betrayed by 
Fascists and non-Fascists alike. Unlike Jews in other countries, Italian Jews 
who were summoned to the police, by and large, did not show up. Zuccotti 
remarks that "Italian Jews seemed to have shared with their Catholic 
compatriots an amiable inclination to ignore the law” (1996, p. 275).
Like Italy, France has traditionally suffered from repressed memory about 
its collaboration with Germany during the Holocaust. Until the 1970s, the French 
generally erased Vichy’s complicity. David Weinberg declares that "for more 
than three decades after liberation, French society denied its painful wartime 
past and ignored the fate of its Jewish inhabitants under Vichy” (1996, p. 31). 
Stanley Hoffman (1981) reports that the first book written on Vichy by Robert 
Paxton was greeted with hostility by the French reading public. And it was not 
until the mid 1980s that the Ministry of Education in France agreed "to include 
discussions of French complicity in the deportation process in classroom
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textbooks” (Weinberg, 1996, p. 36). Elizabeth Bellamy argues that France has
taken longer to come to terms with repressed memory of the Holocaust than
Germany. She suggests that
The psychic phenomena of memory, forgetting, 
melancholia, and repression all converge on 
vichy as the locus of France's characteristic...
“inability to mourn” and they serve as a vivid
demonstration that Frances’Aufarbeitung has
been delayed much longer than Germany’s. (1997, p. 13)
Wyman (1984/1998) and Bellamy (1997) agree that France, before the 1970s,
engaged in a myth of resistance, what Bellamy calls “France's customary
narratives of resistance heroism" (p. 14). But even in the resistance movement
anti-Semitic attitudes were prevalent. Traces of repression, in the form of denial
and reversal, are evident in the ways in which French officials, immediately after
the war, rationalized Vichy's complicity.
These rationalizations and denials manifested themselves around many
different issues. In post-war trials one of the most blatant examples of repressed
memory is that many argued that France became complicit with Germany
because of coercion. Robert Paxton explains that,
Marcel Peyrouton traced the anti-Jewish 
legislation of 1940 to German pressures 
and said that the Germans threatened 
10,000 hostages in 1942 if the French did 
not tighten those laws even further. (1975, p. 142).
But scholars generally agree that Vichy’s anti-Semitic policies were 
homegrown. The Germans did not care what the French did. They never 
threatened the French and they did not demand any kind of anti-Semitic 
policies be set in place. The French, it seems, wanted to demonstrate to the 
Germans that they could be even more anti-Semitic than the Germans, so as to 
win German approval. But as Robert Paxton contends, “Neither diplomats nor
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soldiers at Berlin cared a fig for Vichy’s internal acts” (1975, p. 142). Vichy
authorities wanted to out do the Nazis. And on one occasion they did. Here I am
thinking of the deportation of children from Vichy to Auschwitz. It is estimated
that about 6,000 children in 1942 alone were deported, without the approval of
the Germans. Even the Germans shuddered at Vichy. Marrus and Paxton report
that what transpired at Vichy shocked the world.
During 1942, according to Serge Klarsfeld's 
estimate, 1,032 children under the age of 6 
years old were sent to Auschwitz from France, 
along with 2,557 between 6 and 12, and 
2,464 between 13 and 17. (1981/1995, p. 263)
This would be the greatest shame of Vichy. It is unthinkable that children under
the age of six would be put on cattle cars and shipped off to Auschwitz.
Children! I am aghast. Klarsfeld (1996) has maintained that after this horrific
event occurred, the Catholic Church stepped in to intervene and help prevent
more incidents such as this one. But Paul Webster (1991) writes that Klarsfeld is
mistaken about this. Webster claims,
there are other French historians, even inside 
the Catholic Church who... point out that both 
Cardinal Gerlier and Cardinal Suhard went to 
see the head of State on 29 October 1942 to 
pledge their loyalty at a time when deportation 
trains were still leaving. (1991, p. 132)
It becomes very difficult to believe that the Church would actually pledge loyalty
to Vichy. But, of course, we now know that the Church was compliant all along.
The Church has recently justified their silence during the Nazi era, claiming that
they remained silent to save Jews. Clearly this is a move of denial.
Xavier Vallet’s postwar trial defense offers up a similar kind of reversal.
Vallet was responsible for setting anti-Semitic policy. Vallet argued that
because the French mainly hunted foreign-born Jews and that anti-Semitic
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policies were directed toward them, that Vichy actually engaged in a policy in 
which “Jews had been saved. Vichy, the argument went, had served as a 
shield" (Marrus & Paxton, 1981/1995, p. 344). But in point of fact 76 thousand 
Jews were deported from Vichy. How does Vallet rationalize that?
Like Vallet, police chief Rene Bousquet, in a move of reversal, suggested
during the postwar trials that he was, in fact, “defiant” (Webster, 1991, p. 107)
against the demands of the Nazis. But this clearly was not the case.
Recent research has destroyed the image 
of a defiant Bousquet, which he projected 
during his trial. He often lied over his 
responsibility in planning the round-ups, 
even covering up a crucial meeting with 
SS chiefs. (Webster, p. 107)
Like Bousquet, Pierre Laval, who conducted the deportation of children from
Vichy to Auschwitz, pretended that he was a “lone wolf" (Paxton, 1975, p. 67)
who got in over his head and kept his “colleagues in ignorance" (p. 67). But
according to German archives, this lone wolf image is untrue. Paxton reports
that we learn from these archives that Vichy’s complicity was “much more
broadly shared” (p. 67). And like Bousquet and Laval, Marshal Petain was
portrayed in postwar trials as a “manipulated old man" (Webster, 1991, p. 7). Yet
this portrayal is not accurate either. Marrus and Paxton claim that it was not a
coincidence that anti-Semitic laws came into existence just twelve days after
Petain’s arrival in office. Marrus and Paxton (1981/1995) explain some of the
implications of setting in place anti-Semitic laws:
The law of 22 July 1940-rushed into effect only 
twelve days after Marshal Petain’s role as head of 
state... Eventually over fifteen thousand lost French
citizenship... including about six thousand Jews___
The law of 4 October 1940 authorized prefects
. . .  to intern foreign Jews in “special camps." (p. 4)
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Clearly, this is not the work of a “manipulated old man.” This is the work of a 
man with a mission. Twelve days after taking office, Petain began to ruin the 
lives of Jews with the stroke of a pen. Petain knew just what he was doing.
Denial and reversal take time to get worked through. It has taken French 
society many years to begin to come to terms with their collaborationist past. 
Bellamy (1997) and Hoffman (1981) agree that, at least since the 1970s, France 
has begun to “lift the veil of repression" (Bellamy, p. 14) and to remember its 
complicity.
Although Italy, France, Britain and the United States played radically 
different roles during the Holocaust, there does seem to be a consensus among 
scholars about a fundamental attitude that ran through all four countries: 
indifference. Even after the war, the French continued their attitude of 
indifference. Hoffman remarks that, “Simone Weil, who survived deportation, 
told of the indifference with which Jewish survivors were met when they 
returned to France” (1981, x). Like the French, many Italians, at least those 
Italians who were not living in occupied territories during the war, remained 
indifferent Furio Columbo (1996) explains that although “many Italians never 
became enemies of the Jews or informers for the Germans... [they did not 
oppose]. . .  the racial laws [but] simply pretended to avoid seeing the 
implications” (xiii). To pretend that the racial laws did not exist or to rationalize 
them was to remain, in essence, indifferent to the Jews. But in occupied 
territories, Italians were anything but indifferent.
Similar to Italy and France, Britain remained, for the most part, indifferent. 
Wasserstein reports that although Churchill was sympathetic to the Jewish 
tragedy, he was blocked by “his subordinates [who got submerged in] an ocean 
of bureaucratic indifference and lack of concern" (1988, p. 395). Feingold
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(1995) suggests that the United States State Department was being bogged 
down with “indifferent... decision makers” (1995, p. 175). David Wyman 
declares that neither the British nor the American government officials gave one 
whit about the Jews. In fact, “the American State Department had no intention of 
rescuing large numbers of European Jews” (1984/1998, xii). Roosevelt 
demonstrated, “indifference to so momentous an historical event as the 
systematic annihilation of European Jewry [which]... emerges as the worst 
failure of his presidency” (Wyman, xv).
Against these scholars, Tony Kusher (1994) suggests that the term 
“indifference" is not helpful. Kusher claims that “indifference" is too simplistic a 
term to explain the complexities of response to the Holocaust. By and large, 
Britain, especially upon examination of labor movement responses, was not 
indifferent, but rather “essentially ambivalent” ( Kushner, p. 46). Kushner 
attempts to suggest that responses to the Jewish tragedy were not monolithic. 
And indifference seems to suggest a monolithic response.
I think Kushner is correct here, and he is right to point out 
that there were a variety of responses to the Jewish catasrophe. And at 
the end of the day, it is really quite impossible to tell what it was people felt, if 
they felt anything at all. However, the actions of the Allied countries leads me to 
believe that government officials, for the most part, in both Britain and the United 
States did not care enough or do enough to save European Jews.
In both Britain and the United States top government officials blocked 
opportunities for refugees to escape Europe at every turn. This seems to 
suggest more than an attitude of indifference; it seems to reveal contempt. And it 
is this contempt for Jews that disturbs me. Perhaps seemingly sympathetic 
responses served as gloss for a deeper hatred for Jews. If British officials were
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truly sympathetic, they would have acted differently. But the White Paper policy 
remained intact through the duration of the war. The White Paper policy limited 
the numbers of immigrants allowed to go to Palestine to 75,000. But as 
Wasserstein points out, “barely half... had been admitted" (1988, p. 52). Part of 
the rationalization for not allowing many refugees into Palestine sprang from 
paranoia that German spies would be among the refugees and threaten “the 
international security of Palestine” (1988, p. 49).
A similar kind of paranoia filtered into the U.S. State Department. 
Feingold refers to this paranoia around Jewish refugees as a “security 
psychosis" (1995, p. 172). By 1940, immigration to the United States was 
impossible. Breckenridge Long, who was Head of the State Department, 
argued that “Germany had infiltrated the refugee stream with agents” (Feingold, 
p. 172). But spies were never discovered.
David Wyman (1984/1998) remarks that the U.S. State Department 
amassed what he called Paper Walls, which made it nearly impossible for 
refugees to land on U.S. soil. These Paper Walls were made up of “four feet 
long” visa applications. Refugees found themselves in an Orwellian nightmare 
because they had difficulty reaching American Consuls in Axis territories, and 
those who escaped from Axis territory were not thought to be in danger and so 
there was no need for them to come to the United States. Wyman explains that 
“where Jews were in acute danger, in Axis-held territories, there were no 
American Consuls to issue visas. But those who escaped to countries where 
consuls continued to operate were not [considered to be] in acute danger” 
(1984/1998, p. 127). The U.S. State Department, in short, made certain that 
European Jews would not be able to reach American soil. The chief architect of 
these Paper Walls was Breckenridge Long. Long, was dearly a Jew hater.
225
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Long, an early admirer of Hitler and Mussolini 
came to head the Special Problems Division of
the State Department almost by accident It was
the caprice of this single individual that could 
make the difference between life and death, (p. 86)
It is hard to imagine that the Head of the U.S. State Department was an admirer
of Hitler and Mussolini.
Information about the Holocaust was known. Since Kristallnacht in 1938 
German policy toward Jews was no secret. However, both Britain and the 
United States censored news and even cut it off. Walter Laquer (1981) explains 
that in 1942 the Jewish Telegraphic Agency received word from a certain 
Reigner from Europe that approximately four million Jews had been 
exterminated. But Breckenridge Long cut off such reports after yet another 
telegram was sent. And in Britain Reigner's telegraphs were completely 
dismissed. Officials dismissed the reports as “Jewish Agency 'sob 
stufTcalculated to engender greater sympathy for Zionist efforts to get more 
refugee immigrants into Palestine” (1996, Cesarani, p. 607). It was not as if the 
British did not know what was happening. Cesarani reports that as Jews were 
being deported to Auschwitz from Hungary these “deportations were known in 
Britain virtually as they took place" (1996, p. 609). But the British government 
did little to help the Jews.
What is perhaps the most scandalous of all is that the Allies, when they 
had the chance, never bombed the rail lines to Auschwitz, which could have 
potentially saved many Jews. Wyman (1984/1998) contends that Roosevelt was 
urged by The Jewish Committee to consider bombing the rail lines but he never 
did. It was not that the rail lines were located in some remote region; it was not 
that bombing the rail lines would have thwarted the war effort either. In fact,
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Wyman declares that ua total of 2,700 bombers traveled along or within easy 
reach of both rail lines on the way to targets in the Blechhammer-Auschwitz 
region" (p. 311). But because "rescue was not part of its mission" (p. 307) the 
military bypassed Auschwitz as the sealed trains continued to their destination.
William Rubenstein (1997), an ultra-conservative historian, argues that
bombing the rail lines at Auschwitz would have done little to save Jews.
Rubenstein’s position reflects that of the Franklin Roosevelt Institute which
seems to suffer from denial. In Rubenstein’s (1997) work he argues, against the
grain of Holocaust scholarship, that the United States actually had a “liberal"
immigration policy toward Jews and that Roosevelt did everything in his power
to move the war effort forward. The thrust of Rubenstein’s argument is that no
matter what Roosevelt would have done he could not have saved Jews anyway.
But clearly, many scholars argue that Roosevelt could have made a difference
but saving Jews simply did not interest him. It is difficult to understand why the
Allied countries abandoned the Jews, as the title of Wyman's book suggests.
And it is even more difficult to face squarely the fact that our own President
Roosevelt turned his back on Jews at a time when they needed him most.
Feingold (1995) remarks,
The president, so beloved by American Jewry,
did not have the spiritual depth to fathom the
crucible being experienced by European Jewry,
the historical insight and intelligence to understand
the meaning of Auschwitz for his time in history, (pp. 176-177)
I remember how much my own grandparents loved Roosevelt, like so many of
their generation. How shattered they would be if they only knew the truth.
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CHAPTER 6 
MEMORY TEXT OF HOLOCAUST NOVELS
Historical novels are an expression of memory. Like the craft of doing 
history, novel writing is a kind of systematization of memory. Writers organize, 
select and narrate. Novel writing, however, is not reducible to memory, since 
writers, even if drawing on their own memories, are constrained by the narrative 
form. Memory seems not to be constrained in the same way, although we 
remember via “quasi narration" (Casey, 1987, p. 44). Edward Casey argues that 
what is lacking in memory is a narrator who tells a story. Memory is more like a 
“pastiche" (p. 72). Even novels that are written in the form of a pastiche seem 
more tightly woven than memory itself. Personal memories function out of sites 
of repression, denial and projection and may therefore determine, to a certain 
extent, the ways in which novelists select, imagine, and construct the past.
The writings of historians share certain features with the writings of 
novelists. But I suggest that, at bottom, historical writing is not reducible to the 
writing of historical novels. History shares with literature its narrative and 
imaginative form. History is both a construction and reconstruction of the past. I 
maintain that history constructs the past by drawing on memory, perception and 
imagination. Historians select and omit events and express their thoughts by 
narration. Further, historians attempt to reconstruct the past by drawing on 
archives, artifacts, testimonies and other kinds of documents. Although 
historians rely on imagination to systematize and interpret, they are ultimately 
constrained by the methodology of the discipline in order to ensure that they get 
at an approximation of the truth about the events of the past.
Novels that are historical rely on narrative to express the imagination of 
the writer. These novels, like historical texts, are constructions that draw on
228
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
memory, perception and imagination. Novelists, too, select and omit what they 
deem relevant to their stories. Historical novelists may also draw on artifacts, 
archives, testimonies and other kinds of documents, but they do not have to use 
evidence to support their claims in the same way that historians do. History 
writing and the writing of novels around the Holocaust, if they are to do justice to 
the memory of the Holocaust, might follow Edith Wyshogrod’s lead that the 
“promise of truthfulness” (1998, p. 10) be maintained.
Psychologically, fiction may evoke different kind of transferential relations
in the reader than historical accounts of the Holocaust. Reading Holocaust
novels may trigger more intense emotional engagement than reading historical
texts. And the emotional response of the reader is complexified by her relation
not only to the text but to the otherness that the text evokes in her own
unconscious. Peter Brooks (1987) comments that,
The advantage of such a transferential model, 
it seems to me, is that it illuminates the difficulties 
and productive encounter of the speaker and 
listener, the text and the reader, and how their 
exchange takes place, (pp. 12-13)
This exchange takes place, as one unconscious (the text) interferes with
another (the reader). Andre Green remarks that the text will inevitably “leave
behind... scattered traces of the primary process on which it is constructed”
(1986, p. 338). Because these scattered traces of unconscious processes get
introjected into the reader’s psyche, it becomes important to become aware of
the ways in which different kinds of Holocaust novels affect the reader.
Realism, metaphor and irony deposit different kinds of traces in the 
reader’s psyche. Novels written by Jews and novels written by Germans who 
are not Jewish impact readers differently, depending upon their own ethnicity
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and gender. Therefore, I suggest that researchers, if they are to grapple with 
what I call the memory text of Holocaust novels, need to read broadly. Different 
genres written by both Jews and Germans help readers experience different 
kinds of transferential relations with the memory of this event as it gets handed 
down to us in fiction. This chapter will examine Holocaust novels written by both 
Jews and German non-Jews. But first, I would like to turn to some of the debates 
over Holocaust novel writing.
Writing Holocaust fiction is not wholly acceptable, especially in Jewish 
circles. In fact, for some Jews writing fiction around the Holocaust is considered 
anathema. Alvin Rosenfeld (1980) reminds us that it was Adorno who claimed 
early on that turning the Holocaust into art is “not only impossible but perhaps 
even immoral” (p. 13). Lawrence Langer remarks that “there is something 
disagreeable, almost dishonorable, in the conversion of suffering of the victims 
into works of art" (1975, p. 1). Some, like George Steiner, call for silence.
Steiner argues that art trivializes (cited in Langer, 1975). Like Steiner, Reinhard 
Baumgart and Michael Wyshogrod feel that the Holocaust should not be turned 
into art (cited in Rosenfeld, 1980). Following Adorno, Baumgart declares that 
Holocaust literature does a terrific injustice to victims because it domesticates 
and exploits. Sara Horowitz claims that “in the ongoing initial discourse about 
the Holocaust and its representation, the status of imaginative literature as a 
serious venue for reflection about historical events comes repeatedly under 
question” (1992, p. 1). Literature that glorifies suffering, that exploits victims, 
that offers redemptive messages, that turns suffering into “an affirmatively 
posited transcendence” (Adorno, 1966/1995, p. 361) does indeed run counter 
to an ethical sensibility and does not do justice to the memory of the Holocaust. 
These scholars are right to point out the pitfalls of writing fiction around the
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Holocaust. But I argue that there are other ways of writing fiction around the 
Holocaust which avoid these problems. And the alternative to artistic 
expressions of silence is not a good one. Silence represses memories; silence 
shuts off and shuts out literary representations leaving a void in the heart of 
memory. Silence cannot be maintained because the repressed returns. And the 
repressed returns in ways that haunt, in ways that will do tremendous damage 
to Jewish and German psyches. Dori Laub comments that “silenced memory... 
finds its way... through an uncanny repetition of events that duplicate... the 
traumatic past” (1992, p. 65). For survivors, memories, if not written about, talked 
about, thought about, get repressed and surface in nightmares, somatizations, 
depersonalizations and depressions. However, writing about the past in an 
imaginative way does not always undo repression either. Sometimes writing 
fiction re-traumatizes. It is no coincidence that so many Jewish Holocaust fiction 
writers have committed suicide. There is nothing liberating about writing 
Holocaust novels. Writing is a way of coping.
One of the most obvious worries, especially for Jews, is simply that fiction 
lies, that it fabricates and falsifies. Holocaust fiction, for some, seems to “add 
nothing substantial to our understanding of those events but instead gives 
fodder to the historical revisionists” (Horowitz, 1992, p. 20). Many people 
believe that (legitimate) historical accounts are more appropriate than literary 
ones. However, historians are not the only keepers of memory and certainly 
their interpretations are not the most authoritative. Novelists have something to 
say about this past, and imaginative constructions evoke emotional responses 
in ways that historical accounts do not. Both historical and literary 
representations of the Holocaust, if they do justice to the memory of the victims 
and survivors, have something to offer. I argue that if we are to call ourselves
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educated people, it is crucial that we read novels alongside historical texts.
Neither form of representation should be placed over against the other. Both are
equally important in shaping our understanding of this event. Literary and
historical representations help us keep the memory of the Holocaust alive.
Yehuda Bauer remarks that reading historical accounts actually enrich our
readings of fiction.
Without a return to the arduous task of actually 
knowing something about the Holocaust, the 
symbolic descriptions that occupy, quite 
legitimately, the center of the literary stage 
in Holocaust literature, become just another 
escape route for the superficial. (1988, p. 7)
I do not believe that literature is "escapist.” Maxine Greene (1995) and 
Mary Aswell Doll (in press) argue that literature grounds us in lived experience. 
Doll suggests that fiction is not “mere"; rather, it can serve to "disturb the status 
quo. Feelings thought to be central get routed. Peripheral imaginings begin to 
take roof (in press). Fiction is not fluff. As Doll suggests, fiction is about living 
and dying and there is nothing superficial about that. Reading historical 
accounts alongside literary ones helps us to encounter different perspectives 
and thus broaden our experience as readers. James Young argues that "literary 
and historical truths may not be entirely separable” (1988, p. 1). And because 
they are not entirely separable it makes sense to read them both.
Many argue that literary representations of the Holocaust are indeed 
appropriate expressions of memory. Yet, there is much disagreement about 
appropriate genres. More conservative scholars contend that the realistic novel 
best represents the Holocaust (Rosenfeld, 1980; Lang 1990: Bosmajian, cited in 
Ryan, 1983; Trommler, cited in Ryan, 1983). Realist novels James Young terms 
“docu-novels” (1988, p. 51) because they are written in a documentary style.
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These scholars feel that literary representations of the Holocaust should attempt 
to get at the truth of this event. And it seems that the assumption here is that 
truth is unmediated. The documentary style, accordingly, is the closest thing to 
the real because words can represent things. Sara Horowitz claims that Berel 
Lang, for instance, calls for the “bare chronicle” (1992, p. 20). Hamida 
Bosmajian argues against using metaphor and irony because they merely 
serve as a “psychological defense against memories that threaten to become 
overwhelming” (1983, cited in Ryan, p. 19). Rosenfeld declares that “there are 
no metaphors for Auschwitz” (1980, p. 27). Frank Trommler claims that 
metaphor “obscures the reconstruction of the German past” (cited in Ryan,
1983, p. 19).
It seems to me that what undergirds the argument for what Young calls
“docu-novels” (1988, p. 51) is the belief that texts can correspond to reality,
unproblematically. This assumption is what I have called the classical position
around representation. But texts do not correspond to reality in neat and tidy
ways because they are mediated by language, perception, memory, repression,
projection and all kinds of complex psychological mechanisms. Texts are
translations of events and these translations are slippery and necessarily
perspective. But perhaps the real issue underneath these debates around
genre has little to do with the genre itself. The real issue, Sarah Horowitz says,
(1992), turns on truth.
At issue is not simply the stylistic competence 
of a particular writer but also the truth, authenticity, 
and morality of the writing, its connection with the 
philosophical, political, metaphysical implications 
of the Nazi genocide, (p. 25)
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Truth is not absolute. Nowhere do absolute truths exist. Scholars, therefore, 
who argue for the legitimacy of documentary style fiction are, I think, naive. I 
think they suffer from literalism.
Mary Aswell Doll (in press) makes a strong case against literalisms. She 
argues that “the problem is not illiteracy but rather literalisms.. . .  Texts are 
everywhere being literalized:copied” (in press). The idea that fiction must 
literally represent truth or literally represent the events of the Holocaust lacks 
depth and is built on what I consider to be a misguided presupposition. No 
matter how literal one tries to be, no matter how much one attempts to match up 
words with memories of past events, slippage is everywhere. Memories have 
memories of their own. And words canot capture, in a neat and tidy way, the 
past. Imagination, belief, repression always interfere with representations.
However, it is understandable why Holocaust survivors felt the necessity 
to tell the truth, to tell their story in a documentary way. Aharon Appelfeld 
explains
The first writing about the Holocaust was
in the documentary style To write about
oneself, about one’s personal feelings, 
seemed selfish and vulgar... .The interior 
was locked away. (1994, x)
Appelfeld continues by saying that for many survivors “deviation from memory
was sinful” (xii). But Appelfeld remarks that he could not get a likeness to his
past and his memory was too slippery and changeable. And the harder he
tried to write in a documentary style, the more stifled his writing became. Ernst
Van Alpen points out that for many “literary representations of the Holocaust are
especially valued if they make people think of literature as little as possible”
(1997, p. 18). Appelfeld (1994) argues that testimonies, memoirs and
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documentary novels serve actually as repressive mechanisms because they 
bury emotions. Documentary novels serve to block deeper emotions, says 
Appelfeld.
If you read the many collections of testimony 
written about the Holocaust, you will immediately 
see that they are actually repressions, meant to 
put events in proper chronological order. They 
are neither introspective, nor anything resembling 
introspection, but rather the careful weaving 
together of many external facts in order to veil 
the inner truth. (1994, p. 14).
As against Appelfeld, I argue that testimony and memoirs are important 
genres when examining the Holocaust. The question is, What do people use 
testimony for? Is it used to block thinking and feeling? If so Appelfeld’s 
contention is right. Testimony, if used to just report facts, is a way of not thinking 
and not feeling and may sen/e as a repression. However, if testimony is used to 
unblock thinking and feeling, if testimony is used to communicate with others or 
to communicate with the self, then it does not serve repressive ends. If writing or 
testimony or memoir aims at capturing the literal truth, whatever that is, it lacks 
depth, in part, because I believe that it censors primary process thinking. Docu- 
realism is the kind of writing that is guided by secondary process thinking, 
writing that gets hedged in by categories, rationalizations, dates, times, places, 
names and so forth. But because writing is always already a translation, an 
embellishment, it still leaves traces of primary process thought in the text. If the 
writer censors deeper emotions, these traces get blocked and repressed. When 
writing moves against the unconscious and censors, it reads without depth and 
texts tend to get flattened out. The novel, then, becomes explanation. And surely 
a novel could be more than this. James Macdonald teaches that if 
understanding is merely rational, as it is in docu-realism, it serves to cut off
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emotion. A text that gets flattened out because it squashes feeling dulls. James
Macdonald teaches that thinking needs to embrace feeling or it
leaves out the thinker, his or her own horizon 
or place in the universe, with its associated urges 
feelings and impulses. The main purpose of 
rational thought is to explain things, so that 
we may predict and control things. Explain 
means to "flatten out." (1995, p. 173)
If the writer were more open to primary process thought, free association and
dreams, the text might open out toward unconscious traces. Here, a deeper text
surfaces. It is here, in the mode of primary process thinking, that metaphor finds
a home. Metaphoric texts do seem richer and deeper than texts that attempt to
get a likeness; metaphor opens the doors of perception and leaves the
otherness of the text open rather than closing it off.
James Young comments that "part of the impulse [against metaphor] may 
stem from a traditionally positivistic attitude toward metaphor as a frivolous and 
merely decorative and trivializing influence" (1988, p. 19). And this attitude may 
also be a move against unconscious processes that open texts out onto many 
layers and levels. Texts are like dreams in that the latent and manifest content 
compete for attention. Freud (1900a/1900b) suggests that it is not so much the 
manifest content that is crucial; it is the latent content of a dream that is 
important. It is here that the trajectories of associations and jagged wanderings 
open out onto the otherness of lived experience. Metaphors evoke these kinds 
of openings.
The use of metaphor in Holocaust novels does not mean that the text 
does not point toward the horizon of truth[s]. Metaphorical writing, at least for 
me, seems to deposit more disturbing traces in my psyche. I respond to 
metaphor in more emotionally intense ways than I do to documentary texts.
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Documentary texts serve their purpose, of course, but I simply prefer Holocaust
novels that are metaphorial because they seem to move me more intensely.
Thus, metaphorical writings are not forms of defense mechanisms, as
Bosmajian (cited in Ryan, 1983) claims; on the contrary, I feel that literalisms
and documentary realism can serve as defense mechanisms. I argue that an
openness to the otherness of the unconscious keeps us from turning Holocaust
literature into a glorification of suffering. Lawrence Langer remarks that
The will of the reader is drawn into an autonomous 
milieu of the work of art and is subtly transformed- 
disfigured... to see imaginatively both the relationship 
between empirical reality of the Holocaust and its 
artistic representation in the work of literature, and 
the fundamental distinction between both of these 
worlds... The reader is temporarily an insider and 
permanently an outsider, and the very tension 
resulting from this paradox precludes the possibility 
of ‘‘pleasure’’ Adorno mentions. (1975, p. 3)
That readers are permanently outsiders to the event, if indeed they have 
not actually experienced the black sun of Auschwitz, is what openness to the 
otherness of the text ensures. And this is why we cannot say after reading 
Holocaust fiction that we understand the event in any absolute way, because 
we never will. But these texts do provide “a framework for responding” (Langer, 
1975, p. 2). And respond we must. Holocaust fiction writers, I believe, have an 
ethical responsibility to approximate the truthfulness of this event, whether they 
tell their tales in an ironic, metaphoric or realistic mode. But truthfulness does 
not mean literal truth. Fictional accounts must do justice, in some way, to 
Holocaust memory.
Holocaust novels written by Jews and German non-Jews are important 
for us to read. However, some argue that German writers, who do not 
represent Jews in their novels, should not be considered part of the Holocaust
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canon. Alvin Rosenfeld (1980) argues that Gunter Grass should not be included 
in the Holocaust canon because Jews are rarely represented in his texts. 
Dismissing German writers, as if they have nothing to say, erases memory and 
further represses the German past. Rosenfeld misses a crucial point about the 
invisibility of Jews in German texts. This invisibility tells much about the ways in 
which German writers have not come to terms with the past. The absence of 
Jews in Holocaust texts signals what Dan Diner calls a “negative symbiosis" 
(cited in Gilman, 1995, p. 43) between Germans and Jews. The glaring absence 
of Jews in these texts may signal the presence of negativity Germans feel 
toward Jews and or the presence of negativity in Germans themselves around 
this event. The cloud of memory haunts Germans. But the memory Germans 
bury is inextricably tied to Jews.
A German psychotherapist, in an interview with novelist Ursula Hegi 
(1997), contends that her “Germanness plays an important role with Jews [she].
.. works w ith... It has to be acknowledged. We have to understand that we 
understand each other through that. Over and around and through that” 
(Katherina, cited in Hegi, p. 273). Whatever “Germanness” means, it always 
already means a symbiotic relation with Jews; Germans carve out their 
identities in the ways in which they absent Jews from their psyches or their 
worlds. What happened in Germany between 1933 and 1945 cannot be erased; 
Jews will always leave traces in the psyches of Germans. Freud (1925/1989) 
might suggest that it is to these negations that we must turn because 
underneath the no is a yes. No, Jews do not appear in German novels. Yes,
Jews haunt Germans. Jews are present in their absence. Germans and Jews 
will always be in complex interrelations with Germans. Difficult memory haunts 
and entangles whether we like it or not. And so it is to this difficulty we must turn.
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The ethical responsibility of Holocaust fiction wirters, according to Aharon 
Appelfeld (1994), is to counter facelessness, the facelessness Germans 
imposed on Jews during the Holocaust. Jews were reduced to numbers, to 
subhuman creatures, to massless ash. “In their explicit wickedness, the 
murderers reduced Jews to anonymity, a number, a creature with no face. And 
in fact, years of suffering slowly erased the image of humanity from within the 
Jews” (Appelfeld, 1994, p, 22). It is to the face of the other we must turn. But the 
face of the other is not abstract; it is the face uof the individual, the individual 
whose father and mother gave him a name, taught him their language, gave 
him their love, and endowed him with their faith” (Appelfeld, 1994, pp. 21-22). 
The continued facelessness of the Jew in German fiction attests, perhaps, to a 
failure to see Jews as Jews, to see Jews as human beings. And this failure to 
see the other as other is due to all kinds of psychological resistances to the 
memory of the Holocaust. It is up to second, third and fourth generation 
Germans to put the face of humanity back on Jews, to see Jews as Jews and to 
put them back in their writings, back in their expressions of memory.
Jewish Novels
At this juncture, I would like to turn to Holocaust fiction written by Jewish 
writers. Cynthia Ozick’s (1989a) Rosa and The Shawl (1989b) are two 
companion pieces about a Holocaust survivor named Rosa. Rosa's daughter 
Magda was murdered in a concentration camp by a Nazi guard. Magda was 
thrown against an electrical fence and died instantly. The memory of this haunts 
Rosa, ruins her life and drives her beyond the bounds of sanity. Rosa clings to 
the shawl in which she tried to hide Magda before the Nazi flung her daugher 
against the fence, before Magda was electrocuted. Magda haunts Rosa.
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Rosa is a detached shadow of herself. “Someone who is already a 
floating angel, alert and seeing everything, but in the air, out there not touching 
the road” (Ozick, 1989, p. 13). She is a “madwoman” (p. 13) who is but a mere 
“shell” (p. 16) of a human being. Those who escaped from the horrors of the 
camps, Rosa suggests, are now “burned out" (p. 16) and resemble “scarecrows" 
(p. 23). The narrator of this novel describes Rosa as being “skinny” (p. 23) like a 
“ragged old bird with worn feathers” (p. 23).
Rosa calls herself a “shell" (p. 16) of a human being. Sander Gilman 
(1995) contends that the issue of invisibility is pervasive among German Jews. 
“There are dangers in being too visible a Jew in Germany today” (p. 34). Gilman 
suggests that many German Jewish writers, especially women writers, attempt 
to negotiate a space between their feelings of invisibility and their need to 
become visible through their writing. But because they are afraid to come out 
with their Jewishness, it makes the writing task all the more difficult.
Ozick’s character Rosa emphasizes how the very discourse about 
“survivors” makes her feel worse, more invisible. “Consider also the special 
word they used: Survivor. Something new. As long as they didnt 
have to say human being. It used to be refugee... A name like a number...
Blue digits on the arm .. . .  They didn’t call you a woman anyhow” (pp. 36-37). 
Rosa points out that the term survivor is obfuscating. It serves to take away the 
face of the individual and the individuality of suffering; it is a term that conceals 
and covers over. And the word survivor also erases the engendered nature of 
suffering. Rosa declares, “They didnt call you a woman” (pp. 36-37). As Marion 
Kaplan stresses, “There is a relation between gender and memory” (1998, p. 8). 
And there is a relation between gender and suffering. Women suffered 
differently from men while in the concentration camps as I pointed out earlier.
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Rosa, in Ozick's novel, gives back to the individual her face and drives home 
the point that Holocaust survivors are not numbers and are not without gender. 
Aaron Hass (1996) remarks that frequently “Jewish survivors are often seen as 
a unitary phenomenon" (p. 7). But Rosa’s deconstruction of the term survivor 
interrupts preconceptions that level survivors into one massiess, faceless thing. 
Lawrence Langer (1998) comments that Ozick “refuses to tell a story of the 
triumph of spirit, the vindication of suffering through transcendence... closure is 
impossible” (p. 123). Rosa is a madwoman who talks to her shawl and pretends 
that her daughter is alive. She never assimilates into her new life after 
Auschwitz she is always clinging to memory, clinging to her dead daughter.
Like Ozick’s Rosa, Greta Weil's (1984) unnamed narrator in Mv Sister.
Mv Antiaone is also a Holocaust survivor who feels detached from herself 
psychologically, haunted by facelessness. “A strangeness that eludes dear 
definition but seems to be growing steadily. A sense of distance between myself 
and other, myself and objects" (p.11). The narrator dedares that she 
is “being hollowed out” (p. 76) by life after Auschwitz. Recall, Rosa in Ozick’s 
novel referred to herself as a mere “shell” (p. 16). Both of these characters, 
then, experience feelings of detachment, derealization, depersonalization and 
invisibility. Dina Wardi (1996) teaches that Holocaust survivors who seek 
psychological treatment suffer from “an excessive use of the mechanisms of 
defense, denial and compartmentalization" (p. 13). Defense mechanisms such 
as detachement and depersonalization helped Jews to survive while in the 
camps, but their continued use lead to “internal rifts and splits [in the ego]” 
(Wardi, 1996, p. 13). In Rosa’s case, the rifts and splits became manifest by 
psychotic episodes. Unlike Rosa, the unnamed narrator in Weil's novel flirts with 
insanity but never actually crosses the border. “I am distraught almost to the
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point of madness. I brush along the wails, getting gray paint on my clothes, cob 
webs in my hair, yet I lack the strength to run through the wall, to go really mad” 
(p. 77).
Weil's narrator is unnamed perhaps because she feels she has no
identity, no face.The Germans have succeeded in making her faceless. She has
introjected their poison. This unnamed narrator asks whether identity loss is
such a bad thing after all. “Is loss of identity really such a mistake? Would I have
been better to remain a German Jew in Munich all my life? (p. 148). Remaining
in Germany probably would not have been a good move for her. Sander Gilman
(1995) suggests that Jews who remained after the war are, in the last analysis,
“masochists” (p. 42). But being a maschoist has its advantage, Gilman
contends. He says that German Jewish writers, who are masochists for living in
Germany, are able to gain a certain amount of “control" (p. 47) over their sadistic
counterparts, non-Jewish Germans. The Jewish writer is able to create “worlds
of words, they can function in a position of dependence while claiming their own
control over the world" (pp. 43-44). A “negative symbiosis” (Diner, cited in
Gilman, 1995, p. 43) signals this sado-masochistic relation between Jews and
Germans. Some suggest that dialogue between Germans and Jews is
impossible. Jack Zipes suggests that Jew are seen by some Germans as
“potential Nazis” (1991, p. 9) primarily because of the tensions in the Middle
East. Zipes explains,
What matters is that there is a great tendency 
among Germans to operate on Jews as stereotypes, 
and this tendency has been exploited by anti-Semities 
to transform Jews into Nazis. This operation is 
typical of the new German-Jewish symbiosis put 
forth by Henyrk Brodker, one of the most outspoken 
critics of German anti-Semitism... it is the German who 
will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitz, (p. 23)
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In a move of reversal, some Germans see themselves as victims of 
history, while Jews have become the perpetrators. Some of Ursula Hegi's 
(1997) interviews with Germans reflect this position. Joachim says to Hegi, “And 
yet this[is] constantly thrown in their faces: Look at what your grandparents did. 
No race wants to be responsible for what its ancestors did. It’s exactly the way 
Jews were being discriminated against" (p. 168). Hans-Peter, another 
interviewee, says to Hegi, “I feel a connection to blacks because I too have 
been prejudiced against” (p. 141). The perpetrator’s grandchildren see 
themselves as the victims of history. They often comment that they are sick of 
hearing about the Holocaust. But these remarks signal a refusal to take 
responsibility for at least discussing the ways in which second and third 
generation Germans might intelligently criticize their parents and grandparents. 
A critical memory would not lapse into victimization, which, for Germans, is 
completely inappropriate. Germans are not victims of history, Jews are. Attitudes 
like these among Germans signal repressed memory and denial and these 
attitudes foster a lack of social and moral responsibility. Part of the problem 
here, too, is that most Germans never make contact with Jews, at least in 
Germany. And this absence creates the space for bizarre phantasies to emerge 
about Jews. Katharina Ocshe points out that in Germany “the probability that a 
non-Jew would ever meet a Jew is very small” (1991, p. 113). Thus, hostility 
cannot be worked out if German Jews and German non-Jews do not talk face to 
face.
This negative symbiosis between Germans and Jews is evident in the 
language used to talk about these two groups of people. Ocshe reveals that in 
Germany today there is much debate over how Jews are to be named. If non- 
Jewish Germans address Jews as a separate group by saying, for instance,
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Germans and Jews live in Germany, a problem arises. This division between 
Germans and Jews “robs the Jews of their citizenship, as if they were also not 
Germans” (Ocshe, 1994, p. 114). Further, Ocshe comments that “those who 
prefer the expression “Jews in Germany” or “German Jews" reject the label 
“Jewish German” as inappropriate. For the “Jewish German" the expression 
“Jews in Germany” is an exclusionary term” (p. 114). Difficulties around the 
discourse of Jews and Germans is a symptom of the difficulty Jews have living 
in Germany and signals the difficulty non-Jewish Germans have managing 
difference. A common phrase for Jews living in Germany is that they sit on their 
suitcases (Rapaport, 1997).
So to answer Weil’s narrator’s question, then, about remaining in 
Germany, one would have to say that it would not have been the best place for 
her. Having to deal with the complexities of negative symbiotic relationships 
with Germans would create a tremendous strain for a Jew. Although it is 
probably not impossible for Jews to live in Germany, some Jews probably live a 
good enough life there now.
Weil’s narrator expresses a terrible sense of guilt for surviving the 
Holocaust. In fact, guilt consumes her. It is for this reason that she 
psychologically aligns herself with Antigone, for Antigone is her opposite and 
her heroine. Antigone “sneaks out under the cover of darkness to where
Polyneices lies unburied Protest! Protest! She pulls up clods of earth
with her bare hands, throws dirt on the bloody flesh” (1984, p. 15). Antigone did 
what she could never do, bury the dead. Unburied Holocaust victims haunt her. 
And for not being able to even throw dirt over the dead, to grant the dead the 
dignity of a proper burial, she punishes herself by being buried in guilt.
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Psychoanalysts are in agreement that many survivors suffer from guilt.
This, analysts term “surivor guilt.” In order to incorporate the dead into living
memory, the survivor becomes attached to guilt and to mourning. Yael Daneli
comments that
Survivors fear that successful mourning may 
lead to letting go thereby forgetting the dead, 
and committing them to oblivion.. . .  Many children 
of survivors also share this sentiment and, like 
their parents, hold onto the anhedonia, guilt, 
shame and pain. (1989, p. 440)
I doubt that Holocaust survivors can ever experience so-called “successful”
mourning whereby they let go and go on, but the investment in grief and the
investment to the dead keeps them trapped in what Abraham and Torok call a
“crypt” (cited in Rashkin, 1992, p. 157). Encrypted memory perpetually haunts
because it hovers between memory and forgetting.
Like Ozick and Weil, Ida Fink’s (1997) collection of short stories called 
Traces is also about women survivors of the Holocaust. Only here, the reader 
sees traces of these characters, as if traces are the only thing left. We only get a 
brief glimpse into the lives of various characters. Eugenia, Sabina and Julia are 
underweight to the point of being nearly invisible, faceless. Eugenia is “petite 
and fragile" (p. 72) with “thin legs" (p. 97); Sabina is “tall, and thin" (p. 97) and 
her hair is “thin, lanky and limp” (p. 97). These women are wasting away; 
survival after Auschwitz does not mean liberation. Eugenia “proclaimed that she 
wished to die in an automobile accident” (p. 71); Sabina has a “startled 
expression, as if she knew in advance that the world and its inhabitants had 
nothing good in store for her” (p. 97); Julia “floated away... and soon ail one 
could see was the black cloud rising above her” (p. 184). The Holocaust has left 
its indelible stain on these women. And they remain faceless, invisible and
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haunted. These characters had introjected and incorporated into their bodies 
the bad object of Nazi dehumanization. They have become perpetually 
depersonalized. These women could never again regain a sense of self, forever 
they would remain fragmented and detached. There can be no liberation from 
the Holocaust. “Memory is not only a spring flowing from the well of the past, but 
also a tomb, whose contents cling like withered ivy to the mind” (Langer, 1991, 
pp. 195-196). Memory is not only a “monument to ruin” (Langer, pp. 195-196) 
for Holocaust survivors, it is also a monument to ruin for children and 
grandchildren of survivors, for second and third generation Jews after 
Auschwitz.
In Cheryl Pearl Sucher’s (1997) novel entitled The Rescue of Memory. 
readers are introduced to a Jewish character named Rachel who is the 
daughter of a Holocaust survivor. She is not, however, “rescued" by memory; 
rather, she wishes she could be rescued away from it. Rachel is torn between 
remembering and forgetting as her father continuously tells her his nightmarish 
stories. Rachel says at one point, “The truth was, I wanted to forget’ (p. 95). But 
she cannot forget and, in fact, insists that her purpose in life is “collecting 
remnants of memory” (p. 96). But she suffers nightmares of her dead mother 
and scores of other family members killed during the Holocaust. And even 
though the war is long since over, Rachel confesses that “Emily and I often 
stayed awake at night waiting for disaster to come” (p. 100). Aaron Hass (1996) 
states that “many children of survivors await a repetition of the persecution their 
parents experienced. Their homes [are]... shaded by ominous clouds and 
peopled with ghosts and demons” (p. 7). Rachel is a “memorial candle” (Wardi, 
1996, p. 31). She is chosen by her father as the bearer of memory. Wardi says;
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According to Heller (1988), the survivors tended 
to choose girls more than boys for the role of 
‘memorial candles,’ perhaps because the 
Halacha prescribes that it is the mother's 
religion rather than the father’s that determines 
the religion of the child, (pp. 31-32)
Wardi suggests that being the burden of a ‘memorial candle’ is sometimes too
great. It creates a double identity, an enmeshed identity not only with the
parents but with all the dead relatives who perished during the Holocaust.
Rachel, in Sucher’s novel remarks that,
Each year on the Day of Atonement, I attend my 
father’s synagogue to say a prayer in honor of 
the souls whose name I have been given.
Inscribed on the raised copper plates and 
illuminated by lemonflame bulbs, the names read 
Ruchel Wallfisch and Channah Sureh Greenblatt 
Bathed in the pale golden light,
I wonder what else of theirs is mine. (p. 30)
Rachel wonders about difficulties in individuating herself from her father 
too. She sees his face whenever she looks into the mirror. Symbiosis with 
surviving parents and with the dead is what brings children of Holocaust 
survivors into therapy (Wardi, 1996). These children have difficulty carving out 
their own identities. They also suffer from guilt. These complexities for children 
of Holocaust survivors transcend any neat and tidy diagnosis. Kestenberg 
(1990) reports that there has been considerable debate over whether or not to 
label symptoms “under the heading of ‘survivor's child syndrome”  (p.83). But 
Kestenberg suggests that this label is simply not accurate because symptoms, if 
any emerge, are too various to be reduced to this label. It is hard to avoid 
"transgenerational haunting” (Rashkin, 1992, p. 22). Transgenerational 
haunting is real. It can ruin lives. And it seems that psychoanalysts are baffled 
by these uncanny ghosts. Sammy Speier comments that even the language
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analysts use to describe these hauntings is problematic. It seems that these
hauntings appropriate a language and a coursing of their own.
The implications of the experience of concentration 
camp survivors for the psychic illness of their children 
are much debated today; even the term “psychic 
illness” shows that the traditional diagnostic 
vocabulary of psychic illness is insufficient. (1993, p. 63)
Speier suggests that there are no sufficient diagnoses for people who have
“grown up with the fear of extermination" (p. 63). I argue against pathologizing
Holocaust survivors and their children. Pathologizing and diagnosing covers
over the horrors of suffering. It keeps us from thinking about the complexities
and the individuality of suffering (Salvio, 1999).
At this juncture I would like to contrast these novels written by Jewish 
women with novels written by Jewish men. I argue that gender matters in 
matters of novel writing, in matters of memory. Memory is engendered.
Texts written from a “male frame” differ from those written by women.
Bruno Schulz’s (1934/1977) novel The Street of Crocodiles is a
surrealistic tale. Schulz’s narrator anticipates the danger to come, as the Nazi’s,
or crocodiles, begin crawling the streets. The narrator of this novel tells readers
about his mad father. “He remained for long periods without moving, except to
flap his arms like wings" (p. 43). Engaging in “childlike self-absorbed twittering,"
(p. 49) he thinks that he is at once a bird and a cockroach. Kafka's (1916/1992)
novel The Metamorphosis, like Schulz’s novel, allows readers to witness the
transformation of Gregor Samsa, who turns into a roach. Like Kafka's Samsa,
Schulz's narrator explains that his father
lay on the floor naked, stained with black 
totem spots, the lines of his ribs heavily 
outlined.. . .  He moved with many-limbed, 
complicated movement of a strange ritual, (p. 115)
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Soon, however, this hallucination fades and the narrator reports that after his 
brother came home with news of the end of the world (I assume he is referring 
to the Nazi accession to power), his father “put his head in the chimney shaft of 
the stove” (p. 157) and when he opens the flue his father sees through "its dark 
abyss, where a smiling homunculus slept forever in luminous sleep, enclosed in 
a glass capsule, bathed in florescent light, already adjudged, erased, filed 
away” (p. 160). The Jews of Europe had already been adjudged, erased and 
filed away as Hitler arrives on the scene in 1933.
One interpretation of this story could suggest that the narrator’s father is a 
raving lunatic. But at a certain level, the father understands what is happening 
and he anticipates what is to come, albeit in a psychotic state. The streets are 
filling up with crocodiles. These crocodiles, these ugly horrible Nazis, are taking 
over and will soon come for their prey. They are coming.
Instead of becoming emaciated, as many of the characters did in novels 
written by women, Schulz’s character becomes larger than life to the point of 
becoming surreal. This complete and utter alienation from others drives him to 
transform his being into other beings. He changes his face into that of another. 
He removes his face and becomes transformed into a creature, a non-human 
creature. Jews were hunted down like subhuman creatures; Eichmann called 
his men Jew Hunters, and he sent them everywhere to capture their prey. The 
feeling of being hunted down like subhuman creatures is unthinkable. Yet it was 
this feeling of being hunted that drove many Jews to despair and even suicide. 
Those who intuited that they could not escape took their own lives. Like many 
others, Schulz did not have the chance to escape. But he did not take his own 
life, it was taken from him. Schulz was murdered in 1942. Ficowski explains:
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On November 9,1942, on the streets of 
Drogobych... there commenced a so-called 
action carried out by the local sections of the 
SS and the Gestapo against the Jewish 
population. “Black Thursday,” brought death 
to some one hundred and fifty passerby.
Among the murdered... was Bruno Schulz, 
a former teacher of drawing at the local 
high school. (1977, p. 13)
There was nowhere to run by 1942, for the crocodiles were everywhere. And
hardly anyone was willing to help Jews. The free world would “cast a cold eye"
(Yeats, 1938-1939/1989, p. 325).
Schulz’s text is written like a dream or a nightmare. It is couched in
metaphor and surrealistic imagery. It forever slips through interpretations and
leaves marks of unconscious traces on the site of interpretation itself.
Analyst Andre Green talks about the difficulties of doing interpretive work
around texts. He suggests that we treat a text as if it were the unconscious of
another person. Green remarks,
When the analyst ventures outside the analytic 
situation, in which he is in direct contact with the 
unconscious, as it were, he must proceed with 
caution. The work of art is handed over to the 
analyst; it can say nothing more than is incorporated 
in it and cannot, like the analysand, offer an 
insight into the work of the unconscious. (1994, p. 47)
Whether we are analysts or not, Green's comments become important because
he suggests we move with caution when doing interpretive work. The text is not
an analysand, but it is the text of an other. Someone writes a text and leaves her
traces in that text. But the writer has vanished; she is no longer present. Her
absence, though, is marked by traces deposited in the site of the text. We move
cautiously and offer tentative interpretations, never approaching arrogance by
claiming that one has got the authoritative interpretation.
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Interpretations around metaphorical images become slippery because 
metaphor resonates with primary process thinking. Time is slippery, place is 
slippery, things converge in uncanny ways. This is a world that is, as Martin 
Stanton (1997) would say, out of order. A smiling homunculus, birdman and 
roachman all exist simultaneously. Schulz's text evokes strange transferential 
relations, feelings that cannot be named, thoughts that refuse categorization, 
ideas that refuse clear understanding, always slipping, slipping into unnamable 
horrors. Immersed in the vortex of being, immersed in the coming to power of 
Hitler, one could not possibly know the implications of what was to come.
Schulz captures the confusion and sinisterness of Germany during the early 
1930s. Something out of joint signaled doom.
Unlike the surreal landscape of Schulz's novel, Simon Wiesenthal
(1976) writes a realistic novel entitled The Sunflower, which tells the tale of a 
Jew who grapples with the problem of forgiveness upon encountering a dying 
SS solider. This is the story of Simon, a Jew who survives the Holocaust. This is 
also the story of Karl, a Nazi who dies in a hospital during the Holocaust. Simon 
tells about his first encounter with Karl. “Although the place was in semi­
darkness I would now see a figure wrapped in white, motionless on the bed. I 
tried to trace the outlines of the body” (p. 34). Karl needs to “confess” (p. 35) his 
crimes to a Jew, to Simon, so that he can feel absolved of his sins before death. 
Simon comments “I began to ask myself why a Jew must listen to the confession 
of a dying Nazi soldier" (p. 39). Karl tells the awful tale of setting a house ablaze 
with Jews inside and finishing them off with the toss of a hand grenade. 
Wiesenthal's story is based on real events that not only happened to him during 
the Holocaust but happened to millions. In fact, Martin Gilbert (1985) reports an 
event that occured in Bialystok Russia in 1941. Szymon Datner recalls that
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From everywhere, the unfortunate people were
driven in the direction of the great synagogue,
which was burning with a great fire, and from
which horrible cries came out. (cited in Gilbert, pp. 160-161)
According to Martin Gilbert, 800 Jews died in this fire.
Karl, the SS man in Wiesenthal's novel, is one of the many Germans who 
burned Jews alive during the Holocaust. Karl begged forgiveness from Simon 
the Jew. It is not insignificant that Karl is wrapped from head to toe in gauze and 
is blinded by his gauze. Karl is blinded by his act, he is blinded by his guilt and 
blinded by his request for absolution. Simon, however, sees that forgiveness is 
impossible. In fact, during Karl’s testimony, Simon remains silent. Karl's 
punishment is silence. Simon declares, "I stood up and looked in his direction, 
at his folded hands. Between them there seemed to rest a sunflower... without 
a word I left the room” (p. 55). The sunflower might be a metaphor for dying with 
dignity, a death visited by flowers on the grave and by “butterflies” (p. 20).
The Bitburg cemetary might be such a place, a place where Nazis and 
the Wehrmacht soldiers are buried in Germany. But for Jews there were no 
graves, and there was no such thing as death with dignity. Simon, in 
Wiesenthal's novel, remarks “for me there would be no sunflower. I would be 
buried in a mass-grave, where corpses would be piled on top of me” (p. 20).
The Judeo-Christian tradition teaches that we must always forgive, no 
matter what. The virtue of absolute forgiveness seems inscribed in our skins.
But this teaching falls short in the face of Auschwitz. I argue that the virtue of 
absolute forgiveness be unlearned. Sometimes it is better not to forgive. Rabbi 
Barri Dov Schwartz reminds us that Wiesenthal once said that the Church “will 
fail us through its forgiveness" (cited in Wiesenthal, 1976, p. 5). Herbert 
Marcuse suggests that “the easy forgiving of such crime perpetuates the very
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evil it wants to eradicate” (cited in Wiesenthal, p. 169). Martin E. Marty 
comments that “non-Jews and perhaps especially Christians should not give 
advice about Holocaust experiences to its heirs” (cited in Wiesnthal, p. 172). 
Marty remarks that forgiveness around this issue may be little more than “cheap 
grace” (p. 177). Cheap grace slides down the slippery slope to forgetting. Marty 
says, “will we not soon forget to tell these stories?” (p. 174).
My experience reading these texts has been what I term a “continual not- 
me." As a Jew I identify with Jewish people who have suffered and died during 
the Holocaust. But this identification is partial because I did not experience 
these things directly. On another level, I dis-identify with these texts because I 
will never wholly understand these kinds of experiences. A potential danger 
when reading fiction is psychological merging with characters. Many students 
wish to identify with characters in fiction; they wish to find a kinship with the 
characters. Many long for a mirror. But as Jacques Derrida warns, “the 
misfortune would be the mirror itself' (1991, p. 200). I argue that a jagged edge 
between my eye/ “I" and the text must always remain or I shall become 
symbiotic with the text. Holocaust texts are other and must remain so. The 
alterity and strangeness must remain. If I merge psychologically with the text I 
may think that it is possible to understand what it was like to live through or after 
Auschwitz. But this is impossible and it is arrogant.
At the end of the day I must separate myself from the text. Suzanne de 
Castell teaches that we must engage in readings ““against the grain,” readings 
which are not only against the grain of the text, but against the grain of the 
world” (1996, p. 31). Reading against the grain is a way to open spaces 
between my “I" and the eye of the text, or the unconscious site of the text, de 
Castell argues that we must “refuse the literal” (p. 31). The literal is the mirror
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itself, the that's-me of reading, the identification and consequent submerging of 
the reader into the text. The unconscious site of the text, the unconscious traces 
deposited by the author, shatter this identification. Rather, a dialectical 
movement between reader and text is necessary, an identification-dis- 
identification, which keeps the otherness of the reading process intact. The 
effects of literary representation of the Holocaust on the site of the reader must 
remain mysterious. Perhaps it takes years to tell what it is these readings and 
interpretations do to the reader.
For a Jew, the experience of reading Holocaust texts might be very 
different from that of a Christian. For a German non-Jew, the experience is 
still different. One’s situatedness makes a difference in the ways reading is 
experienced. I also believe that it makes a difference if the author of the novel 
writes from a Jewish or German non-Jewish perspective. It makes a difference if 
the author is male or female. My reading of Holocaust novels written by 
Germans produces a different experience than those written by Jews. But at the 
end of the day, whether novels are written by Jews or Germans, I agree with 
Lawrence Langer that, “all Holocaust art, whether memoir, biography, or fiction, 
is built on a mountian of corpses, so it can never be an account of celebration, a 
triumph of form over the chaos of experience" (1991, p. 127).
German (non-Jewish) Novels
Here I would like to turn to Holocaust novels written by non-Jewish 
Germans. James Young remarks that "in every nations' memorials and 
museums [and I would add works of fiction] a different Holocaust is 
remembered, often to conflicting political and religious ends" (1993, ix). 
Certainly, a different Holocaust is remembered by Germans than by Jews and 
we see this as the Holocaust gets represented in myriad forms in German
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literature. German novelist Gunter Grass stresses the importance of
responsibility to confront the past.
The Germans... cannot evade their responsibility.
The more inoffensive they try to seem, the greater
the dread they inspire in their neighbors No
amount of talk about the innocence of the Germans
who had not yet been bom or about the crimes
of other people can relieve them of their guilt. (1985, p. 76)
A member of Hitler Youth, a high school drop out, winner of the 1958 Grippe
47 Prize, Gunter Grass consumed by his own sense of guilt is driven by an
uncanny ethical responsibility to tell the story of the Holocaust over and over
again in his novels. Grass is unusual. He began writing Holocaust novels
shortly after the war and he began wrestling with what had gone wrong. But for
many Germans, this wrestling was belated. Margaret Mitscherlich-Nielson
writes,
After the defeat [of Germany] there was 
first an abrupt derealization; the past simply
faded away like a dream The manic effect
to undo, the enormous collective effort to 
rebuild, a kind of national therapy, made 
permanent denial and repression possible 
for the majority of Germans. (1989, p. 406)
Against this backdrop, artists such as Thomas Mann, Klaus Mann, Heinrich Boll,
Gunter Grass, Christa Wolf, Ursula Hegi, Bernard Schlink and others write
about the Nazi era and refuse to remain silent, or sunk in denial. These German
novelists, each in their own way, have broken through the pervasive numbness
and repression that haunts many Germans still. Even third Generation Germans
are haunted by this uncanny feeling of numbness. Barbara Heimmansberg and
Christoph Schmidt comment that psychotherapists encounter many Germans
who are troubled by numbness and emptiness. These therapists tell us that
255
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
often in psychotherapy we encounter people 
of a peculiar emotional numbness and 
emptiness; they can tell us nothing about 
the causes and precipitants of their sudden 
anxiety attacks, and if asked about their parents 
they reveal a broad field of ignorance... diffuse 
anxiety and feelings of guilt can be the half-erased 
traces of the Nazi past. (1993, p.3)
Gunter Grass (1959/1964), in his novel The Tin Drum, describes a ritual that
Germans must undergo in order to shed a tear. Cutting an onion induces
weeping. But what kind of weeping is this? It is artificially induced. This kind of
grief is unreal.
However, early Holocaust novels, especially those by Thomas Mann, 
Heinrich Boll and Gunter Grass, demonstrate a start, a struggle to at least begin 
the mourning process. Now some may argue that their mourning is incomplete, 
but at least they have begun the process. Whether these novelists were 
driven by a sense of guilt or shame, or an ethical sense of responsibility, 
whether they were driven by their own sadness, or numbness, they were driven, 
and that they were driven needs to be recognized.
The ways in which German novelists grapple with the Nazi past varies. 
Some novels demonize Germans. Others do not. Thomas Mann’s (1948/1992) 
Doctor Faustus tends to demonize. Ursula Hegi’s (1994) Stones from the River 
does not demonize. Novels that attempt to portray East Germans as victims of 
history, like Christa Wolf’s (1980) Patterns of Childhood, lacks what I would 
consider to be an ethical responsibility. Gunter Grass’s (1959/1964) The Tin 
Drum, on the other hand, is ethically sensitive, for he insists that individuals 
must take responsibility for crimes.
One of the interesting connections that has been made by Judith Ryan 
(1983) around literary and historical representations of the Nazi era is that
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literary representations tend to parallel, in many ways, historical ones.
Literature and history, that is, follow, similar trajectories.
Changes in the novel form must be seen 
as a response to changes in conceptualized 
thought: if history is seen as determined by fate 
or necessity, by recurrent or archetypal 
configurations, this will be reflected in essentially 
self-contained literary structures; if on the other 
hand, history is seen as subject to change, 
as a process that can be influenced—  [literary] 
forms... mirror this view. (Ryan, 1983, p. 21)
Fatalist views of history are, of course, nothing new. One might suggest that
Hegel’s was a fatalist view of history. Spirit moving through the world, killing
anything in its way, determined the path of history. Subjects do not produce
history, history produces subjects. Hegel had world history all sown up. At the
end of time, all contradictions would be solved. Interestingly, deterministic views
of history seep into Thomas Mann’s writings. He suggests that the Germany was
doomed since, at the least, Martin Luther. It was no coincidence that Hitler
sprang up from the heart of German soil. Germany was waiting for a Hitler to
come along. A turn in Holocaust historiography, since at least the Eichmann
trial, suggested that arguments around so-called collective guilt of Germans
would no longer be tenable. Historians have stressed over and over again that
individuals are to blame and it is to individual guilt that we must turn. Subjects
produce history. History is contingent upon individual decision making and
action. This is the intentionalist argument I spoke of earlier. There is nothing
deterministic about the rise of the Third Reich; it was created by individuals who
made decisions to do what they did. We hear echoes of the intentionalist
position in the writings of Gunter Grass. Peoples’ decisions shape history.
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Let us begin these inquiries into German Holocaust fiction with Thomas
Mann’s (1948/1992) Doctor Faustus. This novel is about Germany’s pact with
the devil. Adrian Leverkuhn declares that he is sought out by the devil. “But
seen Him I have, at last, at last: He was with me, here in this hall, He sought me
out’ (p. 222). “The Lutheran Leverkuhn” (p. 8) makes a pact with the devil, a
pact that will ensure the composition of the most perfectly wicked piece of music
that will flood the gates of hell. Serenus Zeitblom, the narrator, remarks that
Adrian's "lamentation" named after Durer’s woodcut of the Apocalpse
represents utter “soullessness! I will know that this is at bottom what they mean
who apply the word “barbaric" to Adrian’s creation" (p. 377). After Adrian’s
monstrous creation was written, Zeitblom comments that,
Germany had become a thick-walled underground 
torture-chamber, converted into one by a profligate 
dictatorship vowed to nihilism.. . .  Now the torture-chamber 
has been broken open. (p. 481)
This pact Leverkuhn made with the devil was an inevitable one. He was
“destined” to do this, he was “so afflicted by fate" (p. 3). “Fate has crowded the
German soul!" (p. 3) And this German fate suffered from “old-world,
underground neurosis" (p.37) which could be traced back to Luther.
Donna Reed points out Mann was familiar with the writings of Freud and 
like Freud he believed in the “power of the unconscious” (1985, p. 101). Reed 
claims that,
From Mann’s point of view, potential hysteria is 
omnipotent, ready to repeat itself. He often makes 
no historical distinctions between the irrationalism 
of the Middle Ages, the pre-Nazi cult of instinct... 
and the impassioned faces cheering Hitler, (p. 111)
Mann’s Leverkuhn, the melancholic, suffered from migranes. He was 
emotionally cold, ruthless, arrogant. "What is afoot betwixt me and Satan; not
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much to it after all" (p. 141). His pact with the devil enabled him to achieve what 
he called “the breakthrough" (p. 304). This so-called breakthrough was the path 
toward evil. Zeitblom says, “O Germany, thou art undone” (p. 388), Germany has 
become a “land self-maddened, psychologically burnt out" (pp. 481-482). “Our 
essential Germanness is stained” (p. 482), says the narrator.
Thomas Mann's novel pathologizes and demonizes Germans. But this 
pathology and demonization was determined beforehand by fate. Germany was 
fated to do what it did. Like the Sonderweg thesis, which argues that basically 
Germany was siezed by a madman, siezed by demons and took a deviant path, 
took a wrong path, Mann argues that Germany was fated to become monstrous, 
that path was sown into the soil of Germany from Luther on. But does Mann offer 
up an apologetic? Does the demonization of Germany serve as an 
exoneration? If being possesed by demons is beyond the control of individuals, 
who is responsible for Germany’s crimes? Leverkuhn, or Doctor Faustus, 
remarks “how little he was his own master” (p. 359). If a country has gone mad 
and is not its own master who is to blame? The insane cannot be judged; 
Germany cannot be judged. The demonization of the so-called German 
character is no longer thought to be tenable because there is no “essential 
Germanness" (Mann, p. 482) as Mann would have us believe. To suggest that 
there is something innately evil about Germans is ridiculous. Germany was not 
fated to carry out the Holocaust. Germans carried it out because they wanted to. 
At least this is the message of Goldhagen’s (1997) controversial historiography. 
Of course, things are much more complicated that that. But still, human beings 
choose to take certain paths and must take responsibility for the path chosen. 
“Fate” is a mythological creature. History is not determined by fate, but its path is 
contingent. It is contingent upon decisions people make.
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Mann's notion of the troubled genius, the melancholy musician is highly
problematic, for it signifies a romantic notion of a melancholy Germany. To
romanticize over Germany’s late,” is an inadequate response to a Germany’s
failings. Julianna Schiesari explains that according to Aristotle, "all great men”
must suffer from melancholia" (1992, p. 6). But women suffering from
melancholia, Schiersari remarks, are thought to be merely hysterical and
weepy. It is the mark of male genius to suffer. But there is no necessary
connection between genius and illness. There is no necessary connection
between melancholia and genius. Gunter Grass criticizes Mann’s melancholic
Germany because it implies a “stasis” and an inability to act and change the
course of history. Judith Ryan explains that Grass,
points out in the Durer Lecture [in 1971] 
that melancholy is essentially a function 
of the belief in stasis; it is a response 
to the assumption that the course of history 
is not really open to change.. . .  When resistance 
seems virtually impossible, melancholy becomes 
a substitute for action. (1983, p. 69)
Melancholia sounds a certain stuckness in time. A depressed Germany cannot
get out of its own way to do anything to stop the wheels of history. The
melancholic is stuck, glued to one place and one thought, one feeling, trapped,
immobile and helpless. Paula Salvio remarks that “What is dangerous about the
gaze of the melancholic is that it causes life (time) to flow out of objects-it
petrifies them... one of the forgotten symbols of melancholy, Walter Benjamin
(1977) reminds us, is stone” (1998, p. 17). The stoney German character, Mann
suggests, prevents the stopping of Hitler. Germany becomes, in Mann's eyes,
the victim of its own melancholia. Zeitblom, the narrator of Mann's novel,
comments on the “evils” of Germany. Hell is a German creation, he says.
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There were years in which we children of 
the dungeon, dreamed of a hymn of exultation, 
a Fidelio, a Ninth Symphony, to celebrate 
the dawn of a freed Germany-freed by herself.
Now only this can avail us, only this will be sung 
from our very souls: the Lamentation of the Son 
of Hell, the Lamentation of men and God... the most 
frightful lament ever set up on this earth, (p. 485)
I suggest that a pact with the devil has nothing to do with some
mythological transcendent creature who comes to earth and possesses human
souls. Making a pact with the devil is the act of banishing one’s own devil, ones
own bad objects, one's own heart of darkness from one’s psyche. To banish the
otherness within the self is an invitation for all sorts of projections. To banish
one’s heart of darkness within one’s own soul is an invitation to the projection of
hatred onto others. Germany could not manage difference and banished the
other to concentration camps. Like a piece of music, Germany created the
concentration camps, the Nazi, and the ordinary German who killed, Germany
created its own hell and perfected it and Germany must therefore be held
responsible for its own creations. A creation is a human invention, not a
monster, although Germany’s was a monstrous creation.
Adolf Bartelmas, a railway employee in Auschwitz 
said in his testimony at the Auschwitz trial that 
in Frankfurt many years later that flames could 
be seen at a distance of 15-20 kilometers and 
that it was known that human beings were 
burned there. (Laquer, 1981, p. 23)
The flames of the apocalypse are not mythological; the apocalypse was
Auschwitz, it marked the end of the world for European Jews.
Unlike Thomas Mann, Gunter Grass stressed that individuals in Germany 
made choices and that they were movers of history and that therefore they were 
responsible for the crimes of Germany. Choice and responsibility are themes
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that are found throughout Grass's Danzig Trilogy (The Tin Drum (1964/1991); 
Cat and Mouse (1961) and Poo Years (1963/1986). The Tin Drum caused 
terrific scandal in Germany when it was first published. John Reddick (1975) 
says that about 40 law suits were filed against Grass and this novel “was 
prominent amongst a number of books publicly burnt in Duseldorf by a religious 
youth organization" (p. 4). This novel was thought to be obscene and offensive 
to Germans. But I think the reverse is true. This novel is Grass's best and most 
gritty work. Salman Rushdie remarks that "what Grass learned on his journey 
across the frontiers of history was Doubt... he is quintessential^  the artist of 
uncertainty” (1985, xiii). Further Rushdie comments that Grass is, "after all, a 
metaphorical being” (xiv)
What draws me to Grass is his metaphorical writing and his unabashed 
criticism of Germany. Frank Keele (1988) declares that “Grass's artistic 
search for the causes of ev il... concentrates on minutiae: on subtleties of 
language, of prejudice and political accomodation, of misplaced sexual and 
religious fervor" (1988, pp. 4-5). Grass's uncanny ability to capture the minutiae 
of everyday experience of German life, the heaviness of the 1930s, the 
slowness in the Dog Years, the camivalesque atmosphere of German society, 
the absurdity and seemingly normality of what Grass calls "the great crime” 
(1985, p. 86) draws me in as a reader. Frank Keele remarks that “Grass has 
said that in Danzig the Nazis ‘rise to power occured slowly, almost as a 
microcosmic model, so that one could take notes" (1988, p. 4). Unlike Thomas 
Mann, Grass sinks into the metaphors of ordinary life during the rise of the Third 
Reich. Mann, on the other hand, transcends the ordinary taking readers into an 
extra-ordinary transcendent, mythical realm. Conversely, Grass offers a picture 
of German complicity from a bottom up perspective, akin to what historians call
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Alltagsgechichte. Gut Grass's novels are not couched in historical realism, but 
metaphorical absurdity. And this metaphorical absurdity leaves traces of 
otherness, strangeness and alienness that one does not necessarily feel 
reading Thomas Mann. Normalcy and brutality are taken-for-granted modes of 
being in Grass’s worldview. Grass's novels are quite chilling. Never does he 
lapse into sentimentality, romanticism or nostalgia. Ever the harsh critic, Grass 
“does not exempt himself from guilt” (Keele, 1988, p. 5). Grass tells us that he 
became so bothered by his own complicity as member of the Hitler Youth that 
he suffered nightmares about the possibility of doing the unspeakable. "I could 
not swear that, if I had been six or seven years older, I would not have 
participated in the great crime” (Grass, 1985, p. 86). Against the backdrop of so 
much denial in Germany, Grass demonstrates a move away from denial, he 
demonstrates a grappling with the Nazi past in a way that is gritty. This gritty 
sense of responsibility Grass takes up is reflected in the Danzig Trilogy. But 
here I would like to look at only The Tin Drum because of the three novels in the 
triology, this one struck me the most. It is The Tin Drum that I think is Grass’s 
best contribution to the German memory of the Holocaust.
The Tin Drum (1964/1991) is the story of a mentally ill Germany. In many
ways, Grass's novel parallels early psychohistories and psychobiographies of
the Nazi era. Recall, these early histories tended to pathologize Germans.
When we turn to page one of Grass’s novel, we are introduced to Oskar
Matzerath who is in a mental hosptial. Oskar comments that
Granted: I am an inmate of a mental hospital, 
my keeper is watching me, he never lets me 
out of his sight; and my keeper’s eye is the 
shade of brown that can never see through 
a blue-eyed type like me. (p. 15)
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This non-transparent blue-eyed type, has landed in a mental hospital because 
he had a breakdown on November 9th, 1938 when the Nazis took the drum 
store owner, Sigsimund Marks away. November 9th, 1938 dates Kristallnacht, 
a day that signaled a turning point in German history, a day that begins the 
breakdown of German society, and the date that causes many Jews to commit 
suicide (Trunk, 1979).
Oskar’s story begins at his painful birth when he decided that he did not
want to progress past the age of three. “He had lost his enthusiasm even before
this life beneath the light bulbs began" (p. 49). Oskar decided that the only thing
that would keep him alive would be to acquire a tin drum. But he wanted to
arrest his growth nonetheless. Thus, he would fling himself down the stairs.
I noticed that the trap door leading to the cellar
was open Above all, no harm must come to
my drum... from the ninth step, I flung 
myself down, carrying a shelf laden 
with bottles of raspberry syrup, (p. 62)
Landing on his head, Oskar remained stunted and dwarfed forever. Oskar’s first
choice had been made. He chose to become dwarfed. As Judith Ryan remarks,
"For Oskar, choice is the operative element.. . .  He chooses not to renounce
Satan just as he chooses not to grow up" (1983, p. 61). Grass seems to suggest
that Oskar’s infantile regression is symptomatic of Germany's own infantilism.
Although Oskar declares that he wanted to be a "resistance fighter "(p. 124) as
he "disrupted six or seven rallies and threw three or four parades out of step
with [his] drumming” (p. 174), he ultimately chooses to join Bebra’s (or Satan’s)
circus. Bebra, another dwarf, continually tries to "justify" (p. 309) why he aligned
himself with Goebbels and Goering. Bebra warns Oskar that the Nazis are
coming and they will do whatever it takes to clear the way, including murder.
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They are coming, he whispered. They 
will take over the meadows where we pitch 
our tents. They will organize torchlight parades.
They will build rostrums and fill them, and down 
from the rostrums they will preach our destruction.
(P-114).
Bebra’s rationalization to align himself with the Nazis was this: kill or be killed. If 
he joined the Nazis, they would not have killed him, in other words. But the truth 
of the matter is that nobody was coerced to join the Nazi party, nobody was 
coerced to kill. In fact, as Christopher Browning (1998) teaches us "Pappa 
Trapp," leader of police battalion 101, gave his men a choice not to kill Jews, a 
choice to step out of the firing squad. But only 12 out of 500 made the choice not 
to kill. And those who stepped out were not punished at all. And certainly 
nobody was killed because they did not choose to kill.
Like Bebra, Oskar’s mother and father chose to embrace the Nazis.
When Oskar’s father joined the party, he proceeded to hang a picture of 
Hitler above the piano. “The picture of the gloomy Beethoven... was removed..
. and Hitler’s equally gloomy countenance was hung upon the same nail” (p. 
115). While Oskar's father wanted to “banish" (p. 115) Beethoven, his mother 
“insisted” (p. 115) that Beethoven be placed “over the sideboard” (p. 115). 
Oskar’s father felt that the old culture of Germany replaced the new. Beethoven 
must be, therefore banished from the chronicles of history.
But the banishment of Beethoven caused Oskar’s mother to die. And her 
illness and death started with eels. Out of a dead, decapitated horse’s head, 
“small light-green eels were darting” (p. 150). Meanwhile, Oskar’s father “was 
too busy to see Mama turn green* (p. 150). Mr. Matzerath was too busy running 
around in his SA uniform to see that his wife was sickened by what had been 
transpiring in Germany. Oskar’s mother intuited that Beethoven's move to the
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sideboard meant certain death for Germany. But what part did Oskar play in all 
of this? Oskar asks, uWhat had my drum in common with the blood of Poland?" 
(p. 226) Oskar’s part in spilling the blood of Jews began with his decision to join 
Bebra's circus. But his complicity and guilt could be traced back even earlier to 
the day he bought his tin drum. Our little drummer boy was very adept at 
“shattering glass” (p. 64) [read Kristallnacht ]. But initially he only shattered 
glass when someone threatened to take away his tin drum. And then, Oskar 
screamed.
Oskar, who until then had passed as a 
quiet, almost too well-behaved child, 
succeeded in emitting that first annihliating 
scream: the polished round crystal which 
protected the honey-colored dial of our 
clock from dust... burst... the destruction was 
complete, (p. 66)
As Oskar mastered his screaming talent, he could destroy more and more 
crystal, he could destroy more efficiently and more easily, even without any 
provokation. It is not insignificant that “Hitler was known as the drummer”
(Keele, 1988, p. 140). When he gave speeches he screamed and pounded his 
fists. His speeches sounded completely hysterical. Such incredible rage 
emanated from the podium. This is probably why Binion (1976) suggests that 
Hitler suffered from “oral sadism” (p. 170). When anyone threated to take his 
power away he shattered glass; Kristallnacht marked the first shattering. The 
killing sped up and became more efficient. Nobody dared challenge him, 
nobody dared to take his drum of power away.
Unlike Thomas Mann, Gunter Grass suggests in this story that the 
everyday family, the Matzerath’s made choices and were complidt in the course 
that history would take in Germany. Germany was not fated to align itself with
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evil. For Grass, Germany chose that path. Grass’s novel, along with early
psychohistories, helps us to understand why people would so easily wish to
diagnose and pathologize Germans. In a way it is easier for us to diagnose, to
categorize, to suggest that they (Germans) are not like us (the West). They went
mad, we did not. This is a simple dichotomy which keeps people from thinking
about the unthinkable. We want so to explain the Nazi phenomenon, or perhaps
we want to explain it away with easy categorization. And this is what
pathologizing does, it explains things away. But the hideousness will not go
away. This splitting off of us from them, is a way to defend us against massive
hideousness, which I think Grass tries to depict metaphorically. Eels squiggling
around in a dead horse's head, winding up on the dinner table symbolizes the
grosteque nature of what it was the Nazis were doing. Quite frankly, Grass's
images are disgusting. Oskar’s mother manically shoving eels down her throat
until she dies [read Germans shoving Jews into ovens] captures the disgusting
and horrible things that the Nazis were doing. No need to be literal here. Grass
drives his point home metaphorically and it is through the metaphor that readers
experience a kind of pervasive horror. But some scholars are opposed to the
utilization of metaphor. Judith Ryan (1983) argues that it is appropriate for Jews
to draw on metaphors when writing Holocaust fiction, but not for Germans. She
suggests that when German writers utilize metaphor they obscure the “great
crime’' (Grass, 1985, p. 86). Again we hear the call to literalism. But as James
Young points out that
it becomes all the more puzzling when critics 
persist in trying to know the Holocaust without 
recourse to metaphor, as if it were possible to 
write about literature, talk about it, or even 
narrate its history without figurative language.
(1988, p. 89)
267
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
And it is Grass’s metaphorical bent that makes his work so dense, so layered 
over with unconscious traces. Eels, dead horse heads, dwarves and tin drums 
may trigger unconscious responses in the reader that otherwise would lay 
dormant. Unconscious responses open the reader to the otherness of the text.
Like Oskar Matzerath, Trudi Montag, another dwarf, is the main character
in Ursula Hegi's (1994) novel entitled Stones from the River. Through the eyes
of a four year old dwarf readers see another picture of everyday life in Germany
during the Nazi era. Trudi, however, is very different from Oskar. Her
dwarfedness gives her the power to “resist’’ “Hitler’s gaze" (p. 167). Trudi does
not demonize her fellow Germans for their complicity. Trudi comments that, “In
real life it was not that easy to tell who the villains were, and even if you could
identify them, they were not total villians. No one was entirely all of one thing"
(p. 168). Trudi gathers and collects stories from the “people of Burgdorf (p.
239). After the war she wanted to tell these stories, stories mainly of “complicity”
(p. 239), but she realized that nobody would listen.
Trudi would find very few who’d want to
listen because the people of Burgdorf
would be immersed in changing what
had happened into a history they could
sleep with,e//?e heile welt-an intact world
they could offer to the next generation, (pp. 361-362)
This intact world is, thus, something that the people of Bavaria also 
wanted to offer to the next generation as depicted in the film Schreckliche 
Madchen or the Nastv Girl (1990) directed by Michael Verhoeven. The English 
translation “Nasty Girl” is misleading, for Schreckliche suggests terrible, fearful 
or dreadful. What is dreadful for the townspeople of Bavaria is that a young girl 
writes a book called Mv Home Town During the Third Reich. In the process of 
doing research for her book, this young girl, or nasty girl, uncovers all kinds of
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dirt about her neighbors’ complicity during the rise of the Nazis. Everyone she 
encounters lies and tries to cover up their involvement and complicity. The 
townspeople make it very difficult for her to gain access to archives until she 
wins a law suit which enables her to get the information needed to complete her 
book. She ends up having to steal the files necessary to unlock the secrets of 
Bavarian complicity. In the meantime, her life was in danger. Thugs kill her cat 
and hang it on her front door. Thugs throw rocks through her car window. Thugs 
toss an explosive into her home and nearly kill her. The townspeople of Bavaria 
were determined to unwrite history. Director Michael Verhoeven states that this 
film is a mixture of fact and fiction and was inspired by Anja Rosmus who 
attempted to reveal the truth of her hometown. But Anja Rosmus became very 
unpopular with her neighbors. Anja Rosmus found out about her neighbors.
Like Verhoeven's film, Hegi’s novel points to the ways in which Germans
have tried to re-arrange the past, so they could sleep better. Trudi Montag, must
have been considered a kind of nasty girl too, because she hid Jews in her
cellar. I would think that this would be total anathema for Germans. And spying
made this nearly impossible. Even children spied on their neighbors and
informed the SS when Germans transgressed Nazi policy. Trudi, though, hid
Erma and Konrad Neimann, Eva Sturm and others from the Nazis, while the rest
of Burgdorf was busy attending,
parades and speeches--some like the 
taxidermist, because they genuniely believed 
in their leaders; others like Herr Blau because 
not to go would call attention to yourself. Most 
practiced the silence they were familiar with, 
a silence nurtured by fear and complicity, (p. 234)
But Trudi stresses that it was obedience more than anything else that allowed
Germans to become complicit. “You learned about obedience from your parents
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and all other adults, then obedience to your church, your teachers, your 
government” (p. 10). Daniel Goldhagen (1997) explains that the argument that 
Germans acted out a sense of obedience is nothing new. This theme, he tells us 
has been popular amongst historians and psychoanalysts. Accordingly, Stanley 
Milgram, Herbert C. Kelman, V. Lee Hamilton, Erich Fromm, and G.P. Gooch, 
says Goldhagen, all suggest that it was obedience that made Germans do what 
they did. But Goldhagen takes them to task and says that obedience had 
nothing to do with it. Germans killed, he suggests, because they wanted to.
But Trudi Montag was not obedient and she was not duped by the Brown
Shirt thugs who marched through Burgdorf. The problem was, Trudi declares,
that nobody paid much attention.
The Nazi time came upon Bergdorf like a 
Diet auf Schleichwegen --a thief on sneaky 
paths-Herr Blau would say after the war.
To him and to many others in the town, 
the men were unsympathisch, ridiculous 
even, but surely not dangerous. Who really 
paid much attention, (p. 194)
Gunter Grass claims that the Nazis moved in so slowly that one could almost
take notes. Similarly Hegi’s character Trudi remarks that “The people of
Burgdorf were drawn in gradually, almost imperceptibly” (p. 195).
In Hegi’s work called Tearing the Silence (1997), she remarks that,
Fifteen years ago I walked into a mailroom at the 
University of New Hampshire, and when I overheard 
two of my colleagues talk about a Holocaust 
documentary, I backed away, unable to speak.. . .
I was still within the silence, though I wouldn’t 
have defined it that way. (p. 14)
Though born in Germany, Hegi now resides in the United States and she
declares that it is the distance from Germany that has allowed her to "tear the
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silence" (p. 157). The past seemed erased for her as her parents, teachers and
relatives were ‘‘reluctant” to tell her much (p. 15). Analyst Sammy Speier claims
that for Germans, "what is erased reappears in the children, who are patients
today, as emptiness, identity diffusion, bewilderment and confusion” (1993,
p.62). But what kind of a silence has Hegi tom? Her protagonist and heroine
Trudi Montag is the quintessential righteous Gentile who saves Jews by hiding
them in her cellar. Of course there were righteous Gentiles in Germany who did
save Jews. Certainly theologian Dietrich Bonnhoeffer and members of The
Confessing Church were examples of righteous Gentiles. Bonnhoeffer was
murdered by the Nazis when it was discovered that he was involved in a plot to
kill Hitler. Oskar Schindler was considered to be a righteous Gentile too. He
saved many Jews by allowing them to work for him. Schlinder’s list, the Jews
who he summoned to his factory, was well over 1,000. But by and large, and
this is the crucial point here, most Germans were not involved in any kind of
resistance movement to save Jews. Saul Friedlander drives this point home.
When pastor Umfried criticized the attacks on Jews 
in his town, no church authority supported him; when 
Jewish businesses were boycotted, no religious 
voice was heard. . .  when Jewish colleagues were 
dismissed, no German professor publicly protested; 
when the number of Jewish students was dramatically 
reduced, no university committees or faculty members 
experienced opposition. (1997, pp. 59-60)
For the most part, Germany "cast a cold eye” (Yeats, 1938-1939/1989, p. 325).
Trudi Montag, though, is an example of a righteous Gentile in Hegi’s novel.
Laypersons unfamiliar with Holocaust history may be mislead reading Hegi’s
work. It might be misleading to think that Trudi Montag represents a vast sector
of German society during the Nazi era. She would have been an exception.
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Another possible interpretation of Hegi’s novel is that Trudi sees herself
as a victim of history. She had the power to see through the Brown Shirt thugs
who marched through Burgdorf. And because she is a dwarf we might take pity
on her because she is ostracized and nobody would be willing to listen to the
stories of complicity that she gathers throughout the novel. This interpretation,
then, would suggest to me that Hegi has not torn the silence deeply enough.
Hegi, it seems, has not fully mourned this history. And it is mourning that
enables one to tear the silence. However, analyst Sheldon Roth declares,
that Germans will never be able to do this 
[mourn for Germany’s past] and I will tell you 
why.They will be tortured and I think it will 
take generations for them. In order to mourn 
you have to go back to the past and 
openly fee l!.. . .  I think the mourning 
process for Germans is definitely 
different from what it is for us [Jews]
(1995a, pp. 233-235)
It seems to me that Hegi’s novel lacks a sense of mourning and lacks a sense of
grit, the kind of grit we see in Grass’s work. One wonders how Germans can
come to terms with the Nazi era, especially since many critics argue that former
West Germany had many continuties with the Nazi regime. Markovits and
Noveck write,
Germans refer to 1945 as Stunde Null, a 
historical tabula rasa created by the end 
of the war and the reestablishment of 
democracy in the Federal Republic.
But a number of Germans as well as foreign 
critics have questioned the validity of th is ...
They point to the many continuites between 
the Nazi regime and the Federal Republic.
(1996, p. 401)
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Former Nazis were put in power positions after 1945. Some became judges!
Imagine that. Like the former West Germany, the former East Germany is still
trying to come to terms with its past and is still trying to undo the rhetoric of anti-
Fascism. It was in 1991 that former East Germany officially took responsibility for
the Holocaust. Until then, this was completely denied. But just because rhetoric
has changed, actions have not. In Germany anti-Semitism is on the rise again.
Peck claims that,
Programmatic GOR State doctrine against 
anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia seems 
to have had little effect on either the GDR’s 
own citizenry or those in the former West 
Germany, since Jewish cemetaries continue 
to be desecrated. (1996, p. 449)
Many scholars worry that the strength of a reunified Germany will unleash even
more hatred. The tensions between former East and West Germany have
resulted in the current atmosphere where Turks and others have been killed
and brutalized. A stronger Germany does not necessarily mean a better one.
Someone who was opposed to reunification is Christa Wolf, a former
East German. She has written a popular novel called Patterns of Childhood
(1980). This novel has captured the attention of many who are interested in the
power of autobiography, memory and storytelling. The novel has been praised
for its gripping narrative, but criticized for its politics. Julia Hell explains that,
Critics have called Kindheitsmuster the 
autobiography of a “victorious subject," 
a metaphor resonating with the novel’s 
psychological and historical dimensions. .. 
the novel demonstrates the “victorious” 
emergence of the subject out of all those 
components that are repressed, denied 
splitt off...the novel plays with the SED's 
self-characterization as victims of history.
(1997, p. 199)
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Christa Wolf’s story is narrated by Nelly. She looks back and recalls what 
it was like as a five year old child to watch the rise of the Third Reich. What can 
a five year old child do? Protest? Children were victims of ’‘Fascism” (p. 36). 
Recall, former East Germans engaged in what is referred to as “Staatlich 
Verordnete anti-Faschismus (State sanctioned program of anti-Fascism)n 
(Wegner, 1995, p. 175). The former East German government has traditionally 
only honored Communist “resistors” of Fascism. It would seem that Wolf 
embraces this ideology and injects it into her story. Wolf’s fictional testimonial, 
however, is powerful. Her novel from the start is quite evocative. Much of the 
subject matter turns on the problems of repressed memory. For me, this 
novel was particularly interesting. At first, though, I did not understand what it 
was that Wolf was doing because I read her novel before researching East 
German politics. I had no idea why the critics were skeptical of Wolf’s underlying 
message. And it was upon my reading around East German politics that drove 
home the point again that it is so important to read both historiography and 
literature, otherwise, one does not fully understand what one reads. And I think, 
at first, I was duped by Wolf’s writing. Still, I think that Wolf’s understanding of 
repressed memory important. Nelly, the heroine of the novel, remarks that “The 
present intrudes upon remembrance, today becomes the last day of the past.
Yet we could suffer continous estrangement from ourselves if it weren't for our 
memory of the things we have done” (p. 4). But Nelly comments that she has 
“encapsulated vaults of memory” (p. 69). Memory is imprisoned and hovers right 
below the surface of awareness. Germans, says Nelly, “Ignore, overlook, 
neglect, deny, unlearn, obliterate, forget” (p. 149) the past. But these denials 
cannot be maintained. “Suddenly a wall to one of the well-sealed vaults of 
memory breaks down” (p. 69). And when the vault breaks open, Germans
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remember. But most Germans cannot break open this vault. And so they
engage in the narrative of, 'we did not know.' But when repressed memory is
lifted, “suddenly you know that everyone knew" (p. 69). Historians point out that
Auschwitz was no secret. Workers coming home from a day at the crematorium
talked. Walter Laquer explains that
Hundreds of civilian employees, Germans as well 
as Poles, worked at Auschwitz, arriving in the morning 
leaving in the afternoon.. . .  Many technicians and workers 
from various parts of Germany and the occupied 
countries came to Auschwitz. (1981, p. 24)
Nelly struggles to break through repressed memory, to break through the 
fog of the present to get at this horrific past. She wonders if she is successful. 
Nelly asks “Has memory done its duty?" (p. 406) Has she admitted her own 
“guilt and concealment” (p. 57) enough? And if one admits complicity is that 
enough? Can repressed memory, once lifted, exonerate? Has Nelly conquered 
her memory? Does she emerge as the “victorious subject" after all? (Hell,
1997). The novel does seem to suggest that Nelly conquers repressed memory. 
But is repression that simple? A complex look at the nature of repression, 
though, might suggest that repression never fully goes away. As Jean 
Laplanche (1999) argues, most everything is “partly translated and partly 
repressed” (p. 94). For Germans especially it would seem that repressed 
memory is interminable. There is no getting rid of it in a dean sense. It is 
impossible for Germans to think of this past without not thinking of it at the same 
time. It is never clear how much of this past Germans can actually take in 
psychologically. And it is not as if one suffers from repressed memory, 
remembers what one has forgotten through therapy or novel writing, and then 
puts the past to sleep once and for all. Traces of repression remain.
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Studying the Holocaust through literature is crucial for grappling with this
event. It is not enough to just read historiography. A more balanced curriculum,
one that examines both fictional and historical accounts broadens readers’
perspectives. As Mary Aswell Doll points out, curriculum theorists "have long
called for metaphorical ways of expressing the life of the mind” (in press).
Holocaust Fiction, when it is metaphorical, is especially powerful. But docu-
realist novels serve their purpose as well. When people argue that the
Holocaust as represented in literary form is inappropriate, perhaps they should
listen to Aharon Appelfeid as he teaches that,
One sometimes hears this argument and 
warning: “Keep literature out of the fire zone.
Let the numbers and the well-established 
facts speak.” I have no wish to belittle 
that claim, but I do wish to point out 
that the numbers and the facts were 
the murderers' own well-proven means.
Man as a number is one of the horrors 
of dehumanization. (1994, pp. 27-28)
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CHAPTER 7 
UNDER THE SIGN OF DYSTOPIA
Interpreting one’s own curriculum theorizing requires memory work. To 
remember why one does curriculum theory in the first place becomes key to 
doing self-reflexive scholarship. Several possibilites might emerge. One 
possibility might be that one does curriculum theory to offer hope to students 
and colleagues in the academy. Another reason one might do curriculum work 
is more despairing. One might do curriculum work to offer warnings. And these 
warnings concern the dangers and worries of living in the world, the troubles of 
lived experience. I want to offer warnings about hope. In order to do this, 
though, I choose an inbetween place from which to speak. Distance from hope 
and despair allows the curriculum worker to examine the dangers of each.
Being mired in hope blinds; being mired in despair causes deafness. I despair 
about hope. To understand this, I stand in the middle; I take the middle way 
between both. This is the way of the Buddha, the place situated between the 
extremes. However, unlike the Buddha, I am not offering enlightenment; I am 
merely attempting to get distance from the extremes of hope and despair in 
order to better despair about hope. When I remember why I do curriculum work 
in the first place, it turns on this paradox. To despair about hope becomes my 
mantra.
Brent Davis suggests that “our schooling system can no longer robe itself 
in the rhetoric of benevolence of hope" (1996, xxii). To disrobe the concept of 
hope to find out what it conceals, then, is my task. I attempt to discover why 
words like hope turn dangerous. Ernst Bloch says “It is a question of learning 
hope" (1938/1986, p. 3). Bloch’s magisterial work entitled the Principle of Hope 
is meant to convince readers of the necessity of hope. In order to live a better
277
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
life and create a better world one must, he insists, learn hope. But I am not 
convinced that learning hope necessarily leads to good things. If hope is 
something that is, in fact, learned, can it be unlearned? Should it be 
unlearned? What would it mean to live without hope?
What monster hides beneath the concept of hope? Utopianism. And it is 
this that demands interrogation. Utopianism is a way of being-in-the-world that 
embraces a rainbow at the end of each thunderstorm, that sees good in 
everything and everyone, that makes claims to innocence. Utopianism is the 
dream of equality, liberty and justice for all. Utopianism reaches toward heaven 
and paradise.
The utopic teacher believes she can make the world a better place; a 
utopic curriculum worker believes she can make the academy a better, happier 
place. But wishing for this better, happier place tends to reduce the complexities 
of lived experience into a recipe or method for happiness. That is, the purpose 
of school, for the utopic teacher, is to teach young people how to achieve 
happiness, how to create a better life. Toni Morrison warns: uHow exquisitely 
human [is] the wish for permanent happiness, and how thin human imagination 
[becomes] trying to achieve if  (1998, p. 306).
Unexamined utopianism, the wish for happier places, is dangerous and 
can even become deadly. Utopianism is dangerous because it may perpetuate 
what I term the evil of innocence. Innocence is a refusal to hear the four 
horsemen of the apocalypse descending, to acknowledge that bad people do 
exist, to understand that equality is often gotten at the expense of liberty, that 
justice is often incompatible with law. Utopianism offers up a deadly, naive 
phantasy about an earthly paradise. School, for instance, as a possible 
haven/heaven is the utopic teacher’s dream. To create a safe place for young
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people to learn is the dream. But more often than not, school is like prison; 
school is a deadly place where murders occur, where drugs are exchanged, 
where lives are destroyed. Even if school seems to be a safe place where none 
of these activities occur, even if school seems far from the mad world outside, 
violence, discontent and despair still seep through the school walls. There is no 
haven/heaven on earth, and school is not a haven, for it is part of the larger 
culture, the larger world, and this world can be a frightening place for young 
people who are already involved in drug cultures or death cults. Further, if 
teachers attempt to protect students from the world outside, they unwittingly 
create more difficulties for them. Protecting students presupposes that school 
and society are distinct. John Dewey teaches that school and society are not 
separate. School walls are an illusion because culture and society are already 
inside the school walls. Protecting students is a way of controlling them. And it is 
this that is especially worrisome. John Weaver points out, “From a controlled 
and manipulated curriculum, young adults leave schools wondering why the 
world does not fit the one that was created at school" (in preparation).
A utopic curriculum, whether conceived as a blueprint, a static plan with 
objectives and goals, or as a dynamic current of lived experience, runs the risk 
of blinding and thwarting understanding. I argue that understanding the 
complexities of life has little to do with rainbows and paradise; understanding 
the complexities of what it means to be an educated person has little to do with 
becoming happy or feeling better. If the goal of education is making citizens 
happy, making them feel better about themselves, I think it is a thin and 
unproductive enterprise. Certainly education should offer more than the dreams 
of kindergarten, a child's garden, an eden. A dystopic curriculum seems more 
adequate to the task of becoming an educated person. Dystopia is not myopia.
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Dystopia is a way of looking suspiciously at happy texts, happy histories, happy 
memories. A dystopic curriculum seeks out monsters robed in the rhetoric of 
utopian thinking. Happy texts, happy histories, happy memories tend to get 
shoved down what George Orwell terms “memory holes” (1949/1977).
Memories that slip through holes have disappeared and are forgotten. Recalling 
them becomes key. Recalling what is utopic thinking, what creates memory 
holes to begin with becomes crucial. Utopic thinking cannot manage the other, 
cannot manage difference, so it thrusts unhappy memories into holes and 
forgets to retrieve them. There is no place for the other in utopias. Thus, a 
dystopic curriculum looks for what Alan Block (1997) terms “lost articles." “A lost 
article is unrealized, it requires the other to exist.. . .  In discovering lost articles, 
we engage in relationships which bear unique responsibilities” (p. 7). The 
responsibility for dystopic curriculum workers is partly to remember how and 
why the other got lost to begin with. What was it that forced the other out of the 
picture, outside the frame? Utopias force others out. Utopias make others 
faceless. Utopias turn the other into a number.
Utopias create happy places for those who fit the utopic dream. Those 
who do not fit in are shut out. Schooling, then, built on utopian thinking forces 
students and teachers into a “homogenizing process [which] can become 
totalitarian in its demands for conformity” (Egan, 1997, p. 11). Utopianism can 
become a form of totalitarianism because it offers a total vision, a grand 
metanarrative of the perfect life, a life without glitches or idiosyncracies. Further 
utopianism offers up “the illusion of order” (Weaver, in preparation). John 
Weaver reminds us, moreover, that illusions limit understanding. Weaver 
remarks that the “forms of knowledge we sanction through our work and the 
illusions we impose upon the world [limit] what can be created and imagined in
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schools and in universities” (in preparation). If curriculum is ordered only 
around orthodox canonical readings, orthodox ways of thinking emerge. If a 
Holocaust curriculum is ordered only around canonical historical texts and 
historical debates, only one kind of thinking emerges, the historical. I argue for a 
broadening of texts when studying the Holocaust. Reading Holocaust fiction, as 
I have pointed out, is considered inappropriate for some. Fiction, for some, is 
thought to be less important than historical texts; it is considered mere fluff.
Some argue that the Holocaust should not be represented by fictional texts 
because we cannot leam anything from them. But these are orthodox views 
which I think too narrow and limit, ultimately, our understanding and memory of 
this event.
One of the issues here turns on the importance of imagination and the 
ways in which imagination enriches memory rather than depletes it. Orthodox 
canonical ways of thinking squash out imagination. And what is squashed out of 
imagination are other ways of thinking about the world, ways that might admit of 
ambiguity and paradox. These other ways of thinking might allow for more 
heterodox, idiosyncractic knowledges to appear on the scene.
If, however, curriculum is ordered around orthodox texts, whereby young 
people read only how Plato's cave people emerge in the sun finally to be 
enlightened, how Rousseau’s Emile lives happily ever after in his natural 
solitude, how Aristotle's Nichomacheaus finally becomes the happy ethicist 
bravely walking through life, then we have limited what students 
can imagine by offering up these grand utopic visions, these grand narratives 
of happy endings. And if we turn the Holocaust into a happy ending, a light at 
the end of the tunnel, a story of bravery and courage, a story of faith and love, 
we have done a great injustice to the reality of this event. Brought up on
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utopian stories, raised on grand metanarratives, inculcated into Plato’s brand of 
enlightenment masks darkness that surrounds real events lived in real time in 
real lives. The story line that suggests that at the end time redemption is at hand 
only serves to conceal that tragic sense of life, that darkness and the black sun 
of Auschwitz. Let us think again. And it is so difficult to rid our psyches of these 
utopian metanarratives because of transference. The themes and plots of these 
narratives get transfered onto narratives that are horrific. I stress that we must 
work to undo these deeply ingrained beliefs in happy endings, especially when 
we are dealing with Holocaust texts. There is nothing happy about the 
Holocaust. I stress that my position is not nihilistic. Memory work is the work of 
justice. It is an ethical project that dares to take the plunge into the unthinkable. 
Memory work is a way of coping. There is nothing liberating about it. Liberation, 
emacipation and hope belong to grand myth-o-narratives.
Curriculum workers need to remember why they might be mired in 
utopian thinking. How did they “learn hope" (Bloch, 1938/1986, p. 3)? And what 
are the consequences of this learned hope? Hope is, after all, a social 
construction. It is to texts that I turn, to grapple with these questions, because it 
is the always already of texts that are handed down to us in culture that produce 
and influence the ways one might think about life. And it seems to me that there 
is something deeply psychological about buying into the myth-o-narratives of 
hope, benevolence, emancipation, liberation. And this psychological 
transference might explain, in part, why many are wedded to these kinds of 
concepts. There is something deeply psychological about the investments one 
has to a particular way of viewing the world. Thus, this question about 
utopianism is not just an epistemological one; it is a psychological one, too. The 
unconscious transference of one kind of story (a fairy tale where the princess is
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rescued by the prince, for instance) onto another (that the Holocaust is a story of 
rescue and resistance, which has been the pervasive myth of France's Vichy 
until the 1970s) is key to understanding why interpretations of a most hideous 
event can become yet another story with a happy ending.
In this chapter I will examine utopianism briefly in order to come to a 
more adequate understanding of some of the philosophical underpinnings of 
this way of thinking. Secondly, and more specifically, I will review the writings of 
Charles Fourier, Pierre Tielhard de Chardin, H.G. Wells and Adolf Hitler. I argue 
that utopian thinking, overwhelmingly, “others." And for these writers, whether 
implicity or explicitly, it is Jewish bodies that are othered. And so Jewish bodies 
are shoved down “memory holes” (Orweil, 1949/1977, p. 35) in order that they 
will be forgotten, erased, mutilated or murdered. Moreover, and most 
importantly, I contend that 2,000 years of utopian thinking in the West has 
created the conditions, in part, for a Hitler to emerge and to write a blueprint for 
the perfect killing dream.
Remembering Utopianism
Michael Clifford Spencer explains that the word utopia “was first used by 
Thomas More in 1516 [and is] the Greek derivation [of] ou-topos... and means..
. “nowhere" or “happy place" (1981, p. 126). Immediately one might wonder 
about the contradictory nature of the term itself. The term utopia is at once a 
happy place that is a no place. If utopia is a place, it is someplace, located in 
time and space; if utopia is a no place it is a nowhere, found neither in time nor 
space, but rather only in imagination. Ruth Shklar suggests that classical 
utopias, perhaps traceable back to Plato’s Republic, are no place; that is, they 
are “contemplative only” (1966, p. 105), while modern utopias, which Shklar 
dates around the nineteenth century, are a “summons to action" (p. 109). Thus
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Shklar contends that from Plato to Rousseau, utopias are thoughts about no 
place. After Rousseau, utopias are thoughts in some place.
More generally, David Higgs summarizes trends in utopian thinking from
the sixteenth to the ninteenth century.
In the 16th and 17th centuries this longing 
[for no place] was often a desire to return to 
religious sources; 18th century utopias were 
moral critiques, and the utopias produced 
from the middle of the 19th century onward 
draw much inspiration from science. (1978, p. 25)
These broad trends can be found in different kinds of writings such as political
philosophies, religious texts, fiction and science fiction. Curiously, Western
culture has been replete with utopic writings. In fact, Frank and Fritzie Manuel
explain that The profusion of Western utopias has not been equaled in any
other culture” (1979, p. 1). What is it about utopias that so fascinate the West?
Here there are at least two avenues of thought concerning this question. First,
some believe that human beings have a certain “utopian propensity” (Manuel &
Manuel, 1979, p. 5) which “springs from deep within the psyche” (Richter, 1975,
p. 45). That is, dreaming of a better place is part of the human psyche. It is an
innate something that is embedded in the core of being. It is, in other words,
natural to hope for a better life. However, this so-called natural way of thinking
essentializes. It presupposes that everyone, at bottom, has an essential longing
for better things. But pessimists and spoilers have always lived alongside
eternal optimists.
A more adequate way of thinking about the why of utopianism might be 
captured by Ruth Levitas. She claims that utopian thinking is a social 
construction. There is, then, nothing natural about it. Levitas declares that,
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utopia is a social construct which arises not from 
a ‘natural’ impulse subject to social mediation, but 
as a socially constructed response to an equally 
socially conducted gap between the needs and 
wants generated by a particular society. (1990, pp. 181-182)
Thus, Levitas argues that utopia is an invention of Western thought, not a
natural disposition. Still, the question as to why utopian thinking is so prevalent
in the West is shrouded in mystery. Why are so many invested in this type of
thinking? The answer is far from dear. From Plato through Rousseau, from
Charlotte Perkins Gilman to H. G. Wells, utopian ideas abound.
A shift in utopian thinking began to occur with the advent of World War I. 
Erich Fromm comments that the First World War was to “destroy a 2,000 year 
old western tradition of hope” (1977, pp. 258-259). In fact, Albert Soboul 
reminds us that “according to Ernst Bloch, utopia is bom from the 'principle of 
hope" (1978, p. 176). And if utopias spring from the prindple of hope, what 
happens when the West becomes less hopeful? One would think that utopias 
might wane or even disappear altogether. Although they have waned, they 
have not disappeared. Some even call for the re-conceptualizing of utopias by 
making them more feminist, open-ended and dynamic (Goodwin & Taylor, 
1982). But still utopias like these involve some sort of quest for perfection. And 
as Isaiah Berlin warns, “the search for perfection does seem... a recipe for 
bloodshed” (1991, p. 18). Perfect societies are a call to uniformity and 
conformity. This call causes othering. And so, as Adam Ulam suggests, 
“perhaps we have reached a moratorium, if not indeed the end of utopias, and 
perhaps this is not altogether a bad thing” (1966, p. 134). According to Richter, 
Nikolas Berdyaev says that “the pressing problem of today is not how to reach 
utopia but how to avoid i f  (1975, p. 7). I agree that utopias and utopian thinking
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should be left behind with the dinosaur. These old crusty, awkward, naive 
creatures are dangerous and sometimes deadly. I do not argue that one should 
attempt to rescue them by making them more feminst or open-ended, but I 
contend that they be interrogated and dismantled and finally demolished.
In order to demolish utopianism, one might consider how utopian 
thinking is connected to memory. As I have earlier explained, what I call 
personal memory text is elusive, hard to pin down. When I remember something 
I look back, I conjure up images in my mind of an event that is distanced from 
me. Memories seem cloudy sometimes. Memories of yesterday will differ from 
memories, say, of two years ago because time plays tricks on memory. 
Sometimes yesterday's memories are more cloudy than that of two years ago; 
sometimes older memories are more cloudy than yesterday's memories. Amos 
Funkenstein reminds us that “personal memory-as first shared by Augustine of 
Hippo-is likewise never pure memory. Most of our personal memories are... 
also the memories of memories” (1993, p. 7). Thus, what I re-member is a re- 
experiencing of an event through a filter of memories. This complicates things. 
This does not mean, though, that I cannot grasp my past lived experience at all.
I can, but it is mediated through complex re-presentations of memories.
Collective memory involves many intersecting memories, many people’s 
memories across time and place. Funkenstein comments that collective memory 
“can be characterized as a system of signs, symbols, and practices: memorial 
dates, names of places, monuments... museums and texts” (1993, p. 6). The 
collective and personal are interwoven and mediated through culture. Further, 
memories change over time and consequently the meanings of our memories of 
places and texts change. How I understand memory effects how I think about 
the past, present and future. Much of utopian thinking tends to drive a wedge
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between past, present and future. Utopian thinking cuts a clear line between 
time, as if time could be clearly demarcated. And it is this assumed demarcation 
that sets up many difficulties for utopianism. Memory and time, however, do not 
seem to be bifurcated in this way. As Henri Bergson suggests “there is simply 
the continuous melody of our inner life" (1946, p. 176). Bergson claims that 
events happen in a duration of time, a fluidity of past and present. However, 
utopian thinking bifurcates past from present, present from future.
Not only is the present separated off from the past, in utopian thought, it is 
denigrated. Utopian thinkers often feel that the Now is hell. It is curious that 
Alighieri Dante (1307/1982) begins the Divine Comedy in hell, in The Inferno. 
“Abandon Every Hope, who enters here" (p. 21). Hell is a place without hope 
and the Now is this place. Utopian thinkers attempt, therefore, to escape the 
Now, escape the present, in order to reclaim lost hope. The Divine Comedy is 
the upward journey from hell to paradise. For Dante, to pull oneself out of hell 
can be done only with God's grace. Even though Dante was critical of the 
corruption of the popes, he offered a traditional Christian position, which was a 
form of utopian thinking.
Utopian thinkers who have bad memories of the past usually tend to 
construct futuristic utopias. Dante’s is a futuristic tale since one enters paradise 
after death, after a long struggle in hell and purgatory. Utopias like H.G. Wells’s 
(1967) A Modern Utooia. Charles Fourier’s (1808/1996a; 
1808/1996b;1808/1996c;1808/1996d) The Theory of the Four Movements, and 
Pierre de Chardin’s (1964) The Future of Man. are all brands of futuristic 
utopias. For all of these writers, the future is idealized because the present is 
hell and the past is backward. Looking to the future while denigrating the past 
and the present becomes problematic.The future seems golden.
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Contrarily, utopian thinkers who remember the past as a golden age, 
tend to construct utopias that attempt to claim the happy past. Nostalgic 
longings for things remembered past are captured in the writings of Doris 
Lessing’s (1981) Briefing for a Descent into Hell. Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s 
(1915/1979) Herland. Rousseau's (1750/1938) Social Contract, and his 
(1755/1938) Discourses on Inequality, and most disturbingly, Adolf Hitler’s 
(1923) Mein Kampf. Bertrand Russell comments that, in fact, “Hitler is an 
outcome of Rousseau" (1972, p. 685). I argue that not only is Hitler an outcome 
of Rousseau, he is more broadly an outcome of 2,000 years of utopian thinking.
What is it that goes wrong when the past or future is idealized? Most
obviously, it is naive to think that things were better in the past or things would
be better in the future if I just create a new world. Transgressing the present is
impossible. I cannot step outside of the Now, I am steeped in it. The past is
always already influencing me; the future seeps into the present as well. More
importantly, though, it seems that transgressing involves violence. That is, in
order to create a new world which idealizes past or future, I may have to commit
violence.Therefore, utopian thinking nearly always moves through an
apocalyptic phase to reach its objectives. As Darrell Fasching teaches:
The modern mythos is at one and the same time 
both apocalyptic and utopian. It is apocalyptic in 
that it demands a decisive break with the past; 
a break that in its more radical manifestations 
is conceived of as requiring a revolutionary 
battle between the forces of light and darkness.
It is utopian in that what is imagined to follow
this radical break. . .  is a new utopian order. (1993, p. 23)
A brave new world requires transgression either from the old or from the new.
This brave new/old world, then, may require violence to achieve its ends. Hence
utopian thinking intersects and crosses over with apocalyptic thinking.
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This kind of thinking is even older than modernity. It may even be pre­
modern. New Testament scholar Earl Richard points out that apocalyptic 
literature (which has both apocalyptic and utopian elements in it) can be traced 
back through “Exilic and post-exilic prophets, in the Book of Daniel, in 
intertestamental literature, in the synoptic tradition” (1988, p. 398). Even further 
back, Lewis Hopfe (1991) points out that already in Zoroastrianism, a tradition 
older than that of Judaism, we find notions of heaven and hell here too. So it 
could be that the utopian tradition may date back 3,000 years in the West.
Utopian thinking, generally speaking, falls into two broad categories. 
Some utopias are framed in static terms (Plato, Rousseau, Gliman, Lessing, 
Hitler); some in dynamic terms (Fourier, Wells, de Chardin, Hitler). Hitler’s 
(1923) Mein Kampf and its subsequent realization in National Socialism can be 
considered both a static and dynamic utopia. It was static in the blue print of 
Mein Kampf and dynamic in its actuality in National Socialism. Joseph 
Goebbels commented that Nazism “like all living beings, is in a state of 
becoming" (cited in Hermand, 1992, p. 170). And as Saul Friedlander remarks, 
the Nazis were “masters of improvisation" (1997, p. 326). What must be 
emphasized here is that utopias that are dynamic, that admit of change and 
process, are not necessarily better than static ones. In fact, it may be the case 
that dynamism is even more dangerous. There is always room to change the 
blueprint in order to justify killing more people who do not conform to the 
utopian way of life.
Is there any harm, one might wonder, in having phantasies about a 
better, happier place? Perhaps phantasies are harmless enough. When 
phantasies become realized as prescriptions for living and are acted out in the 
world, danger looms near. When the images of utopias become realized in the
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flesh, something happens that tends to lead to ruin. A phantasy island 
becoming real hardens into stone something that was once dreamy. Are 
dreamy phantasies innocent? Perhaps not.
Utopian thinking is a form of Pelagianism. Dystopic thinking is a form of
Augustinianism. Krishan Kumar explains that
Part of the interwoven story of utopia and anti-utopia 
can indeed be interestingly told as the long standing 
clash between Augustinianism and Pelagian traditions.. . .
The utopian... is a Pelagian. He denies original sin, 
and believes that men can perfect themselves by 
creating the right environment. The anti-utopian. .. 
is Augustinian. He sees weak human creatures 
constantly succuming to the sins of pride, avarice 
and ambition. (1987, p. 100).
Pelagius, an eternal optimist, believed that human beings could pull themselves
up by their own bootstraps. Augustine, the eternal pessimist, was more
concerned with why people sin. Like Augustine, I do believe that what is worth
worrying about is why people do bad things. Unlike Augustine, though, I do not
believe that there is such a thing as “original” sin, for this presupposes some
sort of enduring character that is passed along generations. Certainly, I do
believe people sin, but there is nothing original about it, because sin is not
innate.
Utopian discourse is often trotted out in theological contraries such as 
hope/despair, salvation/perdition, paradise/apocalypse. In order to achieve 
hope, salvation and paradise, stages of the apocalypse must be acted out or 
experienced along the way. To help citizens achieve the utopian goals, utopias 
nearly always include some sort of educational blueprint which is meant to 
inculcate citizens. But this utopian vision is usually achieved by wiping out, 
eliminating or annihilating whoever gets in the way of its final objective. Those
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who are considered weak, impure, dirty or nonconforming must be controlled, 
manipulated, or killed. Purity, strength and conformity are the keys to sustaining 
a utopian world. At bottom, then, utopias concern the manipulation and 
surveillance of bodies. As Foucault reminds us “It is always the body that is at 
issue" (1979, p. 25).
The Four Horsemen of Utopianism
Let us now turn to the lour horsemen" of utopianism. I will first examine
Fourier, de Chardin and Wells, and finally I will treat Hitler's (19231 Mein
Kamof. Charles Fourier, (1808/1996c;1808/1996a) in The Theory of the Four
Movements, robes his utopian scheme in theological discourse. The four
movments of the “social, animal, organic and material" (p. 3), and what Fourier
calls the “destinies... [of] past, present and future" (p. 6), evolve and are
determined by “God's mathematical laws” (p. 36). Of the four movements,
Fourier calculates that the social “will progress uninterruptedly in two ages of
ascending and descending combinations. . . which will take about 7,000 years"
(1808/1996a, p. 44). Presently, we are living in an age of “ascending
incoherence” (p. 41) in which there is much “suffering” (p. 41). Fourier suggests
that this suffering is due to capitalism, modern industry and poverty. Fourier
believes that the earth and the other planets are created in cycles. These cycles
are moving, ever evolving. He tells us that the planets “can copulate" (p. 45).
Thus, planet earth was created out of a sexual act. The “first creation" (pp. 45-
46), of which there are many, Fourier compares to hell.
The first creation... filled land and sea with an immense 
quantity of harmful animals...  what could hell in its fury 
invent that would be worse than rattle-snakes, bed-bugs, 
the legions of insects and reptiles, sea-monsters. (pp. 45-46)
291
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Unlike Fourier’s account of creation, the biblical account in Genisis 2:4 of 
the creation of the world was not hellish, but was a paradise, at least in the 
beginning. With the advent of the Fall, of course, things went badly as the world 
began to flood and the plagues rolled over the children of God.
Central to Fourier’s utopian world is the concept of God. God is both 
transcendent and immanent, but he is mostly transcendent. God “reign[s] [over] 
the combined order. .. which is the most beautiful of the divine conceptions” (p. 
67). And the order of things are progressing in what Fourier terms a progressing 
series. God is also immanent. Nicholas Riasanovsky explains that for Fourier, 
“God, like man had both body and soul... he did sometimes appear as a 
personality” (1969, p. 35). Thus, for Fourier, God is both immanent and 
transcendent.
Further, God organizes society by what Fourier calls “passionate 
attraction” (p. 15). And these attractions are sexual. So it is sex that orders the 
world. Sexual relations are most healthy, says Fourier, if they are free. 
Therefore, marriage is not part of this utopian world. Communal living and free 
love are key to sustaining utopia. Communities called “phalanxes” (p. 15) would 
be ideal. Michael Clifford Spencer explains that for Fourier a phalanx is “the 
basically agricultural economic and social unit in harmony usually containing 
about 1600 [people]” (1981, p. 181). Fourier thought that civilization and 
modern industry brought about decline and disharmony. And in fact he blamed 
this decline on the Jews. Fourier states that “civilized industry was... a calamity 
invented by God as a punishment” (p. 7). Thus, salvation involved living in 
harmony free from disorder and “incoherence” (p. 13). What he really means to 
say here is that salvation is life without Jews. Fourier's Jew hatred permeates 
his texts; in fact, Fourier was a rabid anti-Semite, as I shall point out later.
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For now, let us move on to another brand of utopian thinking. Here let us 
turn to the utopian thinking, which is also couched in theological language, of 
Pierre Tielhard de Chardin. In The Future of Man (1964). de Chardin offers a 
utopian vision which departs little from traditional Christian theology. Only here, 
de Chardin attempts to combine pseudo-scientific talk about evolution (read 
social Darwinism) with eschatology. de Chardin’s utopia ends up justifying 
racism and supersessionism. The future of man for de Chardin is really about 
the future of white supremacy and Christian imperialism.
de Chardin’s obfuscating language is cluttered with neologisms like 
“noosphere" and uneogenesis" which confuses more than not and conceals a 
very conservative kind of christological position. Like classical christology, de 
Chardin's work exhalts Christ as the last and final savior and Christianity, as the 
final word on religion. Christianity, for de Chardin, is the only right and true 
religion. At least, this is the impression I get from reading The Future of Man. 
The only difference between de Chardin's position and that of the classical one 
turns on the notion of evolution. Evolution of the species, says de Chardin, 
involves greater and greater love for Christ. In fact he claims that There is only 
one evolution... the whole of the world’s industrial, aesthetic, scientific and 
moral endeavor serves physically to complete the body of Christ" (p. 23). It 
becomes hard to understand how the world can complete the body of Christ, 
when de Chardin’s Christ has no body to begin with, de Chardin’s Christ is 
cosmic, not embodied. He says Christ’s spirit, which is different from his body, 
can “radiate through all centuries and all beings” (p. 94). This brand of what is 
termed high christology leaves Jesus, the human being, out of the picture while 
emphasizing the Christ part of Jesus, which is his divinity. A low christology, 
which stresses that Jesus was a human being who suffered and wept, while
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participating in the divinity of God, seems to make more sense to me. But this is 
not what de Chardin is offering.
de Chardin’s eschatological vision is that at the end time all people will 
psychologically merge to agree upon the fact that Jesus was the Son of God. 
Moreover, all human beings will become more and more alike in spirit, mind 
and body in this belief, de Chardin declares that “psychic centration, phyletic 
intertwining, and planetary envelopment... give birth to the noosphere” (p.
159). The noosphere is the mind of the world which will enfold upon itself 
around the belief in Christ when evolution is complete.
Like Fourier, de Chardin’s vision is dynamic, progressive and evolving. 
But these qualities do not make it more adequate than another more static 
utopia. I wonder what happens to those who do not merge into the noosphere? 
Not everyone believes that Jesus was the Son of God. Not all Christians believe 
in a cosmic Christ, and not all theologians agree that high christology is an 
adequate way to image Jesus, de Chardin allows no room for difference. What 
happens to non-Christians in his utopic vision? He is silent on this issue, and it 
is the silence that worries. In one way or another, many utopias, whether 
explicitly Christian or not, set up schemes that do not allow for otherness. There 
is only one way to salvation, one possible path toward the good, one way to 
God. As Asher Moore points out “utopia involves standardization” (1978, p. 1).
Like de Chardin and Fourier, H. G. Wells (1967) in his Modem Utopia 
robes his vision in theological discourse. He describes the leaders of this 
futuristic society as “samurai” (p. 159). Samurai are priests who administer and 
run the modem utopia. “The Samurai will be forbidden the religion of 
dramatically lit altars, organ music, and Catholic ritual" (pp. 300-301). Wells 
sounds like Martin Luther here in his dislike for embellishment and ritual. For
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the Samurai, God must be transcendent. Recall, for both de Chardin and 
Fourier, God is a transcendent one, even though Fourier sometimes images 
God in an immanent way. The image of a transcendent God is a conservative 
one theologically. More liberal theologians, like John Cobb(1975) and David 
Griffin (1973), talk about God as being both immanent and transcendent. This 
position is termed panentheism. Unlike pantheism, whereby God is completely 
immanent in the world after the fashion, say, of Spinoza, panentheism suggests 
that God is both in the world and beyond it. If God is completely immanent, how 
then do theologians solve the problem of evil. For if God is wholly immanent, 
then God creates evil. If God, on the other hand, is completely transcendent, 
how can I relate to him? But if God is both immanent and transcendent, the 
problem of evil gets lodged in the heart of humankind. Thus the construction of 
the notion of God is inextricably tied to theodicy.
H.G. Wells remarks that “the leading principle of the utopian religion is 
the repudiation of original sin" (1967, pp. 299-300). Wells echoes Shklar’s 
(1966) claim that all classical utopias are rejections of original sin. Recall,
Shklar dates classical utopias from Plato to Rousseau. Thus, it seems that 
Wells’s utopia fits in with this classical model. What is it about the concept of sin 
that bothers utopian thinkers? Looking into one’s heart of darkness is 
completely antithetical to utopian projects. I wonder how one can build a utopia 
without doing a little self work? How can citizens of utopias become better if 
they do not admit that they have fallen somewhere along the way? Why is it that 
many who do not look into their heart of darkness become wicked? Wells’s 
utopian dream is monsterous really, perhaps because he could not integrate his 
own badness in himself. His description of the leaders of utopia conjure up, in 
my mind, images of Nazis. A Samurai is a "clean-shaven,” lean, muscular type
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who likes to engage in combat A Samurai is a warrior, a hero, a dashing
young, healthy swashbuckler. He is a
well-built man of perhaps five and thirty, 
with the easy movement that comes with 
perfect physical condition, his face is 
clean shaven and shows the firm mouth
of a disciplined man His general effect
reminds m e... of the knights templars. (1967, p. 159)
Hitler dreamt the knights templars into existence. Already in 1933, Hitler had an
“idealized image of the knight, the German knight, or the knight of the Teutonic
order” (Hermand, 1992, p. 239).
It is curious that all three of these writers robe their discussions in 
theological language. What is disturbing is that this language serves as a gloss. 
This gloss attempts to cover over and conceal violence. The paradox of slippery 
theological and eschatologica! visions is that they offer up a hopeful picture, yet 
it is only through oppression that this picture can be completed.
All three of these writers discuss how to better inculcate the citizens of 
their utopian worlds through some sort of educational blueprint. This 
educational blueprint ensures that citizens know how to fit in. Thus, education 
means standardization. Standardized objectives and goals are key to 
inculcating citizens, for everyone learns precisely the same things for precisely 
the same reasons. While reading these utopian writers I was reminded of Alan 
Bloom’s (1987) The Closing of the American Mind.
Bloom comments that “America tells one story: the unbroken, ineluctable 
progress of freedom and equality” (p. 55). Like many utopian writers, Bloom 
declares that
idealism as it is commonly conceived should 
have primacy in an education, for man is a 
being who must take his orientation by his
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possible perfection. To supress the 
most natural of all inclinations... is ... to 
throw out the baby with the bath. Utopianism 
is, as Plato taught us... the fire with which we 
might play because it is the only way we can 
find out what we are. (p. 67)
Bloom's position, not unlike most utopian thinkers, is naive, exclusionistic,
conservative and dangerous. First, Bloom's assumption that America has one
story to tell is naive. American history is made up of many competing and
conflicting stories. Secondly, his insistence on the'primacy" of ideals in
education may serve oppressive ends. Whose ideals should we teach and
why? And for what purpose should we teach ideals? Thirdly, why should
perfection be an uorientationn at ail? The goal of producing perfect students
fosters the worst sort of competition. And furthermore, perfection is not a natural
inclination, it is a social construction. Perfectionism is dangerous for the soul.
Recall, Isaiah Berlin (1991) said that the quest for perfection means bloodshed.
Like Bloom, Fourier wants standardized educational objectives which 
serve to inculcate citizens into the utopia of the four movements. Like Rousseau, 
Fourier suggests that children should avoid cultural influences as long as 
possible so as to not be corrupted by them. Unlike Rousseau, Fourier declares 
that children should have no teachers. “The children teach themselves without 
any external prompting or surveillance" (1808/1996a, p. 69). The children will 
learn to become “constantly active" (p. 69) so as to build up their bodies at a 
young age. Thus, education means activity, not reflection for Fourier. And 
activity is standardized. Activities are done in a so-called natural enviomment 
away from the dangers of culture. Fourier's educational blueprint is anti­
intellectual, like Rousseau’s. And anti-intellectualism is dangerous because it 
fosters all sorts of prejudices. An unreflective mind has difficulty working through
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tough issues. Further, Fourier suggests that culture can be split off from nature. 
But there is no way to jump outside of culture. Nature is cultural. Even the way 
we talk about nature is socially constructed. The always already of culture 
shapes us even before we arrive on the scene. These sorts of romantic, 
nostalgic visions of education fail because they begin on false premises and 
are mired in illusions.
For both de Chardin and Wells, the goal of education in their utopian
worlds is singular. Citizens must learn standardized visions to realize the goals
of their societies. For de Chardin, Christian education is the only correct kind.
He says, in fact, “there is no institution other than Christianity” (1964, p. 36). And
the institution of Christianity must be run by Christian teachers. Wells, like de
Chardin, declares that “the whole world will surely have a common language”
(1967, p. 17). This common language is a common vision. Education must have
a “clear common purpose” (p. 128). Alan Bloom echoes in the background here.
I wonder how education can have a dear common purpose when people have
little in common to begin with. Why are these thinkers so invested in the quest
for commonalities? Further, it is not dear what educating citizens
means in the first place. If anything, education is a highly complex and
ambiguous process. Common purposes and standardized bodies of
knowledge, more often than not, serve oppressive ends. Brent Davis points out
that, for instance, standardized mathematics education has traditionally been
an enabler of scientific “advances,” of military 
technologies, of normalizing statistical reductions, 
mathematics has been associated with the 
establishment and maintenance of power 
imbalances contributing to large-scale destruction 
of the planet; and the disenfranchizing and 
depersonalizing the citizenry of Western 
cultures... all in the name of progress___
298
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Mathematical knowledge has... become 
coterminous with masculinist, Western, 
bourgeois, and modernist regimes of power.
(1996, xxii)
It seems that standardized bodies of knowledge attempt to conceal their real 
objectives, which are military and scientific imperialisms.
What is colonized, especially, in utopian writings are bodies. Bodies are
colonized, controlled, manipulated to fit into the utopian ideal. Those who call
for standardized bodies, like those who call for standardized bodies of
knowledge, cannot allow for difference. Nonconforming bodies, therefore, get
squashed. Recall, Fourier’s utopia is a perfect universe where harmony, peace,
and love reign. However, certain bodies do not fit into this picture. And these are
Jewish bodies. Fourier declares, “Jews are parasites" (1808/1996d, p. 261);
they are “the secret enemy of all nations" (p. 233).
Has there ever been a more contemptible nation 
than the Hebrews, who never made a single 
advance in the arts and sciences, and who were 
distinguished only by their habitual crimes and brutality.
(1808/1996a, p. 64)
Leon Poliakov (1975) comments that nearly all of Fourier's writings contain Jew
hating diatribes like these. As a matter of fact, Poliakov (1985) states that along
with Fourier, many other French socialists (Fourier was a socialist) were anti-
Semites. For instance, P.J. Proudon writes in his diaries that he would have
liked to have called,
for the expulsion of the Jews from France, the 
abolition of all their synagogues; denial to them
of all employment; the abolition of their cult The
Jew is the enemy of the human race. This race
must be sent back to Asia, or exterminated. (1969, p. 228)
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The legacy of socialist utopias are deadly. F. A. Hayek (1994) draws a 
connection between Nazism and utopian socialism. Certainly, Proudhon and 
Fourier buttress Hayek’s thesis, although of course there are many brands of 
socialism which do not. At any rate, Jewish bodies bug socialist utopic 
discourse.
Like Fourier, Wells deals with bodies that do not fit into his utopian
scheme. And his "solution” to the "problem” of bodies that bug him, echoes
Hitler’s Final Solution. Wells cannot tolerate dirt or mess. Bodies that seem dirty
must be "punished” (1967, p. 110). In this utopia, apartments will have "no
corners to gather dirt” (p. 104). Moreover, those who are considered dirty or odd
will be dealt with.
It is our business to ask what utopia will do 
with its congenital invalids, its idiots and 
madmen, its drunkards and men of vicious 
mind, its cruel and furtive souls, its stupid 
people. .. its lumpish and unimaginative 
people, (p. 136)
Wells declares that the way to deal with these lumpish, stupid people is simply 
to get rid of them. "The species must be engaged in eliminating them” (p. 136). 
Wells remarks, "Utopia will kill all deformed and evilly monstrous births” (p.
143). Hitler did just this. Daniel Goldhagen (1997) explains that in October of 
1939 Hitler initiated what he called the "euthanasia program” (p. 143) whereby 
he gassed to death the "congenitally infirm and insane” (p. 143). This so-called 
euthanasia program was a sort of trial run to see how effective gas would be. 
The trial run prepared that Nazis for the Jews. By the time the gas chambers 
were up and running in 1941, Hitler had perfected his poison gas machines. 
Some could kill up to 2,000 people at once. Imagine that!
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Along with eliminating the insane and lumpish people, Wells also 
advocated that all members of the utopia be accounted for at all times by a 
keeper of an index. Bentham's panoptican lives. Wells comments ua little army 
of attendants would be at work upon this index day and night” (p. 165). Lucy 
Dawidowicz (1975/1986) remarks that, similarly, Reinhard Heydrich, who was 
appointed Gestapo chief in 1936, headed an “intelligence gathering agency” (p.
77) that began to “organize a card index of NSDAP opponents [read Jews]” (p.
78).
At this juncture I would like to examine Hitler’s (1923) Mein Kampf. 
Disturbingly, Werner Maser explains that Hitler “had serious plans to become a 
priest” (1974, p. 6). In fact, many historians comment on the religiousAheological 
nature of Hitler’s vision of a National Socialist utopia. Saul Friedlander claims 
that Hitler’s was a “decidedly religious vision, that of a German (or Aryan) 
Christianity” (1997, pp. 86-87). Amos Funkenstein (1993) and Robert Wistrich 
(1991) comment on the apocalyptic quality of Hitler's writings. And Jost 
Hermand comments on Hitler’s “religious belief in the “resurrection” of the volk" 
(1992, p. 171). Mein Kampf is shrouded in theological discourse and reveals 
the “blueprint" (Dawidowicz, 1975/1986; Goldhagen, 1997) for the Holocaust. It 
is a utopian vision that serves to inculcate through the destruction of bodies. 
Educating citizens of the Third Reich that the Jews must be stayed was Hitler’s 
dream. And this dream was couched in religious language. Hitler says “Thus 
did I believe that I must act in the sense of the Almighty Creator: by fighting 
against the Jews I am doing the Lord’s work” (1923, p. 25). Hitler really believed 
that he had been called, like a prophet, to carry out the will of God. He uses 
words like “providence” over and over again to suggest that the Final Solution 
was fated by God. Consequently, Germans, says Hitler, had a “mission
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appointed for them by the Creator of the universe" (p. 94). The mission entailed 
a "National resurrection” (p. 99) of "race... [and] purity of blood" (p. 94). This 
mission could only be completed in "the spirit of fanaticism and intolerance in 
which it attacks all others” (p. 141). Hitler called for “Salvation for the German 
nation" (p. 54).
In order to inculcate the German nation's citizens into Hitler's Third Reich, 
he offered up an educational blueprint that would focus on the practical. Hitler 
remarks that "there were a great number of weak points in German education 
before the war... a view to mere knowledge and very little with a view to 
producing practical ability" (p. 107). Anti-intellectulism is Hitler's brand of 
education. Hitler declared that education should teach young boys the value of 
strong bodies, particularly through boxing. "There is no sport which encourages 
the spirit of attack as this one does” (p. 167). In other words, education should 
teach violence. Attacking opponents is the sport of learning. And education 
“must be directed toward giving them [young people] a conviction that they are 
superior to others” (p. 168). Here Hitler is talking about young so-called Aryan 
youth. They should, in other words, feel superior to so-called Semitic, or Jewish 
youth.
Jewish bodies, for Hitler, are diseased beings whose "spiritual 
pestilence... [was what] the nation was being innoculated [with]” (p. 21). To 
"fight with poison gas” (p. 11) against the Jews will return Germany to more 
“healthy social conditions” (p. 10). It is this passage about poison gas that has 
led some historians like Lucy Dawidowicz (1975/1986) to claim that Hitler 
intended all along to kill the Jews.
Even right before Hitler committed suicide, he continued to believe that 
he had been called by God to murder six million Jews. He felt totally justified in
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doing what he did. And he justified his actions in theological gloss. Hitler
declared in 1944 that
The gods love those... of whom they ask the 
impossible and who ask them the impossible 
of them. And when we do the impossible we 
shall assuredly win the approval of Providence.
I may not be a light in the Church, a pulpiteer, 
but deep down I am a pious man and believe 
that whoever fights bravely in defense of the natural 
laws of God and never capitulates will never 
be deserted by the law giver, but will, in the 
end receive the blessings of Providence.
(cited in Maser, 1974, p. 208)
Bromberg (cited in Rappaport. 1975); Waite (1977), Erikson (1976) all 
suggest that Hitler suffered from borderline personality disorder. Laplanche and 
Pontalis (1973) explain that the Term [borderline is] most often used to 
designate psychopathological troubles lying on the frontier between neurosis 
and psychosis, particularly latent schizophrenia presenting an apparently 
neurotic set of symptoms" (p. 54). Borderline personality disorder, in other 
words, signals that the individual's psyche founders somewhere on a 
continuum between madness and sanity. This is a person who can function in 
the world, but may have periodic lapses of schizophrenia. But some borderline 
patients are more neurotic than psychotic and do not regress to a schizoid state. 
Borderline personalities exhibit severe mood swings and unpredictable 
behavior. They tend to swing "between sadism and masochism, destruction and 
creativity, cruelty and kindness” (Waite, 1977, p. 168). But again what good 
does it do to pathologize Hitler? What do we learn about him by doing this? 
What does this category keep us from thinking about?
In a book called The Soul’s Code: In Search of Character and Calling. 
post-Jungian psychologist James Hillman (1996) argues that Hitler was
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“possessed" by the demonic (p. 216). The demonic, Hillman suggests, is a
“timeless” (p. 216) “transcendence" (p. 235). This “particular demon selected
Hitler for its host” (p. 215). And this demonic spirit was both “genius" and “evil"
(p. 215). Hillman goes on to argue that Germans suffered from a “collective
demonization" (p. 216). Hillman explains
The idea of a demon or evil genius helps 
account for his appeal to the substrate 
of shadow in the German Volk, and to the 
formation of that group ethos which, 
blinded by his demonic visions, complied 
with and executed them... the fascinating 
power in Hitler changed millions into 
a collective demonization. (p. 216)
Hillman's thesis echoes that of Thomas Mann’s (1948/1992) in Doctor Faustus.
A transcendent mystical demonic force possesed Adrian Leverkuhn and he
made a pact with the devil because the devil sought him out. Adrian’s pact with
the devil marked the end of Germany, for Germany had gone astray.
James Hillman is certainly out of step with current trends in psychohistory 
and Holocaust scholarship generally. In contrast to Hillman, Ernst Rappaport 
argues that,
Hitler was neither a genius nor a demonic 
personality.. . .  His intellect was below average 
and his “soaring” imagination was that of an 
ambulatory schizophrenic who was obsessed 
with his paranoid delusions. (1975, p. 210)
To contend that Hitler was possessed by some kind of transcendent spirit and
that Germans were blinded by this spirit functions as an apologetic. Germans'
egos were quite intact, as Roth (1995a) points out. Germany knew what it was
doing (Hilberg, 1961/1985). Christopher Browning (1998) suggests that
legimate Holocaust scholarship must avoid demonizing. Hillman’s argument
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that Germans suffered from "collective demonization” (p. 216) implies the notion 
of collective guilt. But the notion of collective guilt has been dismissed by 
historians at least since the Eichmann trial in 1961. Disturbingly, Hillman 
criticizes the prosecutors of the Nuremberg trial and actually compares them to 
Inquisitors!
The labored, obsessive methods used from the 
Inquisition through the trial of Adolf Eichmann 
in Israel, Klaus Barbie in France, and in the Nuremberg 
trials themselves. This controling carefulness of 
step-by-step rationalism defends against the demonic 
force, (p. 230)
But these so-called step-by-step rational judicial methods were necessary to
demonstrate that individuals, not transcendent demons or forces, were guilty.
Individuals who made choices, who committed crimes, who carried out mass
murder were guilty. And what was at stake in these trials was individual guilt
and responsibility. Jeffrey Herf (1997) drives this point home.
The message of the Nuremberg trials was 
that human beings and their political decisions 
had made Auschwitz possible-not being, fate 
destiny [or demons], instrumental reason, the 
Enlightenment, modernity or the West. (p. 208)
Hillman offers up an argument shrouded in mystical language that I think is
dangerous. The demon in Hitler was nothing transcendent; it was Hitler’s own
badness that he projected onto Jews. He needed scapegoats and, at the end of
the day, we do not really know why. Some psychobiographers blame Hitler's
tyrannical behavior on his alcoholic father (Waite, 1977); some blame his
overbearing mother (Rappaport, 1975; Binion, 1976). Binion declares that after
Hitler’s mother died from cancer, he "saw Germany’s fateful enfeeblement as
due to the Jewish cancer” (1976, p. 21). A Jewish doctor tended to Hitler’s
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mother and Hitler possibly blamed him for her death. Hence, his scapegoat was 
bom. But of course there was more to it than that.
Whoever Hitler was, he was a man of his culture and his time. I do not
believe that he was possessed by demons, by some evil spirit hovering around
the universe waiting to take somebody over, waiting to steal someone's soul. I
believe that he was little more than an ordinary German. Robert Waite
comments that
A thoughtful writer in the Frankfurt Allgemeine 
Zeitung (11 Oct. 1972) who warned his countrymen 
against “demonizing Hitler”. .. for to do so would 
be to diminsh their own responsibility. The German 
journalist concluded that the terrifying thing about 
Hitler was not his uniqueness but his banality. (1977, xvii)
Hitler, Eichmann, Roehm, Mengele, Heydrich, architects of the Holocaust, were
all ordinary men, mortal men who made choices, who killed willingly, who were
responsible for the “great crime" (Grass, 1985, p. 86). A Germany fated to
become possessed by demonic forces does not explain, but explains away. A
demonic Germany conceals more than it reveals.
I offer a dystopic curriculum as a warning against hope. It is a curriculum 
that demands that happy texts be dismantled. I offer a dystopic curriculum as a 
warning so that one may understand in a more adequate way how texts 
handed down through culture may fool us into believing that utopias are good 
things. 2,000 years of utopian thinking led, in part, to the murder of six million 
Jews. But it was not just utopian thinking that led to Hitler's killing dream: the 
causes of this terrible event are highly complex. Dahlia Beck suggests that 
“curriculum is the battered sub-/emerging carriage of memory, it is what makes 
verses of the vanished possible” (1997, p. 17). What has been forgotten is that 
in happy places (utopias), people tend to vanish. If curriculum is to “tap the
306
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
current within” (Doll, in press), memories might be stirred up a bit in order that 
curriculum workers get some understanding of why it is they want happy 
endings. Must we despair of hope? Since Auschwitz, yes.
Under the sign of a dystopic curriculum, I struggle to make sense of this 
research against the background of my Jewishness. I struggle to make sense of 
my life in the midst of the memory of this horrific event. I struggle because the 
sense that I have made is continually interrupted and ruptured by the enormous 
wound left in my psyche. Everyday seems split by the present post-Holocaust 
era and the black sun of Auschwitz. The paradox is that the Holocaust is not 
“post” at all; it is here every day. Not only is it in my psyche, it is in the public eye 
as well. Every day in the newspaper yet another article related to the Holocaust 
appears. There have been more books published on the Holocaust than any 
other event in history, and books keep proliferating. The memory is so 
haunting that it demands continual re-thinking. Doing research on this Jewish 
tragedy has unnerved me. The past bursts into the present at every turn. Anti­
semitism is alive and well, not just in Germany but in the United States, where 
synagogues were recently burned in California. August 10, 1999 Buford O. 
Furrow walked into a Jewish Community Center in Granada Hills, Los Angeles 
and fired off seventy rounds of bullets at children! Five were wounded. Luckily 
most of the children were outside playing. Rabbi Marvin Hier, who is dean of the 
Simon Wisenthal Center, reports that about twenty children from the Jewish 
Community Center were taking a tour of the Wiesenthal center's Museum of 
Tolerance at the time of the shootings. Rabbi Hier remarks that “it's ironic that 
the 20 children were here learning about man’s inhumanity to man, when their 
own day camp became a target of such hatred” (1999, A-4). In New Orleans, 
since August 10, there has been a police presence at the Jewish Community
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Center and at the local synagogues. It is so disturbing to me that children are 
targets of hate. And it is so disturbing to me that when I attend the synagogue I 
see police outside of the building. This is no time for complacency.
The Jewish News reports that about 30,000 Jews have fled Russia 
because of the rise of anti-Semitism and 30,000 more are expected to emigrate 
by the end of the year. Leopold Kaimovsky, the manager of Moscow’s Jewish 
Arts center was stabbed by a neo-Nazi who when caught by the police said, 
“There are 50,000 of us. We will kill all of you anyway” (1999, p. 24). Lev 
Krichevsky claims that in Russia there are, in fact, about 50,000 neo-Nazis who 
belong to a group called Russian National Unity. This is alarming because of a 
tremendous sense of lawlessness in Russia today. The Russian Mafia does as it 
pleases. While the hard-liners, according to Krichevesky, make “inflammatory 
statements” (p. 24) against Jews. And to top it off the economy in Russia is at 
rock bottom. Scapegoating worsens in such climates. This is no time for 
complacency.
Remembering the Holocaust is an international issue. Intercultural 
dialogue and the internationalization of curriculum studies might open avenues 
for further discussion and debate cross-culturally. I urge open and democratic 
discussions between Germans and Jews, especially. I urge open and 
democratic disscusions cross-culturally. More academic projects which foster 
this kind of exchange might help second, third and fourth generation Jews and 
Germans to cope. Work around race, class, gender and sexuality in Holocaust 
studies needs to be deepened. Queer memories demand more visibilty, too. 
More work needs to be done on transgenerational trauma. Some of our 
students and colleagues in the academy may suffer from a transgenerational 
haunting. As teachers and researchers, educators need to become more aware
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of this. Broader and more interdisiplinary approaches to Holocaust research is 
needed. Popular culture is also crucial for understanding this event. Young 
people probably get introduced to the Holocaust through film. Film, art, dance, 
theater, poetry and museums, all have something to offer to the future 
generations.
The important issue for educators is to keep this memory alive. Never 
again. This is the chant Jews utter. But can we be so sure? Who is to say what 
the new miiienium will bring? The Holocaust lives in a present absence, it is 
simultaneously here and not here. But educators might take up the 
responsibility to make this “great crime" (Grass, 1985, p. 86) known and re- 
known again. For, too soon the next generation will forget. How many have 
forgotten already? I remember when I was in the sixth grade and Mrs. G. came 
to our class to show us the numbers on her arm. She came to our sixth grade 
class to tell us that every time she hears a train she mourns. But I did not 
understand what she was talking about. What does a twelve year old know? 
However, the memory of Mrs. G. has stuck with me all these years; in fact, it has 
haunted me. And so whenever I hear a train I think of Auschwitz. Another 
haunting is this one: At the beginning of my graduate program at LSU I wrote a 
letter to Elie Wiesel asking him if I could study with him, fly to Boston a few times 
a semester to work on his novels. (I forgot I had done this, and I do not 
understand why I forgot: Repression works in uncanny ways.) Wiesel wrote 
back a lovely letter to me, saying that he just did not have extra time to take on 
another student. But Wiesel has taken on another student. I am a student to this 
memory. My work has just begun.
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